But isn't there an extra step required to extend concerns from people who already exist to people who might potentially exist? — Echarmion
But who knows, maybe all sleepwalkers are faking it and are all awake the whole time. — Mark Dennis
those are historically common moral theories and each of those has many modern variants. So if you’re suggesting that we are only allowed to discuss the moral theories of long dead people that you respect, then I say I’m done with this argument as you’re not contributing to it. It seems to me, that what you call common moral theories, I call entry level ethics.Common moral theories include contractarianism, divine command theory, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, etc.
So you’re trying to say sleep walking disorder isn’t real and that we should ignore sleepwalkers as evidence of sleepwalking? — Mark Dennis
By very definition of sleep they are not conscious because we are not conscious when we sleep. — Mark Dennis
So would it be fair to say you are a moral relativist? — Mark Dennis
One of the other questions I asked which you conveniently ignored — Mark Dennis
So if you’re suggesting that we are only allowed to discuss the moral theories of long dead people that you respect, — Mark Dennis
It seems conceivable that one might argue that future people have no standing at all. This would be unintuitive, but does not strike me as prima facie incompatible with common consequentialist or deontological systems. So, I'd like to use the claim that "future people have no standing at all" as a baseline for discussion and ask for your opinions and reasons as to why this statement is correct of false, given the system of moral philosophy you ascribe to. — Echarmion
Which of them is speaking the truth? — Mark Dennis
So how can subjectivism be taken seriously? — Mark Dennis
You should read up on moral psychology as a field. — Mark Dennis
not if you have a handful in mind — Mark Dennis
Can we not then, on the same temporal grounds, rationally generalize from this moral (i.e. intrinsic benefit of harm / helplessness avoidance & reduction absent, or independent of, extrinsic benefits (i.e. reciprocality (e.g. quo pro quo)) concern for our future selves [FuS] to moral concern for (our) future populations [FuPop]?
— 180 Proof
Well, for one the whole notion would seem to require a consequentialist approach, since we are talking about benefit and harm, correct? — Echarmion
It seems convincing that any consequentialist system has considerations of the future states of current person's build in. To this effect, it requires us to consider persons as stable through time. — Echarmion
I view my Future self as an extension of myself, but I wouldn't view my grandchildren in that manner.They have no current personhood which I could extent into the future. — Echarmion
180 Proof I was with you up until the conclusion “Present Self implies Future Population.”. Could you maybe expand on that a little and clarify. Or correct my reading of the conclusion if it is wrong. — Mark Dennis
Are you saying; as only the present self has agency, it has an obligation to use some of that agency for a future population? — Mark Dennis
I submit that we all act in consideration of future people all the time: our future selves. — Pfhorrest
You do realise that subjectivism and noncognitivism are contradictory views right? — Mark Dennis
You said you were specifically a subjectivist yet you didn’t answer those questions the way a subjectivist would — Mark Dennis
Also, if you’re a subjectivist how can you claim that subjectivism is factually correct when subjectivists don’t believe in facts? — Mark Dennis
Thank you for bringing questions about the nature of self into this. — petrichor
180 Proof, is your position on personhood or selfhood basically in agreement with Parfit's? — petrichor
Also, if you’re a subjectivist how can you claim that subjectivism is factually correct when subjectivists don’t believe in facts? This is what I mean about relativists. They say silly things like nothing is true and then claim “nothing is true” is true. — Mark Dennis
Individuals who claim there are no moral truths have the potential for a dark hidden bias. A reason why they either hope there are no moral truths or a reason why they want to convince other people of it. Now I’m not suggesting this of you but it’s one that should make you pause when listening to other moral antirealist views. — Mark Dennis
In other words, a moral system in which everything is morally permissible unless we specify that it's morally prohibited? — Terrapin Station
Future me doesn't exist yet but I care about him. I also care about other people generally. It just follows from the two that I would care about future other people who don't exist yet. — Pfhorrest
IMO potential people have as much relevance as any other potential event that may not be as predictable as we’d like. We prefer to control for such uncertainty - to effectively ignore or factor out those variables we cannot control or predict. That’s all well and good, but we cannot pretend we are creating a future where people do not exist. We’re going to have to factor this potential in somehow, and be okay with the uncertainty. — Possibility
only bearers of a shared continuity of memories, relationships and embodied perspective (vide Parfit, linked previously). — 180 Proof
How parents raise their children will impact any potential future grandchildren during the upbringing of their future selves by your present children's future selves, no? The moral concern of a present parent for a present child is compounded in large part by the prospective welfare of that future child who's potentialities include being a future parent, etc. Just as the future self does not exist presently yet as an extension of the present self concerns the present self ... I don't see how concern for presently nonexistent future grandchildren differs, except in degree. — 180 Proof
The reason I buy moral noncognitivism/subjectivism is that I want to get right what the world is like, and it's clear to me, via empirical and logical/reasoned means, that morality is simply dispostions that people have about interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette. Moral stances aren't found in the extramental world, so there's nothing there to match or fail to match (so that utterances can be true or false). — Terrapin Station
And.... people agree on certain dispositions and enforce those agreements. Those agreements in turn influence what moral stances people adopt. Moral stances aren't found in the external world, but morality is very real in that there are consequences if you fail to match it. — ChatteringMonkey
It seems to me that if you want to get right what the world is like, this should at least be part of your description — ChatteringMonkey
It's just that that stuff is irrelevant when we're talking about the ontological status of moral stances re whether they can be true or false. You're not going to say every single thing about every aspect of morality every time it comes up. You'd have to write a book over and over.
It's just that that stuff is irrelevant when we're talking about the ontological status of moral stances re whether they can be true or false. You're not going to say every single thing about every aspect of morality every time it comes up. You'd have to write a book over and over. — Terrapin Station
True or false is the context of morality simply means whether or not it is in accordance with fixed convention... — ChatteringMonkey
That's the argumentum ad populum fallacy, and it results in saying that it's true that it's morally permissible to have slaves (if you're in the US in the 1820s in the South), that it's true that it's morally permissible in certain historical tribal settings to cannibalize neighboring tribes, etc. — Terrapin Station
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