You’re right. I didn’t ask directly I just stated that it doesn’t give me a full impression of your position.

Much like when someone declare something like “I believe in God” I have gist of what they mean, but I’d have to probe further to understand their perspective. I’m certainly not against probing into “-isms” such as materialism, relativism, nihilism, anarchism, or such, but I hold off with these when it comes to political discourse as people all to quickly view you as absolutely “liberal” or “capitalistic” simply because a particular view in a particular context has been expressed.

Ideas surrounding “morals” would tend to be bandied around, in the respect I’m talking with politics, in more “theological” discussions. Not that I’m saying these items don’t span across multiple discussions only that I’ve personally found that each point of discourse requires due care and attention to the use and application of certain terms.

Thanks! I would probably have never noticed this about more “religiously” inclined discussions unless you’d brought up moral relativism.

Redundant.

It'd help if you gave an example.

:brow:

Maybe one day you'll get it. Keep trying. :up:

You didn't indicate an understanding of moral relativism in your reply, because you claimed that I couldn't be wrong, when obviously under moral relativism I can be wrong, relative to others. They do need to be justified, relative to my ethics. If, by their ethics, they don't need to be justified, then that's on them. I don't go by such an ethics, because to me, justification is important. — S

If you are a moral relativist that says that moral judgements can be wrong or right relative only to individuals, then your judgement cannot be wrong relative to yourself, only to the judgements of others. But your judgement being wrong relative to the judgement of others really means nothing, since your judgement is by definition right if you hold it, according to the notion that moral judgements are answerable only to the individuals holding them.

The same goes with moral judgements being relative to communities. If judgements are relative to just one community then their rightness or wrongness can only be a function of the general opinion of the community in question. But any judgement may not be unanimous in which case its rightness or wrongness will be relative to what? A majority? How much of a majority?

So, it would seem that the idea that judgements can be right or wrong under moral relativism is problematic. I can't see how it would work; but perhaps you can explain to me how you think it would work. This really belongs in the 'Morality' thread, but what the hell? Most threads seem to routinely go off topic, anyway. :grimace:

It's not a matter of getting it or not. I want to see whether Terrapin can come up with a plausible real life example of what he has been complaining about.

If you are a moral relativist that says that moral judgements can be wrong or right relative only to individuals, then your judgement cannot be wrong relative to yourself, only to the judgements of others. But your judgement being wrong relative to the judgement of others really means nothing, since your judgement is by definition right if you hold it, according to the notion that moral judgements are answerable only to the individuals holding them. — Janus

You're no different. In practice, it is no different. So what you're saying doesn't work as a criticism. Give me an example of a moral judgement of yours whereby you judge something to be right, but it is more meaningful that others judge it to be wrong. You can't. You go by your own moral judgement. It wouldn't make any sense to do otherwise. If you traveled to some place where murdering children was judged to be right, you know full well that you wouldn't go by their judgement.

The same goes with moral judgements being relative to communities. If judgements are relative to just one community then their rightness or wrongness can only be a function of the general opinion of the community in question. But any judgement may not be unanimous in which case its rightness or wrongness will be relative to what? A majority? How much of a majority? — Janus

First of all, and in light of what I previously quoted above, I hope you're not presenting a false dilemma here, whereby you're making out as though either a) all moral judgement must be relative an individual, or b) all moral judgement must be relative to a community. Because it can be either: an individual or a community.

And it is not even that limited, either. I am highly flexible with regards to the relativism part of my moral relativism. There's no problem here. Just decide the context. Relative to an individual? A community? A majority? A minority? To x number of people?

So, it would seem that the idea that judgements can be right or wrong under moral relativism is problematic. — Janus

Uh, no? But you tried. I'll give you that much.

I can't see how it would work; but perhaps you can explain to me how you think it would work. This really belongs in the 'Morality' thread, but what the hell? Most threads seem to routinely go off topic, anyway. :grimace: — Janus

Fuck it, right? The philosophy of fuck it strikes again.

So, why wouldn't it work, now that your objections have been met?

Give me an example of a moral judgement of yours whereby you judge something to be right, but it is more meaningful that others judge it to be wrong. You can't. — S

This is simplistic and not apposite because I acknowledge that my moral judgements are determined by how I understand general positions on whatever is being judged as well as my own conscience. I also acknowledge the socially constructed nature of my moral feelings. So, I don't say my judgements are relative only to my moral feelings; if my feeling yielded a judgement that was contrary to the rest of humanity, for example if I felt that it was right to murder people, then I would consider my feeling and the judgement associated with it to be wrong.

And to deal with your silly example about a society who believed the wanton killing of babies is good, I would not agree with that being right even relative to that community because it would be contrary to the judgement of the rest of humanity and I would have to think that the whole community was brain-damaged by in-breeding or something in the water or something like that, and that their belief in the rightness of wanton bay-killing was a sign of profound moral degeneration. I doubt there have ever been any communities like that in any case. In some hunter-gatherer communities babies who are not robust enough are routinely killed, but that is a matter of the survival of the community, and I see nothing wrong with it.

As I've said again and again, I judge things to be right or wrong relative to the almost universal cross-cultural opinion about their rightness or wrongness. Where there is no such almost universal opinion, in matters which are of much less moral significance, like whether one should have sex before marriage, whether it is OK to do illegal drugs or whatever other minor moral matter, then of course I will follow my own thoughts and feelings. So, just how would you say my position differs from yours?

This is simplistic and not apposite because I acknowledge that my moral judgements are determined by how I understand general positions on whatever is being judged as well as my own conscience. I also acknowledge the socially constructed nature of my moral feelings. So, I don't say my judgements are relative only to my moral feelings; if my feeling yielded a judgement that was contrary to the rest of humanity, for example if I felt that it was right to murder people, then I would consider my feeling and the judgement associated with it to be wrong. — Janus

Except that, in practice, you don't, so you're just deceiving yourself. You're merely choosing as an example a judgement which, in reality, you don't have. When it comes to your actual judgement, you abide by it without exception. So I have no reason to believe it would be any different if you believed that it was right to murder people.

And to deal with your silly example about a society who believed the wanton killing of babies is good, I would not agree with that being right even relative to that community because it would be contrary to the judgement of the rest of humanity and I would have to think that the whole community was brain-damaged by in-breeding or something in the water or something like that, and that their belief in the rightness of wanton bay-killing was a sign of profound moral degeneration. I doubt there have ever been any communities like that in any case. In some hunter-gatherer communities babies who are not robust enough are routinely killed, but that is a matter of the survival of the community, and I see nothing wrong with it. — Janus

It's not a silly example. It's silly to call it silly, because it shows the obvious fault in your position. Your position is inconsistent. You suggest that morality is defined by herd-morality or humanity or whatever, yet whenever you're presented with a counterexample going by your own criteria, you deny it or undermine your own position.

As I've said again and again, I judge things to be right or wrong relative to the almost universal cross-cultural opinion about their rightness or wrongness. — Janus

Yes, and that's entirely unnecessary. You don't need to repeat what your position is over and over again, you just need to get yourself out of the pickle you've put yourself in.

Where there is no such almost universal opinion, in matters which are of much less moral significance, like whether one should have sex before marriage, whether it is OK to do illegal drugs or whatever other minor moral matter, then of course I will follow my own thoughts and feelings. — Janus

No, you will do so regardless. That's the part you fail to realise and deny.

So, just how would you say my position differs from yours? — Janus

It doesn't in practice, like I said. We both follow our own thoughts and feelings, and we both happen to agree over the big issues like murder.

It seems to me to be mostly detrimental to label yourself and/or someone you’re conversing with as “liberal,” “conservative,” or any other tag — I like sushi

I generally agree. Better to state and defend a position on a specific topic rather than to hand someone else a broad brush with which to paint you.

I am trying, more and more, to eliminate "I am X" thoughts from my inner dialogue and speech. That goes especially for "I am an X-ist". I find that I am becoming more flexible. I am allowing myself to really consider the arguments of those that were once my political enemies. — petrichor

Good post (of which this quote is only a small part).

The general downside of this liminal position is that it lacks the quality loyalty, and loyalty has value. Declaring an ‘ism’ is in a sense making a promise to uphold whatever values that ism represents. If they’re good values it would be a shame to betray them.

Oddly though, the liminal position is still a position. It may be best for philosophers to not align themselves with any ideology, but that in itself expresses an ideology.