First, even if everyone agrees on it, borders aren't objective things, so they're not "real" in that sense. (Even if there's something like a wall or fence, or we're talking about border stations/border guards, etc.--that doesn't make the border itself objective/real; the wall/fence, etc. aren't identical to the border).

A border is a concept that people have and can agree on.

So nearly everyone can agree that there's a border between two countries (where they have to agree there are two countries), with no other territory between them, while disagreeing on just where the border should be considered to be.

What it is for there to be a border is for people to have a particular sort of geopolitical concept in mind. Pointing to it is pointing to that concept, and pointing to its expression, such as statements in almanacs, etc.

This paradox arises out of the ill-defined nature of borders and nations. Are there other things we can apply it to? It might be helpful in rigorously defining concepts. — Paralogism

It applies to much of what we know or perceive. Some examples - colors, races, languages, motorcycles, species, forests, science, art, mental illness.

Rule of thumb - anything an elephant wouldn't recognize as a thing.

makes me think of relationship. Two people are in a relationship, I mean this in the romantic sense of relationship. But each of them are certainly going to have differences in their conception of that relationship. There will likely be overlap, at least in the language used to describe the R, but also differences. In some relationships a lot of differences. The description of the contested border will have some overlap - between mountain chain X and river Y. Like which portions of the countries touch - the NW corner, etc. Differences and overlap. A border between countries is a facet of their relationship with each other and to the area of the border and less so to other countries.

This paradox arises out of the ill-defined nature of borders and nations. Are there other things we can apply it to? It might be helpful in rigorously defining concepts. — Paralogism

National borders are historically contingent. Surely this is a trivial point, not a profound one. The US was the US before and after the Louisiana purchase. It just had more land. Just as you are still you if you buy your neighbor's property and adjoin it to yours.

First, even if everyone agrees on it, borders aren't objective things, so they're not "real" in that sense. — Terrapin Station

Is anything?

Are the boundaries (borders) of objects real, according to you? I've heard you say that there are no real, as opposed to merely conceptual, universals. If you say there are no real, as opposed to merely conceptual, boundaries to objects, then it would seem there are no real particulars either, and it would all begin to look like being mental phenomena "all the way down", a conclusion which, if you were to be consistent, should make you an idealist.

Jesus, what's going on? We seem to be making the same point! :yikes:

However, when we make the claim that something exists, it seems evident that we ought to be able to point to that entity, to define it. — Paralogism

Not really,

We might start with saying that a) Beijing is in China, b) Mumbai is in India and c) if there is a route from Beijing to Mumbai where there isn't third country or a sea between the two, there has to be a border between the two countries. That two countries don't agree where exactly this border goes is actually not uncommon in history, yet that doesn't at all refute the existence of the border. We simply will define an area to be disputed, hence there is no paradox. India isn't arguing that Beijing belongs to India and China doesn't hold that Mumbai is in China, hence there has to be a border.

Do notice that my counterargument can be found in mathematical logic too and these kind of problems have left mathematicians scratching their head also.

Are the boundaries (borders) of objects real, according to you? — Janus

Yes, real, but (a) they can be more or less fuzzy depending on the point of reference, and (b) there's nothing about them in terms of concepts that's real(/objective).

If you say there are no real, as opposed to merely conceptual, boundaries to objects, then it would seem there are no real particulars either, — Janus

Re that, by the way, if someone thought that there was no clear/discernible real border for "objects"--for example, maybe they think that everything is really a more or less lumpy continuum (and somehow they thought that there was no intelligible way to parse "borders" for the lumps), they could simply say that there's one real particular--the more or less lumpy continuum.

That's not my view, by the way. It's just a possible view.

Is anything? — Wayfarer

Of course. Most things are real in that sense.

Without some criteria for favoring one over the other, we are unable to say that any real border exists at all. — Paralogism

An inability to determine the truth of a proposition x doesn't imply that x doesn't have a truth value. We just don't know the truth value. The border exists but we just don't know where it is. If only we could make war, racism, and everything bad disappear by disagreeing.

An inability to determine the truth of a proposition x doesn't imply that x doesn't have a truth value. We just don't know the truth value. The border exists but we just don't know where it is. — TheMadFool

How would you suppose the geopolitical border exists where we just don't know where it is? What, exactly, do you think the geopolitical border is?

If only we could make war, racism, and everything bad disappear by disagreeing. — TheMadFool

Racism is a way of thinking about people. So if racist folks thought differently, racism would disappear.

Likewise, war only obtains via people deciding to engage in particular actions. If people made different decisions, war would cease.

Racism is a way of thinking about people. So if racist folks thought differently, racism would disappear. — Terrapin Station

The OP made things disappear simply on the basis of disagreeing. This isn't possible I believe. If we disagreed on matters of taste, which I presume is subjective, that would be different. Borders I hope are objective and disagreeing on it wouldn't make it magically vanish.

Borders I hope are objective and disagreeing on it wouldn't make it magically vanish. — TheMadFool

When enough people agree on there existing a state, that state and it's borders do exist. Sometimes people have problems in understanding the existence of human institutions and think they wouldn't exist because they are just 'made up', 'invented' or 'agreed upon'.

The OP made things disappear simply on the basis of disagreeing. This isn't possible I believe. If we disagreed on matters of taste, which I presume is subjective, that would be different. Borders I hope are objective and disagreeing on it wouldn't make it magically vanish. — TheMadFool

Are you using "objective" to denote agreement basically?

Are you using "objective" to denote agreement basically? — Terrapin Station

As I understand it borders are physical. It would simply exist whether we agree or not.

It's not easy to find a picture of what I'm looking for (though it's easy to find in person), so for the pic below, you have to imagine the sign isn't in the frame.



What would you say is the physical border there?

As I understand it borders are physical. It would simply exist whether we agree or not. — TheMadFool

?

Even in my lifetime a lot of borders have been redrawn, one important border that I personally crossed over has vanished after the unification of two states. And where I live there are historical borders in my neighborhood where earlier was the border. A border is a perfect example of an institution, just like the picture above from Terrapin Station shows.

What would you say is the physical border there? — Terrapin Station

Well, you see that piece of grass, immediately to the right of the sign...? :wink:

There are borders that exist only because we recognise them. But surely there are also borders that exist because they lie between different things, like the sea-shore, which bounds the sea (or the land, depending which way you're oriented)?

What is it about the boundaries of objects that is real according to you? I mean you say that what is real about the boundaries of objects is not at all conceptual, which I take you to mean is not mental.

Granting that a boundary is not something we merely think, it must be something we see or feel. Yet seeing and feeling are neural processes which means that they are also at least in part mental processes (if the brain is as you say identical with the mind). This leaves me wondering what it is that you think is real and yet wholly non-conceptual about the boundaries of objects.

What is it about the boundaries of objects that is real according to you? I mean you say that what is real about the boundaries of objects is not at all conceptual, which I take you to mean is not mental. — Janus

So for example, material particles have spatial extension, but the spatial extension isn't infinite. The limits of that spatial extension is a boundary.

The same is true of particles in bonds with other particles. There's a spatial extension that isn't infinite.

And the same is true of particles in dynamic motions relative to other particles--for example, where those dynamic motions are dictated primarily by electromagnetic forces. The motions aren't just random and infinite in terms of spatial extension. They only spatially extend over a particular area. The limit of that is the boundary.

Granting that a boundary is not something we merely think, it must be something we see or feel. — Janus

That's talking about perceiving boundaries, which is different than the boundaries themselves. The boundary of a particle is in no way dependent on us perceiving it.

What you’re talking about is a shared subjective 5D experience of a 4D event, and how it relates to 3D objects in a 2D space.

A ‘border’ aims to signify the moment of four-dimensional change in spacetime from one ‘country’ (as a 3D object) to another. It can be defined only in relation to the experience of others. An exact position of the border in 3D or 2D space remains ‘fuzzy’ until a shared experience can be observed (in relation to another observer), and then measured (in relation to other objects) and marked (on a 2D plane) - in mutual agreement.

At this point in the negotiation, one may wonder why a border needs to be defined in the first place...

So the border signifies a relationship between subjective experiences of a particular four dimensional event.

The boundary of a particle is in no way dependent on us perceiving it. — Terrapin Station

How do you know that is the case, or even what it would mean? Does it even make sense to speak of fundamental particles having spatial extension?

See for example this: https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://thedutchparadigm.org/13-2/the-standard-model-of-fundamental-particles-and-interactions/point-particles/&ved=2ahUKEwiPm_Du973kAhUIfysKHdklAm4QFjANegQIChAB&usg=AOvVaw28lIcgNBmjbkmQTBoZmarh&cshid=1567833017704

So first, let's clarify that "Are the boundaries (borders) of objects real" and "What is it about the boundaries of objects that is real" are ontological questions.

"How do you know that is the case" is an epistemological question. And "What would it mean" is a question of semiotics or semantics.

Ontological questions don't require epistemology, because, for example, ontology can simply present a possibility, and that possibility can be chosen while discarding other possibilities for a number of reasons including coherence, pragmatism, and so on, where we don't have to be making a knowledge claim to not only present but to also choose an ontological stance. So making sense of an ontological stance, understanding the ontological stance, and choosing an ontological stance do not require epistemology.

When we start addressing the epistemological question as well as the semiotics question, we're doing something different than we were doing in addressing the ontological question.

We can move on to the epistemological question, but before we do, I want to clarify that the ontological stance was understood as a possibility. (And this includes the stance I presented as not my own, but a possible stance where one asserts there are no clear boundaries, yet there's a particular.)

Ontological questions don't require epistemology, because, for example, ontology can simply present a possibility, and that possibility can be chosen while discarding other possibilities for a number of reasons including coherence, pragmatism, and so on, where we don't have to be making a knowledge claim to not only present but to also choose an ontological stance. So making sense of an ontological stance, understanding the ontological stance, and choosing an ontological stance do not require epistemology. — Terrapin Station

This seems quite wrong-headed to me.

The claim that objects have real boundaries completely independently of our perceptions of them is either an empirical claim or it is not. If it is an empirical claim it must be testable, and if it is testable then it belongs in the realm of epistemology and is thus an epistemic claim. Now it is trivially true that objects are perceived as having boundaries, and thus it is epistemically true that objects have boundaries since that is how we know them. By the same token it is also obviously phenomenologically and semantically true that objects have boundaries.

If you want to make a claim beyond that you are entering the arena of metaphysics, of ontology, but the problem is that it doesn't really make sense to say that we can make metaphysical claims, because in order to qualify as a claim a speculation should be testable, or else merely be a claim in the form of a description of the way we speak coherently about things, but again such claims are just epistemic or semantic.

Of course there is no problem with ontological speculation per se, but such speculations should not be interpreted as stances that can be defended, simply because they are untestable.

If it is an empirical claim it must be testable — Janus

Are you (partially) defining empirical claims that way?

What do you mean "partially"? If a claim is not testable (at least in principle) it cannot count as an empirical claim. Of any theory that claims to be empirical it should be possible to ask what imaginable observation would refute it. This is so basic I can't understand why you would ask the question.

What do you mean "partially"? — Janus

Not wholly. (Shouldn't that be obvious?) In other words, I don't want to assume that's your complete definition of "empirical." Maybe it is, but I'm asking if it's at least part of how you'd define "empirical."

Okay, so presumably you'd say that some ontological claims are not empirical claims, right?