Why Living Now Isn't Surprising: Prime Principle of Confirmation

PhilosophyAttempter

PRIME PRINCIPLE OF CONFIRMATION:
“Whenever we are considering two competing hypotheses, an observation counts as evidence in favor of the hypothesis under which the observation has the highest probability”

Objection by Michael Huemer, Paradox Lost,

“Given facts about population growth, *if* the human species lasts for a long time into the
future, then the great majority of humans who ever live will turn out to have
lived at a later time than now, in a more advanced society than this. If that’s the
case, then you should view it as surprising that you would find yourself living in
this primitive time, rather than in the advanced future with the high population.
On the other hand, if the human species is not going to last much longer, then it
wouldn’t be surprising that you’d be living now rather than in the advanced
future. Therefore, the fact that you find yourself living now is *evidence that*
the human species will not last long into the future.”

To lay this out further
H1: The human species will not last long into the future
H2: The human species will last long into the future
Evidence: You find yourself living in this primitive time with a relatively small population
Prime Principle: If some evidence is not improbable/surprising on H1 but very improbable/surprising on H2, then that evidence provides strong evidence for H1.
Conclusion: We have here strong evidence that the human species will not last long into the future.

Huemer would not agree with this conclusion, thus disproving the soundness of the prime principle of confirmation

I am objecting his evidence (that us living in the now as opposed to the future is “surprising”) and arguing that our existence in the now is not surprising.

Following his example, If our existence in the now is reason to believe our race is near its end, wouldn’t it be just as surprising that we find ourselves living as/in one of the last populations to exist? Wouldn’t it be far less surprising to say we aren’t one of the last populations to exist?

Furthering, it is arguable to state that any existence on the timeline of population isn’t surprising. Take a scenario of throwing a dart as an example. With a handful of darts, you throw them all aimlessly on the board, they each land in various spots. Would you say “ah, that is surprising that those darts landed exactly in the spot that they did?” I would argue that you wouldn’t. Thus, you wouldn’t say “ah, it is so surprising that I was born in 1995 as opposed to 2011 or 1870.”

I argue that his conclusion is not sound because it is neither improbable nor surprising to exist in the now, knowing our population will extend far further in the future.

petrichor

Why limit the reference class to humans?

boethius

↪petrichor

Exactly, I didn't find this post surprising at all.

Echarmion

↪PhilosophyAttempter

I started another thread on this so called "doomsday argument" a while back. We weren't able to reach a definitive conclusion, but there seems to be an issue in applying the Copernican principle to self-sorting problems.

In the context of the prime principle of confirmation, this would mean either that the principle has an exception for self-sorting problems or that the probability must be assessed differently.

Following his example, If our existence in the now is reason to believe our race is near its end, wouldn’t it be just as surprising that we find ourselves living as/in one of the last populations to exist? Wouldn’t it be far less surprising to say we aren’t one of the last populations to exist? — PhilosophyAttempter

In the traditional form of the argument, it asserts that we are most likely not in the first 5 or 10% and that therefore, there will probably only be a couple more generations. This would be sound reasoning for a normal sorting problem, like guessing how many cars of a given type have been produced based on a single serial number.

Furthering, it is arguable to state that any existence on the timeline of population isn’t surprising. Take a scenario of throwing a dart as an example. With a handful of darts, you throw them all aimlessly on the board, they each land in various spots. Would you say “ah, that is surprising that those darts landed exactly in the spot that they did?” I would argue that you wouldn’t. Thus, you wouldn’t say “ah, it is so surprising that I was born in 1995 as opposed to 2011 or 1870.” — PhilosophyAttempter

Essentially, what we're doing is looking at a single dart and trying to decide how many darts have been thrown.

T Clark

“Given facts about population growth, *if* the human species lasts for a long time into the
future, then the great majority of humans who ever live will turn out to have
lived at a later time than now, in a more advanced society than this. If that’s the
case, then you should view it as surprising that you would find yourself living in
this primitive time, rather than in the advanced future with the high population.
On the other hand, if the human species is not going to last much longer, then it
wouldn’t be surprising that you’d be living now rather than in the advanced
future. Therefore, the fact that you find yourself living now is *evidence that*
the human species will not last long into the future.” — PhilosophyAttempter

So, let's change the game a bit. We'll use cards. There is a well-shuffled deck with 1,000,000,000 cards.

First condition - I take a card from the deck. It's the 10,009,361 of clubs. There is only a one in a billion chance of picking that card. Shouldn't I be surprised? No, of course not. After all, it had to be something. Actually, I'm very surprised! Where the hell did you get a deck of cards with a billion cards in it?

Second condition - Before I draw, I make a prediction of what the card will be. I predict the 452,467,292 of hearts. I draw and pick the 452,467,292 of hearts. Am I surprised. You bet your ass I'm surprised.

What's the difference in the two conditions - It's that the result was predicted in advance. It's not surprising that I was born, as a matter of fact, the probability is one, otherwise I wouldn't be here to respond to your post. You have just recreated the faulty logic of the strong anthropic principle.

petrichor

The real reason you shouldn't be surprised to find yourself living now, to find yourself human, to find yourself in a fine-tuned universe, and so on:

When you are everywhere, you should never be surprised at finding yourself in any particular place or time.

You draw all the cards. So the probability of drawing any one of them is exactly 1.

Individuality, or the discrete boundedness and exclusivity of your identity is an illusion caused by a failure to integrate all the information.

Please see Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Schrodinger, Daniel Kolak, the Upanishads, and so on, for more on this matter.

That which finds itself in your shoes is that which occupies all perspectives. It is none other than your essential self. A human doesn't occupy these perspectives. A homunculus doesn't occupy them. That which is everything is everything. There's only one substance. There's only one mind, everywhere present to itself.

“I submit that both paradoxes will be solved (I do not pretend to solve them here and now) by assimilating into our Western build of science the Eastern doctrine of identity. Mind is by its very nature a singulare tantum. I should say: the over-all number of minds is just one. I venture to call it indestructible since it has a peculiar timetable, namely mind is always now. There is really no before and after for mind. There is only a now that includes memories and expectations. But I grant that our language is not adequate to express this, and I also grant, should anyone wish to state it, that I am now talking religion, not science.” —Schrödinger, What is Life?: With Mind and Matter and Autobiographical Sketches, p. 134–135

Here, read this chapter from Schrodinger's book (only 13 short pages):
https://archive.org/details/WhatIsLife_201708/page/n143

Terrapin Station

Saying that one thing is more likely than something else isn't saying that the more likely thing is the case, unless we're going to argue that unlikely things never happen, but that would be ridiculous.

petrichor

Saying that one thing is more likely than something else isn't saying that the more likely thing is the case, — Terrapin Station

If you are in either of two situations, A and B, and you don't which, but you know that A would make your situation a rare case while B would make it a common case, you'd be wise to bet you are in B.

For example, suppose you are asked to stick your hand blind into a bag containing some blue and some red marbles and you draw out a marble at random. You draw a blue marble. You are then told that one of two things is true:

A: blue marbles outnumber red marbles 100 to 1
B: red marbles outnumber blue marbles 100 to 1

You are then to place a bet. What should you bet? Clearly, you should bet on A.

In the kind of reasoning in the OP, the perspective you find yourself occupying is like drawing a marble from the bag. It is called "self-sampling". And the self-sampling assumption says:

All other things equal, an observer should reason as if they are randomly selected from the set of all actually existent observers (past, present and future) in their reference class.

One thing I find objectionable is the reference class. Consider the doomsday argument. A basic assumption needed to make the argument work is that the only thing it is possible to find yourself being is a human. Think about how it would change the conclusions if we allow all sentient beings, including aliens on other planets, as well as all animals, to be the reference class. And if we restrict it to humans, why not restrict further to just men, or just men of a certain race? How is that any different from restricting to humans? The reference class is an arbitrary choice. But of course, if you think that what you are is a 3 pound hunk of matter, why are brains privileged? If you really are that collection of atoms, it is conceivable that you could be any collection, even a rock or a cloud of gas. So being a live brain at all then makes your situation a truly rare case, and so finding yourself as a human brain, you should probably reject something about this picture, as it makes your situation extraordinarily unusual.

In my picture, it is necessary that you find yourself being the only thing that exists. You hold all the marbles, rare and common, and so you shouldn't be surprised to find yourself holding the rare ones.

Why Living Now Isn't Surprising: Prime Principle of Confirmation

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