The meaning depends on the context of use; much like how ‘art’ can mean practice, aptitude or object. What is it in regards to psychology? We’re too busy struggling with defining ‘consciousness’ as is I reckon.

Will can mean ‘aim’ or ‘goal’. Both of these are humanly felt attitudes toward life activities.

The where doesn’t seem a reasonable question anymore than asking where a river comes from or a where a rock comes from - which are at least sensibly grounded in physical experience (I can pick one up and get into the other). I cannot pick up the “will” nor can I get “into” it.

If you’re talking in a neurological sense then there are models, but such sciences are trying to seek out concepts in the brain without much success.

Volition (Will) is the resolve which sustains intention (descriptive and/or causal purpose). It is a function of motivational intensity (which varies along a linear continuum between high and low).

As with all mental events, it does not have spatial extension, but criterial evidence in terms of observed behaviour establishes that it exists.

What: ......the manifestation of pure practical reason in rational agents, employed as a faculty of choice under the auspices of the fundamental human condition of morality;
Where 1: .....innate in humans, initially undeveloped;
Where 2: .....can be subverted by mere inclination or selfish wants.

“....Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognises as practically necessary, i.e., as good....”
(F. P. M. M., 1785)

Best response? Probably not. But still considered the baseline for modern moral philosophy and certainly good enough for non-academics to work with.

Will is the mental phenomenon of us controlling or directing both other mental content, including decisions, as well as actions. As such, it's located at our brains. It only occurs when our brains are in specific states. "Where it goes" when it's not present is simply the fact that our brains are not in that state. It's like asking where "our driving cars" go when the car's not driving. It's really just the car being or not being in a particular state (and relative to other things).

What: ......the manifestation of pure practical reason in rational agents, employed as a faculty of choice under the auspices of the fundamental human condition of morality; — Mww

Is this to say that every product of reasoning (e.g., resolving to tie my shoe because it is untied) has ethical implications?

As such, it's located at our brains. It only occurs when our brains are in specific states. — Terrapin Station

Cite credible scientific research.
Hint: this is a matter of logical, not empirical, investigation.

Cite credible scientific research. — Galuchat

Nope. It's empirical.

All evidence we have, which includes imaging, studies of brain injury patients, etc. suggests that all mental activity is a brain phenomenon. Plus the whole notion of nonphysical existents is completely incoherent.

We’re too busy struggling with defining ‘consciousness’ as is I reckon. — I like sushi

It seems to me that explaining the will is part of the battle in explaining consciousness. Can there be consciousness without will?

Cite credible scientific research. — Galuchat

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15925808

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/neuroskeptic/2014/03/15/power-conscious-intention/#.XOlR5v57lhE

https://scialert.net/fulltextmobile/?doi=crn.2016.23.27

Just Google, "the neurophysiology of intention" and you will find plenty of credible research.

What about sense of authorship where there is none? Libet’s experiment highlighted that well enough. We’re biased to assume authorship when the outcome is positive.

Asking what “will” is a bit like asking what “yellow” is. Without context there isn’t much we can say.

What about sense of authorship where there is none? Libet’s experiment highlighted that well enough. We’re biased to assume authorship when the outcome is positive. — I like sushi

Not true. Many athletes take ownership when they fail and give glory to God when they succeed. And if we didn't take ownership when we fail, then how do we learn?

Asking what “will” is a bit like asking what “yellow” is. Without context there isn’t much we can say. — I like sushi

Yellow is a color. Where is the context in that?

what about the will in terms of phenomenology? why do you think that someone else can tell you about the nature of your will? when you call it, it comes, when you cease needing it, it goes away; if it is physical, to which physical storage compartment does it return? what are its physical dimensions? if the Will has none, the how do you know that its source is local? if the source of the will is beyond space, how is it that neuroscience is helpful in ascertaining the ‘freedom’ of our will when they can only measure and observe what is physically extended in space? it seems as if their conclusion that there is no will or that its purely physical is the only possible solution that they can find because they refuse to even consider the latter.

when you will to move your arm, what part of that process can you truly take credit for? since you know nothing about what happens inbetween your instantiation of the will from potentiality and it’s ultimate final cause and actaualization, how can you say that your will is entirely yours? if it’s not entirely yours, then who shares it will you? Brain events, what are those? what makes those possible? how are they made possible independently of willing in the universal sense?

Is this to say that every product of reasoning (e.g., resolving to tie my shoe because it is untied) has ethical implications? — Galuchat

No, not as stated, although most any empirical situation is susceptible to manufactured moral/ethical implications, re: the various and sundry renditions of the trolley problem.

It is true. Simply saying “not true” doesn’t make it so.

In an F1 race a yellow flag has a particular meaning. “Yellow” doesn’t exist detached from an object.

Oh, sorry! You’re asking about ‘freewill’? No thanks :)

Oh, sorry! You’re asking about ‘freewill’? No thanks :) — I like sushi

if the cause of your fear of freedom lies in some prior material cause(s) or perception, what was the nature of that cause? if you don’t know the nature of the cause for your fear of freedom, well then how can you say that it has a material cause? I think that you should observe what feelings of thoughts are prompted in your conscious mind when you’re asked about questions of freedom and transcendence, and God, and then ask why they are happening and if what your initial unconscious says is true or not and if you can know if it’s true or not, and then reject it, because it’s clearly keeping you from developing a deeper understanding of things.

Just Google, "the neurophysiology of intention" and you will find plenty of credible research. — Harry Hindu

Thanks for the links.
At first glance, I noticed that the subject of each paper is intention, not volition (will).

1) Haggard, Patrick. 2005. Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition. Trends Cognitive Sci. 2005 Jun;9(6):290-5.
From the Abstract:
"Philosophers studying 'conscious free will' have discussed whether conscious intentions could cause actions, but modern neuroscience rejects this idea of mind-body causation."

No surprise there.
Neuroscience also rejected neuroplasticity prior to research conducted by neuroscientists in the 1960s.

"Instead, recent findings suggest that the conscious experience of intending to act arises from preparation for action in frontal and parietal brain areas. Intentional actions also involve a strong sense of agency, a sense of controlling events in the external world. Both intention and agency result from the brain processes for predictive motor control, not merely from retrospective inference."

This says nothing about the anatomical location or neurophysiological state of intention, much less volition (will).

2) Zschorlich V.R., & Köhling R. 2013. How Thoughts Give Rise to Action – Conscious Motor Intention Increases the Excitability of Target-Specific Motor Circuits. PloS ONE, 8 (12) PMID: 24386291.
From the Abstract:
The present study shows evidence for conscious motor intention in motor preparation prior to movement execution. We demonstrate that conscious motor intention of directed movement, combined with minimally supra-threshold transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the motor cortex, determines the direction and the force of resulting movements, whilst a lack of intention results in weak and omni-directed muscle activation.

Which also says nothing about the anatomical location or neurophysiological state of intention, much less volition (will).

3) Aigbedion, Andrew Ewanlen. 2016. Understanding the Neural Basis of Intention. Current Research in Neuroscience. Volume 6 (1): 23-27.
From the Abstract:
"The neural mechanisms and basis of forming, maintaining/deactivation, execution/implementing remains a fundamental issue unresolved which is the focus of this review."

No, not as stated, although most any empirical situation is susceptible to manufactured moral/ethical implications, re: the various and sundry renditions of the trolley problem. — Mww

Fair enough. Cheers!

Oh, sorry! You’re asking about ‘freewill’? No thanks :) — I like sushi

I second that sentiment.

I'm disappointed that no one made the connection that the will derives from Cotton Eye Joe.

At least that would be consistent with good entertainment.

Too many questions to answer all of them in one post. Re physicality, location, "where it goes," etc., another analogy that's useful is that it's like, say, a trumpet playing a particular note. There's no question that that's a physical phenomenon (well, or hopefully there's no question about that). It obtains when someone puts their mouth to the mouthpiece of the trumpet, when they blow into the trumpet, which causes both the air moving through the trumpet and the trumpet itself to vibrate, air is pushed out of the trumpet's bell, all of the vibrations cause particular soundwaves to propagate through the air, and that's the note. It obtains via structures (the structure of the player's body/their mouth/etc.), the structure of the trumpet itself, etc. and via processes, which I described above--pushing air through the trumpet, etc.

Mental phenomena are the same. They obtain via structures and processes--the structure of your brain, particular electrochemical phenomena in your brain, etc. (And in fact, all phenomena are really the same--everything obtains via materials, structures (of those materials), and dynamic processes (of materials).)

Asking "where will goes" when it's not present is like asking where the note goes when it's not present.

It is true. Simply saying “not true” doesn’t make it so. — I like sushi

I didnt simply say, "not true". I also backed it up with examples. You're the one making assertions with anything to back it up.

In an F1 race a yellow flag has a particular meaning. “Yellow” doesn’t exist detached from an object. — I like sushi

You originally asked what yellow is, not what means. What it is is a color. What that color means in any particular context is what caused it.

So are you asking what the will is or what the will means?

At first glance, I noticed that the subject of each paper is intention, not volition (will). — Galuchat

What is the difference between intention, volition, and while we're at it, goal?

what about the will in terms of phenomenology?... — TheGreatArcanum

The will is what is what I would call a process - similar to a central executive in an information processing system that utilizes working memory - and I would avoid using incoherent terms like "physical" and "non-physical".

@Harry Hindu

I didnt simply say, "not true". I also backed it up with examples. You're the one making assertions with anything to back it up.

Wrong again. I referred to one of, if not, the most famous experiment known in this particular area whilst you made an anecdotal comment about some religious athletes claim. If seriously think the athletes didn’t have any awareness of of running a race, or of knowing they had run a race, then when interviewed they’d say “What just happened? Where am I?”

In a version of the Libet’s experiment there were two people, one with their finger placed on the others. They were then asked to answer questions. When the person with their finger on top pressed the button the other person claimed authorship for the action even if they hadn’t moved their own finger, and when they did move their finger and got the wrong answer they sometimes denied authorship - whether they referred to god or not having authorship is utterly irrelevant.

The will is what is what I would call a process - similar to a central executive in an information processing system that utilizes working memory - and I would avoid using incoherent terms like "physical" and "non-physical". — Harry Hindu

the will is a process in the sense that its a bridge that connects potentiality and actuality; it has no real existence in itself, obviously, it's not an object; logically speaking, the will can be represented symbolically a subset of memory, meaning that the intentional process which converts potentiality to actuality in mind is born out of memory, and also, returns to memory, so really, the will involves two processes the instantiation of the will out of memory and potentiality into actuality, and the return of that actuality back into memory. using coherent terms like physical and non-physical is necessary, for either the will is born out of a prior state of actuality and therefore physicality, or it is born out of a prior state of potential and non-locality...and its freedom is entirely dependent upon whether it is born of actuality (actualized potentiality) or potentiality (unactualized potentiality).

using coherent terms like physical and non-physical is necessary, for either the will is born out of a prior state of actuality and therefore physicality, or it is born out of a prior state of potential and non-locality...and its freedom is entirely dependent upon whether it is born of actuality (actualized potentiality) or potentiality (unactualized potentiality). — TheGreatArcanum

If the will has any power at all it must be an actuality. So why not simplify all this to say that it is a non-physical actuality?

If the will has any power at all it must be an actuality. So why not simplify all this to say that it is a non-physical actuality? — Metaphysician Undercover

that’s not necessary; and also not true because the actualized state of existence isn’t eternal.

What do you mean?

I mean that the second law of thermodynamics states that if the universe is a closed system, (purely physical) the total energy of the universe is finite and will run out eventually, and every physical cause expends energy, so the chain of physical causation (locality to locality) cannot be infinite...meaning that a non-spatial aspect to reality exists, in which, causation can act from non-locality to locality. the will can potentially act from non-locality to locality then.

the will is a process in the sense that its a bridge that connects potentiality and actuality; it has no real existence in itself, obviously, it's not an object; — TheGreatArcanum

You said that it is a process or a bridge that connects potentiality and actuality, so how can you then say that it has no real existence? How is it that you are talking about it if it has no real existence? I'm not saying anything about it being an "object" or not, I'm just asking what you mean by "real" and "existence". To me, something is "real" or "exists" if it has causal power. The will appears to cause things to happen, and the will is influenced by perceptions at any given moment. The decisions we make at any given moment are dictated by our present experience in relation to similar memories. We often "choose" the action that has always worked before. We are creatures of habit, and only change when forced to. Even if the will is an "illusion", illusions exist and are real. They have causal power.

logically speaking, the will can be represented symbolically a subset of memory, meaning that the intentional process which converts potentiality to actuality in mind is born out of memory, and also, returns to memory, so really, the will involves two processes the instantiation of the will out of memory and potentiality into actuality, and the return of that actuality back into memory. — TheGreatArcanum

This all seems so unnecessarily complicated. There is no conversion needed as there is no difference between mind and body that needs conversion. Bodies are processes too. Notice that you and I both haven't used the terms "physical" or "non-physical" in any of our explanation so far.

using coherent terms like physical and non-physical is necessary, for either the will is born out of a prior state of actuality and therefore physicality, or it is born out of a prior state of potential and non-locality...and its freedom is entirely dependent upon whether it is born of actuality (actualized potentiality) or potentiality (unactualized potentiality). — TheGreatArcanum

If they are coherent and necessary, then why haven't you used them in any of your explanation so far? What is the difference between physical and non-physical that requires some sort of conversion before being causally linked? How can you also say that the conversion doesn't really exist or isn't real?