• Troodon Roar
    18
    There is a certain scenario that I have thought of which seems to me to be logically contradictory, but I am wondering if there might be a possible way to pull it off.

    It is this:

    I am wondering if it is possible for something to be an alternative to something else, whilst also not lacking that other thing.

    It seems to me to be logically contradictory, but I have thought of a way around this seeming contradictoriness. It is this: We all know that subjectivity is definitely very real, since we all experience reality from our own subjective perspectives. And there are lots and lots — infinite, really — things of whose existence we are unaware. So from our perspective, they don’t exist. And if existence is infinite, then there is no ultimate catalogue or list of ALL of the things that exist, anyways, due to the nature of infinity.

    Let’s say there is someone who is aware of the existence of a certain thing, which we will call Thing A, and is unaware of the existence of some other thing, which we will call Thing B. Therefore, from the subjective point-of-view of someone who is unaware of the existence of Thing B, Thing A does not lack Thing B, since Thing B does not exist to be lacked in the first place! Meanwhile, from the perspective of someone else who is aware of the existence of both Thing A and Thing B, Thing A is an alternative to Thing B.

    Therefore, someone could conceivably combine each of these perspectives to create a hybrid perspective in which Thing A is perceived as an alternative to Thing B, but is not perceived as lacking Thing B. Think of it as combining the alternativeness aspect of the perspective in which Thing B exists in addition to Thing A with the non-lacking aspect of the perspective in which only Thing A exists but not Thing B, while discarding the non-alternativeness aspect of the perspective in which only Thing A exists but not Thing B and the lacking aspect of the perspective in which Thing B exists in addition to Thing A.

    I’d love to hear of any other possible ways to have this scenario obtain that I haven’t, as of yet, managed to think of.
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    Can you please give a concrete example?
  • Wittgenstein
    442

    The following statement is false
    The previous statement is true

    Is that logically possible ? :meh:
    It can be possible if we drop law of the excluded middle.
  • fresco
    577
    Things are thinged by thingers. They have no existential status 'in their own right' .What you call 'logical contradiction' amounts to disagreement between thingers about 'thinghood'.
    Take 'glacial melting' which A believes is caused by 'sunspots' and is therefore 'an uncontrollable thing.. On the other hand, B believes glacial melting is caused by man made global warming and is therefore a potentially controllable thing. The status of the thinghood differs insofar as to what the thinger's subsequent actions might be. 'Things' are always contextually dependent. Logical 'set membership', is never independent of needs of observers.
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    The following statement is false
    The previous statement is true

    Is that logically possible ? :meh:
    It can be possible if we drop law of the excluded middle.
    Wittgenstein

    This doesn't appear to be what the OP is talking about. Can you explain?
  • Wittgenstein
    442

    I don't know what OP is talking about, couldn't get my head around it . I thought it was related to logical paradoxes since those were the exact statements of OP.
  • Possibility
    2.8k
    I am wondering if it is possible for something to be an alternative to something else, whilst also not lacking that other thing.Troodon Roar

    For instance, there are those who see determinism as an alternative to the existence of free will, and those who see free will as an alternative to determinism. But there are others still who see determinism as not lacking in the existence of free will - in this case the existence of free will is not perceived as an alternative to determinism, as such. QM supports the notion of both/and in relation to subjective experience, and so the middle no longer need be excluded. It only appears as a logical contradiction when considered from a single perspective.

    1. Determinism is lacking the existence of free will.
    2. Determinism is not lacking the existence of free will.

    3. Determinism is an alternative to the existence of free will.
    4. The existence of free will is an alternative to determinism.

    5. Determinism is true.
    6. Free will exists.

    If 1 is true, then BOTH 3 AND 4 can be true, but ONLY 5 OR 6 can obtain.
    If 2 is true, then 3 and 4 are a matter of limited perspective, and BOTH 5 AND 6 can obtain.

    I’m not good with logic, but this makes sense to me.
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