Or in other words, classes/kinds/types are simply a matter of how we want to conceptualize things, how we want to divide them up. — Terrapin Station
↪tim wood
Don't we need a definition of what it means to "exist" before we can proceed with an inquiry like this? — Metaphysician Undercover
No Voodoo, no woowoo. — tim wood
Samuel Johnson claims to have refuted this by simply kicking against a large rock, exclaiming 'I refute it thus!' But his 'refutation' is said to be fallacious, insofar as it simply assumes that Berkeley's claim is wrong or nonsensical, without offering any real rebuttal of it. (Hence the designation of it as 'argumentum ad lapidiem', the argument from the stone.) — Wayfarer
"Certum est, quia impossibile" ~Tertullian :chin:The idea is to list as many differing kinds of existing/existence/existing things as we can think of. Part of the goal is to identify which things/classes of things may be reasonably said to exist, and also both to weed out unsupportable claims and to rule out "things" for which there is no direct evidence. — tim wood
1) All material things.
2) All other things existing by reference, but not material, as ideas/mental constructs. — tim wood
Two stones are near each other, and no others are close. That must be two, yes? No. the two is in the mind of the observer who associates the idea of two with the two stones. — tim wood
I offered this above as tentative:Maybe I should offer a tentative definition of existence, or at least that which falls out of my two categories above: objects of thinking or sense or some combination, but in combination reducible to either object of thought or sense by parts. — tim wood
1a) Material existence shall be an absolute qualification for existence - the materiality, obviously, being demonstrable. If you might stub your toe on it, then it's difficult to see how it isn't. — tim wood
Will you accept an amendment to, "Having the capacity to be present in some sense or some way"? Meaning that lacking any such capacity means non-existence. Is that what you meant? — tim wood
Maybe, as the collection of everything that exists includes everything that exists, but does that help? As to classes and types, do you really have a problem having a class of sand that includes as members all the individual grains of sand? Of course, if you insist that it is all just how we want to conceptualize, that puts it "all" into the category of ideas. — tim wood
Hang on, weren't you quite vociferously arguing against model dependant realism only a few days ago, the idea that people don't objectively exist being nonsense? Now you're saying the opposite, that grouping some particular set of entities into a containing class is just a matter of how we conceptualise things. — Isaac
What I'm saying is really simple (at least it seems so to me), but your response suggests that you can't even grasp it. — Terrapin Station
Properties are particulars — Terrapin Station
Typically, properties are considered to be examples of universals, not particulars. — Pantagruel
Yes, I just skimmed through the Stanford article on Tropes also.
Personally, I find metaphysical hairsplitting to be a little tedious. Invariably it seems we are either trying to graft the mental onto the physical or ungraft it. In the end, both are in play, so unless there is some really compelling practical consequence I can live with a little ambiguity. — Pantagruel
The test I'm using is negation. — tim wood
Abstract objects are things like numbers and sets. They aren't considered to be mental objects for reasons pointed out by Frege. — frank
Anything to contribute? — tim wood
Perhaps this. Materiality just means encounterability (in some way or other), whether or not the the thing be encountered. I'm sure you will almost immediately again see circularity in this, in that presupposed is the thing encountered. But to go back, toe-stubbing was listed as "an" absolute qualification, not the only. So it seems difficult not to beg-the-question. But the way out of that is to acknowledge that things exist, and to try to identify sufficient conditions for existence. I nominate encounterability as a sufficient condition and an improvement over toe-stubbing and capacity-for. Yes? No? Improve? — tim wood
So perhaps “object” would be a more precise term for existing things. “Object” also proves difficult to define but I think has at least these qualities:
it is finite
it moves as one
it is bounded by a surface
it has a position relative to other objects
it acts — NOS4A2
The difficulty I have is that the relationship is no thing separate from the objects themselves. Two stones are near each other, and no others are close. That must be two, yes? No. the two is in the mind of the observer who associates the idea of two with the two stones. — tim wood
I'm looking on line for a definition of force , but haven't found a good one. How would you define "force?" — tim wood
Don't we need a definition of what it means to "exist" before we can proceed with an inquiry like this? — Metaphysician Undercover
3) Process. The question arises if things are existent that require a length of time, that in less than which time they do not exist. But processes clearly exist, so it would appear that things exist within some bounds that do not exist outside of those bounds. I think that's interesting. — tim wood
5) self and others. I think those have got to be ideas/mental constructs. — tim wood
On yours, in the way of relationships, the number of such immediately explodes into an uncountable infinity of descriptions of relationshps, and of everything in every combination. — tim wood
And we have to consider that the existence of relationships, in this case, in as much as they do not depend on mind, must be real in virtue of something other than mind, and thus not necessarily accessible in any way by thee and me. — tim wood
even if it destroys by explosion the concept of existence via the notion of relationship. — tim wood
But I invite you to consider whether relationships can be a different species of existence, or if instead they fall into ideas/mental constructs - that is, will you develop your thinking a bit more so that we might fall on one side or the other? — tim wood
What about such things as money? Does it exist? Does the economy exist? What about newspaper articles? Insurance policies? College degrees? Speed limits? I think most people would agree that those are socially or mentally constructed. But I would argue that such things as rocks are also constructed by our minds in an important sense. There is no line out there in the world in itself separating this rock from the mountainside, saying that this collection of atoms is this particular thing we call a rock, which is good for throwing at birds, kicking, and so on.
A lot of this is a matter of how we humans are functionally related to our environments. What it is for something to be a chair is that it is something to sit on. Supposing all humans were to suddenly die, are there any chairs in the world? Are there any magazine articles? — petrichor
The way we carve up and associate things and attach meanings to them is largely transparent to us. We mistake it for how things really are out there in the world beyond us. — petrichor
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