philosophers are a prideful bunch, perhaps because of how much criticism philosophy gets in the modern day, not many are willing to admit that a lot of it is, in fact, contradictory bullshit. — Grre

This is a great point. The shrewder philosophers must assimilate these criticisms. So Wittgenstein and Heidegger become the greatest philosophers of the 20th century, for instance. If an anti-philosopher is sufficiently exciting, he gets interpreted as a philosopher.

His demystifications are repackaged so that yet again experts are needed as sage-whisperers. Heidegger played into this big time, at least at first. Later he's just a naked poet-sage. Wittgenstein's style in Philosophical Investigations is so informal and anti-systematic that it backfired! The anti-systematic point was presented so anti-systematically that experts are called in to connect the dots...into a system.

I think both H and W are great, by the way. To what degree, though, did they catch on because their styles were strange? And because of their cult-leader charisma? To what degree is the novelty of their insights exaggerated within philosophy ? As others have said, many have anti-philosophical insights that are manifested by just not becoming a philosopher. Maybe some of them write novels. Others study psychology or physics.

And most modern philosophy is constructed so as to adhere to scientific facts, given this, he was right to eliminate metaphysical and mystical concerns from philosophy. But in doing so, he cut the balls off. — Merkwurdichliebe

Good point. How much of philosophy is left over once part of it becomes literature-mysticism-politics and the other part of it becomes science? Others who know more might illuminate me here, but it seems to me that obsessing over language is largely what's left over.

If an anti-philosopher is sufficiently exciting, he gets interpreted as a philosopher. His demystifications are repackaged so that yet again experts are needed as sage-whisperers. Heidegger played into this big time. Wittgenstein's style in Philosophical Investigations is so informal and anti-systematic that it backfired! The anti-systematic point was presented so anti-systematically that experts are called in to connect the dots into a system. — ghost

:lol: nice point. That is why I prefer the ancient spirit in which there is no mediation. They bring it to your face, and if necessary, a hammer to the back of the head.

Others who know more might illuminate me here, but it seems to me that obsessing over language is largely what's left over. — ghost

@Wayfarer where are you?!?

nice point. That is why I prefer the ancient spirit in which there is no mediation. They bring it to your face, and if necessary, a hammer to the back of the head. — Merkwurdichliebe

Thanks. And when I look into the ancients or the moderns I like...it seems to me that not much has really been accomplished since. Admittedly some important insights were made explicit, and that can be valuable. When Hegel isn't being too metaphysickal, he's great, for instance. And he's even a great writer at times. I also think that some of Marx is powerful.

Thanks. And when I look into the ancients or the moderns I like...it seems to me that not much has really been accomplished since. — ghost

As I see it, the moderns rehashed the ancient ideas into new terms. And in their unique cleverness, they created a bunch of fantastical problems.

As I see it, the moderns rehashed the ancient ideas into new terms. And in their unique cleverness, they created a bunch of fantastical problems. — Merkwurdichliebe

So do you not like Hume?

Here's another quote from Hobbes that impressed me. It's something that we 'already know.' And yet I find it a plausible image of the human intellect.

And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that which Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the evill exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others. — Hobbes

Reason-experience is directed at future consequences. I like all that is packed into this way of framing it. It looks outward at the world and prioritizes experience.

Hume's guillotine is invaluable. But as great and original a philosopher as he was, all his contributions amount to is material for discrediting empiricism. Nevertheless, as much as Hume's ideas failed to be carried further, he gave us closure in regard to the system of empiricism. So I consider him one of the few philosophers who adequately solved a problem of philosophy. Because of Hume, empiricism has been rendered obsolete, and no longer a problem for philosophy.

I've got an assignment due and have to concentrate. :sad: But in response to a few of your remarks - my engagement with philosophy was really grounded in the kind of 60's mentality of seeking enlightenment. It does make my approach a bit idiosyncratic, I will admit - actually rather 'theosophical' in a way. Accordingly, I subscribe to a view which is broadly perennialist (a term coined by Leibniz, by the way) - that there are broad themes represented in wisdom traditions generally, of which the Greek is one of the major examples. That's the background of my reverence for ancient philosophy - that it embodies a kind of forgotten truth, some vital insight that became redacted out of it by subsequent generations. But, once you start to learn to see it, there are still, shall we say, veins and nuggets to be found, even in some moderns. But, as I say, I have something I have to concentrate on for rest of day and will be back tomorrow.

Fascinating. From my point of view the metaphysicks of empiricism in Hume, admittedly obsolete, is perhaps less important than what that obsolete metaphysicks was successfully aimed against.

Along the same lines, Kant's preface to the CPR has arguably aged better than the details of his system. It's as if these guys were trying to beat metaphysicks within metaphysicks. But they also eloquently explained their general project while doing so.

Life calls. I will check back. Great thread!

I've got an assignment due and have to concentrate. :sad: — Wayfarer

I understand. TPF is a terrible distraction in my own life. :grin:

Life calls. I will check back. Great thread! — ghost

Thanks! :grin:

I appreciate your input, especially your original insights. :up:

[. . .]that it embodies a kind of forgotten truth, some vital insight that became redacted out of it by subsequent generations. — Wayfarer

Well stated. Every generation contains it's own internal politics, and the eventual abandonment of tradition over time seems inevitable. That tradition becomes the incidental victim is the great tragedy of all progress (philosophy included).

Reason-experience is directed at future consequences. I like all that is packed into this way of framing it. It looks outward at the world and prioritizes experience. — ghost

To begin, Hobbes was essentially an empiricist. But he slightly preceded Locke, who is considered the founder of empiricism. I do not mean to discount his lasting contributions, but Hobbes laid the groundwork for modern collectivism, which came to a head in the thought of Hegel and Marx, which continues to impose its influence in everything we witness in the modernized world. The ancient view generally considered the individual to be primary to the collective (an essential factor), whereas the modern view tends to assume that the individual is predicated on the collective (an accidental variable). This is something I have trouble overlooking. Democracy only monetizes the individual, as a quantity or numerical unit in relation to the whole, it does not factor in the qualitative importance of the unique value of each individual in itself.

To begin, Hobbes was essentially an empiricist. — Merkwurdichliebe

I agree. But for me that's not bad thing. I guess we agree about the negative influence of Descartes --or part of Descartes, because his math was great. So I thought that the subject-object metaphysics was what you most objected to, not the emphasis on experience.

But he slightly preceded Locke, who is considered the founder of empiricism. — Merkwurdichliebe

I recently read Locke for the first time. Overall I liked the spirit of his book. Before Kant we already get the theme of humans figuring out what kind of thing they are...good at figuring out. I think the empircists had their eye on the right ball. They wanted an escape from superstition and linguistic confusion.

Your points about politics are food for thought. I suppose I read Hobbes largely for his prose style and his vision of human nature. I found his politics more fascinating than convincing.

Democracy only monetizes the individual, as a quantity or numerical unit in relation to the whole, it does not factor in the qualitative importance of the unique value of each individual in itself. — Merkwurdichliebe

I definitely empathize with this. Taken to extremes, we get some of the scarier moments of the 20th century. At the same time our free society seems aimed at letting ten thousand different flowers bloom. When it comes to politics, I take off my hat. That's a supreme challenge. One of the things I like about stoics & epicureans & various other strains of philosophy is the distance it allows the individual from the madness and trouble of the passing day. It's not that a person must tune out but rather that they can. Some measure of transcendence seems almost necessary to a strong personality. It's like a battle against total absorption in the moment's fury, a quest for cool-headedness.

I found his politics more fascinating than convincing. — ghost

Their fascination is part of what makes them so convincing. These guys are original geniuses, the like of which we have never seen in our lifetimes.

I think the empircists had their eye on the right ball. They wanted an escape from superstition and linguistic confusion. — ghost

That is a near perfect assessment of their intention. The consequences did not turn out so optimal. Nevertheless, the consequence of empiricism was not as detrimental as the that of Marxist or Hegelian thought, which produced ideologies that resulted in the worst travesties in history.

That is a near perfect assessment of their intention. The consequences did not turn out so optimal. Nevertheless, the consequence of empiricism was not as detrimental as the that of Marxist or Hegelian thought, which produced ideologies that resulted in the worst travesties in history. — Merkwurdichliebe

I'm glad we agree on the empiricists were really about. I also agree that Marx and Hegel are dangerous. What's a little sad about Marx is that he was a great anti-metaphysician in The German Ideology. But yet again the anti-metaphysician is transformed into a positive system, by others if he doesn't do it himself. It's one thing to note the 'force' of the concrete-economic situation on human consciousness and another to think one can see the future this way.

Their fascination is part of what makes them so convincing. These guys are original geniuses, the like of which we have never seen in our lifetimes. — Merkwurdichliebe

Bingo! That's what I meant about the newer stuff largely being more style than substance. It's not easy to be that creative, and the low hanging fruit has been plucked already.

That tradition becomes the incidental victim is the great tragedy of all progress (philosophy included). — Merkwurdichliebe

Good point. And my dig at the Hegelian hippo is an attack on the idea that tradition can be transcended and included in its full vitality. It can't! Most of us just can't walk around as if we are in God's creation anymore. The night was dark and full of terrors. If it still is, then the nature of that darkness has nevertheless changed. And my image of what to strive for has changed in an acceptance of my mortality. One can't 'transcend and include' the after-life or the certainty that a human-like God created the world for our benefit as a kind of game show with infinite stakes. It's either/or. And I remember believing in God as a child, but that memory is faint and ineffective.

Good point. How much of philosophy is left over once part of it becomes literature-mysticism-politics and the other part of it becomes science? Others who know more might illuminate me here, but it seems to me that obsessing over language is largely what's left over. — ghost

I don't think that's all that is left. Rather, the people who get into Philosophy these days seem to, a lot of them anyway, have a huge obsession with words, to the extent that what were once substantial normative, logical or metaphysical issues are turned into fuss about the meaning of words.

PA

The problem with philosophy in general these days is......how to cope with technology. When the learned can actually see parts of what the brain is doing, as opposed to theorizing all the things the mind is doing, philosophy itself loses some of its power. Now, rather than standing as the explanatory paradigm of all human mentality and/or abstracted physiology, philosophy must limit itself to that which the pertinent science has not yet found the means to address.

For the non-academic closet philosopher in particular, the problem is more personal, insofar as he pretty much rejects anything outside his favorite metaphysical system, and consequently laments the discourse the professionals deem worthy of being called philosophy. In other words, he grants the improvements his choice of doctrine evokes, but frowns on what may even be a subsequent improvement on it, and may even see such pseudo-improvements as merely a business, or a need to be published, rather than a better way for man to understand himself.

My....non-refundable....two cents.

Any problem, anything to solve, is going to be about our curiosity or understanding (wanting to know or understand something we currently don't), or wanting to achieve something, having some goal, that's different than our current state.

Outside of our desires, reality has no problems, needs no solutions, etc.

.

The problems of philosophy...do they really exist, as in having some correspondence to reality? Or are they simply artificial constructs of philosophical thought? — Merkwurdichliebe

I have always found some philosophy to be disconnected from real life. And I have always wondered why we bother with it. On a more positive note, there is plenty of philosophy that is genuinely relevant and useful in the real world, and that is where we should concentrate our efforts. IMO, of course.

@ghost said

How much of philosophy is left over once part of it becomes literature-mysticism-politics and the other part of it becomes science? Others who know more might illuminate me here, but it seems to me that obsessing over language is largely what's left over.

Surprised no one has mentioned Dennett on "Chmess" yet as far as I could see. I linked a short account if you're interested. It seems he has a partial answer to his question and makes a distinction between genuine problems (which are interesting to people outside of philosophy departments) and spurious problems due to philosophical inbreeding.

(As others have mentioned, a pleasure to see a reasonable and decent philosophical discussion).

Great link. I've looked at that paper before. Good stuff!

Incidentally I used to love making strategy games. One of them involved a king that could indeed move twice in a row. Other pieces could move again after every capture, and they could capture friendly pieces as part of a blitzkrieg. I ended up with so many ideas like this that I never did settle on a game and try to market it. Add it to the shelf with all of the other ideas I'll never find time for. Life is too short.

a distinction between genuine problems (which are interesting to people outside of philosophy departments) and spurious problems due to philosophical inbreeding. — Izat So

That seems solid to me. Like anything it can be taken too far or interpreted crudely. Nevertheless, I think we have a rough sense of the difference between inbreeding and relevance. I've read papers that were clever enough but basically repeated old ideas in whatever terminology was fashionable.