In other words, I submit that the perceptual objects (which are after-the-fact constructions of the causes of the given sensations by the brain) are merely “purported” causes of the sensations because we can never be certain that the brain’s spontaneously constructed perceptual objects (BSCPOs) actually coincide with the “real” cause(s) of the subjective sensations, which cause(s) would necessarily have “predated” the brain’s act of spontaneous construction. — charles ferraro
.we can never be certain that the brain’s spontaneously constructed perceptual objects actually coincide with the “real” cause(s) of the subjective sensations, which cause(s) would necessarily have “predated” the brain’s act of spontaneous construction. — charles ferraro
Arthur Schopenhauer claimed that the human brain (the understanding) — charles ferraro
Of all systems of philosophy which start from the object, the most consistent, and that which may be carried furthest, is simple materialism. It regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists. It then lays hold of the law of causality as a guiding principle or clue, regarding it as a self-existent order (or arrangement) of things, Veritas aeterna, and so fails to take account of the understanding, in which and for which alone causality is. It seeks the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it ; ascending from mere mechanism, to chemistry, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility — that is knowledge — which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result — knowledge, which it reached so laboriously — was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought 'matter', we really thought only 'the subject that perceives matter'; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it. Thus the tremendous petitio principii reveals itself unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like Baron Munchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs.
But please explain to me what any of this has to do with explaining the originating source of human (under the skin) sensations. — charles ferraro
However, neither Schopenhauer, nor Kant, ever attempted to explain where the body’s subjective sensations came from in the first place; i.e., what the nature of their originating source might have been prior to the brain’s construction of the perceptual objects out of them. — charles ferraro
where did he, or Kant, have a lot to say about WHERE THE SENSATIONS CAME FROM BEFORE THEY WERE PROCESSED BY THE BRAIN INTO EMPIRICAL OBJECTS. — charles ferraro
I seem to have missed this reply - sorry!We do NOT know if the BSCPO's NEVER coincide with the "real" causes. — charles ferraro
I certainly expect present day neuroscience to continue to provide us with more precise detailed descriptions/explanations of the myriad complex ways in which the human brain processes subjective sensations into perceived phenomenal objects and perceived phenomenal states-of-affairs; but no matter how successful neuroscience may be, and continues to be, in this regard, it will, I think, still not be able to describe/explain where the subjective sensations come from (their originating source) before they undergo neuro-cognitive processing. — charles ferraro
Also, isn't it interesting how we have to resort to BELIEVING, or NOT BELIEVING, in the truth of epistemologies, rather than relying, instead, on the possibility of empirically verifying them, or not? We know the empirical reasons why we believe that Einstein's theories are "truer" than Newton's. — charles ferraro
This is the inherent weakness that attaches to all philosophical theories, no matter how marvelously they may have been constructed. Beautiful theories all destined to go nowhere. Dead ending because the truth of their hypotheses is not subject to the possibility of any empirical verification. — charles ferraro
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