As above, for me the referent of "the believing" would be the process or act of believing. I don't feel comfortable with referring to believing in that context as "thought/ belief formation". It may not be problematic, but I think it could be misleading, and I think "believing" is a perfectly sufficient term in any case, and that using a different term when referring to pre-linguistic contexts may help to avoid anthropomorphization and any confusion that might ensue from that. In other words I don't see any advantage, and perhaps no inevitable disadvantage, but I do see possible disadvantages, to be had in referring to the act of believing as an act of "belief formation" when speaking about a pre-linguistic context. — Janus
We can know what pre-linguistic thought/belief consists of by virtue of knowing what linguistic thought/belief consists of and taking it from there. Are you seeing this for yourself yet?
— creativesoul
No, I don't see that. As I said a few posts ago, I think the most we can do is "gesture at it" which means to speculate more or less blindly or wildly. — Janus
Perhaps an example would help. I throw a ball for the dog onto the verandah, He obviously doesn't see whether it has gone over the edge because he runs all around the verandah searching for the ball. When he has looked all over and doesn't find it he immediately runs down the stares and into the garden and looks there for the ball.
Now if it were me I would look all over the verandah and when I saw the ball wasn't there would think "The ball must have gone over the edge of the verandah onto the garden, so I should look there for it". Now I know the dog cannot think that thought just as I have expressed it there, since he cannot exercise symbolic language.
But I can conjecture that he might have visualized the ball being on the verandah, and when he found it wasn't then visualized it in the garden beyond. — Janus
That is, since there is no determinate "content" of thought in the absence of language, and since the indeterminate cannot count as content, then it makes no sense to talk of content in that context. I say the most we can do is speculate about how the indeterminate process of non-symbolic thinking might be related to or analogous to the determinate content of symbolic thinkin — Janus
I am saying that I can see no way to know what non-linguistic creatures' thinking consists in. By contrast, we know that linguistic creatures' thinking consists in language, or at least that it is expressible in language and thus comes to have determinate content. But it is not as though we determine some "content" of what we think and then translate that "content" into language; the expression of thinking in language just is the determination of its content. Put another the way the content of thought is inseparable form its symbolic expression. — Janus
Non linguistic thought/belief must consist of something that is evolutionarily amenable to propositions, assertions, and statements. It must be able to evolve and grow into the linguistic expressions we all know and use. Any and all accounts of thought/belief must be amenable to evolutionary terms. — creativesoul
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