I want to examine an argument for the claim that religion is a conspiracy theory, perhaps the “ultimate” conspiracy theory. I’m bothered by the conclusion of the argument, but I’m not sure how to critique it without begging the question. I’d like some feedback from people.

I’m making use of Brian Keeley’s discussion of conspiracy theories and what I think his argument is for the claim that conspiracy theories are self-defeating:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conspiracy_theory

https://philpapers.org/rec/KEEOCT

A reconstruction of Keeley’s argument that we discussed in my Philosophy of Religion class is the following:

1. If you accept a sufficiently mature conspiracy theory, then you’ll come to doubt various people and institutions that have been set up to generate reliable data and evidence.
2. If you accept a sufficiently mature conspiracy theory, then you’ll come to doubt various people and institutions that have been set up to generate reliable data and evidence, then you’ll also have good reason to doubt the various people and institutions that generated the data and evidence for the conspiracy theory.
3. If you have good reason to doubt the various people and institutions that generated the data and evidence for the conspiracy theory, then you’ll have good reason to doubt this conspiracy theory.
4. Thus, if you accept a sufficiently mature conspiracy theory, then you’ll have good reason to doubt that conspiracy theory. (1-3 HS)
5. If you have good reason to doubt mature conspiracy theories, then mature conspiracy theories are self-defeating and should be rejected. (3-4 HS)
6. Thus, mature conspiracy theories are self-defeating and we should reject them. (4, 5 MP)

I am assuming that the above argument, or something very much like it, succeeds in showing that conspiracy theories are self-defeating. Perhaps others might object to it.

An analogous argument can be made for the claim that religious belief is self-defeating:

1. If you accept the supernatural claims of a specific religion, then you must doubt the supernatural claims of other religions.
2. If you must doubt the supernatural claims of other religions, then you must also believe that you have good reason to doubt the supernatural claims of other religions, for example, that they lack direct, public evidence for their supernatural claims.
3. If you must believe that you have good reason to doubt the basic claims of other religions—for example, that they lack direct, public evidence for their supernatural claims—then you must believe that you have good reason to doubt the supernatural claims of your own religion.
4. Thus, if you accept the supernatural claims of a specific religion, then you must believe that you have good reason to doubt the supernatural claims of that religion. (1-3 HS)
5. If you have good reason to doubt the supernatural claims of a religion, then accepting the supernatural claims of that religion is self-defeating, and you should reject these claims. (3, 4 HS)
6. Thus, if you accept the supernatural claims of a specific religion, then you should reject these claims. (4, 5 MP)

So far, the conclusion appears to be that religious belief is self-defeating. We can add more inferences to make the matter clearer:

7. Both accepting and rejecting a claim is contradictory.
8. If a belief is contradictory, then it should be eliminated.
9. Accepting the supernatural claims of a specific religion is contradictory. (from 6)
10. Thus, the supernatural claims of a specific religion should be eliminated. (8, 9 MP)

Focusing on the issue of falsifiability/unfalsifiability, we might conclude further that religion is a kind of conspiracy theory, perhaps the “ultimate” conspiracy theory:

11. If a belief is contradictory, then it is unfalsifiable.
12. Thus, the belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is unfalsifiable. (9, 11 MP)
13. If a belief is about the nature of reality, then it is an “ultimate” belief.
14. If a belief is unfalsifiable, then it is a kind of conspiracy theory.
15. Thus, belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is a kind of conspiracy theory. (12, 14 MP)
16. Belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is belief about the nature of reality.
17. Thus, belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is an “ultimate” belief. (13, 16 MP)
18. If a belief is both a conspiracy and an “ultimate” belief, then it is an “ultimate conspiracy theory.”
19. Belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is both a conspiracy theory and an “ultimate” belief. (15, 17 Add)
20. Thus, belief in the supernatural claims of a specific religion is the “ultimate conspiracy theory.” (18, 19 MP)

I realize that I’m playing loosely with the idea of conspiracy theory. For example, 14 might be challenged on the grounds that not all unfalsifiable beliefs are conspiracy theories, if by “conspiracy theory” we mean something very specific like “belief that there is a small number of people controlling wide-ranging events for nefarious ends.” Assuming a broader conception of “conspiracy theory," however, I think that we can use 14 or something like it. Perhaps others disagree.

Is religion the ultimate self-defeating conspiracy theory? How can one respond to this argument without begging the question by assuming —by appealing to faith—what one is trying to prove? Thanks for your feedback.