That.... Doesn't asnwer my question.

That.... Doesn't asnwer my question. — khaled

Yes, it does. You're asking a question about the implications for justification for whether there are real choices.

The two have nothing at all to do with each other.

The two have nothing at all to do with each other. — Terrapin Station

Really? If S believed A has more justification than B could S pick B?

How in the world does justification not have anything to do with real options.

Really? If S believed A has more justification than B could S pick B? — khaled

Yes, of course. "S could pick B" is about whether it's ontologically possible to pick B.

Justification has to do with WHY someone picked a choice that they picked. It has nothing at all to do with whether it's ontologically possible to pick something else.

Yes, of course. — Terrapin Station

So why didn't he. Did he choose A because of it having more justification? But then he couldn't have picked B, because A would have still had more justification. That A had more justification doesn't answer the question "Why didn't he pick B" provided he could have picked B.

If mind is a subset of physical functions and those physical functions are either deterministic or random then where is the free will? — khaled

Will is a brain function. Freedom can occur anywhere, including brains.

Freedom can occur anywhere — Terrapin Station

When does freedom occur? (Did I ask this before, I feel like I have)

So why didn't he. Did he choose A because of it having more justification? — khaled

People often choose what they do because they have more justification (stronger/better reasons, in their opinion, for choosing something) for it.

This doesn't at all mean that it's not possible for them to make a different choice. Whether various options are possible doesn't at all hinge on anyone's justifications.

That A had more justification doesn't answer the question "Why didn't he pick B" — khaled

Yes, it does, as that's exactly what justifications are in this case. It's why they picked one thing rather than the other. Saying it doesn't answer that can only suggest not even understanding what justifications are in the first place, or otherwise not understanding the question "Why did you pick A"


This post is essentially just repeating the same thing yet again. Hopefully I won't have to keep doing this.

When does freedom occur? — khaled

Are you asking for a literal time, or is that a way of asking "in what circumstances"? If the latter, it's simply a term for phenomena (occurrences) that are not causally determined. That could conceivably occur in any situation, any phenomena.

Are you asking for a literal time, or is that a way of asking for "in what circumstances"? If the latter, it's simply a term for phenomena (occurrences) that are not causally determined. That could conceivably occur in any situation, any phenomena. — Terrapin Station

Yes I'm asking in what cirumstances. So epistemically random counts?

Yes, of course. Freedom necessarily involves randomness. Just not necessarily equiprobable randomness.

Shouldn't you just call it "randomness" then? It seems to me you literally just defined randomness. (Also I don't know why you talk as if every time I say random it means equiprobable random, I never said that)

What is random but not free. Or what is free but not random. By random I don't mean equiprobably random

Shouldn't you just call it "randomness" then? — khaled

Are you one of those people who has a problem with synonyms?

I never heard "freedom" and "randomness" called synonyms before

Okay, but that's what ontological freedom/indeterminism is. It's (not necessarily equiprobable) randomness. The only other option, logically, would be causal determinism.

Ok. I think you're defining free will differently from most on this thread. Because most people I've talked to so far do not contend with "random" as a substitute for "free", though they can't tell me what "free" means. They seem to be suggesting something that is not causal determinism or randomness but "free". That's what I was asking them to explain at the very start

If you define free will like that then I agree everyone has free will (though I don't know whether or not brain functions are epistimically random, I hear they are on the microscopic level)

If we have a universe with just two particles, and particle A strikes particle B, then either particle B is causally determined to react with a certain velocity (speed & direction), or if particle B might react with one velocity rather than another, even if there are 99-1 odds for the two velocities, and there are no unknown forces at play, then by definition, there's some randomness in the resultant velocity. That's ontological freedom.

If you define free will like that then I agree everyone has free will (though I don't know whether or not brain functions are epistimically random, I hear they are on the microscopic level) — khaled

There has to be ontological randomness involved for it to be free will. Again, the point of bringing up that some choices are epistemically random above is to note that at least some people like making some "whim" choices. The choices that are not epistemically random would still involve ontological randomness if they're choices.

People probably have a problem with saying that it involves randomness because they think that's going to amount to saying that all choices are epistemically random. Many choices are not epistemically random. And those choices involve biasing the odds, based on reasons/justifications, which are (a) not usually decisions themselves (at least not at the point in question), and (b) not random themselves.

There has to be ontological randomness involved for it to be free will. — Terrapin Station

I agree. The person I was asking to define this third category of causality called "free" didn't.

The choices that are not epistemically random would still involve ontological randomness if they're choices. — Terrapin Station

I agree

People probably have a problem with saying that it involves randomness because they think that's going to amount to saying that all choices are epistemically random. Many choices are not epistemically random. And those choices involve biasing the odds, based on reasons/justifications, which are (a) not usually decisions themselves (at least not at the point in question), and (b) not random themselves. — Terrapin Station

I think it's more than that. It wasn't on this site but when I argued with some real life friends about this they said "But that's just a mix of determinism and randomness, that isn't real freedom" or something to that effect. I think people would still disagree with your formulation here. Though I ask those people to define that third category of causality they claim exists.

Honestly I think it's just more human glorification. There is a whole different way in which events can be caused and only us fantastic humans can utilize it.


It's 9pm here bye

I think it's more than that. It wasn't on this site but when I argued with some real life friends about this they said "But that's just a mix of determinism and randomness, that isn't real freedom" or something to that effect. I think people would still disagree with your formulation here. Though I ask those people to define that third category of causality they claim exists. — khaled

Well, a lot of people think a lot of incoherent shit like thinking that their consciousness is something separate from the physical world, they think that somehow their consciousness is just "occupying" or "driving" their body while not being identical to it, and so on. So who knows what sort of vague nonsense they might have in mind by "freedom" re free will.

they think that somehow their consciousness is just "occupying" or "driving" their body while not being identical to it, and so on — Terrapin Station

Or that we pick up brain waves from other people or beings. 'Fixed will' is immune to all these notions, for they would just be another input, Yes, the more good inputs the better for widening the range of the will, but as fixed the will still wills an output based on all that it has in it to consider, aside from playing dice harming the mechanism.

I've had more or less the same views about a lot of philosophical issues for 30 to 40 years, and even longer for a few things. And I've been talking about that stuff with others in the manner that we do here for just about that long, including remotely via computer, starting almost 40 years ago via BBSs, and then for the past 25+ years on the Internet. — Terrapin Station

Well I have only been reading your stuff for a year or two, but you are remarkably consistent.

And 40 years experience makes your patience for nitpickers like me all the more impressive :smile:

But how are we so sure these internal 4D events exist? Perhaps it’s because internal experience shows us how they interact with observable/measurable (actual) internal 4D events, such as heart rate. — Possibility

I like the actual evidence for internal reality you mention: things like heart rate, etc.

But I also "know" my thoughts exist in the same way I "know" that "I" exist. More specifically, I don't know either. But my thoughts provide me with evidence of my existence more than any external factor possibly could (ANY and EVERY external factor can only be measured if thought occurs...it seems there must be an exception...but how could there be? oh, maybe A.I.? or is that just a different type of thought? Even A.I. could only "measure" for other A.I., any human explanation would require thought).

Sorry if I am rambling. I feel you have a more academic (advanced) understanding of ideas that have been bouncing around in my head for years...So I just keep going to see what else you can add :smile:

Feel free to ignore me, as I doubt I am adding much that will help you:

tease out Hegel’s idea of dialectic process and reach some level of synthesis that is more convincing than compatibilism. — Possibility

But I do appreciate hearing your thoughts.

.

Whether or not they have free will doesn’t change what the purpose of punishment is or it’s effectiveness. — khaled

I entirely agree. But remember for the pro free-will crowd, especially if they happen to be religious too, THE PURPOSE of punishment is PUNISHMENT. They are all about retributive justice. This is part of the reason some are so attached to free will. They can't justify THEIR punishments without it. They also believe they DESERVE all the good that has happened to them because they are good.

If we have a universe with just two particles, and particle A strikes particle B, then either particle B is causally determined to react with a certain velocity (speed & direction), or if particle B might react with one velocity rather than another, even if there are 99-1 odds for the two velocities, and there are no unknown forces at play, then by definition, there's some randomness in the resultant velocity. That's ontological freedom. — Terrapin Station

I like this explanation. I think it’s consistent with how I’ve been looking at it, just described in a MUCH simpler way. I feel like I’ve taken a long and complicated journey to somewhere, only to come across you standing there, saying ‘You do realise there’s a more direct route, don’t you?’

Experience counts for a lot. Thank you for this.

:up:

All do as they must; there is no brain-separate 'I' with separate machinery to rule over the brain will.

Those 3 attributes will produce a happier life in the long run but i wish i could say that means that there is free will. I go back and forth on the issue of scientific determinism or predestination. At its core i have the concept but my logic circuits at this present time dictate that it is true.

Google search: scientific determinism

and

Google search: dna and decision making

google search: nurture versus nature or search nurture and nature.

The first of a series, although rather basic…

The Other Shoe Drops

Determinism doesn’t sit well, at first;
Its flavor does not quench the thirst,
For then it seems we but do as we must,
But, we’ll see a way that in this we’ll trust.

We wish that our thoughts reflect us today,
Our leanings, for it could be no other way.
To know, let us turn to the ‘random’ say
To see whatever could make its day.

Shifting to this other, neglected foot,
What could make the ‘random’ take root?
It would have no cause beneath to explain
The events, they becoming of the insane.

We could pretend, imitating air-heads,
Posting nonsense on purpose in the threads,
But that then we meant to do this way,
Too, so, such a ‘random’ holds not much sway.

Seems less problem of a determined Nature
Than the same in our individual nature,
But, sense isn’t made from ‘random’ direction
That relies on naught beneath its conception.

Would we wish it to be any other way?
Doing any old thing of chance that may?

The ‘random’ foot then walks but here and there,
Not getting anywhere, born from nowhere.
The unrooted tree lives magically, unfathomed.
Is not then ‘randomness’ but a fun phantom?

The opposite of determined is undetermined,
The scarier ghost that’s never-minded.

Sorry if I am rambling. I feel you have a more academic (advanced) understanding of ideas that have been bouncing around in my head for years...So I just keep going to see what else you can add :smile:

Feel free to ignore me, as I doubt I am adding much that will help you — ZhouBoTong

Ramble away - I do. It’s probably only that I’ve bounced these ideas around in a different environment. I’ve really only been playing with philosophy for a few short years - and not very academically, either. Don’t assume that because I drop a philosopher’s name or two I have any more than a cursory understanding of their work.

But I also "know" my thoughts exist in the same way I "know" that "I" exist. More specifically, I don't know either. But my thoughts provide me with evidence of my existence more than any external factor possibly could. — ZhouBoTong

What you’re explaining here is, in my view, a five dimensional subjective experience. The ‘conscious self’ (‘I’) exists as an experience of interacting four dimensional events, both internal and externally observable. The ‘evidence’ I have that my self exists consists of the experience of internal events; your ‘evidence’ that I have a ‘conscious self’ comes from your experience of externally observable events. Yet neither of us are certain that what we experience (‘know’) is ACTUAL, except that we agree on the experience (‘knowledge’) that these events interact with what we can agree is actual by its relationship to mutually observable/measurable data: the body, heart rate, etc.

Thoughts exist in much the same way. They’re ‘real’ because of the relationships that exist between 5D subjective experiences of 4D events interacting with 3D observable objects consisting of measurable data.

It is in this 5D structure of the mind that the experience (knowledge or understanding) of any event in spacetime has the capacity to interact with the experience of any other event. It is here that I think this ‘ontological freedom’ is ours: insomuch as we are aware of, connecting and collaborating with the potential in each experience. We have the capacity to intervene, to prevent predicted events from occurring, to change the causal conditions of future events, even to alter the ongoing effect of past causes, etc. by changing how we relate to the significance of an experience.