Thank you, schopenhauer1; on both counts!

And you know, that comic really did make me laugh out loud! :lol:

No problem! :grin:

But you know, if Kant really is as context insensitive as I've been saying...

Is hitting people with rules something I - or he - would will to be universal?

Rules or rulers? Ha.

That's the problem, anything can be universalized and in a way justified or not justified. "If every student who lied should be hit with rulers" is there a contradiction if universalized? Another problem is what kind of maxims are appropriate to universalize. Surely, we would all disagree. There are a number of problems here.

The second formulation seems general enough to actually apply meaningfully. To not use other people as merely an ends is an interesting point, and is a large basis for my antinatalism.

For example, foisting challenges on another individual is always wrong, even if that individual eventually identifies with the challenges. Foisting challenges on an individual, along with exposing them to a world that has non-trivial (and unavoidable structural) suffering, due to some other X reason (i.e. parent's reasoning for having the child), is always wrong. A person who did not exist already, did not need to experience the X (parent's) reason in the first place. The child would be exposed to suffering and sets of challenges. This would be using the child for a means to some end (some X reason), and discounting the challenges and suffering of the actual child that did not need to be foisted upon them in the first place.

This is of course a variation of the CI second formulation.

Show of hands here - how many have actually read any Kant? — tim wood

Well the "Groundwork" is not that long, and I found it enjoyable to read (in german at least).

I've had similar criticisms of the CI. What counts as a maxim to be universalized? I think that his first formulation was trying to be too rigorous for its own good. — schopenhauer1

I don't think it really matters so long as you are actually concerned with maxims governing actions and not just making a rule for every single actions. It's not supposed to be some fixed catalog at a high level of abstraction like the ten commandments. If the principle that guides your action is embedded in some more abstract principle, you can go up an check if the principles that guide your actions are consistent with themselves and the CI.

If the principle that guides your action is embedded in some more abstract principle, you can go up an check if the principles that guide your actions are consistent with themselves and the CI. — Echarmion

Fair enough, but I guess there is a reason he calls it "practical reason".. But is it practical? If he gives you a standard, but the standard is incompatible in its many uses, what does it matter then as a useful thing? I would like to universalize the fact that everyone should smile when I walk into their establishment and be as friendly as possible. If we universalized that, there is no contradiction here, should this be a general maxim?

Let me edit what I said above.. If let's say, there WAS a contradiction..something like "If everyone were mean, civility itself would not exist".. would that be a general maxim? Everyone MUST be friendly to me when I walk into the establishment? You may disagree with how granular I'm getting.. see what I'm getting at?

I would like to universalize the fact that everyone should smile when I walk into their establishment and be as friendly as possible. If we universalized that, there is no contradiction here, should this be a general maxim? — schopenhauer1

A maxim of benevolence / friendlyness can be universalized, I think. Of course, this is different from a maxim that includes forcing people to be friendly, which, while not necessarily self-contradictory, isn't something one would want to be on the receiving end of.

Let me edit what I said above.. If let's say, there WAS a contradiction..something like "If everyone were mean, civility itself would not exist".. would that be a general maxim? Everyone MUST be friendly to me when I walk into the establishment? You may disagree with how granular I'm getting.. see what I'm getting at? — schopenhauer1

If a maxim fails the CI, it does not follow that the reverse becomes a duty. if a general maxim of "mean-ness" (non-benevolence) fails the CI and is therefore prohibited, it does not follow that "friendlyness" (benevolence) becomes an absolute duty. You shouldn't be mean to your customers on principle, but that doesn't mean you can never be mean if the situation requires it.

Sorry. I can't find. Perhaps type the first few words of the paragraph? I assume you're within the second section of the Groundworks.... I see no footnotes. and in the seventh or eighth paragraphs of that section I find nothing that seems to be on our point.

Dunno what to tell ya, bud. I figured the text would come across the screen consistently no matter the device, but maybe not. I’m on an iPad so my description follows that appearance.

Not the seventh or eighth paragraph; the 7th indented paragraph, of the second section, with the asterisk that denotes it as a footnote in an actual book, before any sub-sections of the second section.

I already quoted it directly, but I’ll add some to it, from the Gutenberg link:

“....When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims * shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.

* A maxim is a subjective principle of action, and must be
distinguished from the objective principle, namely,
practical law. The former contains the practical rule set by
reason according to the conditions of the subject (often its
ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the principle
on which the subject acts; but the law is the objective
principle valid for every rational being, and is the
principle on which it ought to act that is an imperative.

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law....”
—————-

I see how you arrived at your three versions of the C. I. and how it relates to proving my one version wrong.

I’ve been thinking some more about this. I know I wavered on my original formulation at one point, but I’ve come back to it. I want to stress that I mean exactly what I said, and only what I said: that Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative forbids literally everything.

To get some perspective on all this, I often think of a brief exchange I had some years ago with a fine arts student. This particular student had no truck with abstract definitions or theories as to what constitutes a work of art. No, he wasn’t going to have any of that.

“Art,” he stolidly pronounced, “is the creation of objects.” And that, it seemed, was that.

The reason I remember that prosy proclamation so vividly is because at the time he made it, we were both visiting the house of some mutual friends where we had both often been guests in the past. And in this house, as in virtually all houses, they had a toilet. I thought of that toilet, and without speaking the words aloud, silently asked the question:

“Did you ever make any objects in there?”

[There’s a complete tangent I’m tempted to go off on here, but... that’s for another thread, and anyone at all familiar with conceptual art will know what I’m talking about anyway. Suffice it to say, that at the very least, not all shit is art.]

My actual point here being, framing good definitions, or good laws, or good rules of any kind, is hard. Our rules often wind up including things we didn’t intend, or exclude things we did. As I’ve made abundantly clear, I don’t claim to be any kind of Kant expert. Nor do I claim for one moment that forbidding literally everything was what Kant intended to do. I only claim to have put some thought into the logical implications of what Kant actually said – in his first formulation of the categorical imperative. And to have reached the conclusion that forbidding literally everything was what Kant actually said actually does.

So let’s get to that.

“Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”

https://www.britannica.com/topic/categorical-imperative

Only according. Only.

That, word “only” is crucial here. It means that if there is even one maxim that an act violates, Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative has been contravened. Yes, weighing up competing maxims does seem to me, as well as to others here, to be the reasonable thing to do. Maybe Kant himself even said as much elsewhere. Until someone produces the reference for that I’m frankly skeptical, but I don’t know for a fact that he didn’t. And even if he did, so what? “Weigh up competing maxims” is most definitely not what this rule says, and we all know it.

“Act only according to that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law.” That’s it. If you act according to even one maxim which you cannot at the same will to be a universal law, you won't have acted only according to that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law. You will have broken this rule. End of discussion. So if an act can be described by any maxim that you would not will to be universal, and you perform that act, you have broken this rule. Again, end of discussion.

And if anyone here can think of even one act that is not in accordance with at least one maxim that no basically normal person could ever want to be universally applied... I challenge them to tell us what it is!

Even though shopenhauer1 has told us that foisting challenges on another individual is always wrong...

Oh well. I like shopenhauer1, but honestly, I’m a meta-ethical subjectivist anyway. So I don’t think that anything is wrong.

:grin:

Nor do I claim for one moment that forbidding literally everything was what Kant intended to do. I only claim to have put some thought into the logical implications of what Kant actually said – in his first formulation of the categorical imperative. — Theologian

I struggle to see the point of discussing a philosophy on the basis of wilful ignorance of the details of said philosophy.

“Weigh up competing maxims” is most definitely not what this rule says, and we all know it. — Theologian

That doesn't matter though, since a maxim can have as many conditions added to it as you like. Whether you treat the exceptions as a competing maxim or a part of the first maxim is logically equivalent.

So if an act can be described by any maxim that you would not will to be universal, and you perform that act, you have broken this rule. — Theologian

Again, this is not how it works. You don't "describe" acts with maxims. It's right there in the CI: you act according to a maxim, and that maxim is the one that matters.

And if anyone here can think of even one act that is not in accordance with at least one maxim that no basically normal person could ever want to be universally applied... I challenge them to tell us what it is! — Theologian

The CI does not ask whether an act violates "at least one maxim". The CI only applies to the maxims themselves. If we're talking about the CI as written, you could at most ask us to come up with a maxim that doesn't violate the CI. Such as "safe lives where you can do so without significant danger to yourself".

I struggle to see the point of discussing a philosophy on the basis of wilful ignorance of the details of said philosophy. — Echarmion

Oh, Lord! :roll:

Let's just agree that someone is completely missing the point. Willfully or otherwise.

Perhaps you'd be interested in actually engaging with the substance of my post? You did say this:

Beyond the usual invitation to comment implied by any posting, I would be especially interested in hearing from anyone who knows if this argument has been made before, or who thinks they can find a flaw in my argument. — Theologian

I would be glad to. Perhaps in the next day or two though, as I am a little tired right now.

And perhaps you could also refrain from ad hominem attacks in the form of accusing me of wilful ignorance.

if there is even one maxim that an act violates, Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative has been contravened. — Theologian

This is correct. The whole point being, of course.......don’t act on that maxim.

The maxim could very well be agent A’s subjective principle formulating his volition, which he himself willed as if it were to be a universal law, but if such principle is in conflict with agent B’s, yet B acts consistent with the judgement required in conforming to A’s will......B’s imperative is violated and he has lost his claim to moral worthiness. On the other hand, historical precedent shows B may merely change his mind, that is to say, think an alternate rendition of pure practical reason based on a witnessed objective validity, altered his personal imperative by means of his willful choice of volition, and he then tacitly subscribes to the idea of a possible universal law even if not originally of his own will.

It is impossible for a thinking subject to be absolutely controlled by rational law, in the same way he is controlled by natural law. Any moral philosophy grounded in rational law is merely a guide to private conduct, with the understanding explicit in its formulation that there is no fundamental causal accounting for diverse cultural and psychological subjectivity. Even allowing the universality of the faculty of human reason in general doesn’t account for the influence of experience on its members.

Hi. Got it. I believe I should concede to you the whole gloat. I made no distinction between the CI, which is a one though in triune form, and such maxims as might arise under it. You were right and I was wrong, and I repent my errors - all of them, you won't mind a few extra passengers riding along, yes? - repent my errors in sackcloth and ashes. I always wonder how and why Kant worked through all that he did work through.

Scribble 10 E=MC2 on yonder blackboard, go forth amongst the vulgar masses* and philosophize as you see fit.

In your defense, I must say it is odd, and somewhat disturbing, that Kant would use exactly the same phraseology for an imperative standing as a law, as a principle standing for nothing more than a subjective interest. From that it is easy to see, as you have hinted already, that passing familiarity with Kantian metaphysics will never suffice for meaningful dialectic about it.

* Hume, 1740. He apparently never had to worry about being culturally correct. (Grin)

On the other note, you are probably well aware that Kant never married, never had a serious lasting relationship with the other gender, never traveled, hardly socialized at all, seemingly never did much of anything but think. I guess if you spent 70-odd years at thinking, you pretty much cover everything that has any relevance to you. Boring as hell if you had to live with him, I bet, but looking back on his catalogue of writings.....a thoroughly fascinating intellect to be sure.

Above in this thread are referenced two texts of Kant's that add clarity to understanding what his Categorical Imperative is, and maxims, with reference to duties and conflicts between duties. One Metaphysics of Morals, the other his Groundworks....

Rather than either repeat them here or attempt to summarize them - Kant is difficult to summarize - I will instead attempt a metaphorical description, and invite criticism of it. And the texts are there to read as well.

Imagine you want to build a brick all, for some reason. Before you do, you had better build a foundation. Or at least verify that the wall will be properly supported. Of course the foundation is neither the wall itself nor the building of it. The foundation solves nothing of the problem the wall is intended to solve. Foundation, wall: two different things. And, if a good foundation is not laid down, then the wall had better not be built.

The point is that the CI corresponds to the foundation. The wall itself, the building of it, what it's for, those can all be apportioned to purpose/function, maxim, duty. When it comes to walls, there are all kinds for all purposes, even just of brick walls never mind other kinds. But the idea of a good foundation is a one, one idea.

What is the reason for a good foundation? To hold up, preserve, protect what is built on it, and its purpose. And this is the reason underlying the whole project. That is, there is - should be - reason underlying. Example: You wish to break a promise; it seems worth it to you for you to do it. Your maxim might be, "It is all right for me to break a promise if I gain some advantage thereby." Maybe it's a promise to repay a loan. But can that be universalized? At first glance it seems it must be: you can do, say, claim whatever you like - but not within reason! The twist is that if you universalize breaking promises so that anyone and everyone can break his or her promise when they want to, then the concept and meaning of promising is destroyed. Your maxim had an inadequate foundation, and the test was through reason. -And that's about it.

Kant points out - makes the distinction - that the CI itself is always already prior - before - the particular question. Just as the need for a foundation for a wall is prior to the wall itself. As such, no matter of the wall itself has anything to do with the need for a foundation. the foundation is prior, the wall after. Similarly, no desire or other consideration of the act itself outside of its conformance with the CI, is relevant to the CI.

Thus, for example, don't lie. And just here is what Kant's morality is embedded in. If you cannot obey the CI, then there's no morality in your action. Which is not to say that no good will come of your action, maybe some good will come of it, but it will not be a moral good, as Kant argues it.

It's easy enough for people who do not at least start to feel the weight of Kant's arguments to be dismissive of them, even condescending or contemptuous, in support of their own actions. Even at the level of the individual this can do great harm, even if only local. But if the individual has a public presence, the harm even that much greater. The current president of the US is an example of the dangers such a person can present.

Good summary there. My problem with the CI is not about certain, easy-to-see contradictions. Rather, it is when it gets to more everyday interactions and situations. That's why I used the example above about being friendly to everyone who goes into a store. So, let's say I go into a store, and the cashier person working ignores me when I ask a question and just couldn't give me the time of day or something. It's really no big deal, though I'd rather have more helpful interaction as a customer. So should that be a universal maxim? "If all store employees were rude to their customers then the concept itself of customer service would no longer be a real thing". This kind of granularity seems to be more controversial. You might say that customer service isn't what is violated, but civility in general. Another person would say that those aren't even contradictions like the lying-property one is, and that they wouldn't count as something violated. There is just no epistemological way to tell what kind of action should be universalized nor what the actual contradiction is that might be violated.

So should that be a universal maxim? "If all store employees were rude to their customers then the concept itself of customer service would no longer be a real thing". — schopenhauer1

I think maybe a consequence. The maxim might be the clerk's, this way: "It is all right to ignore customers if I want to." If universalized, then indeed customer service would be at risk. But the maxim contradicts an implied reading of the categorical imperative, which would be to treat all persons with (appropriate?) respect, or, to not deny the humanity of any person. The clerk doesn't realize that their act ultimately - and maybe soon! - both in principle and in fact puts their job at risk, is destructive of its own ground.

To my way of thinking, it's useful to keep in mind this viewpoint is Kantian - a way of understanding, even if a good and compelling way. That is, the clerk could be rude for lots of reasons, none of moral significance.

And on the other side, recognizing duties and expressing them as maxims can be something of an art. I have certainly had - I assume most people have had - the experience of being sure I was correct/right, yet being persuaded otherwise by a wiser person.

And on the other side, recognizing duties and expressing them as maxims can be something of an art. I have certainly had - I assume most people have had - the experience of being sure I was correct/right, yet being persuaded otherwise by a wiser person. — tim wood

It's hard to tell who is wise, other than it makes sense to you perhaps. But if you say because they were right about consequences, that would negate Kant's deontology anyways.

Again, the point is we do not know what maxim is correct, hierarchically. So let's say that the clerk is rude because his wife died a couple weeks earlier and that puts him in a bad mood. So then in that case the maxim might be, "A clerk should not be rude, unless a tragedy befalls him close to the time of rudeness to a customer, as then no one would be allowed time to process their grief appropriately". This then trumps the maxim, "Clerks should never be rude to customers as this is violating civility and denying their humanity". Which rule wins out?

Even Kant was pretty bad at applying his own philosophy. He would answer that it would never be good to lie, even if a killer came to your door asking where your friend was, and you knew they were trying to kill him. Clearly, he is violating some maxim about protecting life. "If everyone acted in a way where if someone's life were in danger they could not violate another maxim, even if that person died as a result" were universalized, the very concept of preserving life itself would be violated. If everyone gave in to aggressors like that, life itself would be short, nasty, and brutish. I am sure violating the principle of life would come before principle of property or trustworthiness.

I'm about two thirds of the way through writing a more serious reply to some of the arguments raised. In the meantime, I've discovered a definitive answer to one of the questions I posed in my OP.

I wondered out loud if I was the first to make the argument I did. It turns out I'm not.

https://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/10/28/gregory-salmieri/kant-vs-white-conflicts-duty#_ftn1

"Any action can be described at different levels of abstraction, such that it will be willable as a universal law under some descriptions and not under others."

Oh well. Always disappointing. But it happens a LOT in philosophy.

Anyone interested in the secondary lit on Kant may also find this interesting:

It also deals with Kant's ability/inability to deal with competing ethical claims.

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30317932.pdf

Good stuff. Thanks.

"A clerk should not be rude, unless a tragedy befalls him close to the time of rudeness to a customer, as then no one would be allowed time to process their grief appropriately". This then trumps the maxim, "Clerks should never be rude to customers as this is violating civility and denying their humanity". Which rule wins out? — schopenhauer1

I think you're not getting it. It's not what he or she or they should do; it is about what you intend to do or want to do. Of course you can try to put yourself into another's shoes. As to which "wins," as I read it, you do the best you can, meaning, as noted way above, the best you can. Can you will the maxim for your action to be a universal law? Does it comport with using persons as ends and not means alone? Is it consistent with a kingdom of ends? - All of that? And not meaning "I'll get away with it and be long gone before it matters to me." Not that, but in terms of reason as discussed above? Then your action meets Kant's criteria for being moral, and probably both mine and yours as well - good job!

But can you come up with competing maxims? Sure. Then you have to decide which. Having decided which, Kant lets you off the hook for the other. His position (as I understand it) is that there cannot be competing maxims. I take this to mean that if I think there are, then I need to think some more. The duties of a soldier in battle seem here an example.

More prosaically - perhaps - is my pet annoyance which is people who idle their automobiles when they shouldn't (in many places it's against local law). They're clearly not making a moral choice - clearly not even thinking. What is someone thinking who parks on a blistering hot pavement to drink their coffee and otherwise waste time, while running a hot, gas-powered, polluting, 150 horsepower air conditioner - while they could be instead inside in an air conditioned restaurant (e.g., McDonald's)? Argh, where are my meds!!

And somewhere Kant remarks that while the theory behind his ethics may be academically rigorous, he observes that common people get it. This alone insulates it from the efforts of the participants in the cottage industry of Kantian criticism whose arguments are, briefly and bluntly, arcane and obscure fluff.

The essence of Kantian ethics, again and always as I understand it, is simply to man up, adult up, and both take and be a thoughtful and responsible human being.

That is, the clerk could be rude for lots of reasons, none of moral significance. — tim wood

This is key, because Kantian deontological moral philosophy has to do with what IS morally significant, and not with the haphazard machinations of common life. This also releases Kant from the critical “arcane and obscure fluff” exemplified when “...he fails to investigate the possibility of conflicting moral claims....”**

While it is quite obvious Kant recognized the reality of conflicting moral claims; his was not the purpose to investigate them, but to provide knowledge of the supreme ground of good and right, in order for us to resolve them on our own:

“....Innocence is indeed a glorious thing; only, on the other hand, it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced. On this account even wisdom-which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge-yet has need of science, not in order to learn from it, but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence. Against all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness. Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible, and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command. Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i.e., a disposition, to argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt them at their very source, and entirely to destroy their worth-a thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good....”
——————

On competing maxims:
The reason for reducing moral philosophy to the idea of law, is to describe an absolute necessity. To will an action as if it were a universal law, therefore, carries that very absolute necessity as intrinsic to it. From here, one can see there is no competition within absolute necessity whatsoever. But that, in and of itself, isn’t sufficient for good moral conduct, for one must still feel the need to acquiesce to it, hence the principle of duty, from which the “act ONLY....” arises.

**Timmermann, 2013, “Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory”

We should not use metaphors when explaining something that is already difficult and dense.
If the foundation fails, whatever the problem the walls tend to solve wont be solved.Can you describe a good foundation without refering to what it is supposed to support.I certainly can do that but the analogy fails when you try to compare CI to foundation and walls to purpose/duty.Can a categorical imperative be seperated from the action/duty, l dont think so.They depend on each other.
"The point is that the CI corresponds to the foundation. The wall itself, the building of it, what it's for, those can all be apportioned to purpose/function, maxim, duty. When it comes to walls, there are all kinds for all purposes, even just of brick walls never mind other kinds. But the idea of a good foundation is a one, one idea.
What is the reason for a good foundation? To hold up, preserve, protect what is built on it, and its purpose. And this is the reason underlying the whole project."

I can try to build a structure that is made for collapsing when the enemies attack, but that requires a weak structure.In ethics, we cannot do that because nature does not discriminate and reason will not allow us to build a weak foundation, atleast not for ourselves.

Kant points out - makes the distinction - that the CI itself is always already prior - before - the particular question. Just as the need for a foundation for a wall is prior to the wall itself. As such, no matter of the wall itself has anything to do with the need for a foundation. the foundation is prior, the wall after. Similarly, no desire or other consideration of the act itself outside of its conformance with the CI, is relevant to the CI.

Well l don't think the analogy applies here, the act will be relevant to CI, if there is one but if there isn't any, the act can exist on its own.

I would like to respond to more arguments but the matter is not clear.

That doesn't matter though, since a maxim can have as many conditions added to it as you like. Whether you treat the exceptions as a competing maxim or a part of the first maxim is logically equivalent.

There is no logic involved here, you should try to use that term in its true sense.A conditional maxim is a contradiction in terms.We can throw away certain maxims or make them part of others but that will leaves us confused and destroy any ethical theory.

"If all store employees were rude to their customers then the concept itself of customer service would no longer be a real thing". This kind of granularity seems to be more controversial. You might say that customer service isn't what is violated, but civility in general. Another person would say that those aren't even contradictions like the lying-property one is, and that they wouldn't count as something violated. There is just no epistemological way to tell what kind of action should be universalized nor what the actual contradiction is that might be violated

I think Kant talks of perfect duties and imperfect duties, one is a must and the other is optional.
This is a big mess, simply beacuse we often get rhetoric,enotions mixed with convincing arguments, and trust me there is no way we will agree on what was Kant was saying if we regard him as right.
If we think Kant's position is weak, we can certainly share some common criticism of his theory.