'Qualia' are only ever discussed in the context of a particular clique of current American academic specialists. As such, I think the term deserves to be regarded as 'jargon'. Treating such a term as denoting something important is a concession to the barren debate which gave rise to it.

I'm studying a module in Metaphysics of Mind at the moment in (analytic) Academe. I have a sensible tutor who doesn't speak about qualia much. It seems to me that 'experience' and 'the first person' are the important concepts to keep a hold of: we experience living in certain ways, I feel and think and act in certain ways, and these ways are not always quantifiable, they are often qualitative, and most certainly they are ill-represented by the present language of the natural sciences.

I am reading round the topic and found a nice essay by Chomsky from the 90's about language and mind, much of which is about linguistics, but some of it is about terminology. While he comes from a naturalistic perspective he was interestingly relaxed about the supposed distinction between 'mental' and 'physical' that analytics get worked up about. These are just words we use, they don't represent ontological categories. If belief and desire precipitate action, in our usual way of putting things, who is to say they are merely 'mental'? I see 'belief' and 'desire' in other people's demeanour and behaviour. Conversely, to call someone 'hot-blooded' or 'sharp-tongued' is not to refer to them by physical terms.

'Qualia' have become a bit of problematic catch-all, representing too many things to too many different people, at least that's my take on them. But then, at the moment I am much more excited in opposing the 'causal closure of the physical', which people of a natural-scientific inclination seem to presume awfully easily. They can't provide me with a forecast-successful empirical model of the little spider that keeps crawling across my desk - but say that physics is causally closed - it beggars belief. Or so I think! But I'm such an empiricist I suppose. I love science because it's empirical, getting to the bottom of all sorts of phenomena, and hate it when people try and impose Big Theories on me with evidence that's a chain of a thousand inferences from the actual phenomenon I'm experiencing.

I suppose, lastly, that's why one would want to hang on to qualia: because they represent feelings we have that Big Science with its Big Theories seems to be trampling out of existence. Perhaps I should be at the barricades for them after all, but 'in the literature' they have been rather misused to mean all sorts of things, so I don't know if there's a way of hauling them back in.

PS...I found online the original paper by Levine from 1983, which talks about qualia and introduced the concept of 'the explanatory gap', a concept I should have mentioned in my rambling post because it seems to me useful even if qualia aren't: the notion that any physical account of an experience will have something missing.

http://www.uoguelph.ca/~abailey/Resources/levine.pdf

And what are the consequences of dismantling qualia? What happens to our manifest image? Does pain no longer hurt? Does red no longer look red? The absurdity of this leads me to believe that the entire project to dismantle qualia is fundamentally flawed. — darthbarracuda

I don't think anyone denies that pain hurts or thinks that science will someday explain it away. Instead, the objection is that the term lacks a meaningful referent or useful function, similar to the older notion of "sense-data" in perception. Our experiences have a qualitative nature. It doesn't follow that qualia is a thing or that we experience qualia.

The absurdity of this leads me to believe that the entire project to dismantle qualia is fundamentally flawed. — darthbarracuda

Yeah, I have never quite understood either (a) the desire to eliminate (the idea of) qualia, (b) the notion that there's anything mysterious about qualia. Both sides of that have always seemed ridiculous to me.

I feel and think and act in certain ways, and these ways are not always quantifiable, they are often qualitative — mcdoodle

Qualitative/qualities/qualia are just the properties of something (with "qualia" being reserved for a specific context, of course). So how would how you feel and think and act ever not be qualitative?

But then, at the moment I am much more excited in opposing the 'causal closure of the physical', which people of a natural-scientific inclination seem to presume awfully easily. They can't provide me with a forecast-successful empirical model of the little spider that keeps crawling across my desk - but say that physics is causally closed - it beggars belief. — mcdoodle

I'm a physicalist. My physicalism has nothing to do with subservience or deferment to the scientific discipline of physics, and as an ontological stance, it is in no way dictated by epistemic abilities, psychological satisfaction, social conventions, etc. with respect to empirical models/"explanations," etc.

The curious case of the robot and the scientist.

Consider a faulty scientist and a faulty robot. The scientist is an expert in light, but was born with a rare condition affecting her optic nerve, that makes it unable to transmit blue light signals. The robot has a loose wire, so it too is unable to transmit blue light signals from its camera. The scientist is fixed by a doctor, and the robot is fixed by an engineer.

So, what has changed? Both the robot and the scientist can now recognise blue and are able to use that recognition to perform certain tasks. Both the robot and scientist experience blue.

But, only the scientist now *knows* what it is like to experience blue, the robot does not. There are also a couple of curious aspects of this experience that she notices - she, despite her extensive knowledge, could not predict what the experience was going to be like, and she can't describe it either.

Only the scientist possesses the quale of blue.

It seems a bit easy just to deny qualia exist, rather than recognise there is a potentially deep philosophical problem to solve.

Both the scientist's and robot's blue has qualities that are unique to the blue phenomenon at their respective terminuses. The robot's blue isn't a quale, because we reserve that word for a conscious experience of blue, which we don't believe the robot has. There's no reason to believe at this point that conscious experience isn't a peculiarity of the exact matter, structures and processes of functining brains.

Re the science predicting what the experience would be like, propositional knowledge simply isn't identical to experiences. It's not identical to anything else that's not (the same) propositional knowledge.

Both the scientist's and robot's blue has qualities that are unique to the blue phenomenon at their respective terminuses. The robot's blue isn't a quale, because we reserve that word for a conscious experience of blue, which we don't believe the robot has. There's no reason to believe at this point that conscious experience isn't a peculiarity of the exact matter, structures and processes of functining brains. — Terrapin Station

But where is the "terminus"? Both robot and scientist are being affected by blue light - i.e. some atoms are being affected.

We know, via computational universality, that consciousness *cannot* be a peculiarity of an exact state of matter.

Also, depending on how you define consciousness, there exist conscious entities that don't possess qualia - e.g. all non-human animals.

The fact remains that qualia are unpredictable and indescribable - very odd indeed!

I wrote this a while ago in a similar thread I started: "Is "mind is an illusion" a legitimate position in Philosophy of Mind?"

Here is what I wrote: Here's the thing, even if consciousness is mirage-like, this mirage "exists" in some way, even if the origins of the consciousness is somehow descriptively from something else. What's funny about Dennett's position is he seems to go into painstaking detail to say he is not committing the homunculus fallacy but then does so by saying the mind is an illusion. Why? Because the illusion has to subside somewhere. Explaining the "actual" origins of the illusion, and ways in which it "we" are fooled, means that all these tricks and mirages are happening "somewhere" and that implies that there is a projector of mind where the illusion is playing out and that is the homnuclus fallacy. The illusion itself has to be accounted for as something that "feels like" it is happening.

But where is the "terminus"? — tom

I was just using that term as a way of denoting the phenomenon at the location of the robot's circuits and the scientist's brain.

We know, via computational universality, that consciousness *cannot* be a peculiarity of an exact state of matter. — tom

I don't think we know any such thing, especially not via "computational universality." For one, that would surely rest on a mistaken ontology of mathematics.

Also, depending on how you define consciousness, there exist conscious entities that don't possess qualia - e.g. all non-human animals. — tom

Such a thing is not possible in my view. "Qualia" is just a term for the qualities, the properties, that is, of conscious phenomena. If an entity has consciousness, that conscious phenomena has properties.

The fact remains that qualia are unpredictable and indescribable — tom

Not at all. Again, it's just the properties of conscious phenomena.

Good points, schopenhauer1

Obeying the laws of thought, modern science favors quantifiable results that fit classical logic's yes or no, true or false, criteria which recognize the law of non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle in classical logic. Qualia provide a metaphorical alternative that can be applied to anything where the law of identity is in question. A shadow or black hole, for example, possess a humble identity that simultaneously can be said to both exist and not exist because they are extremely context dependent. Similarly, yin-yang dynamics or paradoxes of any kind can be described as qualia or metaphors which can be incorporated in fuzzy logic and the emotional-logic or metaphoric logic of Intuitionistic mathematics.

Just as we have a conscious mind, we have an unconscious one and qualia allow us to define them according to their function in specific contexts.

In my view there's no good reason to buy that there's an unconscious mind per se. I certainly buy that there are unconscious brain processes, but unconscious thoughts, concepts, desires, etc. are essentially an "other minds" problem, with the added complication that we can't even know (by acquaintance) the suggested phenomena from a first-person perspective.

In my view there's no good reason to buy that there's an unconscious mind per se. I certainly buy that there are unconscious brain processes, but unconscious thoughts, concepts, desires, etc. are essentially an "other minds" problem, with the added complication that we can't even know (by acquaintance) the suggested phenomena from a first-person perspective. — Terrapin Station

If we hit someone over the head and knock them out we say they are "unconscious" and to claim they are still conscious without any empirical evidence is either semantic splitting of hairs or mystical metaphysical mumbo jumbo along the lines of saying everything is consciousness. We have only so many words to choose from to define their mental state of unawareness just as we only have so many words such as "time" that describe change. Some cultures have no future tense or verbs "to be", but English speaking cultures are not among them and even they recognize change. We live, we die, we are conscious or unconscious and according to even the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction without there being a way to negate what someone calls "consciousness" its just so much gibberish.

If we hit someone over the head and knock them out we say they are "unconscious" and to claim they are still conscious without any empirical evidence is either semantic splitting of hairs or mystical metaphysical mumbo jumbo along the lines of saying everything is consciousness. — wuliheron

It seems like you just didn't read my response that closely. I said, "I certainly buy that there are unconscious brain processes." So yeah, the person who is knocled out is unconscious, and their brain is still active. What I disagree with is that there's any good reason to say that those unconscious brain processes amount to mentality, so that they're having thoughts etc. just where they're not aware of them.

It seems like you just didn't read my response that closely. I said, "I certainly buy that there are unconscious brain processes." So yeah, the person who is knocled out is unconscious, and their brain is still active. What I disagree with is that there's any good reason to say that those unconscious brain processes amount to mentality, so that they're having thoughts etc. just where they're not aware of them. — Terrapin Station

The most recent evidence in physics is that the brain maximizes entropy and consciousness is therefore an emergent property. Humor is another example of an apparent emergent property. Infants do not laugh or express any sense of humor for the first four months. They must first build up a pattern matching "data base" where the pattern of humor revolving around what is low in entropy, or what's missing from this picture, leaps out at them from the data just as we might assemble a table top puzzle and the picture it contains will suddenly start to leap out at us as we collect more of the Big Picture of what it looks like.

What that means is there is no clear dividing line between what is a conscious or unconscious mind any more than there is between what is humorous and what is serious because it remains context dependent upon whatever "data base" we are currently using in a given situation. Sometimes I like to joke that the brightest lights are often left on when nobody is home. What is memory and what is awareness becomes context dependent because there is no way for us to distinguish between the two ourselves.

I don't think we know any such thing, especially not via "computational universality." For one, that would surely rest on a mistaken ontology of mathematics. — Terrapin Station

Computational universality is a principle of physics. It has nothing to do with mathematics, or its ontology. All known laws of physics, and all future laws will respect this principle.

We know that a universal computer can be put in 1-to-1 correspondence with the human brain (or any other finite physical system).

Computational universality is a principle of physics. It has nothing to do with mathematics, or its ontology. All known laws of physics, and all future laws will respect this principle.

We know that a universal computer can be put in 1-to-1 correspondence with the human brain (or any other finite physical system). — tom

"A black hole has no hair! Gravity without mass! Time is what prevents everything from happening at once! There is no law except the law that there is no law!" John Wheeler

"If you think you understand quantum mechanics you are wrong!" Richard Feynman

In my view there's no good reason to buy that there's an unconscious mind per se — Tom

I think its existence is incontestable. It is a known fact that one's mental processes are in part directed by sub-processes of which one is not conscious (by definition) but which have a considerable bearing on one's actions and decisions. Of course such psychological issues are in some sense 'soft science' but I think the general notion of the unconscious is also supported by neurological studies as well.

The curious case of the robot and the scientist... — Tom

That's actually a paraphrase of a fairly well-known philosophical thought experiment called Mary's Room (in that case, the color in question is red, but the idea is the same). Interestingly, Frank Jackson, who defended dualism when he originally proposed Mary's Room, later changed his mind and started to defend materialism.

I agree with this entirely.
Qualia is just a fancy word for abstraction.

thanks! Warms the quale of my heart >:O

The curious case of the robot and the scientist.

Consider a faulty scientist and a faulty robot. The scientist is an expert in light, but was born with a rare condition affecting her optic nerve, that makes it unable to transmit blue light signals. The robot has a loose wire, so it too is unable to transmit blue light signals from its camera. The scientist is fixed by a doctor, and the robot is fixed by an engineer.

So, what has changed? Both the robot and the scientist can now recognise blue and are able to use that recognition to perform certain tasks. Both the robot and scientist experience blue.

But, only the scientist now *knows* what it is like to experience blue, the robot does not. There are also a couple of curious aspects of this experience that she notices - she, despite her extensive knowledge, could not predict what the experience was going to be like, and she can't describe it either.

Only the scientist possesses the quale of blue.

It seems a bit easy just to deny qualia exist, rather than recognise there is a potentially deep philosophical problem to solve. — tom

Why would the robot need to experience blue in order to know what blue represents? Why couldn't it represent a 475nm wavelength of EM energy with some other symbol in it's memory and still "know" what the scientists "knows"?

We don't have qualia just to have qualia. Qualia inform us of some state-of-affairs outside of our minds. If a banana is yellow, it is ripe and ready to eat. If it is black it is rotten and not good to eat. When you say "The banana is yellow", aren't you really meaning that the banana is ripe? If the robot were to bypass it's qualia and just say, "the banana is ripe". How is that any different? Both the scientist and robot know the banana is ripe. Why would the robot need to experience yellow to know the banana is ripe? Knowledge needs to be redefined to take into account the fact that information is stored (long term memory like a hard drive) and can be accessed when similar information arrives in working memory (short term memory like RAM) in order to interpret the information in working memory. Knowing is simply the ability to interpret some bit of information using stored memory. This why I can say that "I know how to tie my shoes" even when I'm not tying my shoes, nor accessing memory with instructions on how to tie my shoes. I know how to tie my shoes even when I'm sleeping because the instructions are stored in my long term memory.

But where is the "terminus"? Both robot and scientist are being affected by blue light - i.e. some atoms are being affected.

We know, via computational universality, that consciousness *cannot* be a peculiarity of an exact state of matter.

Also, depending on how you define consciousness, there exist conscious entities that don't possess qualia - e.g. all non-human animals.

The fact remains that qualia are unpredictable and indescribable - very odd indeed! — tom

I think it is anthropomorphic to claim that all non-human animals don't possess consciousness to some degree. When we share nearly 99% of our genes with chimps, what is it about that 1% that prevents the chimp from having consciousness? How do you explain how a chimp can know that when another chimp is staring in another direction, then they look in that direction too. This must mean that they can model other chimps' mental activity - that they know that other chimps have access to information that they might not until they look in the same direction.

To me, all animals with central nervous systems have consciousness to some degree. The brain is the central location where all sensory input coalesces into a whole experience of visuals, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations at once. This provides a benefit to organisms who have this system because it allows you to compare the information from one sense to another in real time. You can discern more detail about things, and make less mistakes, with more senses accessing it. When you see someone from behind and you mistake them for someone you know until you hear them speak, is an example. The key difference between humans and other animals is that humans seem to have acquired this mental ability to turn their mental processing back on itself - of thinking about thinking - of thinking about themselves doing the thinking - to reflect on the process itself rather than just be the process.

The most recent evidence in physics is that the brain maximizes entropy — wuliheron

What would that even mean? (And physics research on brains?) Maybe if you'd link to the research you have in mind, it would make more sense than your attempted paraphrasing of it.

Anyway, nothing you said after that in any way implies (and it doesn't even seem to have the slightest bit to do with) the idea of mental content that we're not aware of.

Computational universality is a principle of physics. It has nothing to do with mathematics, or its ontology. — tom

So it's not part of computability theory, which is a branch of mathematical logic?

What would that even mean? (And physics research on brains?) Maybe if you'd link to the research you have in mind, it would make more sense than your attempted paraphrasing of it.

Anyway, nothing you said after that in any way implies (and it doesn't even seem to have the slightest bit to do with) the idea of mental content that we're not aware of. — Terrapin Station

Physics describes the fundamental relationships between anything observable and, for example, they've also shown how quantum mechanics applies to the brain.

The brain maximizing entropy means its organized to produce the lowest possible energy state of the system. Two pendulum clocks hung on the same wall will coerce one another to swing in unison by vibrating the wall, thus, producing the lowest possible energy state of the system. Its analogous to a car engine idling which can then leap the fastest into a higher energy state, while going from a higher energy state down to a lower one takes more time. My own belief is it reflects the original impetus of the Big Bang still expanding and means the human brain is actually a creative engine that only incidentally happens to resemble a computer simply because its another way to be creative.

Among countless other things, this would explain why the human brain capacity is estimated to be over a petabyte, or the equivalent of the entire worldwide web, yet human memory is notoriously fallible. What it also implies is there is no clear way to distinguish between the human mind and brain because they form the particle-wave duality of quantum mechanics and are indivisible complimentary-opposites. Already neurologists have shown that at their most fundamental level of organization the two can substitute for each other roles providing better error correction and greater efficiency. The current suspicion among many is that the architecture of the mind-brain describes how the fundamental laws of nature are organized possibly due to supersymmetry applying to everything.

I'm calling bs on you, wuliheron. Let's see a reference to one of the studies you're talking about.

There's nothing B.S. in anything I've said, however, feel free to read up on Penrose's experimental confirmation of quantum mechanics in the brain and all the neurology if you want. Donald Hoffman is a game theorist who spent ten years examining the neurology and running one computer simulation after another only to finally concede that if the human mind and brain had ever resembled anything remotely like reality we would have become extinct as a species. The simple truth is quantum mechanics applies on the macroscopic level as well as the subatomic and everyone is now rushing to put the pieces together. The latest estimates are that classical computers will be capable of exposing the mathematical foundations of a theory of everything within ten years. The chase is afoot and its believed within the next century physics will achieve the alchemists dream.

Here's what you claimed:

"The most recent evidence in physics is that the brain maximizes entropy"

I'm saying that's b.s..

There's an easy way to show that I'm wrong, to establish that it's not b.s.--how? Well, simply reference a study done under the rubric of physics that claims that "the brain 'maximizes entropy.'"

Re very non-specifically mentioning Penrose, for example, I'd guess that you're referring to The Emperor's New Mind. I read that, though quite some time ago, so I don't recall anything Penrose said in it about entropy, but at any rate that's a popular work that doesn't count as any sort of research, and it's especially not physics research.

The curious case of the robot and the scientist.

Consider a faulty scientist and a faulty robot. The scientist is an expert in light, but was born with a rare condition affecting her optic nerve, that makes it unable to transmit blue light signals. The robot has a loose wire, so it too is unable to transmit blue light signals from its camera. The scientist is fixed by a doctor, and the robot is fixed by an engineer.

So, what has changed? Both the robot and the scientist can now recognise blue and are able to use that recognition to perform certain tasks. Both the robot and scientist experience blue.

But, only the scientist now *knows* what it is like to experience blue, the robot does not. — Tom

I think this is quite misleading, there is a confusion about what we are denoting with the word "blue".
There are two possibilities:

• "blue" is denoting the radiation with wavelenght 450-495 nm: in this case saying "experience blue" doesn't make sense because the experience comes from the interaction between the radiation and the human sensory apparatus: one could experience the radiation in different ways if he is a different animal
• "blue" is denoting the quale produced by the radiation, in this case the robot wouldn't "experience blue" but there is no point in considering the knowledge about the light radiation that produces that quale on the human sensory apparatus