It's not that every moment is a return. You have to name the thing. — Mongrel

I did name the thing, "moment". So I have the principle of identity right here within the moment, as an identified thing. But each moment is a difference from the prior moment, though it's still the same, as "the moment".

That's kind of odd. You could also pick "centimeter" as your thing. Neither of those could be the ultimate subject of a predicate, so thinking of a moment as a thing is mistaking time for something absolute.

And that's what I originally thought SLX was saying about selection.... that it's the selection of what qualifies as a real thing.

Eh... I think the topic has run out of go-juice. Don't you?

K's Abraham is an image of the unique dissolved in the eternal... I guess in this case, the Father. "Great by virtue of impotence... Great by virtue of hope that takes the form of madness..." And all that. Volition is a vector pointing toward the earth... not toward the eternal..

I haven't thought specifically about this for some time.On the old PF in a thread about the relationship between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' I remember saying that I think that the latter is a kind of the former, but that they are both derivative of knowing in a more primordial kind of biblical sense; the knowing of familiarity; or the knowing by acquaintance. Although the idea of familiarity and even more so the idea of acquaintance can carry an implication of separation., whereas the idea I have in mind is more like a knowing by communion.

That's kind of odd. You could also pick "centimeter" as your thing. Neither of those could be the ultimate subject of a predicate, so thinking of a moment as a thing is mistaking time for something absolute. — Mongrel

I saw you briefly in our Derrida's "Voice and Phenomenon" reading group Mongrel. Check out the summary of Ch6 which I'll quote here: "The ideal object is the most objective of objects, it can be repeated indefinitely while remaining the same". Doesn't that described object sound like the present "moment"? And doesn't that description, the possibility of indefinite repetition, appear to be predication? On what principles do you believe that the moment is not a thing?

That's a fascinating question, dude. Would you mind if I started a different thread to discuss it?

Not at all, get right on it.

No problem Πετροκότσυφας
:)