If strict determinism was proved, predestination follows as a consequence. But predestination seems to be possible without determinism - we would simply not be able determine an already fixed future.

No experiment is ever repeatable in the strictest sense. We cannot get the same rat to choose twice between hole A and B - when we repeat the experiment, time has moved on and it is a different rat making a different choice.

So I would have though free will cannot be proved empirically (or theoretically).

Yes it's an empirical claim.

Empirical claims are not provable. They're only falsifiable to the extent that someone isn't willing to make whatever moves they'd need to make to retain their claim/theory in the face of recalcitrant evidence (a la Duhem-Quine).

Nevertheless a common denominator is that free will is the ability to choose without influences that we can't control.

My question is is the statement "Free will exists/doesn't exist" an empirical claim or not? — TheMadFool

The problem is it can always be said that there are influences we can't control even if we don't notice them. Even if we thought that there is no influence we can't control, it could be said that there might be something we can't control that influences our thoughts and we don't notice it.

What we can check empirically is whether we notice any influence that we can't control. One example of such influence is that when we jump upwards we always seem to get brought down to the ground, we can't seem to choose to keep going up. So in appearance at least we don't seem to have complete free will, there are some influences that we can't seem to control. But then it could be argued that maybe it's possible and we just haven't found out how yet.

Also I think that whether we have free will or not is a personal view: if you don't care about having superpowers, and whenever you make a choice there is seemingly no influence you can't control that is leading you to choose one way or another, then you could say that you have free will regarding what matters to you.

Another thing to consider is that we share the world with others who have a will of their own, and their will could be seen as an influence we don't have complete control over. But then if we had complete control over what they will then they couldn't have free will, if anyone had complete control over what others will then they couldn't have free will. But our will is a limiting factor to the free will of others only to the extent that we prevent them to choose something.

The question of whether or not free will would be a physical phenomenon, and therefore subject to an empirical approach, goes to the core of the debate.

There are a number of intertwined issues here. Is everything reducible to physical phenomena and do physical phenomena therefore provide a complete account of consciousness and will? Is it even conceivable that, under physical laws, something like freedom would exist? If so, how would it be distinguishable from randomness?

I do not think "freedom" has any place in the physical world. It's simply not something the laws of physics provide the grounds for. At best, there might be true randomness, but even that is, as far as I am aware, at least heavily debated. Which leads me to conclude that "free will" could, if it exists, not be a physical phenomenon in the first place. Therefore using empirical science to prove or disprove free will is pointless.

So I would have though free will cannot be proved empirically (or theoretically). — Devans99

Yes it's an empirical claim. — Terrapin Station

:chin:

Are we making progress?

The problem is it can always be said that there are influences we can't control even if we don't notice them. Even if we thought that there is no influence we can't control, it could be said that there might be something we can't control that influences our thoughts and we don't notice it. — leo

This resonates with what I consider an impossible requirement to demonstrate/falsify free will viz. the necessity for omniscience. Since we need to know ALL factors that may influence our choices and this requires us to know everything about the mind it then means we need to be omniscient which is a practical impossibility.

Are we making progress? — Terrapin Station

:razz: :grin:

I do not think "freedom" has any place in the physical world. It's simply not something the laws of physics provide the grounds for. — Echarmion

Absolutely. And, as if that wasn’t enough, it does not follow necessarily, that because empirical claims are unprovable, and the concept of freedom is unprovable, that freedom is an empirical conception. It is logically consistent, on the other hand, that because the empirical domain has its principle causality, the rational domain should have its own principle causality. Freedom’s as good an idea/concept/word as some other, seems like.