its applied ethics, not business ethics so I'm not even the butt of your joke there. Well done on being wrong as per usual. I'm not going to bother debating with you, I'd rather debate with my five year old as I'll probably hear something intelligent from him. You however, yet to see any sign of intelligence from you. Just nastiness and insults thrown at everyone who disagrees with you. Enjoy your sad little life and I'm honestly so glad I dont have to tell you not to breed.

The bigger joke is someone without a masters jealously knocking them because he cant hack it in school when the teacher easily makes him look like the fool that he is.

Would you like another argument against the physical universe - one, admittedly, beyond the ken of your average five year old?

Here:

1. Anything that exists has either been caused to exist by something external to it, or it exists by its very nature
2. If any physical things exist, they do not exist by their very nature
3. Therefore, if any physical things exist, they have been caused to exist by something external.
4. If physical things have been caused to exist by other physical things, then if there are any physical things there will be an infinity of causes
5. There cannot be an infinity of causes (or anything else for that matter).
6. Therefore if there are any physical things, they have not been caused to exist by physical things
7. A non-physical thing is something that lacks extension - that is, something that does not occupy any space.
8. Therefore, if there are any physical things, then they have been caused to exist by things that lack extension
9. There can be no causal interaction between an extended thing and an unextended thing
10. Therefore, there are no physical things.

I think your conclusion does not follow necessarily from your premises.

One problem is how you go from arguing that immaterial reality has no causal relation with physical reality to therefore no physical things exist. Perhaps immaterial reality does not interact with material reality in one specific causal manner, as in the way that a potter crafts a pot to exist, but that does not seem to preclude the possibility that material reality is metaphysically contingent upon immaterial reality- which may be metaphysically necessary- the point here is that is possible to say that the existence of x causes the existence of y to exist (if x's existence is logically prior to y's existence) and still have no "causal interaction" with y.

Your first premise reminds me of the principle of sufficient reason that Leibniz uses in his argument for God so I thought of this example after reading your argument.

An example of how a thing can have been caused by another and yet still have no interaction with that other can be seen in a God who is argued to be non-physical, changeless, and as such is timeless, and possesses whatever mental state that it is in.

The existence of such a God is logically prior to the existence of its thought so that if there was no such God, then there is no such thought; indeed, the thought's existence is caused to exist (in this example "caused" refers to logical dependency or metaphysical dependency) by something that is not identical to the thought and is thus external to it, since this example assumes that whatever God is that he is not his own thought, thereby satisfying premise one of your argument, but there is also no "causal interaction" between the existence of God's thought and the existence of God, as there can be no causal interaction between the existence of the thing that is logically dependent upon the existence of some necessary thing. So while God may have the power to cause whatever thought he wants, the actions of God's mind does not cause that the existence of God's thoughts are logically posterior upon the existence of God's existence; in this respect, God's mind and the logical dependency that the existence of God's thoughts have on God's existence have no causal interaction.

So we can agree, for sake of argument, that there is no causal interaction between immaterial and material things, but hold that it is still possiblely the case that these two things are metaphysically linked.

In this case, the material reality could have always existed in time and was nonetheless caused to exist, perhaps by the necessary existence of immaterial reality preserving the non-necessary existence of material reality; premise 1-4 suggest to me that you think immaterial reality is unlike material reality in not needing to be caused by something external to it, but correct me if I am mistaken.

There is no contradiction in it being the case that the existence of material reality is caused by the existence of immaterial reality and that there is no causal interaction between immaterial reality's activity the existence of physical reality. Here we see that what a thing is and what a thing does are not the same, so while it can be stated that immaterial reality's activities can do nothing to "causally interact" with material reality existence, the existence of immaterial reality may be the reason for why material reality exists.

The point is not to say your conclusion is wrong, mind you, but that you need to defend a version of premise 9 that argues that if there is no "causal interaction" between two things that that must also entail that there is no metaphysical and logical dependency between those things.

Shouldn't we be asking a more fundamental question? What is life?

One problem is how you go from arguing that immaterial reality has no causal relation with physical reality to therefore no physical things exist. Perhaps immaterial reality does not interact with material reality in one specific causal manner, as in the way that a potter crafts a pot to exist, but that does not seem to preclude the possibility that material reality is metaphysically contingent upon immaterial reality- which may be metaphysically necessary- the point here is that is possible to say that the existence of x causes the existence of y to exist (if x's existence is logically prior to y's existence) and still have no "causal interaction" with y. — Walter B

I agree that the weakest premise in the argument is the one that asserts that extended things can only causally interact with other extended things.

But without necessarily endorsing it, it does have a great deal of prima facie credibility. I think it is fair to say that the reason of many people - including, it would seem, the bulk of contemporary philosophers - endorses it, for it is the principle basis upon which (ironically) belief in the soul is rejected as false. For it is at the heart of the so-called 'problem of interaction'. The (supposed) problem being that if our minds are immaterial things - souls - then they would be incapable of causally interacting with our extended bodies; yet as our minds clearly do causally interact with our extended bodies, our minds must themselves be extended things (and thus not souls).

So, because that problem is currently considered a very big one, and because it depends crucially upon the premise that extended things and unextended things cannot possibly causally interact, I think we can safely conclude that the reason of many represents causal interaction to be impossible between objects of different kinds.

If that's right, then it is reasonable to think that the relevant premise is true. But I agree that its truth is not beyond a reasonable doubt.

Let's imagine it is false, then. Well, we still need to stop the regress. The only way to do this, so far as I can see, is to attribute a power of so-called 'substance causation' to extended things. That is, although extended things can cause events by undergoing changes themselves, they can also cause events directly - that is, without themselves undergoing any change.

But here Plato's point, I think, is that we simply do not see this kind of causation among extended things. What we observe, where extended things are concerned, is event causation, not substance causation. That is, we notice that every movement in a thing, is caused by some other movement elsewhere. There may be no necessity to this, but it is what observation suggests. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the movements of extended things are ultimately caused not by substance causation by extended things, but substance causation by immaterial things.

I will respond to the rest shortly

The point is not to say your conclusion is wrong, mind you, but that you need to defend a version of premise 9 that argues that if there is no "causal interaction" between two things that that must also entail that there is no metaphysical and logical dependency between those things. — Walter B

Hmm, I would say that the credibility of the claim that no extended thing can causally interact with an unextended thing is about the same as the claim that no extended thing can causally depend on an unextended thing.

Take a ball on a cushion and let's assume that they have both existed in that arrangement for eternity. It seems true to say that the ball is causing the indentation in the cushion, even though there is no event of the ball having caused the deny. So this, I think, would be an example of one thing - the dent in the cushion - causally depending on another thing - the ball, without there being any interaction between the two.

However, could something about an extended thing depend, in that kind of way, on the presence of an unextended thing? No, or at least it seems as hard to conceive of this as it is to conceive of interaction between an unextended thing and an extended thing.

So I think premise 9 is as plausible when it is about causal dependency as it is when it is about causal interaction (which is to say, very plausible though - I accept - not true beyond all reasonable doubt).

Take a ball on a cushion and let's assume that they have both existed in that arrangement for eternity. It seems true to say that the ball is causing the indentation in the cushion, even though there is no event of the ball having caused the deny. So this, I think, would be an example of one thing - the dent in the cushion - causally depending on another thing - the ball, without there being any interaction between the two. — Bartricks

Let say that a cause and an effect are temporarily simultaneous to each other, as in your example; by definition an effect depends on its cause for its existence, so if X is the cause of Y- even when X and Y are contemporaneous- then there is still an asymmetrical relation between X and Y; the presence of Y guarantees the presence of X, but not the other way around; therefore, the particular physical thing that refers to Y is causally dependent upon the physical thing X, but the part of physical reality that constitutes Y is not logically dependent upon the part of physical reality that constitutes X.

An effect, by definition, implies the existence of a cause, but the physical reality that constitutes X does not make it so that effects imply the existence of a cause. There is a distinction to be made between causal and logical, and metaphysical dependency

If it is the case that things owe their existence either to themselves or to something else, then "caused to exist" in premise 8, and again in "causal interaction" in premise 9, will have to be defined to include causal, logical, and metaphysical dependency.

So you must be ready to argue that if X has no causal interaction with Y, that this information alone suffices you to conclude that no metaphysical or logical dependency is possible.

I got stuff to do so I will try to keep this conversation going in the future. I appreciate your thoughts though!

Hmm, I am not sure I follow.

Perhaps I should say that I do not think anything exists with necessity, including God - I am a sceptic about necessity. But I take it that others would say that if a thing exists by its very nature, then that's what it is for something to exist with metaphysical necessity (I would not say this, but I accept that some things exist by their very nature).

But if a thing does not exist by its very nature, then the kind of explanation its existence requires is a causal one. That is, something external to it needs to be causally responsible for its having come into being.

If that's right, then the fact that extended things do not exist by their very nature, combined with the fact there are no infinite regresses of causes and fact that extended things cannot causally interact with unextended things, would suffice to establish their non-existence.

And this, combined with the fact my mind exists with certainty, would then entail that my mind is not an extended thing (something that, I think, is implied in multiple other ways).

Re your God example - I did not quite follow it. I accept that no thought can exist absent a mind to have it. But I would say that God substance-causes his own thoughts. God's first thought would not have been caused by any prior thinking on God's part, but it would still be caused by the thing that is God. Perhaps I am missing something here though.

Every one of your premises 1 to 9 is false, hence your conclusion (10) is unproven.

1. Anything that exists has either been caused to exist by something external to it, or it exists by its very nature
2. If any physical things exist, they do not exist by their very nature
3. Therefore, if any physical things exist, they have been caused to exist by something external.
4. If physical things have been caused to exist by other physical things, then if there are any physical things there will be an infinity of causes
5. There cannot be an infinity of causes (or anything else for that matter).
6. Therefore if there are any physical things, they have not been caused to exist by physical things
7. A non-physical thing is something that lacks extension - that is, something that does not occupy any space.
8. Therefore, if there are any physical things, then they have been caused to exist by things that lack extension
9. There can be no causal interaction between an extended thing and an unextended thing
10. Therefore, there are no physical things. — Bartricks

This is a version of the cosmological argument, is it not? I suppose another way of putting 1 is that 'anything that exists has come into existence'. In my lexicon, the way I put it is that 'existing things' are necessarily compound and impermanent, that being the 'mark' of 'anything existent'. So this distinguishes what is 'compound and contingent' from what is 'simple and self-existent', which is the mark of 'real being'. So, as no physical things are 'simple and self-existent', therefore (according to the argument) their existence is contingent, so they are unreal (which is not exactly the same as simply non-existent). That's another way of stating (10) but one which 'preserves the appearances', so to speak, as it allows them a kind or degree of reality, namely, existence.

In any case, in the classical cosmological arguments, the necessary being is the Aristotelian first mover, usually identified with God. Is that the point towards which your argument is aimed?

Every one of your premises 1 to 9 is false, — A Seagull

Please indicate something that exists that has not been caused to exist.

er, no. They are all true. But thanks for your input.

This is a version of the cosmological argument, is it not? I — Wayfarer

It has some premises in common, certainly. But the cosmological argument has 'Therefore, God exists" as its conclusion, whereas I am arguing that no physical - that is, extended - objects exist.

my argument is much stronger than a cosmological argument because it seeks to do less.

My argument does not seek to establish the existence of a very specific, single person - God - but only the existence of a certain kind of thing or things, namely unextended things, and consequently the non-existence of extended things (physical things).

In my lexicon, the way I put it is that 'existing things' are necessarily compound and impermanent, that being the 'mark' of 'anything existent'. So this distinguishes what is 'compound and contingent' from what is 'simple and self-existent', which is the mark of 'real being'. — Wayfarer

That's not how I would use those terms. An existing thing is just anything that exists. Simple things are things that lack parts.

I think any object that has parts requires explanation. Confronted with something that appears to have parts, our reason tells us that it is legitimate to wonder how those parts came to be united in that way.

By contrast, simple things - that is, things lacking parts - do not require explanation as anyone who grasps the concept of such things can recognise. For a simple thing, lacking parts, is not made of anything more basic than itself. To ask how it came to together, then, is to have failed to grasp that one is dealing with a simple thing. Simple things cannot be made, for there is nothing from which one can make one.

Likewise, simple things cannot be destroyed, for there is nothing into which one can deconstruct one.

Thus, by simply applying our reason to the idea of a simple thing, we can see that any simple thing that exists, exists by its very nature and thus does not require explanation (or, perhaps better, its existence is explained by its nature).

This is not so with complex things.

The problem with extended things - with physical things - is that they are by their nature complex, for they are infinitely divisible and thus have infinite parts.

This is by itself sufficient to establish their non-existence. But additionally, it means that they always require explanation, and that explanation is going to have to reside in something non-physical (which combined with the fact that nothing non-physical can cause something physical, establishes once more their non-existence).

I should add, some would go further and say that simple things - or at least one simple thing - exists of necessity.

I don't. I think that existing by one's nature and existing of necessity are not quite the same concept. After all, the idea of a simple thing that does not exist seems entirely conceivable, which is not what one would expect of a necessarily existing thing.

So, I think that all things that exist, exist contingently.

But some things that exist, exist by their very nature.

Well, are there any instances of 'simple things' other than as a rhetorical device?

Well, are there any instances of 'simple things' other than as a rhetorical device? — Wayfarer

You haven't followed the argument (or you have dismissed it as a 'rhetorical device').

The argument establishes the existence of simple things. If anything exists, some simple things (or thing) exist - that's what it establishes.

And yes, you have an example in yourself. You are a simple thing. Can you be divided? No. So you have no parts. You - a mind - are an instance of a simple thing.

Fair enough, although I’m nonplussed as to how I would cause physical things to exist. And for that matter, if no physical things exist, then how can you account for their appearance? Are they ideas in the mind or illusory appearances?

And how do you differentiate physical things, like actual objects, from representations of physical things, like drawing or icons? Surely a real chair is physical, and a representation is not.

Causality is a construct based upon a subjective judgement, or if an experiment is repeated it is statistical. There may well be a temporal association of events - one event can precede another, but the assertion that one causes the other can never be proven.

although I’m nonplussed as to how I would cause physical things to exist. — Wayfarer

I used your mind as an example of something simple - something unextended. But I am not thereby saying that you caused all else to exist, only that something, or things, like you has.

Also, of course, the argument establishes that physical things do not exist. So, nothing created them - they have no reality.

As for the sensations of colour, texture, smell, and so forth - well, we know from our own case that we, minds, mint such things. For we do so when imagine things.

There is the sensible world - the world of sensation - and it exists. But the physical world does not. There is no illusion, however, just a mistaken belief that the sensible world exists extra-mentally.

There is the sensible world - the world of sensation - and it exists. But the physical world does not. There is no illusion, however, just a mistaken belief that the sensible world exists extra-mentally. — Bartricks

This whole paragraph might easily be found in the writings of Berkeley. Which is not to say that it's mistaken, on that account, as I believe Berkeley expresses a profound truth.

Yes, I am aware of that - I am an idealist of Berkeley's sort. But he never made the above argument against physical reality (his argument was different). So the argument I have made against the existence of extended objects supplements his.

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