Literalist conceptions of non-existence

_db

Non-existence literally means the lack of existence. If you do not exist, then you cannot be subject to any experiences whatsoever. The only way of talking about you is by use of counterfactuals and hypothetical possible worlds where you might exist.

To me at least, this seems quite obvious. However, this literalist interpretation of non-existence throws a wrench in many of our common beliefs.

For example, if a child is to be born, only to experience a life of horrible, unrelenting suffering, we tend to say that it would be "good" or "better" for this child not to exist. Yet, if this child does not exist, then no personal value can be applied to it. The only value that can be applied to the child is a bad one, in which the child exists and is tortured.

Similarly, if you personally are undergoing unrelenting torture, you may begin to conceptualize suicide as a legitimate course of action. "Anything to get rid of this pain!" However, it seems to me that this reasoning depends on a non-literalist conception of non-existence. From the perspective of a sufferer, non-existence may come across as "peaceful", "tranquil", or "comfortable". Indeed, this seems to be the outlook of at least some Buddhist beliefs, which take nirvana to be equivalent to non-existence, yet peaceful at the same time. Non-existence, despite it's literal interpretation, is given existence-dependent values.

It also seems to me that in order to pursue an action, one must have a goal in mind, or a consequence that one values. But if we take the literalist interpretation of non-existence seriously, then there cannot be a consequence of value in non-existence.

Therefore, many of our actions seem to involve a faulty image of non-existence and a need for a good outcome. We would avoid having the tortured child, not necessarily because torture is bad for the child but because we think there is a better state of affairs for this child. We think it would actually be "good" for this child to not-exist. And we would also think it "good" that we ourselves do not exist, if we're currently being tortured. This faulty reasoning seems irrevocably ingrained.

But I think this can actually lead to a slightly different ethical approach to value, one that places emphasis on the person themselves and not on a need for a good outcome itself. In my opinion, we can, and should, adopt what McMahan calls "non-comparative personal value", in which an experience is of a certain value despite it not having a correlate.

From this, we can see how having a tortured child would be bad for the child, even though the lack of this pain would not be good. We ought not to give this child these experiences. Similarly, it would be bad for a tortured person to continue to experience this torture, thus suicide becomes a legitimate option for this person. However, in the case of suicide, it seems rather impossible to not conceptualize images of peace and comfort from non-existence. Killing yourself without a perceived outcome seems, at least to me, impossible.

The biggest point being made here, though, is that I think we have inherent need for resolution, redemption, or justice. If a bad thing happens, then the avoidance or resolution of this bad must result in a good outcome. But this is entirely irrational. It is the exact same reasoning behind the valuing of recovery - if I recover from cancer, recovery must be a good in itself, right?! This is similar to Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity as advocating the creation of people in order to help them. "Let me create you so I can help you."

The rational position is one that recognizes that the world does not necessarily support "good" outcomes, only "right" action. And that is, I think, a difficult proposition to accept. It results in the realization that "better" states of affairs are not necessarily "good" states of affairs. Because of this, much of our ethical intuitions can be summarized as a need to be satisfied with a consequence. But there is nothing satisfying about non-existence, rationally speaking.

schopenhauer1

Non-existence, despite it's literal interpretation, is given existence-dependent values. — darthbarracuda

Was this from my response to your other post earlier regarding goals?

But there is nothing satisfying about non-existence, rationally speaking. — darthbarracuda

I remember explaining a while back the difference between a totally ideal world in the preference satisfaction sense, and a totally united world in the Schopenhaurian sense, and I think these two ideas might help with your question..

Preference satisfaction idea world: In an ideal world all preferences would be satisfied at a particular instant of time for the exact outcome one would want at that particular time (even the preference for an unknown amount of pain/misadventure that might enhance one's overall satisfaction). All dials would be adjusted accordingly. The idea of one's life needing to be a tragi-comedy would not even have to be entertained as one is just "satisfied" enough not to default to this coping aesthetic.

Schopenhauerian ideal world All would be stasis and not flux. There is no want or need as one would be completely unified with everything else. Thus a unitary existence where everything is everything is almost equivalent to everything is nothing. It is absolute completeness in the metaphysical sense. Nothing is lacking.

_db

Was this from my response to your other post earlier regarding goals? — schopenhauer1

No.

I remember explaining a while back the difference between a totally ideal world in the preference satisfaction sense, and a totally united world in the Schopenhaurian sense, and I think these two ideas might help with your question..

Preference satisfaction ideal world: In an ideal world all preferences would be satisfied at a particular instant of time for the exact outcome one would want at that particular time (even the preference for an unknown amount of pain/misadventure that might enhance one's overall satisfaction). All dials would be adjusted accordingly. The idea of one's life needing to be a tragi-comedy would not even have to be entertained as one is just "satisfied" enough not to default to this coping aesthetic.

Schopenhauerian ideal world All would be stasis and not flux. There is no want or need as one would be completely unified with everything else. Thus a unitary existence where everything is everything is almost equivalent to everything is nothing. It is absolute completeness in the metaphysical sense. Nothing is lacking. — schopenhauer1

In regards to the preference satisfaction ideal world, this aligns with what I see to be the morality of childbirth - for childbirth to be moral, we must fulfill a certain standard for this child. If we cannot fulfill this standard, then we ought not have the child. Of course, this standard is debatable, and in my opinion cannot be fulfilled in this world. But others might disagree and believe the standard can be met. But that is a different topic.

In regards to the Schopenhauerean ideal world, I find this to be merely equivocating value. Just as certain Buddhist strains of thought make nirvana out to be a peaceful bliss in non-existence, the Schopenhauerean ideal world is one without flux or change. But this additionally means no thinking can occur, because nobody exists to think, since thinking is a process and therefore a kind of change. Thus Schopenhauer's ideal world as you describe it can be seen as the ultimate negation of life, and furthermore falls into the trap of reifying value where there is none - i.e. "grass-is-always-greener" thinking, or a need to anchor oneself in another reality. In this case, though, the other reality is unconceivable.

Schopenhauer may have been a pessimist, but if his ideal world is as you describe then he's still anchoring on to the idea of a redemptive staticity. While a full-going pessimist, in my view, negates any redemption. There's bad and not-bad. Never any good in our case. Equivocating not-bad as good reeks of desperation.

apokrisis

Therefore, many of our actions seem to involve a faulty image of non-existence and a need for a good outcome. — darthbarracuda

Alternatively, the very notion of "literal non-existence" is illogical, unintelligible, given that something does exist.

So you are arguing it is a problem in a personal sense. The "you" that exists already brings with it the choices that counterfactually define that existence (such as a good life vs a bad life, a happy moment vs a sad moment).

But the same goes for existence as a whole.

Something surely exists (our Universe at least). And that makes non-existence a non-sensical thing to be taking seriously. It is not a valid counter-factual. It is not an actual possibility. We can only have the relative absence of something or other.

So this notion of "literal non-existence" has to be given up. It is an impossibility. Metaphysics in particular has to start somewhere else if it is to be an exercise in intelligible argument.

_db

↪apokrisis

By literal non-existence I meant an absence of something. I can imagine having another sibling. This sibling is absent, non-existent. A pure possibility, whatever that manifests as.

What I'm not arguing for is holistic non-existence as a whole. Only what it means to be non-existent at the level of identity.

Alternatively, we can say that non-existence is characterized as the differences between possible worlds. But this places the focus of ethics on states of affairs, when I was distinctly trying to maintain a person-oriented ethics, i.e. something is good/bad for a person.

apokrisis

Alternatively, we can say that non-existence is characterized as the differences between possible worlds. — darthbarracuda

Exactly. And I'm pointing to the fundamental flaw in such modal reasoning.

It takes for granted that things which exist could also not exist in free fashion. And yet if existence is holistic and contextual, then that is a faulty presumption. It can be only relatively true at best that events or objects can be treated as independent variables.

This matters at the cosmic level. Could you have change except within the context of stasis (or stasis except within the context of change)?

And likewise, anything important one might pick out about the life of a person is going to be similarly contextual. You couldn't have joy without pain, etc?

So you can't talk about the possibility of you having a sibling in any plausible fashion unless it is in fact plausible that such a sibling might exist. And you say such a sibling doesn't exist - but how can you be so sure? Did you check in the basement where your parents have had him locked up all these years?

So sure, modal logic is good for reasoning as often the world is atomistically disjoint to a high degree of approximation. It is close enough to a collection of independent events fixed by a history for us to just argue in that fashion. You could have had a brother. But you don't.

I'm just pointing out that this is not a secure basis for the kind of grandly general argument you want to mount here.

If a bad thing happens, then the avoidance or resolution of this bad must result in a good outcome. But this is entirely irrational. It is the exact same reasoning behind the valuing of recovery - if I recover from cancer, recovery must be a good in itself, right?! — darthbarracuda

It is of course entirely rational. Bad and good encode a counterfactuality that makes it possible for there to be definitely something. Things can be one way because it is a real possibility they could be the other way.

I realise you find this problematic because it means life being bad means life can be good. But tough. You just have an illogical approach to this issue.

wuliheron

Just a word of explanation, I'm agnostic and all my poetry reflects that fact treating both mother nature and father truth as merely ways of making the subjects more personal. We are all mother nature and father truth as much as anyone else we might believe ourselves to be.

_db

So you can't talk about the possibility of you having a sibling in any plausible fashion unless it is in fact plausible that such a sibling might exist. And you say such a sibling doesn't exist - but how can you be so sure? Did you check in the basement where your parents have had him locked up all these years?

So sure, modal logic is good for reasoning as often the world is atomistically disjoint to a high degree of approximation. It is close enough to a collection of independent events fixed by a history for us to just argue in that fashion. You could have had a brother. But you don't.

I'm just pointing out that this is not a secure basis for the kind of grandly general argument you want to mount here. — apokrisis

I don't see how this is necessarily of cosmic importance. After all, if we're talking holism here, a little change doesn't alter the overall structure of the universe. Whether or not I exist does not change much cosmically. I've said this before, the ethics I work with is not necessarily of cosmic importance, rather, it's of person-al importance.

When I talk of possible people, then, I'm taking a person-oriented stance that focuses on advantages and disadvantages related to experience. So non-existence initially seems like it might be advantageous to the tortured child - yet clearly if this child does not exist, then there are no advantages to be found.

It is of course entirely rational. Bad and good encode a counterfactuality that makes it possible for there to be definitely something. Things can be one way because it is a real possibility they could be the other way.

I realise you find this problematic because it means life being bad means life can be good. But tough. You just have an illogical approach to this issue. — apokrisis

Well, sorry, you've just ignored the whole point of my post. Counterfactual reasoning in regards to non-existence only applies to the environment, not to the non-existent thing. The difference between the two possible worlds is measured by the causal importance of the subject thing in question. But personal values can only be derived from existing. Therefore, counterfactual reasoning in regards to personal values is rationally impossible. All other attempts to do so are merely fictions, i.e. a over-liberal use of everyday counterfactual reasoning (existing vs existing) to a quite different situation (existing vs not-existing).

If a red chinaplate does not exist, what color is it? It's an inane and irrational question: the plate isn't even able to even have a color to begin with in virtue of it not existing.

The whole purpose here was to show how we can still do ethics without the need for a counterfactual correlate, and in fact is preferable anyway since it focuses on the needs of a person instead of a dream future.

schopenhauer1

Schopenhauer may have been a pessimist, but if his ideal world is as you describe then he's still anchoring on to the idea of a redemptive staticity. While a full-going pessimist, in my view, negates any redemption. There's bad and not-bad. Never any good in our case. Equivocating not-bad as good reeks of desperation. — darthbarracuda

I agree. Hence I usually label it a "pipe-dream". As far as using "non-existence" as a placeholder for better outcome, I agree that these two have become interchangeable in Buddhist/Schopenhauerean terms.. But if you recognize that, you can simply realize this interpretation of non-existence as a future non-painful state of affairs which you appear to be doing in this post.

To expand the topic a bit, I would say that instrumentality should really be the focus of the existential philosophical inquiry. If we were to prune everything down to one person sitting in a deserted island with enough food to stay alive.. We must move forward and make choices, goals, decisions within a context of our physical/social settings and historical institutions/education.

There would be ways to find some entertainment.. some flights of fancy in imagination and in natural surroundings.. Life is just an expanded version of this scenario..

Society is just this concept multiplied- Upkeep and entertainments in a setting with others who agree to similar upkeep and entertainments doing the same things day in and day out.. Liberal-minded "modern" society perhaps looks up every once in a while to try to find a lofty goal.. say that of space exploration and scientific discoveries.. Or to perhaps discuss the arts and literature.. drugs every once in a while to alter the mind and "expand" its experiences.

The oppression of being is that we must do- our wills move forward in survival/social-physical upkeep, and entertainment-seeking. We long to get caught up in moments so we do not think of the need for need in the first place. To those caught up- perhaps instrumentality makes no sense at all.. Many people might feel it eventually in angst, but do not reflect on it enough to make sense of it and thus is a subtle feeling of discomfort behind the scenes and not seen as something that drives every decision and forces us to move forward.

Language is a double-edge sword in this regard because it provides a structure and logic to give shape and form to experience but it also provides us a possible misunderstanding that the lived experience has some reason behind it or salvation behind it instead of just a happenstance of moving forwardness. People think the goals themselves are the solutions, are the reasons. Rather, it is just the need for need. Upkeep/maintenance and entertainment are not options. One must wake up, one must do, one must..

apokrisis

I don't see how this is necessarily of cosmic importance. — darthbarracuda

I'm talking about the logic we would apply to anything. And you already agree we are talking about "possible worlds" don't you?

I've said this before, the ethics I work with is not necessarily of cosmic importance, rather, it's of person-al importance. — darthbarracuda

Again, your dualism in this regard is only possible if you reject the holism of natural philosophy.

So yes. You continually claim this kind of atomistic freedom. It appears to validate your logic. I'm just pointing out its deep flaws. It is the reason why you just accept that there is the world, and there is the self.

Well, sorry, you've just ignored the whole point of my post. — darthbarracuda

I've pointed to the flawed logic upon which you have argued your whole point. That's different.

So non-existence initially seems like it might be advantageous to the tortured child - yet clearly if this child does not exist, then there are no advantages to be found. — darthbarracuda

I dunno. Suppressing the potential for tortured lives by addressing their contextual causes seems a lot more logical to me. Doing something about that is what would be actually logical wouldn't you say?

If a red chinaplate does not exist, what color is it? It's an inane and irrational question: the plate isn't even able to even have a color to begin with in virtue of it not existing. — darthbarracuda

But red china plates can and do exist. So there is both the general possibility and the literal actuality.

What is irrational is to try to base your "logical" position on such nonsense as "this red china plate that does not exist".

Surely you can appreciate the inherent and necessary contextuality of that claim - what it would take to make it a "true statement"?

_db

I'm talking about the logic we would apply to anything. And you already agree we are talking about "possible worlds" don't you? — apokrisis

Different scenarios require us to use different techniques.

Again, your dualism in this regard is only possible if you reject the holism of natural philosophy.

So yes. You continually claim this kind of atomistic freedom. It appears to validate your logic. I'm just pointing out its deep flaws. It is the reason why you just accept that there is the world, and there is the self. — apokrisis

Because phenomenologically that is the case, and that is where ethics resides.

I dunno. Suppressing the potential for tortured lives by addressing their contextual causes seems a lot more logical to me. Doing something about that is what would be actually logical wouldn't you say? — apokrisis

But again this is not personal value here. Suppressing the potential for tortured lives only benefits those who exist. And then we have the non-identity problem, and the related issue of lives that are inherently shitty - i.e. if they weren't shitty, they wouldn't be the same life.

But red china plates can and do exist. So there is both the general possibility and the literal actuality. — apokrisis

Well, sure, but we're talking about an individual china plate, just as we are talking about the advantages a potential, single person can have in non-existence. Does non-existence benefit anyone? I answer in the negative.

Everything else is gibberish, sorry.

_db

But if you recognize that, you can simply realize this interpretation of non-existence as a future non-painful state of affairs which you appear to be doing in this post. — schopenhauer1

A non-painful state of affairs is a bit incoherent in my opinion, as a state of affairs can't feel pain. Instead I would call it a state of affairs that has no individuals who are experiencing pain. Otherwise it seems like we're fantasizing about an impossibility.

To those caught up- perhaps instrumentality makes no sense at all.. Many people might feel it eventually in angst, but do not reflect on it enough to make sense of it and thus is a subtle feeling of discomfort behind the scenes and not seen as something that drives every decision and forces us to move forward. — schopenhauer1

Most people I think never go beyond the initial perturbation.

apokrisis

If we were to prune everything down to one person sitting in a deserted island with enough food to stay alive...

...Life is just an expanded version of this scenario.. — schopenhauer1

And yet of no evolved creature could this scenario ring less true. Humans are socially and even culturally-constructed beings. We are only complete as functional members of functioning groups. So you are basing an argument on an utter fantasy.

_db

And yet of no evolved creature could this scenario ring less true. Humans are socially and even culturally-constructed beings. We are only complete as functional members of functioning groups. So you are basing an argument on an utter fantasy. — apokrisis

And you're trying to reduce transparent phenomenological experiences to a foreign anthropological structure. As if recognizing the sustaining force of our existence doesn't make it less (or perhaps more?) absurd.

apokrisis

Because phenomenologically that is the case, and that is where ethics resides. — darthbarracuda

You have to make up your mind whether the world exists then. If it does, then there may be something beyond your person-al phenomenology. :-}

Suppressing the potential for tortured lives only benefits those who exist. — darthbarracuda

And?

Unless you are going beyond phenomenology to claim ontic idealism or dualism, there is no reason to treat pain as some disembodied quality whose existence can be weighed in Platonic fashion.

And then we have the non-identity problem, and the related issue of lives that are inherently shitty - i.e. if they weren't shitty, they wouldn't be the same life. — darthbarracuda

How many different abuses of logic can you conjure up just to maintain an argument that doesn't work?

Well, sure, but we're talking about an individual china plate, just as we are talking about the advantages a potential, single person can have in non-existence. Does non-existence benefit anyone? I answer in the negative.

Everything else is gibberish, sorry. — darthbarracuda

You've got your conclusion. So all you need is any old rubbish that seems to allow you to get to it.

I've pointed out to the contextuality needed to make your statement true. You agree - even going so far as to say the specific context is you and me agreeing verbally about the absence of some currently experienced particular.

If you aren't then willing to deal with the consequences of the acknowledged contextuality of the statement, that's your problem.

schopenhauer1

↪apokrisis

I predicted you would say that.. Actually, I was going to say after that statement "Cue Apokrisis generic quote about socially constructed reality and how I couldn't be farther from the truth. Yet, I mentioned linguistics which comes from social construction, and despite being social animals.. we are still in the same place. It does not change the scenario. You make a strawman because you think I deny that we are social animals. I do not deny this at all. That would be a tangent from the argument which is the fact that we are maintaining upkeep/survival and finding entertainment goals trying to get caught up in something so as to avoid instrumentality.. Again focusing on the tangent rather than the heart of the argument. Social construction is not some weird cure all that dissolves the problem of being a person albeit one who is in the context of a society and a historical development. This is all acknowledged by me.. To say I don't is to ignore some things I say to make a your argument stronger. It is not acknowledging that your interlocutor already thought of it, acknowledges it, and is still making a certain point that incorporates those things which are supposedly overlooked.

apokrisis

And you're trying to reduce transparent phenomenological experiences to a foreign anthropological structure. As if recognizing the sustaining force of our existence doesn't make it less (or perhaps more?) absurd. — darthbarracuda

But anthropology has no trouble explaining the phenomenology. It is obvious that modern folk live such insulated lives that they develop a magnified fear of the real world. Every papercut becomes the Holocaust because life has lost its normal calibration.

If you grow up dressed in silk, even the manufacturer's tag may seem like an unbearable annoyance.

So this kind of complaining about the unendurability of life is simply a symptom of something you need to fix. It has none of the grandeur of a fundamental philosophical problem or even a Shakespearian tragedy. It is just simply a practical issue - how can we design modern society better in a way that might be more natural to what makes the human animal most content?

apokrisis

You make a strongman because you think I deny that we are social animals. I do not deny this at all. — schopenhauer1

That would be more convincing if you just hadn't begun by presuming the opposite - that society is a bunch of people who for some reason wandered off their desert islands, with their abundant food supplies, to go live collectively and dependently in the name of a little light entertainment and big city distraction.

schopenhauer1

That would be more convincing if you just hadn't begun by presuming the opposite - that society is a bunch of people who for some reason wandered off their desert islands, with their abundant food supplies, to go live collectively and dependently in the name of a little light entertainment and big city distraction. — apokrisis

You are completely off-base with your interpretation. That was meant to convey that LIKE being a on a desert island where we are solely focused on upkeep/entertainment- where there are less complex versions of said upkeep/entertainment SOCIAL reality that we actually DO live in, is the same except DUE to the social nature of it and more complex environmental/historical situatedness of it, we may THINK that it is otherwise. This has nothing to do with us being isolated beings or having an origination outside of a social context. You are making it a strawman by turning it into a different argument.

apokrisis

That was meant to convey that LIKE being a on a desert island where we are solely focused on upkeep/entertainment- — schopenhauer1

Where is your evidence that anyone living on a desert island would think about their existence in this fashion? In what sense are you describing a natural state of being for humans?

...SOCIAL reality that we actually DO live in, is the same except DUE to the social nature of it and more complex environmental/historical situatedness of it, we may THINK that it is otherwise. — schopenhauer1

You can't scale up from an unnatural state to explain the natural state. Complexity is different (as the slogan goes).

_db

But anthropology has no trouble explaining the phenomenology. It is obvious that modern folk live such insulated lives that they develop a magnified fear of the real world. Every papercut becomes the Holocaust because life has lost its normal calibration.

If you grow up dressed in silk, even the manufacturer's tag may seem like an unbearable annoyance.

So this kind of complaining about the unendurability of life is simply a symptom of something you need to fix. It has none of the grandeur of a fundamental philosophical problem or even a Shakespearian tragedy. It is just simply a practical issue - how can we design modern society better in a way that might be more natural to what makes the human animal most content? — apokrisis

Anthropology also can help explain as to why humans have to make culture to begin with. Done unbiased it shows how humans have developed civilization as a hodgepodge method of postponing/procrastinating death.

No amount of social institutions are going to fix the structural aspects of the human condition, only make them more or less bearable.

You have to make up your mind whether the world exists then. If it does, then there may be something beyond your person-al phenomenology. :-} — apokrisis

Oh, it exists sure, but we're not focused on the World, are we? We're focused on the inhabitants of the World! The basic focus of ethics! People! Not the relations they have to the environment or how they are part of the great cosmic plan of entropification.

And?

Unless you are going beyond phenomenology to claim ontic idealism or dualism, there is no reason to treat pain as some disembodied quality whose existence can be weighed in Platonic fashion. — apokrisis

And neither did I claim so. You're making this impossibly difficult. Pain exists where people exist. If people do not exist, then pain does not exist. If we identity pleasure as the only good, then the lack of pain is actually not a good thing at all, rather, it's merely comparative betterness in an impersonal sense. Non-existence cannot be good or bad for anyone. I'm not sure why this is so difficult.

How many different abuses of logic can you conjure up just to maintain an argument that doesn't work? — apokrisis

Oh, my god, you're hilarious. Insulting, but hilarious.

You agree - even going so far as to say the specific context is you and me agreeing verbally about the absence of some currently experienced particular. — apokrisis

We're not just talking about things that already exist, we're talking about potential existants. Just because the lack of pain would be good for us, doesn't mean the lack of pain would be good for potential, unborn people. Because we already exist, and they do not. This is not that hard.

_db

That would be more convincing if you just hadn't begun by presuming the opposite - that society is a bunch of people who for some reason wandered off their desert islands, with their abundant food supplies, to go live collectively and dependently in the name of a little light entertainment and big city distraction. — apokrisis

What? What is more realistic is that society developed initially to support our needs to survive, but later began to develop as a means of keeping ourselves entertained. Civilization is OP in comparison to what nature throws at us generally. Yet we have the brainpower and time left over...what to do, as we twiddle our fingers?

What, indeed? Perhaps we'll argue on an internet forum!

apokrisis

Done unbiased it shows how humans have developed civilization as a hodgepodge method of postponing/procrastinating death. — darthbarracuda

Let's not be ridiculous.

Oh, it exists sure, but we're not focused on the World, are we? We're focused on the inhabitants of the World! The basic focus of ethics! People! Not the relations they have to the environment or how they are part of the great cosmic plan of entropification. — darthbarracuda

What level of natural selection do you want to talk about then? Merely the cultural? Not the social or the ecological?

You're making this impossibly difficult. Pain exists where people exist. If people do not exist, then pain does not exist. — darthbarracuda

Is there a reason you skipped my actual point? Pain can only exist in counterfactuality to its phenomenological "other" - pleasure. So if the existence of pain is your big ethical concern, then that is the counterfactual that is actually relevant.

It's not me who launched into the great red herring of literal non-existence. I just reminded you of the rational basis for any counterfactual state of existence - the one which naturally relies on the further notion of striking a balance.

We're not just talking about things that already exist, we're talking about potential existants. — darthbarracuda

Yet you state that the red plate, along with your sibling, is literally non-existent. And it sounds like you want to talk about potentiality as though it "exists" now.

So yes, this kind of logical talk is very familiar. It works well for reasoning about states of affairs. It is very pragmatic.

But it is all at sea when it comes to addressing deep metaphysical questions.

Just because the lack of pain would be good for us, doesn't mean the lack of pain would be good for potential, unborn people. — darthbarracuda

Well, it would seem to remove what is in your eyes a major constraint on their existing. What would they say if you indeed allowed them to exist having created such living conditions? Thank-you?

It's actually pretty rare for people to wish they have never been born even in this imperfect world. So it seem presumptuous of you to talk for the unborn billions.

apokrisis

What is more realistic is that society developed initially to support our needs to survive, but later began to develop as a means of keeping ourselves entertained. — darthbarracuda

So modern society exists primarily for mass entertainment.

Are you for real?

schopenhauer1

Where is your evidence that anyone living on a desert island would think about their existence in this fashion? In what sense are you describing a natural state of being for humans? — apokrisis

So, we don't go from upkeep/survival to entertainment in a social setting?

You can't scale up from an unnatural state to explain the natural state. Complexity is different (as the slogan goes). — apokrisis

If you don't like the analogy, then we can use one more to your liking. What you are definitely doing is ignoring the argument for an analogy that you deem to be false. Even if I was to let the analogy go to move the debate forward, that does not lessen the argument, only provide more room discuss the actual matter at hand. So, you can continue trying to shoot the dead horse in order to try to get as much as you can about the analogy or your can actually discuss the argument which is that of the idea of instrumentality. By the way, it is not about being an unnatural state.. It is actually THE natural state.. upkeep/survival and entertainment for big-brained social animals. Sounds about right for the big picture. All the "complexity" which you want to use as leverage for trying to "seem" more sophisiticated in your argument, comes out of the fact that we must do to do to do.. instrumentality.

Again, here is one way I described it:

Language is a double-edge sword in this regard because it provides a structure and logic to give shape and form to experience but it also provides us a possible misunderstanding that the lived experience has some reason behind it or salvation behind it instead of just a happenstance of moving forwardness. People think the goals themselves are the solutions, are the reasons. Rather, it is just the need for need. Upkeep/maintenance and entertainment are not options. One must wake up, one must do, one must..

_db

So modern society exists primarily for mass entertainment.

Are you for real? — apokrisis

Well, what other purpose is there for society other than to help people survive and the sedate them from their fears? Hints of instrumentalism can be seen here...

Let's not be ridiculous. — apokrisis

Bring an argument, then, cause you're not an authority.

What level of natural selection do you want to talk about then? Merely the cultural? Not the social or the ecological? — apokrisis

The ones that put people as ethical priority, as any ethical theory should.

Is there a reason you skipped my actual point? Pain can only exist in counterfactuality to its phenomenological "other" - pleasure. So if the existence of pain is your big ethical concern, then that is the counterfactual that is actually relevant. — apokrisis

I doubt this. Surely we can feel pain without feeling pleasure. Surely we don't need black to see white. We just see white.

Yet you state that the red plate, along with your sibling, is literally are non-existent. — apokrisis

Because it is.

So yes, this kind of logical talk is very familiar. It works well for reasoning about states of affairs. It is very pragmatic.

But it is all at sea when it comes to addressing deep metaphysical questions. — apokrisis

I thought you were all about pragmatism.

Well, it would seem to remove what is in your eyes a major constraint on their existing. What would they say if you indeed allowed them to exist having created such living conditions? Thank-you? — apokrisis

THIS WAS MY POINT, APO. We should focus on what IS/COULD BE the case FOR an individual. A bad psychological state doesn't need a redemptive opposite for it to be bad. We don't need a good state of affairs to act ethically.

It's actually pretty rare for people to wish they have never been born even in this imperfect world. So it seem presumptuous of you to talk for the unborn billions. — apokrisis

Right, cause the majority can't at all be wrong, or because the majority wins by sheer might. huh

apokrisis

It is actually THE natural state.. upkeep/survival and entertainment for big-brained social animals. — schopenhauer1

You might not have noticed it, but entertainment is an industry. And being reduced to being a consumer of a product - a packaged experience - is where much of modern life loses its meaning.

apokrisis

I doubt this. Surely we can feel pain without feeling pleasure. Surely we don't need black to see white. We just see white. — darthbarracuda

Wrong.

I thought you were all about pragmatism. — darthbarracuda

That's why I say there is nothing wrong with modal logic per se. But you don't try to do heart surgery with a hammer and chisel.

Right, cause the majority can't at all be wrong, or because the majority wins by sheer might. — darthbarracuda

You are forgetting that it is the preferences of others that you are judging. And your excuse for advocating anti-natalist genocide is that the common herd are all self-deluding fools who don't realise how unhappy they ought to be.

The technical term for that is projection.

_db

Wrong. — apokrisis

Please explain.

genocide — apokrisis

False.

You are forgetting that it is the preferences of others that you are judging. — apokrisis

Quite the opposite, I realize that nobody wants to die, nobody wants to suffer, nobody wants to lead a tedious life, all structural parts of life.

schopenhauer1

You might not have noticed it, but entertainment is an industry. — apokrisis

So you really think I am using entertainment in the very narrow sense of the entertainment industry rather than as shorthand for how we are pursuing any action that eats up free time simply for the sake of being alive and having no other choice?

apokrisis

any action that eats up free time — schopenhauer1

God forbid that we might narrow our definitions to the point where they would make a meaningful commitment to anything. How could we simply presume our conclusions if we had to start doing that?

Literalist conceptions of non-existence

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