I'm not sure that that's really a problem. Compare for example commercial value. Something is commercially valuable, in an intransitive way, if there are people out there willing to pay a lot for it. — Pfhorrest
it being transitively valuable to someone or another makes it in an intransitively sense valuable in general — Pfhorrest
:grin:The rest of what you said was ignorant gibberish. Continental philosophy is where you belong! — Bartricks
Yes, this is the point that aletheist was trying to make above (and having about as much luck as the rest of us in getting through to the OP). That something can be valuable is a judgement about how it is possible to have a subject relate to it, not about any subject actually relating to it. A bike is ride-able even without anyone riding it - this absolutely has to be the case otherwise no-one would ever be able to have invented the bike because no-one would have been able to conceive of it as being ride-able without someone first having ridden it. — Isaac
If we're just saying that something is "able to be valued," nothing would be excluded from that. And everything would be able to be both positively and negatively valued. — Terrapin Station
At any rate, Bartricks wasn't saying anything about it being a possibility that someone might value something when he used the term "valuable." — Terrapin Station
it's not physically possible. — Terrapin Station
How do you know it's not physically possible? — Isaac
Yes, but we also know something about human brains (the source of value). For some reason you're treating what we know about physics as being unequivocal fact and yet treating what we know about human brains as being irrelevant, and I don't understand why. — Isaac
So you're arguing that there are things it's physically impossible to positively or negatively value? — Terrapin Station
I doubt whether 'neurophilosophy' for example, which also questions 'logical thinking' can be be deemed to be 'continental' — fresco
I am acting under a moral theory that, more than believing it should be universal, I believe it is universal for the example that I gave. And as I mentioned throughout both my first two posts, I don’t believe all morality is universal but specifically for the example that I worked with in the post that is what I will subscribe to. — username
I defined how objective and subjective are being understood here. Stop trying to make this about labels rather than theories.
Subjective means 'made of subjective states' - that is, states of a subject-of-experience, a mind.
Objective means 'not made of subjective states'.
If you don't like those definitions, then just deal with it or start up your own thread in which you use them as you wish. — Bartricks
It was the thesis that moral values are my valuings. That is, that being morally valuable involves nothing more than being valued by me.
That thesis. — Bartricks
P says "if moral values (all of them, not some of them) are my values (so, if being morally valuable is one and the same as being valued by me).
Q says "if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable" — Bartricks
What you've done there is change my argument to a different one to fit your agenda - the agenda of showing my argument is invalid at any cost. — Bartricks
So, are moral values - moral valuings - identical with my valuings? To express it a different way: is 'being morally valuable' synonymous with 'being valued by me"? — Bartricks
that what I am saying is that if moral values and my values are one and the same, then if I value something it must be morally valuable, because 'what it is' to be morally valuable just is to be being valued by me. I mean, that's the thesis under consideration — Bartricks
Premise 1 says "If P, then Q"
P says "if moral values (all of them, not some of them) are my values (so, if being morally valuable is one and the same as being valued by me).
Q says "if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable"
It is true. Not false. True. — Bartricks
Well, what is 'not Q'? If Q is "If I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable" then what is the opposite of that?
This: "If I value something, it is NOT necessarily morally valuable". And that's what premise 2 says. — Bartricks
All you have done is change my first premise and then show me how arguments with different first premises are invalid. What was the point in that? — Bartricks
We have not yet observed an undamaged brain morally valuing a pile of sick — Isaac
Why are you introducing words like "healthy" or "undamaged"? I'm not saying anything like that. — Terrapin Station
To be defined is always the primary ground for some subsequent cognizant ability. That's your words. — creativesoul
If one is using common language to take account of one's own mental ongoings, then one needs to recognize a particular terminology. If one cannot recognize that particular terminology, one cannot possibly be thinking about it. — creativesoul
ITALICS MINEComputational and cognitive neuroscience was delivering an alternative kinematics for cognition, one that provided no structural analogue for folk psychology’s propositional attitudes (e.g. statements about morality) or logic-like computations over propositional contents.
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