Just to clarify, you asked me the stupidly broad question of whether or not there is a "commonality between the attitudes of say Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida when it comes to truth, dialectic, universality and transcendence?". Moreover, I affirmed that they are probably as many commonalities as there are differences in their respective "attitudes", which is just the banal answer that that banal question deserves. Further, my 'ignorant and unstudied comment' was directed at anyone who thinks there is a "general consensus among the postmoderns when it comes to the issues of truth and universality", and did not refer to the question of 'defining commonalities'.

With those little truths of of the way, I should point out just how much bad faith your OP bathes in. It wants to assert that, on the one hand, there are "defining commonalities of thought" between 'postmodern thinkers' (all three of them apparently! Because lets discount the humongous amount of other literature that comes out of the same tradition), and that on the other hand, it's not all that easy to pin down what their saying anyway. As for any actual examples of thesis statements regarding 'truth, meaning, universality, transcendence and metaphysics', of course there's nothing. OP is a joke whose only purpose is to invite further mystification and bad blood.

I'll just repost the commentary about the question of the universal, since the other stuff was referring to a comment made about a text discussed in the other thread.

If nothing universal or even true (apart from empirical facts) can be determined about humans, then what's the point of any discursive enquiry? — John

To understand what is not universal: each state of the world, in its distinction, regardless of it similarity.

Consider various "nature" arguments which make a generalisation about human ability of behaviour. Is it true someone with an AMAB (assigned male at birth) body is stronger than someone with a AFAB (assigned female at birth) body? The old universal assumptions say: "Yes." We are to know, from merely the presence of a categorised body (rather than, you know, someone's actual strength), that someone will be stronger than another. It's a rule which applies regardless of time, environment or the individual.

The post-modern approach disbands this inaccurate (and contrary to the empirical) form of argument. It turns the argument into a question of individual expression, rather than determining constraint. We understand the generalisation about strength to be false. There is no such universality. AMAB bodies are frequently stronger, but they are so on the basis of that individual's strength, not because of a body with a particular sex categorisation.

Instead of relying on ad hoc assertions of necessity, nature, reason and desires, we have to actually to the work to describe people honestly.

We even get around the "distinction is universal" objection, for it is not "universal." We are all part of a shared world. We share an environment. A child shares their mothers body. An artist shares ideas with an audience. And so and so on. We might always be distinct, but we are also always together too. Distinction is not universal.

I am thinking primarily of Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault here, and I think there are broadly characteristic attitudes shared by these three thinkers to questions about truth, meaning, universality, transcendence and metaphysics. Now I am not saying they all present exactly the same thoughts about these matters, but that the thoughts presented in their various works are generally confined within certain characteristic shared boundaries. — John

I agree there are shared characteristics, insofar as they all disregard "universal" narratives, but that doesn't tell us much. All it says is they reject a "grounding myth." Sure, it's upsetting to many others interested in investigating the world (they love their myths which account for all there is), but it's only an assertion is that people can't reduce the world to their particular myth.

There are many differences between them. I mean Derrida and Foucault were famously at each others throats.

The thoughts of the Postmoderns share another characteristic; they are not easy to pin down due to the fact that they generally eschew argument, so they are able to avail themselves of a certain slipperiness. — John

This is certainly the statement of someone who has not seriously read them. Postmodern philosophers make arguments all the time. Sometimes they are needlessly obscure and convoluted, but they definitely hold positions. No doubt they are "slippery" in that they don't assert a simple myth (i.e. "the universal ground" ) which is supposed to account for everything, but that says more about what certain readers think they need out of them, rather than the worth or accuracy of what they are saying.

What's the difference between a "general consensus" and "defining commonalities" in your book?

I don't see any inconsistency in asserting that it is difficult (which is not to say impossible) to know what Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault are actually saying, and that there are defining commonalities of thought. Because the latter consists as much in what they are not saying, as what they are saying. And when it comes to the key ideas of the three; they are well enough established.

Well go on then, make a damn statement with some examples and citations, and stop speaking in this uncommitted 'meta' manner about what you want to talk about. If you have a thesis to put forward, spit it out, and evidence it. Otherwise so far there's only been one instance of 'slipperiness' in this thread so far. Can you do more than hand wave here?

Maybe you can start with, to pick a random example out of thin air, Deleuze's affirmation that he was a pure metaphysician, in contrast to say, Derrida's attempt to 'deconstruct' all metaphysics. Perhaps you can also say something about Deleuze's commitment to pure immanence, as opposed to Derrida's rather more tangled relationship with transcendence. Or perhaps you can comment on Derrida's and Foucault's lifelong polemic reagarding their respective philosophical methodologies. I mean, I know that one of my interests, personally, is in finding points of convergence and divergence in Deleuze and Derrida. I've been struggling with that one for years, as have a multitude of other scholars in the field. Given the relative paucity of literature on the subject (trust me, I've looked high and low), you might have something interesting to say. Perhaps you can comment on the work on Len Lawlor, who is the kind of standard references when trying to coordinate these thinkers. Go on, show your work.

Is it true someone with an AMAB (assigned male at birth) body is stronger than someone with a AFAB (assigned female at birth) body? — TheWillowOfDarkness

Is it true that male humans are, on average, physically stronger than females?

There are many differences between them. I mean Derrida and Foucault were famously at each others throats. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I seem to remember that they disagreed about Foucault's treatment of Cartesian doubt in his History of Madness. But can you think of any significant differences when it comes to the 'big' questions.?

Would you say it is true that Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida among other postmodernist thinkers all reject structuralist principles of meaning?

Not at all.

LOL, no. I am interested to know if anyone can come up with a really significant difference or two between any postmodernist thinkers when it comes to truth, meaning, metaphysics and so on.

So some of them remain structuralists? Which ones?

I agree there is a shared characteristics, insofar as they all disregard "universal" narratives, but that doesn't tell us much. All it says is they reject a "grounding myth." — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, but isn't their rejection of "grounding myths" a significant defining characteristic of PM?

Not rejecting 'structuralist principles of meaning' (an awkward phrase to begin with) doesn't make one a structuralist. And again, what kind of structuralism are you referring to? Piaget? Levi-Strauss? Saussure? Rousset? Lacan? Not all of whom agree with each other, of course. But as usual, you simply trade in shallow labels and aren't able to advance any concrete assertions. I'm done with the empty shell of a thread.

Is it true that male humans are, on average, physically stronger than females? — John

AMAB bodies (mature) are stronger on average than AFAB bodies (mature).

But that's not the question that was asked. An average only speaks about a trend across a large group of people. I asked you whether it was true that a person with a AMAB was stronger than someone with a AFMB body. Giving an average doesn't answer that question.

I seem to remember that they disagreed about Foucault's treatment of Cartesian doubt in his History of Madness. But can you think of any significant differences when it comes to the 'big' questions.? — John

What exactly is a "big question?"

OK, but isn't their rejection of "grounding myths" a significant defining characteristic of PM? — John

Yes... but that doesn't tell us anything about what they think and the worth of their arguments. Well, unless you are only interested in cheerleading for "grounding myths," which seems to be the case here.

This is certainly the statement of someone who has not seriously read them. Postmodern philosophers make arguments all the time. Sometimes they are needlessly obscure and convoluted, but they definitely hold positions. No doubt they are "slippery" in that they don't assert a simple myth (i.e. "the universal ground" ) which is supposed to account for everything, but that says more about what certain readers think they need out of them, rather than the worth or accuracy of what they are saying. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I freely admit that I have not really extensively read them. My experience had been that they generally are convoluted and that they don't rigorously argue for their theses in the way that AP's and the traditional philosophers, usually do. My impression has always been that if i expended the time and effort to penetrate their works to really understand what they are getting at, that I would be disappointed and feel that I had expended more effort than the pay-off was worth.

I've said this before on these forums; I think their work has more value as poetry than as philosophy. If you are a connoisseur of new and novel ways to think about things in a kind of free-floating vacuum free of traditional philosophical presuppositions then you may well enjoy them very much.

Look, I am no expert on these philosophers, but I have formed an opinion, rightly or wrongly, about them, that there are not significant differences between them on the 'big' questions. I admit I could be wrong, and that could easily be shown by someone coming up with such a significant difference.

What exactly is a "big question?" — TheWillowOfDarkness

Questions of metaphysics, ontology, meaning, transcendence, truth, the nature of dialectic, religion, spirituality, ethics, aesthetics, universals, essence and existence and so on. All the questions that are important to human life, in other words.

But that's not the question that was asked. An average only speaks about a trend across a large group of people. I asked you whether it was true that a person with a AMAB was stronger than someone with a AFMB body. Giving an average doesn't answer that question. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Well, it will be more likely that any randomly selected male will be stronger than a randomly selected female; but of course that can tell you definitely what will be the case regarding any particular pair of male and female persons. But that seems to be so obvious as to be hardly worth noting.

It is not so easy to come up with non-examples of significant differences. It should be far easier to come up with examples, specially for those more familiar with the works of the thinkers in question than I. I am not the expert; I am just someone who has read a bit of Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida, and formed an opinion that may well be shown to be erroneous.

That would a group probability.

You say that's it obvious, but it's exactly that sort of action which "universals" ignore. We've just spend decades unstitching the "universals" like a man you encountered will be stronger than a woman, to partial success, which grounded gender roles and assumptions of behaviour.

Sure, it seems obvious, but it's not reflected in how people think and react. I mean even you in this very thread jumped straight to "The Truth" of men being stronger than women, as if our understanding of the individual was meant to be channelled through group measures and probabilities.

You didn't answer my question on the terms of what it was interested in. Instead of saying: " You asked about individuals. We need to examine how strong they are," you went for the "universal" which supposedly allows us to say someone's significance without actually knowing or thinking about them.

Well, no I was speaking only generally and in terms of probability. I mean if I asked you whether a gorilla, a tiger, a rhinoceros or an elephant is stronger than a man what would you say?

I'd say you have to look at the tiger, rhinoceros, elephant or man. Probability doesn't cut it. The individual may differ from the supposed "universal." No myths. No generalisations. Individuals understood for who they are rather than assumed to be part of a universal someone thinks the world needs.

Indeed, you were speaking general and in terms of probability. That's the issue. "Only generally" really means "how this individual we are talking about is." You are using it to describe an individual, not talk about a trend or probability.

Well, if I asserted that transcendence is real, or that there are truths which are such independent of humanity or even just independent of discourse, that we have an immortal soul, or that we should trust our individual intuitions, I think I can safely say that none of the three in question will agree with me.

But I'm not. I can't believe that you don't agree that any healthy and mature tiger, silverback gorilla, rhinoceros or elephant would be stronger by far than any man or woman on the planet.

Anyway is this not straying somewhat from the subject of the thread?

Which man or woman? The weaker individuals we are aware of? I have no problem saying a stronger tiger, silverback gorilla, rhinoceros or elephant is stronger by far.


What I don't say is that, without reference to any individuals, a mature tiger, silverback gorilla, rhinoceros or elephant is stronger. It's simply not true. There is no such necessity. The world may do something different.

I'm not surprised you can't believe I would take this position either. That's the way "universals" work. They suppose any other meaning in the given context is impossible. A human that's stronger than a tiger is just something that can't happen by logic. The world simply must have humans weaker than tigers, else it doesn't make sense. Nature would be transgressed.

But the world doesn't care about what you think it needs. It will do what it does. If that includes a tiger that's weaker than a human, then that's what will be.

Anyway is this not straying somewhat from the subject of the thread? — John

Maybe, but I'm using the example to demonstrate how your concern is for protecting universals. Your objection to postmodernism about the rejection these "grounding myths." You aren't even willing to engage with them because, as a sort of microcosm of the issue of contention, the won't accept they grounding myth that tigers are necessarily stronger than humans.

Yes, there is a general trend to think in 'modern' and 'postmodern' ways about those issues; and a rejection of much that is traditional in philosophy. The general consensus seems to be very much that these traditional issues have been put to rest, because they were based on false assumptions, or at least assumptions which are no longer thought to be appropriate. In short I think there is a lot of fashion at work in the academy.

I also think it has a lot to do with the rise of the scientific paradigm and its permeation of academic thought in general, which is beginning to 'trickle down'. But, it is a hard assertion to argue for, because where would one begin?

I know that Deleuze considered himself a transcendental empiricist and actually a metaphysician who wanted to provide a metaphysics to support mathematics and science. But this is very far from traditional metaphysics, because it has already accepted that there is a 'master' metaphysics implicit in math and science'; that is it has already accepted materialism. So it is really a rejection of traditional metaphysics; it is only a matter of working out all the details.
.

Which man or woman — TheWillowOfDarkness

Any man or woman.

I am not saying it is impossible there could be a man stronger than an elephant; I am saying that I have every reason to believe there is no such man, because if there were, everyone would have heard of him.

I'm sorry but that's exactly what you're saying.

If there might be a elephant weaker than a man or woman, then it's not true any man or own must be weaker. You can't just assume any man or woman is weaker. Now, if you restrict your claim to the men and women we know about, the ones weaker than an elephant, then the issue is resolved. But then it's not a "universal truth."

Your second sentence is a common reaction to when the universal gets challenged. The appeal to make it seem like you position must be truth though what we observed of the world. A man stronger than an elephant simply must be known or he wouldn't exist.

Anyone with a basic understanding evidence knows this is false. Things may go unobserved. People may keep secrets. You don't have every reason to discount the existence of such a man. Just every reason to discount him in the observed world (falsified) and good reason not think one is hidden somewhere on Earth (probabilities given what we observed about humans and elephants).

You aren't even willing to engage with them because, as a sort of microcosm of the issue of contention, the won't accept they grounding myth that tigers are necessarily stronger than humans. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, you see you are misrepresenting my position. I don't say that tigers are necessarily stronger than humans, but that they generally are. Every mature tiger on the planet is probably stronger than every mature human being; that is what I am saying.

But I certainly would not say that every mature man is stronger than every mature woman; I can say with virtual certainty that that would be untrue.

But, I'm not saying that there is no such man; I'm saying I have good reason to believe that there is no such man. Can you not see the difference between the claims?

Again, that's a probability, not a description of the individual.

If we are actually dealing with describing a person or tiger, such assertions have no force. They are misused group measures, used as a "grounding myth," to assert the meaning of mature tigers and mature women without considering the individuals involved.

No "general rule" is useful for describing an individual.

But, I'm not saying that there is no such man; I'm saying I have good reason to believe that there is no such man. Can you not see the difference between the claims? — John

They are different. The problem is you equivocate them when it comes to relate to the individual. Your "good reasons" become the "ground" from which you derive meaning and expectations of the individual. When you ought to be describing the individual (this person is weaker than this tiger), you use your "good reasons" and assert the "general" expresses what they mean.

there is a general trend to think in 'modern' and 'postmodern' ways about those issues; and a rejection of much that is traditional in philosophy. The general consensus seems to be very much that these traditional issues have been put to rest, because they were based on false assumptions, or at least assumptions which are no longer thought to be appropriate. — John

Interestingly, the one-volume anthology of postmodernism I mentioned in the other thread, The Truth about the Truth, has an impassioned essay by Huston Smith saying pretty well exactly that. And, he was included in the volume! So I think it's unwise to say that 'postmodernism says...' So, agree with SLX on that. Besides, he really does know Lacan and Badiou and Deleuze and all those writers in depth and detail (in fact the first time I heard of most of them was reading his posts about them). So even though I don't generally find a lot of common ground with SLX, in this matter I think he's probably right!

I wonder if you have ever discovered what is loosely called 'the perennialists'. That was a group of scholars including Frithjof Schuon, Ananda Cooomaraswamy, and Rene Guenon. (There are some pretty out-lying characters also, like Julius Evola.) Now, myself, I only know snippets of these people (hey I know snippets of a lot of things) but I think you would find them more congenial than most of the well-known philosophers associated with post-modernism. (Have a look at Sophia Perennis.)

But then, another approach would be to find some current writer who is a kind of 'post-modern-neo-traditionalist', who draws all those strands together and then critiques the other post modernists on account of their lack of spirituality. There's bound to be one. That would be 'using the strength of the adversary against him'.