I can tell people what they're going to say before they say it, and then tell them that I can read minds. It really mind fucks them. — Wosret

The magical rabbit from Hades again emerged from my breath and choked out the remnants of yesterday's hangover.

Don't even try to pretend that you predicted I'd say that. I mean, if you did, wow, and maybe you did, I don't know, but I doubt it bruh.

Nope, you're fairly creative, and aware of how full of shit people are. Anyone with children, and anyone that loves some real living people more than themselves needs to have some fairly far reaching sight -- and gets to see everything that people do, just in more obvious, less complex or sophisticated forms.

Thanks for that Brother Wosret. You do have your moments.

I don't understand the question, Harry. Could you explain it to me? — Mongrel

I think you're being purposely obtuse, but I'll ask it a different way.

How do you know when you performing logic? Don't you have to have an experience of performing logically to know you are being logical?

You know you are observing an apple when your experience takes a certain form (visual, olfactory, tactile, gustatory). What form does your logic take in order for you to know that you are being logical - for you to be able to observe your own mental processes as being logical?

I think you're being purposely obtuse, but I'll ask it a different way. — Harry Hindu

Totally honestly, dude... a few posts back in our exchange I began to suspect that you're a troll (saying nonsensical stuff just to get a rise out of people.) So we're having the same sort of experience with one another. That's kind of funny.

You asked me what form "logic takes." Earnestly, that question was meaningless to me. Weren't you really asking what form my experience takes when I note that I'm being logical?

Surely you aren't proposing that a logical principle is identical to any one experience of its application. One can only accept that at the cost of defying logic.

What form does your logic take in order for you to know that you are being logical - for you to be able to observe your own mental processes as being logical? — Harry Hindu

I would describe it as processional like a parade or constructive like a building project. Being logical has the character of walking one step after another. Or it's like mortaring bricks where each one is sturdily stacked on the last (which is why I would describe a really solid logical argument as a brick house.)

You asked me what form "logic takes." Earnestly, that question was meaningless to me. Weren't you really asking what form my experience takes when I note that I'm being logical?

Surely you aren't proposing that a logical principle is identical to any one experience of its application. One can only accept that at the cost of defying logic. — Mongrel

A "logical principle" is an idea. There are no logical principles outside of our heads. There are processes that are lawful in that they are consistent and causal and it is our minds that categorize these processes under "logical principles". I find that humans are often not logical. They have trouble integrating their beliefs from different domains of knowledge into a consistent whole. Remember what I said about our brains being modular?

What form does your logic take in order for you to know that you are being logical - for you to be able to observe your own mental processes as being logical? — Harry Hindu

I would describe it as processional like a parade or constructive like a building project. Being logical has the character of walking one step after another. Or it's like mortaring bricks where each one is sturdily stacked on the last (which is why I would describe a really solid logical argument as a brick house.) — Mongrel

Notice how you described a logical process visually. Thanks.

Thanks. — Harry Hindu

Yep.

So... anyway. I take it that the average member of this forum is pretty comfortable with nativism of the sort that Leibniz advocated (affirming a tendency to think along certain lines). Locke's view just doesn't account for expectations that are typical of us. In fact, I think one could argue that expectation in general is the key here.

That leaves me pondering expectation though. Like logic and math (the obvious markers of nativity), there's something kind of mechanistic about expectation. It's actually pretty easy to program a computer to perform expectation. Even zeroing in on hardware, one could argue that expectation is innate in computers.

So the question doesn't really have ontological implications of the sort that make any difference.

Appealing to the majority, Mongrel? How... illogical.

The universe itself functions along certain lines - causal and consistent. Our brains (and computers) are simply part of this process. When the same causes lead to the same effects (causal) - always (consistent), then there is no surprise that our minds work the same way as the rest of the universe. Water has a tendency to boil when it reaches a certain temperature. You might say that boiling is a relationship between water and heat. Thinking is a relationship between senses and brains.

What is it that thinks along certain lines? Which comes first, the mind/brain, or the ability to think along certain lines?

The "rules" by which the universe works isn't a priori to the universe itself. It is simply part of what the universe is and trying to sever the action from the thing is the result of the tendency of human minds to compartmentalize everything.

What is it that thinks along certain lines? Which comes first, the mind/brain, or the ability to think along certain lines? — Harry Hindu

Well done, Harry. This is along the lines of objections that existed in Leibniz's time. The concern is that nativism isn't saying anything other than that people have a tendency to think. Definitely not a news flash. How can nativism distinguish itself?

Jim has a tabula rasa and Sue has innate ideas. They both believe the sun will rise in the east tomorrow. As we all know, Jim has a philosophical problem justifying his belief. Sue, equipped with innateness, doesn't suffer from this. Is this a bonus for nativism? I say no. All we've done is move the problem of justification upstream.

Also note that whatever one's stance, Jim and Sue have the same belief. What beyond myth-building do we achieve by explaining the cause of that similarity?

What's fascinating is that each view suffers from conundrums which the other side is eager to point out. It's a Mexican stand-off... which suggests that we're due for a synthesis.

Jim has a tabula rasa and Sue has innate ideas. They both believe the sun will rise in the east tomorrow. As we all know, Jim has a philosophical problem justifying his belief. Sue, equipped with innateness, doesn't suffer from this. Is this a bonus for nativism? I say no. All we've done is move the problem of justification upstream. — Mongrel

Jim refers to his experiences of the sun rising hundreds of times as the justification of his belief. Sue cannot refer to any experience, but simply "knows" that the sun will rise without knowing where the knowledge comes from - similar to "knowing" how to breath.

It seems that Sue is the one that has the problem for justifying her belief. Justification comes from experience. What does Sue point to as the justification of her belief? When asked this, all she can say is, "I don't know. I just know the sun will rise."

Not only that but without experiencing the sun, or it rising, how does she even know what the sun is, or what the sun rising looks like to even say she knows this, or that she even understands what she says when she says, "I know that the sun will rise tomorrow"?