Given that reason will not instruct the impossible as a moral judgement, and given that reason will not instruct beyond physical capacity, there should be no rational argument to support why you cannot do as reason instructs. — Mww

It's an article of faith with me that reason instructs willy-nilly, nor is subject to whether you or I can live up to the manifesto of the instruction simply as a matter of capability. The "should" is simply there, and if we can, we should. Even if I cannot, I still should, but that no immorality attaches to my not doing what I cannot do. This is akin to arithmetic truths, which are true notwithstanding my ability to add or subtract.

Such is the foundation of the deontological moral doctrine, in which respect for law in and of itself, regardless of the content of any law in particular, grounds moral dispositions. Herein we may disregard our feelings when it becomes possible we won’t like them, because we have acted out of respect for law, which inspires no feelings at all except having done right. In this respect, it is not reason that is the motor, but it is practical reason that says what form the law will assume, the categorical imperative, for which thereafter our actions respect.

As for the “motor of morality”, meaning that which drives the fundamental human condition, I think Kant would go with the transcendental conception of “freedom”, transcendental in order to distinguish from the conception of freedom associated with degrees of various and sundry empirical restrictions, but rather to denote and prescribe an unconditioned a priori causal principle, that is not itself an effect of any antecedent principle. Hence, moral reasoning is practical, for the determination of its laws, but at the same time absolutely pure, because of its transcendentalism, its source being pure thought alone, having no empirical predicates whatsoever.

What say you? — Mww

I say whew! Psychology is the trap, here, and we need to avoid it.

Please allow me to offer a couple of definitions - or at least descriptions - that we may either accept, refine, or correct (i.e., you correct).

Practical reason is that which ferrets out the rules of how things work so that in consideration of those rules we may have a good idea of what will happen.

Pure reason is the framework of reason - absent empirical content - within and by which practical reason works.

Psychology is the practice of "reasoning" from observations of effects to conjectured causes, often for the purpose of developing "attractive" theories. (If the quotes make psychologists gnash their teeth, then good job!) The idea is that philosophy is not psychology is not philosophy. Part of the distinction is that psychology is usually temporally based, while philosophy, while observing temporal connections, is more about logical priority. Thus what comes into being at first may well have a significant temporal structure, but that thereafter is more properly understood as a logical sequence.

For example, it may seem that pure reason must be prior to practical reason, but that practice shows that practical reason comes first, and then pure reason reasoned/recognized both from it and within it.

So I would argue that first morality is driven by passion, but subsequently by a mix of pure and practical reason - the should and the how, should I? can I?

In this I think I merely parrot what you wrote, that I agree with, only adding the caveat of distinguishing flabby psychologism with muscular reason, pure and practical.

As to feelings somehow qualifying somehow, I suppose they can, but not that they do. If I find a fortune in a bag in the woods, I am definitely going to feel badly in returning it, wishing I could keep it, but I know that I cannot. On the other hand, on the "unconditioned a priori causal principle," I think just here we must take care to qualify the "causal" as a logical cause - though in fact "principle" already does.

Psychologism, as the reversion to the animal as prime mover or first cause in human action, possesses some legitimacy, but not as philosophy and not as reasoned understanding. Kant seems to have got that completely, and so many people since forget it or never understood it.

Computers do recognize patterns of on and off logical gates. What I see you doing is making a lot of claims about what humans can and what computers can't do, but no explanation as to why that is the case. How and why do you recognize patterns? How and why does your mind work? — Harry Hindu

Harry, how does your mind work? How do you prove rigorously that you are conscious? What is consciousness? It's evident from philosophical debate that we don't exactly know these issues. Yet we make these astounding leaps of faith that we indeed are conscious.

However...

What we know is how Turing Machines work: they have an exact definition of themselves and how they work. They follow algorithms. We know exactly what an algorithm is also. This is clear too from Turing and Church. And there are strict limitations on just what a mathematical algorithm can be. First of all, an algorithm has to be a well defined step-by-step procedure. Well defined means that there the instructions (the algorithm) tells always what to do. The algorithm cannot say "do something else" for a computer. That simply isn't well defined! There has to exact step-by-step procedures to "do something else" for a computer, which really isn't what we mean by "do something else", something that is quite open ended. Ambiguity is simply not allowed in an algorithm.


The pattern that Turing Machines can solve is a pattern that is computable. Yet unlike computers, we can even make sense of various things that are quite patternless. Something that doesn't have a pattern, we use narrative. History itself is the perfect example: nowhere else is randomness so obvious. Many even don't consider history a science, which tells exactly how random with unique phenomena history is. The narrative nature of history should be obvious to everybody, just read a history book. Not many functions there explaining historical events!

Also we can be creative and come up with something new or handle ambiguous issues or instructions. Hence we are able to deal with things that are non-algorithmic, but for a computer this is cannot be. Everything that is non-algorithmic has to be in the end transformed to the computer to be algorithmic.

Artificial Intelligence

The field was founded on the claim that human intelligence "can be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it".[19]

Psychology is the trap, here, and we need to avoid it. — tim wood

.....like the plague!!! “And how does that make you feel?” is of absolutely no interest to me, but “And how did you come to think that” tells me everything I might want to know.
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So I would argue that first morality is driven by passion — tim wood

There is an argument that, initially, private happiness drives morality. Quick analysis shows how any mere desire is very far from strong ground for a good will, or, examination of the vast diversity of subjectivity with respect to what happiness means, and the methods for its attainment, shows the weakening of morality itself as a fundamental human condition, insofar as instinct has determining power over the will rather than reason.
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I think just here we must take care to qualify the "causal" as a logical cause — tim wood

OK. I can live with that. Moral philosophy cannot abide the infinite cause/effect regress intrinsic to empiricism. If we merely think a cause which holds no logical contradiction in itself, we are permitted to assign an effect to it also without its contradiction. Doesn’t have to actually be the case; just has to be logically possible.
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Why did psychology and psychologisms make an appearance here? Care to elaborate on that a bit?

Harry, how does your mind work? How do you prove rigorously that you are conscious? What is consciousness? It's evident from philosophical debate that we don't exactly know these issues. Yet we make these astounding leaps of faith that we indeed are conscious. — ssu

Exactly, so how can you make the leap to say that a robot with a computer brain isnt conscious?

I am aware. Does that mean I'm conscious? I have goals, or intent. Does that mean I'm conscious? If a robot was aware and possesses goals are they conscious?

I think consciousness could be an information model of the body's sensory feedback loop. The fabric of consciousness is the same as the rest of reality. That isn't saying that reality is really a mind, like an idealist would. That would be an anthropomorphic projection. What it is saying is that fabric of reality is information.

What we know is how Turing Machines work: they have an exact definition of themselves and how they work. They follow algorithms... — ssu

As I stated before, humans can't do something else either. They can only assemble information that they already possess, not something that they don't. Thinking out of the box entails assembling existing information in new ways, and as I said again, most of the time, these new bits of assembled information are useless. It isn't until they are tested in the world, do we find out whether or not they are actually useful - not until the information is used and the results observed, can we say that something was useful. Algorithms can vary in complexity, and the mind could be using a very complex algorithm that we haven't been able to crack yet.

Have you read about the computational theory of mind?

Could a machine think? Could the mind itself be a thinking machine? The computer revolution transformed discussion of these questions, offering our best prospects yet for machines that emulate reasoning, decision-making, problem solving, perception, linguistic comprehension, and other characteristic mental processes. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Why do you think that computers have provided us our "best prospects yet for machines that emulate reasoning, decision-making, problem solving, perception, linguistic comprehension, and other characteristic mental processes"?

Exactly, so how can you make the leap to say that a robot with a computer brain isnt conscious? — Harry Hindu

Because we simply know how in the end a very mechanical device called a computer works. That's the answer. We surely can make that leap.

I am aware. — Harry Hindu

What does that mean that 'you are aware' and how is it philosophically different from the problem of consciousness?

Algorithms can vary in complexity, and the mind could be using a very complex algorithm that we haven't been able to crack yet. — Harry Hindu

Complexity of an algorithm doesn't change the definition of an algorithm. Sorry, but this is mathematics. Definitions do matter. Look it up: algorithms have a quite clear definition.

It's like saying that every number is a rational number and we haven't just found the correct rational number to everything. Hence you wouldn't call an irrational number a rational number, but perhaps you could call it a 'complex' rational number? Well, if we make an agreement that irrational numbers are 'complex' rational numbers, perhaps we can then assume that all numbers are 'rational numbers'. But then of course, we would be saying that numbers are just numbers.

In the same way when you just assume that complexity can solve these issues, it is a similar argument if you have to change the definition of an algorithm. My opinion is that we're still not there yet, even if we can get there. Not everything from the fundamental parts of mathematics and philosophy simply isn't known yet.

Why do you think that computers have provided us our "best prospects yet for machines that emulate reasoning, decision-making, problem solving, perception, linguistic comprehension, and other characteristic mental processes"? — Harry Hindu

Because we live in our currently "most advanced state" of human knowledge. And the algorithm churning Turing Machines are at the present the thing we have. And before it was mechanical clock-work devices. People made similar comparisons then that everything was like mechanical clocks. Just very advanced ones. And we had idea of the Clockwork Universe. Sound familiar to the ideas today that the Universe is just one supercomputer?

Yet note that humans have nearly always lived on this edge of the best knowledge ever (the exception is the time we had this huge crisis in Globalization called Antiquity turning into the Dark Ages). Voltaire ridiculed quite aptly Leibniz with doctor Pangloss in Candide. Yes, the early 18th Century was indeed "the best of all Worlds" as we know so well now.

Because we simply know how in the end a very mechanical device called a computer works. That's the answer. We surely can make that leap. — ssu

This isn't what I was trying to get at. We also know many things about the brain and can make predictions about what you experience based on a your brain scan. Damage to a certain area as the result of a stroke can limit one's use of language or erase memories. My question is more about what is a computer really like "out there" - separate from our experience of it being a "physical" piece of hardware running software (which is basically hardware states). What is a brain really like "out there" - separate from our experience of it being a "physical" piece of hardware (the brain) running software (the mind - which is basically brain states)? Brains and computers are made of the same "physical" stuff. So how is it that we can say brains have consciousness, and computers don't?

What does that mean that 'you are aware' and how is it philosophically different from the problem of consciousness? — ssu

I would say that awareness and consciousness are the same thing. "Consciousness" is a loaded term.

What it means to be aware is that there is an aboutness to my experience - of having a perception about a situation or fact.

Complexity of an algorithm doesn't change the definition of an algorithm. Sorry, but this is mathematics. Definitions do matter. Look it up: algorithms have a quite clear definition. — ssu

An algorithm is a set of steps to follow intended to solve a specific problem. Mathematical equations are algorithms; so are computer programs. Algorithms are closely related to logical thinking. They are like an applied version of deductive reasoning. Algorithms are for problem-solving. If you aren't trying to solve a problem, then are you using your intelligence? The Turing Test is a test for intelligence, not consciousness. Can you have one without the other?

My question is more about what is a computer really like "out there" - separate from our experience of it being a "physical" piece of hardware running software (which is basically hardware states). — Harry Hindu

But it is a physical machine that does run a program if it works. It doesn't abruptly change it's software and decide to do something other that the programmer programmed it to do. If a computer would do that, then we could perhaps assume it was 'aware' (and likely pissed off about it's programmer).

I would say that awareness and consciousness are the same thing. "Consciousness" is a loaded term. — Harry Hindu

We don't know these issues yet so well and that is a fact. Hence we can mean a lot of different things by AI, for example. This is the problem. As I said, we know our computers and how they work far more better.

Algorithms are closely related to logical thinking. They are like an applied version of deductive reasoning. — Harry Hindu

Do you always use deduction? How about inductive reasoning? Never tried that? How about abductive reasoning?

If you aren't trying to solve a problem, then are you using your intelligence? The Turing Test is a test for intelligence, not consciousness. Can you have one without the other? — Harry Hindu

Not all use of intelligence is problem solving. Of course one might argue everything to be a "problem" that we have to solve.

I think I could round up 10 people and you would think you were talking with a computer. Than the test is not whether a computer can think like a human but whether a human can think like a computer.

I think a better test may be if a computer could create something unaided by humans that humans could use or appreciate, then we got intelligence. Create a calculus, a trigonometry, propose the theory of general relativity, propose of philosophy of language, etc

But it is a physical machine that does run a program if it works. It doesn't abruptly change it's software and decide to do something other that the programmer programmed it to do. If a computer would do that, then we could perhaps assume it was 'aware' (and likely pissed off about it's programmer). — ssu

But what if the programmer programmed the computer to change its programming? People only change their programming when they learn something new.

Being aware doesn't entail changing ones programming. It entails have knowledge of some situation or fact. It requires senses. If a robot used the information acquired by its senses to change its programming, would you say that it's aware and intelligent?

Do you always use deduction? How about inductive reasoning? Never tried that? How about abductive reasoning? — ssu

Dont those types of reasoning require the information provided by the senses?

I'll add that humans have a programmer - natural selection.

But what if the programmer programmed the computer to change its programming? — Harry Hindu

That would be just what the present computer programs have done for ages. Ever heard of cybernetic systems? Something invented during WW2 was hailed to be the solution to everything... until it faded from the popular jargon. Yet this doesn't overcome this issue at all: the computer is exactly following the algorithm and hence is quite predictable in just what it will "learn".

Dont those types of reasoning require the information provided by the senses? — Harry Hindu

Do they? Anyway, the problem is that you have to somehow morph inductive and abductive reasoning into the deductive way as, again, Turing Machines just compute, follow algorithms.

I'll add that humans have a programmer - natural selection. — Harry Hindu

Here's the thing. That there is natural selection doesn't mean a thing when the question is how will Harry Hindy reply this or that question. And one obvious way would be to say that even if we can seem to be choosing ourselves just what we do, there would be a metaprogram that we follow the we can't change or understand. Yet this argument makes it even worse: for the computer it is really a program, not a metaprogram, that the programmer has to tinker with.

It seems to me that both of our takes are based on some level of assuming determinism and no free will vs. Non determinism and free will. I am of the former camp, hence I believe that human brains are just more complex types of (sensory) information processors.

Well, I believe that determinism and free will don't actually exclude each other because we are simply talking about two totally different issues. Free will doesn't exclude determinism and determinism doesn't exclude free will.

There is free will in the form that you are aware of yourself and can change your decisions what you make. There is also determinism in that if we define the future to be what truly happens, then it is deterministic: the future will happen. The only thing is that you cannot know everything even if everything is determined. Why so?

It's simply that we are part of the Universe hence that we cannot extrapolate everything from the present to the future because we are ourselves actors ourselves. Simple logic excludes this option from us.

What is utterly false and totally illogical is this idea of Laplacian determinism. Laplace made the argument in the following way:

We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.

This is simply wrong. This is because the entity is part of this World and we can put this entity (depicted as Laplace's Demon) to a situation where the correct forecast of the future would entirely be depended the opposite of the forecast it makes. No amount of objective knowledge can help you when you are being put to be the subjective decider. Hence whatever it does (or doesn't do), will effect the outcome in a way it cannot forecast the correct future.

Actually this is use of the Cantor's diagonalization method, negative self-reference which is at the heart of not only the paradoxes, but also the incompleteness results. It would be similar to say to you that "Please give an response you will never in your life give". Obviously there are such responses as your and my time here is limited. And obviously we cannot give those, because any response we give is outside of that set of responses.

the argument over free will is nothing more than philosophy as industry. if there is free will and you live as if there is not, that is tragic. If there is no free will and you live as if there is, you could not have chosen to do otherwise.

I guess I'm saying SIMULATED FREE WILL = REAL FREE WILL. — TheMadFool

OK, that was a nice use of the Turing test. If we can't tell the different we might as well treat it as free will. Fine. But what does free will mean? Most of us use language that implies free will, but also that implies compulsion. We don't treat it as binary. I am impulsive. I can't control my desires. I can't focus but I want to. I want to quite smoking (do you? wouldn't you then right now). So determinism is packed into our language as well as free will. Both are packed into our experience. It isn't binary. It's not neat like we experience life as if we have free will. We experience degrees of both. Believing in free will leads to a variety of conclusions, for exmaple around responsibility. How much do we weigh the senses of free will and our senses of compulsion?