Well, how do you make an abstract descriptor as "paranoia" into a, in a sense, a vivid designator for all Ralphs that posses the attribute of being "paranoid" manifest in his de re statement that his neighbor is a spy? — Wallows

But paranoia is a property of a thing (person)), it's not a name of the thing. How is Ralph's statement "my neighbour is a spy" evidence that he is paranoid?

It appears like you are trying to make the attribute "paranoia" necessary, as if it were the thing's name, and then treat it as if it were a non-essential attribute of the thing, in your counterfactuals. You can't have both. Either the thing is designated as "paranoid" and we seek the properties of "paranoid", or the thing is designated as "Ralph", and we seek the properties of Ralph (one might be paranoia).

But paranoia is a property of a thing (person)), it's not a name of the thing. How is Ralph's statement "my neighbour is a spy" evidence that he is paranoid? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's kind of the point here. De dicto, the scope of the epistemic quantifier is non-bound by a singular individual's beliefs.

So, Ralph might be right that his neighbor is a spy in his own mind; but, de dicto that simply isn't the case, or might not be. Hence, de dicto we can conclude that Ralph is paranoid. De re, Ralph might still profess his paranoid belief irrespective of the fact that he may or may not be paranoid. Or, no. De re, Ralph will keep on professing his belief as long as he posses' the quality or trait of being paranoid.

Or, no. De re, Ralph will keep on professing his belief as long as he posses' the quality or trait of being paranoid. — Wallows

The description of being paranoid wouldn't be a rigid designator then. In another possible world, Ralph might not be paranoid. The name Ralph is rigidly designated though.

Never heard of the Barcan formula? — Wallows

The simplest Barcan formula is just to have the mailman come. Your dog will go crazy.

But maybe tackle one small thing at a time until we've solved (or at least resolved) it, and then move on?

The description of being paranoid wouldn't be a rigid designator then. — schopenhauer1

True, though it might be a vivid designator for any Ralph believing his neighbor is a spy?

I don't think "paranoid" is a designator at all, because it refers to a property rather than an object.

True, though it might be a vivid designator for any Ralph believing his neighbor is a spy? — Wallows

It seems as if you're trying on terms of art like they're hats that you might incorporate into a Halloween costume.

How unusual, a contributor to TPF who hides behind terms as if they were a costume.

I don't think "paranoid" is a designator at all, because it refers to a property rather than an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, hence essentialism? Think about it this way. If I stipulate a de re counterfactual, then I am bound to quantify wrt. to a subject de re. If this subject professes a de re belief that his or her neighbor is a spy, then isn't that bound to the abstract property of de dicto epistemic concerns about the subject?

So, it seems that the issue here is not modalities of counterfactual beliefs; but, conditions that allow the de re subject to assert his or her epistemic belief dependent on de dicto facts about the individual, I think.

This might help:

If this subject professes a de re belief that his or her neighbor is a spy, then isn't that bound to the abstract property of de dicto epistemic concerns about the subject? — Wallows

When I worked in a psychiatric hospital, we had one person diagnosed as schizophrenic who would cite a list of all the spies he had seen during the night every morning. Of course at first I thought he was totally insane, but after a while, I realized he was actually telling me about the other other patients secretly watching each other and judging each other's behaviors, leading to him calling them nazi or communist spies.

That is, while what he was stating about them was obviously delusional on the surface, it was derived from factual observation that one could interpret properly, given sufficient experience with his way of describing events. I dont know how that fits in with your 'de dicto' concerns.

Very interesting...

That is, while what he was stating about them was obviously delusional on the surface, it was derived from factual observation that one could interpret properly, given sufficient experience with his way of describing events. I dont know how that fits in with your 'de dicto' concerns. — ernestm

The point I'm trying to say is that the de re/de dicto distinction is epistemically in a loop. De dicto, Ralph is a paranoid schizophrenic. De re, Ralph continues to believe his neighbor is a spy as long as, de dicto, his schizophrenia isn't addressed.

That should be pretty straightforward.

Now, quantifying into a possible world where Ralph, still believes that his neighbor is a spy, then his de dicto "trait/qualities/property/attribute" of being schizophrenic (perhaps untreated) will dictate his de re beliefs about his neighbor being a spy. Hence, there is some element of rigidity for all possible worlds where Ralph professes these delusional beliefs, which in my mind boils down to essentialism. If you want to go a step further, then transworld identity is dictated by these very "trait/qualities/property/attribute" that Ralph has. Therefore, essentialism?

Now, quantifying into possible world where Ralph, still believes that his neighbor is a spy, then his de dicto "trait/quality/property/attribute" of being schizophrenic (perhaps untreated) will dictate his de re beliefs about his neighbor being a spy. Hence, there is some element of rigidity for all possible worlds where Ralph professes these delusional beliefs. — Wallows

Russell's criticism still applies. Just because he says his neighbor is a spy does not mean he actually believes his neighbor is a spy, even if he is schizophrenic. Ralph could be asserting that because he knows his listener thinks he is schizophrenic, so he states it to satisfy the audience.

Russell's criticism still applies. Just because he says his neighbor is a spy does not mean he actually believes his neighbor is a spy, even if he is schizophrenic. Ralph could be asserting that because he knows his listener thinks he is schizophrenic, so he states it to satisfy the audience. — ernestm

Yes; but, even given the opacity of determining intent, the conclusion still obtains.

Yes; but, even given the opacity of determining intent, the conclusion still obtains. — Wallows

One could go in that direction, but it would be more fruitful to consider the diagnosed schizophrenic as being in the ideal position to play language games with his listeners. After all, they don't have much else to do.

One could go in that direction, but it would be more fruitful to consider the diagnosed schizophrenic as being in the ideal position to play language games with his listeners. After all, they don't have much else to do. — ernestm

One maintence shot of Abilify or Zyprexa, first I assume. Hehe.

I’ve read the first 50 pages of Naming and Necessity ... I’ve found it to be a complete waste of time up to now. Does he actually have anything to say or can I expect the same pointless drivel for another 100+ pages?

I’ve read the first 50 pages of Naming and Necessity ... I’ve found it to be a complete waste of time up to now. Does he actually have anything to say or can I expect the same pointless drivel for another 100+ pages? — I like sushi

It's important to be familiar with it if you want to be familiar with analytic philosophy, and especially the developmental history of analytic philosophy, but in my opinion, the whole project that Naming and Necessity is a "symptom" of is a big mess, with Naming and Necessity doing nothing to make it less of a mess.

So unless there's a good reason that you want to be well-versed in analytic philosophy, there's probably no reason for you to slog through the rest of the book, especially if it's not doing anything for you yet, especially if you're not retaining much of it--which you're probably not since it's seeming like a complete waste of time to you. Reading through the rest at this point would probably have the impact of reading a long string of arbitrary words.

Naming and Necessity is really best approached with a robust familiarity with the project it's stemming from, going back to at least Frege's philosophy of language work, then Russell's theory of descriptions, a bit of the mountain of commentary on both in the wake of the theory of descriptions (Russell played a big part in sparking later interest in Frege), etc.

There is nothing said that isn’t blatantly obvious to me already. That is what has disappointed me. I just want to know if there is an actual point this is leading toward or am I meant to be astounded by the first 50 pages in any way shape or form?

It seems like pointless reiteration to lay out the grounds for some position - which hasn’t yet been hinted at. If it has been hinted at then I don’t expect to get much more from this. I may as well slog through it either way as it’s quite short.

Compared to Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” and Husserl’s “Logical Investigations” is almost completely empty. Only 28 pages in to Hegel’s preface and there is more content, Husserl, as usual takes his time to get anywhere, but once it gets going it really gets going. With Kripke I find myself saying “so?” and “that is meant to be new to me?”

It’s not like I don’t appreciate the difference between temporally held names and abstractions. The deal with Nixon is like watching someone flog a dead horse ... get on with man! Haha! I guess because it was a lecture we can understand it as laying out the most obvious points for the audience? Am I being impatient?

Yeah, folks - it's so much easier to critique a book if you don't read it.

Yeah, folks - it's so much easier to critique a book if you don't read it. — Banno

Of haven't read his Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures... Coming up in due time (6 months tops) on my rare reading group sessions.