Watch the capitals, Willow. Seems they are proscribed.

Anyway, how is my use of Socratic Method? Still got it?

You Dialectical Daredevil! :joke:

Come on, you gotta listen to the commands of Reason. — TheWillowOfDarkness

There is only "Reason From".

There is no Reason irrespective of what one is reasoning from. So, if you reason from X, the outcome will be determined by your choice of X. What is your ultimate X? Merely ignoring the question will not make it go away ...

It's alright, but probably a circumlocution.

This is one of the strangest threads I've ever read. I have not seen a moral realist (which the OP appears to be) so insistent to assert moral values are just subjective. I think the whole conversation is a confusion.

The OP seems to be missing crucial concepts which distinguish something which is independent, but might be understood (or not) in our experiences.

Yep.

I'd say @Bartricks is starting out. Or perhaps home-schooled. In either case the important bit is whether he digs in or rethinks.

If he rethinks, he is on the way to doing philosophy.

I was making a pointed joke about the OP's argument just being another form of Divine Command Theory. Why did Banno have to listen to Reason? Well, Reason is just always right in what it says.

*edit*
But it seems the OP understood that, so I'm not sure what they are trying to go for.

My core objection to Divine Command Theory is existential.

Suppose @Bartricks is right, and what is good is exactly what is demanded by reason.

Even then, each of us must decide whether to do what is demanded by reason.

So, even then, we must each decide whether to follow the divine command or no.

Hence Divine Command Theory is of no use in helping us decide what to do.

There is only "Reason From".

There is no Reason irrespective of what one is reasoning from. So, if you reason from X, the outcome will be determined by your choice of X. What is your ultimate X? Merely ignoring the question will not make it go away ... — alcontali

Yes! :up:

Although I would add that some X's are more reasonable than others insofar as they are more consistent/coherent with the totality of human knowledge and understanding.

I was making a pointed joke about the OP's argument just being another form of Divine Command Theory. Why did Banno have to listen to Reason? Well, Reason is just always right in what it says. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Reason is always right in what it says about X, if what it says necessarily follows from X. At the same time, you cannot use Reason to find X. Furthermore, if X is nonsense, then anything Reason says about X will also be nonsense.

Reason is a function with arity two: reason(C=conclusion,P=premise). It does not say what P should be (It cannot find P). It does not say what C should be (It can generally not find C either). It only verifies that C necessarily follows from P. It is very, very easy to overestimate the power or impact of this mechanical function. Reason is almost never what it is about.

It's a pity one can't reply to one's own posts. They are usually the better ones.

The objection to my objection would be that if Reason sets out what is right, then one ought do as reason proscribes. You remain free to choose not to follow reason, but you ought not.

The other thing I would take exception to in the OP is the segregation of subjective and objective.

Sure, use the terms if you like; but the distinction cannot be made rigid in the way the OP supposes.

I'll keep how "the problem of evil" is common to all moral decisions and how each of as acts as (a?) God under my hat then. The similarity between DCT and the act of following a moral standard will probably be too much.

You remain free to choose not to follow reason, but you ought not. — Banno

People never "follow reason". If you reason from X, then you are following X. You always follow the ultimate premise from which you are reasoning, while there is necessarily nothing reasonable about that ultimate premise.

Think you are taking a very tight definition of reason here.

Rather in most cases the reasons for our acts are given post hoc. Would you agree?

When Bartricks said earlier that what is right is what Reason prescribes but the "right" does not mean "what reason prescribes" I wondered whether he was drawing a distinction between what an individual's reason prescribes and what Reason -the god, the Divine Subject- prescribes.

The problem would be that no one would be able to tell as to whether what their reason prescribes is what Reason prescribes. Bartitricks seems to appeal to majority thinking to get around this dilemma; that is, if the reason of the majority says, for example, that murder is wrong, then this would show that Reason judges murder to be wrong, and that murder is therefore objectively speaking (although Bartricks does not like that term) wrong.

while there is necessarily nothing reasonable about that ultimate premise. — alcontali

I think this should be "while there is nothing necessarily reasonable about that ultimate premise".

Rather in most cases the reasons for our acts are given posit hoc. Would you agree? — Banno

How could they be reasonable, in the sense of "following the dictates of reason" if the reasons are given post hoc?

Yeah. Reason is not monolithic in the way @Bartricks takes for granted.

I agree with that.

Well, they are reasonable if reasonable reasons are given...

Think you are taking a very tight definition of reason here. Rather in most cases the reasons for our acts are given post hoc. Would you agree? — Banno

A lot of our behaviour -- I would even think most of it -- is inspired by other, unknown mental faculties that are not reason itself. Even the behaviour of producing a new theorem along with its proof from an ultimate premise, is not possibly guided by reason. Gödel proved that this would simply be impossible.

Therefore, post factum rationalization is more often than not, nonsensical.

You cannot discover a theorem merely by using reason. You cannot discover its proof from given foundations merely by using reason. You can actually not even discover these foundations merely by using reason. The use of reason is strictly limited to verifying that the theorem necessarily follows from such foundations.

Therefore, given the relatively small role of reason in knowledge, I do not see why there would necessarily be any guidance by reason in every possible act.

I agree with that too. But actions can be reasonable without being motivated by reason, no?

Seems he has adopted Rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, and so on)as a guide - as if nothing else had happened in philosophy in the last few hundred years.

Whoa - motive.

I think this should be "while there is nothing necessarily reasonable about that ultimate premise". — Janus

Well, if this ultimate premise were reasonable, we would be able to demonstrate how it necessarily follows from another, even more ultimate premise ... which is just a recipe for infinite regress. ;-)

Therefore, post factum rationalization is more often than not, nonsensical. — alcontali

Don't see how this follows from your first paragraph.

Yes, and the other problem is that Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, in their various ways presumed God, not Reason, as the Divine Lawgiver, with Reason being but one of His divine attributes. This gets back to the problem with his position I was pressing him on: namely the intelligibility of thinking of Reason as a standalone sentient subject.

Meaning?

Just that we might not want to open that whole other kettle of worms - or something like that.