[Spectres of Marx, Routledge, 1993, p. 74]Well, what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps, a certain experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, even a messianic without messianism, an idea of justice - which we distinguish from law or right and even from human rights - and an idea of democracy - which we distinguish from its current concept and from its determined predicates today.
This transformation and this opening of Marxism conforms to what we were calling an instant ago the spirit of Marxism. If the analysis of this Marxist kind rests indispensable, therefore, it appears radically insufficient where the Marxist ontology, which is the foundation of the science or Marxist or the Marxist critique, also contains itself, must contain, and you really can't go without it regardless of modern or post-modern denigrating, a messianic eschatology. Paradoxically, at this title at least, and of course it necessarily is included in but cannot naively be counted as just another ideology or theology for which it calls for critique and demystification. In so saying, we cannot claim that this messianic eschatology that is common to both the religion it criticizes and to the Marxist critique must simply be deconstructed. If it is indeed common to both, excepting the content (and if we must deal with the fact that of course neither of them could accept it, this epokhe of the content, then we can proceed here with just what is essential to messianism in general, the thought of a better future to come), then it is also the formal structure of the promise that follows from them [overflows] or precedes them. Well, what rests also irreducible to all deconstruction, what also stays as indeconstructible as the possibility of deconstruction itself, is perhaps a certain experience of the emancipatory promise; perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, a messiah, even, without messianism, an idea of justice - which we differentiate always with the idea of laws or even people's rights - and an idea of democracy - which we differentiate with how it's currently understood and it's particular characteristics today. (Allow me to refer here to “Force of Law” and The Other Heading) So here we are, and maybe we must now think, and think differently, to ask ourselves where it's going, that is to say where it is leading the Marxism which leads by interpreting it, and so cannot go anywhere without transformation, and not where it would lead us given where it has already been or where it could have gone.
Returning to the neo-evangelism of Fukuyama [...]
-- Posters translation of Spectre de Marx, P 101-102.
From my understanding Heidegger partook in a singular aspect of Phenomenology, that being a concern with language and interpretation. For Husserl this seemed to be regarded as merely one fragment of the enterprise of Phenomenology (the science of consciousness). — I like sushi
The main one would be the definition (or rather lack of) of the term “dasein”. — I like sushi
First off, he certainly didn’t conceal his appreciation of Husserl - B&T was dedicated to Husserl. — I like sushi
We’re a sort of nothingness in which things are revealed (and concealed). — Erik
The later Heidegger seems to think that dasein is a possible way of being (an increasingly unlikely one in this age of technology) and not a given; one which is aware of a relatedness to Being & purposely cultivates the “clearing” given to it — Erik
if we consider Derrida's goal is to say something directly to the culture, both trying to convey some important truth while provoking thought and inspiring action, then I think he starts to make more sense, and that he assumes a significant portion of the culture will read him and take those ideas into yet more conversations affecting yet more people. — boethius
On the other hand, Derrida hated interviews, always insisting that his thought could not possibly be properly understood in a few sentences, and that it required a deep background in a host of philosophical traditions and authors. This doesn't sound like someone who expected to take on the role of public intellectual. — Joshs
Also, he always said that he was much better received in the U.S. than in France. That is why he spent so much time lecturing in the U.S. — Joshs
If you think Heidegger was a hack ,then I wouldn't bother to read any more Derrida. Or Rorty. Or Dreyfus. Or Gendlin. Or Gallagher. Or Merleau-Ponty. Or Deleuze. Or Lyotard. Or Levinas.Or Gadamer. Or Nietzsche. Or Zahavi(one of the most respected current interpreters of Husserl). You may as well cross off your list the most interesting work being done on theories of emotion(Ratcliffe, Slaby) as well. — Joshs
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