Are space aliens purportedly empirical entities?

Are space aliens purportedly empirical entities? — John

Certainly not the ones who've done anal probes.

But who's really doing the ignoring here? I already explained, against this very kind of point, that the mistake you guys are making lies in thinking that spiritual realities must be either the same as empirical realities or else not realities at all, but instead the same kind of thing as you would conceive dreams and fantasies to be, as the Lochness and Bigfoot examples attest.

What precludes that there might be a plurality of spiritual beings, or that the reality of those beings might be linked to the different spirits of different cultures? Your thinking is still of the "it must be either this or that" variety. This means you are not open to spiritual experience at all, and so could have no grounds for any opinion about its power to convince and even radically transform lives in ways that merely empirical experiences never can. — John

How are you distinguishing between spiritual and empirical? And how is this distinction relevant? If God can be experienced, isn't God empirical by definition? And I'm guessing that God counts as spiritual, so God would be both spiritual and empirical, as would fairies, assuming that they can also be experienced. So, can you confirm whether or not you apply the same standard of judgement in both cases?

The way that you're making use of this distinction arouses my suspicion. It's like, I could come up with the most ridiculous fantastical imaginings, but so long as they are given the label "spiritual", then we can apply a special exceptional standard, in which we can be less critical.

If God can be experienced, isn't God empirical by definition? — Sapientia

I don't think more philosophical Christians would say that you can directly experience God. They would hold, rather, that in so far as our own imperfect beings are, we can, therefore, and only in part, relate ourselves to God, who is being itself. I suppose to put that a more mundane way, consider someone who has perfect vision, and another who does not. Would the latter ever say that they've experienced the same sight as the former? No, but they do both see, thus they share a similar relationship of understanding, just not perfectly. That said, not all Christians would affiliate with that sort of dichotomy, however intelligible "being in itself" may or may not be, but I suppose you have to clarify which sort of Christian you're speaking to. Conceptions of God range widely among Christians, this I'm sure you know.

I must admit that the OP does not strike me as one who is wrestling with the quite poetic and nuanced scholastic understanding of the Christian God. This is why many here find him to be either a troll or simply, and somehow, both aloof and mean-spirited. Protestants can be the haughtiest of Christians, at times.

I haven't said that "we have sufficient reason to reject the claim that an experience could cause one to know that God exists. — Brainglitch

But don't you think that there's a difference between believing something and knowing something? I don't think that anyone here doubts that Colin had an experience which made him believe that God exists. The contentious point is that he claims that the experience has allowed him to know that God exist.

Do you think that experience itself is sufficient for knowing? It seems to me, like experience must be interpreted, and knowing is conditional on interpretation. So experience itself is not sufficient for knowing, knowledge is related to how the experience is interpreted.

Rather, I have offered an alternative explanation for the experience, in which people's brains are producing the experience and casting it with beings they already believe in.

We have, as I argued in some detail a post or two ago, much reason to be highly skeptical of such claims. — Brainglitch

I would say that these cases are most likely a misinterpretation of one's experience. It's not that the entire experience is produced by the individual's brain, but there is some real input, something real is going on, which perhaps triggers the wrong thoughts of interpretation. This would be like an hallucination, the mind doesn't completely make up the experience which is going on, but it distorts what is being sensed, to such an extent, that the interpretation is far out.

When we experience something, we often claim "I know X is the case, because I saw it", or something like that. But it is always possible that one misinterpreted what one experienced, so I really don't think that experience justifies the claim of "I know".

A lot of this debate hinges on the fact that in Western culture, there are stark dichotomies between 'belief' and 'knowledge', 'religion' and 'science', 'spirit' and 'matter', and so on. Partially that is a consequence of the fact that religious ideas are associated with the requirement to believe particular things; that is expressed for instance in such verses as The Nicene Creed. Then the polar opposite of that, is said to be the scientific approach of 'conjecture and refutation', to paraphrase Popper. And between these two there is a yawning gulf, or so it seems. One is either required to believe impossible things (according to science) or is condemned to a meaningless universe (according to religion). In my view that is an unfortunate consequence of a choice that was made very early in the Christian era that lead to the formation of orthodoxy; the more experiential and 'inner meaning'-oriented interpretations of the Gospel were suppressed in favour of those that supported the political structure of the emerging church. Read the copy and comments on Beyond Belief: The Secret Gospel of Thomas, Elaine Pagels.

If God can be experienced, isn't God empirical by definition? — Sapientia

Splendid question. However in the realms of 'experience of the numinous', one often encounters paradoxes; by its very nature, that kind of experience is - what's the word? - ecstatic. And 'ecstatic' means 'outside of stasis', stasis being the ordinary state. This is characteristic of certain kinds of mystical experiences. Mystical traditions also often figure individuals who fall into trance states, something which is more characteristic of Eastern religions, but is still found in the contemplative aspects of Western religions. Arguably, such practices were derived from shamanism, rather than from deity-worship.

In any case, lots of this discussion about 'what Colin experienced' don't necessarily take into account that a spiritual epiphany might actually consist of seeing the whole world in a new light. There are plenty of examples of that from the romantic poets. And in the reports on these 'encounters with the Sacred', it might appear as a figure, form, image, or nothing at all; German protestant mystic Jacob Boehme's vision was triggered by the glimpse of sunlight reflecting off a pewter dish. So there is an element of the 'transformative vision': seeing things in a new light, or suddenly understanding life in a different way. Accounts of these can be found in the literature of religious conversions.

But dismissing all such accounts as being in the same class as encounters with mythical creatures, seeing fairies in the bottom of the garden, doesn't do justice to the amount of literature that is out there on these subjects.

I think people use "know" for beliefs they're convinced of., and they're convinced because the belief has satisfied whatever intuitive or explicit epistemic standard they deem sufficient for the belief at issue.

And personal, first-hand experience is the epistemic gold standard--"I KNOW what I experienced."

Only problem is that there is much reason to be skeptical about certain kinds of beliefs, even if they are based on personal, first-hand experience. The uncontroversial fact that brains routinely generate convincing, realistic-seeming dreams demonstrates that brains are capable of generating fictional experiences, so generating an experience starring a being we already believe in, or are familiar with, is a piece of cake.

The reality-check centers of the brain that normally moderate thought content are known to be inactive during dreaming, which is how it is that the normal laws of reality can be violated in dreams. Seems to me that if these areas of the brain were suppressed while we're awake, then we would readily be convinced of the truth of a narrative involving some supernatural agent or other making contact with us from some other realm.

If God can be experienced it would not be like experiencing any empirical object, which may be reliably available as a public object. It would be more like experiencing love or beauty. God may appear to you in some form, but the form could never be the exhaustive identity of God.

And personal, first-hand experience is the epistemic gold standard--"I KNOW what I experienced." — Brainglitch

I don't agree, I think we ask others to corroborate, and this is the epistemic gold standard. I realize that in common experience there is a tendency to claim that I know it because I experienced it, but I think that this is hasty sloppiness in relation to true epistemic principles. Justification requires that the correctness of the belief be demonstrated, and justification is essential to knowledge under most epistemologies. This is the power of communication. If we can describe our experiences in a way which makes sense to others, we can justify our beliefs concerning these experiences. If others are unaccepting, there is no justification for those beliefs.

Only problem is that there is much reason to be skeptical about certain kinds of beliefs, even if they are based on personal, first-hand experience. — Brainglitch

I think that this is very sketchy, and not a quality principle, to say that we should be skeptical of certain kinds of beliefs. The problem is that that all individuals are different, having vast differences in their perceptive capacities. Some have better ears, some have better eyes, and these qualitative differences extent right into the capacities of the brain. So the type of belief which we should be skeptical of in one person is different from the type of belief which we would be skeptical of in another. And we couldn't ever really know a person's strengths and weaknesses in this regard, until we moved to have that person justify those different types of beliefs. Therefore I think that any first-hand experience must be subjected to justification before it cam be classified as knowledge in any formal sense.

I agree with you though, that when a person is convinced of one's belief, that individual will claim to know. But this is not knowledge according to any formal epistemology, it is just belief. There are differences in how strongly we will cling to our various beliefs. But the strength of this clinging is deeply psychological, often stemming from long ago experiences, even instincts, such that the clinging to beliefs (being convinced), is often irrational. So as much as we say, in common vernacular, "I know", when we are deeply convinced, this really has very little epistemic value.

I agree with your point, but I would point out that within experience there is often a component in which the material (body) of the self undergoes modification (experience), which is chemically or spiritually independent of the experience of the selfconscious subject. So the experience is extended beyond the selfconscious subject which is referred to in your point. For example, one might experience an epiphany in which the body of the subject is altered in a real way, so questioning the beliefs, or opinions of the subject would not recognise or confirm this alteration.

I say this because during a mystical experience aspects of the self which one is not aware of, but which are nethertheless a part of the living self, have the experience too, or are altered by the experience. Such aspects might be entirely unknown to humanity, including for example, the noumenon.

So there is an element of the 'transformative vision': seeing things in a new light, or suddenly understanding life in a different way. — Wayfarer

What I don't understand is why anyone wouldn't think that it's simply their brain "behaving" differently.

Again, I can't imagine anything like that where I wouldn't simply assume that something unusual (even if maybe very pleasant) is going on with my brain.

I don't agree, I think we ask others to corroborate, and this is the epistemic gold standard. I realize that in common experience there is a tendency to claim that I know it because I experienced it, but I think that this is hasty sloppiness in relation to true epistemic principles. Justification requires that the correctness of the belief be demonstrated, and justification is essential to knowledge under most epistemologies. This is the power of communication. If we can describe our experiences in a way which makes sense to others, we can justify our beliefs concerning these experiences. If others are unaccepting, there is no justification for those beliefs. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, if what we want, as in science, etc. are reliability and predictiveness, we have come to understand that independent intersubjective corroboration is the gold standard.

What I meant, though, and should have said, is that as far as most people are converned, their own personal experience is the gold standard--"Seeing is believing." It is notoriously difficult, to the point of impossible, to change some people's minds about certain beliefs, particularly of the kind that are not repeatable, even if others who witnessed the incident contradict the belief. Disoutes about remembered events are a common example.

Agreement among a favored group also us a powerful fact in both creating and sustaining belief--as in creationism, for instance--in the face of complete lack of supporting data, mountains of contrary data, and complete lack of corroboration by the informed judgment of scientists.

I don't think that anyone here doubts that Colin had an experience which made him believe that God exists. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, like Heister Eggcart noted in the comment just before yours, there are some of us here who do doubt that, on account of him being a suspected troll. But that is a minor point. We can assume that he is sincere for sake of discussion.

Splendid question. However in the realms of 'experience of the numinous', one often encounters paradoxes; by its very nature, that kind of experience is - what's the word? - ecstatic. And 'ecstatic' means 'outside of stasis', stasis being the ordinary state. — Wayfarer

What is the supposed paradox? I'm not seeing it.

In other - plainer - words, these sorts of experiences are extraordinary. They are extraordinary in that they are presumably more intense and rare than ordinary day-to-day experiences. And they would certainly be extraordinary if they are what they're claimed to be by believers, as in this case, to be experiences of God. But it is this second sense of extraordinary which I doubt, and believe there to be good reason to doubt - even for those who have themselves had these experiences. Contrarily, it might not in fact be a supernatural experience at all, nor an experience of God, but rather a phenomenon that can be better explained naturally, and as mistakenly attributed or misinterpreted.

I have never felt compelled to make a leap of faith in this context, as I am interested in getting to the truth of the matter (and if that cannot be determined, then scepticism is the reasonable default), rather than what I find emotionally appealing. And the former seems more about what one finds emotionally appealing: what one might find comforting, inspiring, hopeful, and so on. But I actually find that rather depressing, because I think that in many cases, it is based on a false dichotomy or a choice between making the most of what we've got or clinging to what may well be nothing but a pipe dream.

This is characteristic of certain kinds of mystical experiences. Mystical traditions also often figure individuals who fall into trance states, something which is more characteristic of Eastern religions, but is still found in the contemplative aspects of Western religions. Arguably, such practices were derived from shamanism, rather than from deity-worship. — Wayfarer

There might be merit in those sorts of experiences, but I don't think that theism is necessary in order to have or appreciate such experiences, nor am I convinced that theism can be reasonably concluded from such experiences. (And I'm simply not interested in unreasonably arriving at a conclusion. Even if I was, why would I narrow my options down to God? If we're disregarding reason, then there are innumerable possible explanations to choose from, and no reasonable means of discriminating between them all).

In any case, lots of this discussion about 'what Colin experienced' don't necessarily take into account that a spiritual epiphany might actually consist of seeing the whole world in a new light. There are plenty of examples of that from the romantic poets. And in the reports on these 'encounters with the Sacred', it might appear as a figure, form, image, or nothing at all; German protestant mystic Jacob Boehme's vision was triggered by the glimpse of sunlight reflecting off a pewter dish. So there is an element of the 'transformative vision': seeing things in a new light, or suddenly understanding life in a different way. Accounts of these can be found in the literature of religious conversions. — Wayfarer

That's in the list of possibilities, but I don't buy it. And if so, then he should've been clearer. He didn't say that he experienced a glimpse of sunlight reflecting off of a pewter dish or anything like that. He said he experienced God.

But dismissing all such accounts as being in the same class as encounters with mythical creatures, seeing fairies in the bottom of the garden, doesn't do justice to the amount of literature that is out there on these subjects. — Wayfarer

Well, if Colin won't come forward with more details in order to rectify this possible misunderstanding, then why shouldn't I make my own assumptions about what he might have experienced, based on what little he has told us, and based on what I know, and make comparisons with claims based on a similarly poor epistemological standard, like claims of faeries and such? I'm not ruling them out without good enough reason, and I don't believe that that has been provided. You're free to cite this literature you refer to if you think it will do so, but I don't want to read through poetic accounts of the same sort of thing, as that ain't gonna do jack. I'm here for philosophy, not poetry, and not flowery or obscure literature that doesn't get to the epistemological point.

If God can be experienced it would not be like experiencing any empirical object, which may be reliably available as a public object. It would be more like experiencing love or beauty. God may appear to you in some form, but the form could never be the exhaustive identity of God. — John

So, just a feeling and an abstract concept. Weak. Very weak. And from this alone, Colin is certain that he has had an experience of God, as opposed to innumerable alternative explanations which he has ruled out. That says a lot more about Colin than anything else.

What I don't understand is why anyone wouldn't think that it's simply their brain "behaving" differently.

Again, I can't imagine anything like that where I wouldn't simply assume that something unusual (even if maybe very pleasant) is going on with my brain. — Terrapin Station

The answer is actually very straightforward: people can be unreasonable.

Socrates spoke of the memory of God which none can remember in all its glory and what he called the Truth responsible for all the good things. As an agnostic myself I don't need any divine revelation to recognize that the truth is greater than anyone can fully appreciate whether they are atheist or believers. In fact, the demonstrable truth is that militant atheists and the religious have a dysfunctional relationship where they hate each other's guts, but rely upon one another to both thrive and survive.

You're obviously not going to get it; but most likely that's what you want anyway, so that's OK. Better not to fret over it.

You're obviously not going to get it; but most likely that's what you want anyway, so that's OK. Better not to fret over it. — John

There's a difference between getting it and being uncritical. How do you know I'm not God appearing to you in the form of someone who doesn't just lap it up, but instead applies a little scrutiny? You haven't passed the test, but don't fret. What do you have to fear? It's only an eternity of fire and brimstone.

What leads you to think that I believe in fire and brimstone? That assumption betrays the shallowness of your conception of Christianity in particular and religion in general.

What leads you to think that I believe in fire and brimstone? — John

Blasphemy!

That assumption betrays the shallowness of your conception of Christianity in particular and religion in general. — John

Relax, it was tongue-in-cheek. (And obviously went over your head).

So, you think I'm a mind-reader now.

So, you think I'm a mind-reader now. — John

No. I don't think that you are gifted with godlike abilities like I am.

Yeah, right.
:-d

Why're you trying to argue with Sapi "Wisdom" Entia? You'll always lose, friend :s

Yeah, right.
:-d — John

See. I knew you wouldn't be consistent. You reject my claim in disbelief, but not Colin's. Yet, what is it that differentiates them? Funny how your openness has evaporated. Is it because Colin hasn't rubbed you up the wrong way like I seem to have done?

What I meant, though, and should have said, is that as far as most people are converned, their own personal experience is the gold standard--"Seeing is believing." It is notoriously difficult, to the point of impossible, to change some people's minds about certain beliefs, particularly of the kind that are not repeatable, even if others who witnessed the incident contradict the belief. Disoutes about remembered events are a common example. — Brainglitch

I guess we're pretty much in agreement then, but this "seeing is believing" thing is a little bit disturbing. It seems quite selfish to hold this perspective, though it is rampant in our society. We really do tend to insist that things are as "I saw them", despite the fact that others may dispute this. We might have a better time cooperating if we weren't so convinced that our powers of observation are infallible.

Contrarily, it might not in fact be a supernatural experience at all, nor an experience of God, but rather a phenomenon that can be better explained naturally, and as mistakenly attributed or misinterpreted. — Sapientia

The conversation has the implication of 'you're trying to convert me'. I'm not, although I am beginning to realise that because I was always open to the possibility of the reality of spiritual experiences, that maybe that what is really meant by 'belief'. My view used to be that understanding the nature of spiritual experiences was a more philosophically mature attitude than simply 'believing what we're told', but I'm starting to see that an element of belief, or at least an openness to the possibility, is required to even investigate the issue. Otherwise all these red flags come up: 'Religion! Don't go there!'

In any case, the last thing I will say to you is that religious revelation and spiritual insights are fundamental to all the world's cultures, and to believe they're all delusional is like the mother of all conspiracy theories.

What I don't understand is why anyone wouldn't think that it's simply their brain "behaving" differently. — TerrapinStation

If everything is 'brain behaviour', that also applies to the explanation 'this is brain behaviour'. And something that explains everything, explains nothing.

Anyway, I'm checking out for a while to do some more reading and reflection. Please carry on.

The conversation has the implication of 'you're trying to convert me'. I'm not, although I am beginning to realise that because I was always open to the possibility of the reality of spiritual experiences, that actually is what is meant by 'belief'. My view was always that understanding the nature of spiritual experiences was more philosophically mature than simply believing what you're told, but I'm starting to see that an element of belief, or at least openness, is required to even investigate the issue. — Wayfarer

I did say "might"...

One can have an element of openness whilst maintaining an appropriate degree of scepticism; remain open whilst being critical; and remain open whilst taking claims with a pinch of salt. There is definitely a difference between being open and letting one's guard down, and between being open and opening the floodgates. But if nothing in one's experience, or to one's knowledge, up to the present date, has ever constituted sufficient grounds for belief, then I think it understandable if one is inclined to the opinion that these claims are false, or prone to treat them as if they are.

In any case, the last thing I will say to you is that religious revelation and spiritual insights are fundamental to all the world's cultures, and to believe they're all delusional is like the mother of all conspiracy theories. — Wayfarer

Depends somewhat on the details. But this reasoning of yours is fallacious, as has been pointed out to you by myself and others in the past, since there is no logical relationship to what is considered to be fundamental and what is true, such that the former entails the latter. And this can quite easily be shown by analogous counterexamples, such as, for example, how geocentricism was once held to be fundamental, but has long since been discredited.

Please don't say that you have 'pointed something out' as if by doing so, you've been instructing, when you're simply expressing an opinion.

As I think I mentioned, I did approach the subject of 'the nature of spiritual experience' through a tertiary degree in the subject. And that does require critical appraisal, it is not Bible College, where the students are all expected to be believers. But I was open about the fact that I was also seeking to have such experiences, and to understand their significance - that was discouraged in religious studies, although things have changed since my time in that there is now more recognition of scholar-practitioners, i.e. those with academic skills in a religion they actually practice

there is no logical relationship to what is considered to be fundamental and what is true, such that the former entails the latter. — Sapientia

When I say 'fundamental to the world's cultures', I'm not engaging in hyperbole. Western culture was founded on the Judeo-Christian tradition; it used to be called 'Christendom'. Midde-eastern cultures were founded on Islam, Indian on Vedic religion, China on Taoism and Buddhism, and so on. So here I'm referring to the foundational role of religious revelation in cultural history. I'm not saying that this proves anything about the validity of this or that individual claim. But what I am saying is that if you dismiss religious claims generally - and many do! - then you're actually dismissing a foundational element of culture itself, and also saying that to that extent, world cultures were founded on hallucinations or delusions. (I'm sure Dawkins' ideas entail this, even if he would not be prepared to admit it.) And that is something that is actually happening, on a very large scale, in Western culture. There are literally libraries of books written on that topic. As you know, my major pre-occupation on this and other forums is arguing against materialism, on the basis that scientific materialism has morphed into a kind of pseudo-religious attitude to life.

One can have an element of openness — Sapientia

In that case, it would be useful if one could demonstrate it. X-)

It seemed obvious to me that you were joking this time, so it wasn't a case of rejecting anything.