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Can immaterialism be translated into materialism (as defined above) and vice versa? How can we go about it? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Per Davidson, if I'm a materialist and you're and immaterialist, I interpret everything you say with the assumption that we believe the same things even if you use different words, unless there is a good reason to believe that you're mistaken. You may claim to be so-and-so, but if I don't see the evidence that we're different, then I don't believe we are.

So while visiting a cemetery (which we do for fun), I see you talking to a gravestone, and I know something's up. I have reason to be confident that our beliefs are not the same on the issue of talking to graves. You're wrong about something.

You're wrong about something. — frank

Or you are. Or neither of us are. Or we both are, in different ways and for different reasons

All you've got to do to reconcile conceptual schemes is pool facts and mutually produce a view. No one wants to pool facts because most everything any individual or sub-culture presently believes is shown to be foolishly false in the act of collective justification or will be in the near future. Trying to explicitly translate non-trivial conceptual schemes is usually career suicide lol

The question is what does the "true", not to mention the "largely true", even mean here? If truths (meaning here what is believed to be true) are determined according to conceptual schemas and their rational commitments then it would be plausible to think that different, even contradictory, things might be counted true in different conceptual contexts.

Of course this won't apply to observations of events in the commonly perceived everyday world, but that kind of relatively trivial agreement is not what we are after here is it?

I come back to the philosophical problem of what it could mean to say that scientific theories are true. Would this not necessarily be to posit some more elaborate form of hidden correspondence between theories and actuality, between models and the territory (that is visible to us at all only via models)?

Per Davidson, if I'm a materialist and you're and immaterialist, I interpret everything you say with the assumption that we believe the same things even if you use different words... — frank

Suppose I say: The universe consists entirely of mind. How, as a materialist, do you translate this statement?

If truths (meaning here what is believed to be true) are determined according to conceptual schemas and their rational commitments then it would be plausible to think that different, even contradictory, things might be counted true in different conceptual contexts. — Janus

My understanding so far: yes, in examining schemes "different, even contradictory, things might be counted true." But these would be translatable in the same way a foreign language can be translated into English. (Weird and worrisome ring of analogy there.) This thread is to help understand how that can (possibly) work.

So, in regard to your question earlier the idea that everything is mind could be translated into the terms of the idea that everything is matter in the sense that they are both ideas of everything being something. But then the ideas of mind and matter do not seems translatable into the conceptual forms of each other. We cannot really understand matter in terms of mind or vice versa.

And going back to the Chinese vs Western medicine example, how would the idea of chi, meridians, energy flow and blockages, Yin and Yang, hot and cold, wet and dry energies and so on be translated in terms of the Western ideas of elctrochemical impulses and nerves?

A reference to Wilfrid Sellars might be helpful here. How does his "manifest image" translate into the "scientific image", or in other words how does the space of reasons translate into the space of causes?

You never really got a solid answer to that one over in the other thread. I don't see a clear answer. It's a nontrivial.

It's a nontrivial. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I agree and again I think that distinction you highlighted between trivial and non-trivial conceptual content is very helpful.

I agree and again I think that distinction you highlighted between trivial and non-trivial conceptual content is very helpful. — Janus

Thanks. Re Davidson, the analytic veterans don't seem to be overly critical in their thinking.

I agree. I've struck this unwillingness to question assumptions with some of our "veterans" many times before on this site and on the previous philosophy forums as well. Hard-won pet theories are apparently hard or unpleasant to shake! :wink:

Part and parcel of being entrenched or submerged in a mode of thought. If I'm submerged in anything, it's Pyrrhonism.

many times before — Janus

Me too. I've been on this site off and on for maybe seven years.

Interesting; I'm also partial to skepticism, and the idea of suspending judgement and feeling the ataraxia that comes with creative acceptance of ignorance.

ataraxia — Janus

It's a profound pleasure and allows the mind the liberty to scavenge both sides of a position. Unperturbed freedom of intellect. Ideally...

Ideally... — ZzzoneiroCosm

:up:

Yes, not always or permanently realizable; but then what is?

You may claim to be so-and-so, but if I don't see the evidence that we're different, then I don't believe we are. — frank

Scenario: You're a materialist. I'm an immaterialist.

You don't see evidence that we're different. Therefore you believe - what? - that I am also a materialist?

Is that how it works, in your view?

(I've certainly seen it work that way on these forums - to a clamor of protest...)

Materialism: The belief that the universe consists entirely of matter.
Immaterialism: The belief that the universe consists entirely of mind. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Is the difference manifested in words only, or does it affect behaviour more generally?
Does the immaterialist offer to do the dishes by thinking them clean, or does he use the sink? Does the materialist always use his fingers to count?

So while visiting a cemetery (which we do for fun), I see you talking to a gravestone, and I know something's up. I have reason to be confident that our beliefs are not the same on the issue of talking to graves. You're wrong about something. — frank

Nothing wrong with talking to a gravestone; the difficulty is all in the reply.

I have never met a materialist who treated himself as an object, or an idealist who didn't eat.

Scenario: You're a materialist. I'm an immaterialist.

You don't see evidence that we're different. Therefore you believe - what? - that I am also a materialist?

Is that how it works, in your view? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Sort of. That's how Davidson sees it. That's what the yawl thing was about: for my interpretation of you, your behavior (which reveals your beliefs to me) overrides your words. You can say it incorrectly, but I still successfully translate your intentions.

He says that's because (rightly or wrongly), I assume that you and I share the same beliefs.

So you might understand that wearing a badge of materialism is important to me, but as long as I dont act strangely, its a hollow claim.

If you think about how we create arguments: that we always rely on premises. You can't donate an understanding of some unprovable starting place. You can only build on our agreement.

I assume that you and I share the same beliefs. — frank

as long as I dont act strangely — frank

What if I did something strange - like start talking insistently about my immaterialism; in the evangelical fashion sometimes found on these forums? Would this alter your assumption that we share the same beliefs? Would you be content to assume something possibly untrue?

You can only build on our agreement. — frank

I agree we can only build on our agreement. The question is: is our agreement profound enough to ensure there isn't a conceptual relativism at work?

What if I did something strange - like start talking insistently about my immaterialism; in the evangelical fashion sometimes found on these forums? Would this alter your assumption that we share the same beliefs? Would you be content to assume something possibly untrue? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I'm on the ontological antirealist side, so it concerns me that a statement of materialism has no truth conditions. I would interpret your behavior psychologically. I may have gotten off topic?

You never really got a solid answer to that one over in the other thread. I don't see a clear answer. It's a nontrivial. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I agree and again I think that distinction you highlighted between trivial and non-trivial conceptual content is very helpful. — Janus

Thanks. Re Davidson, the analytic veterans don't seem to be overly critical in their thinking. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You mean Davidson included?

But the principles involved must be the
same in less trivial cases.

This thread is to refute that? You see the "non-trivials" as a different problem?

is our agreement profound enough to ensure there isn't a conceptual relativism at work?

That's what we're not so good at, culturally engineering optimized discourse and transmission of ideas. Its an ethical and institutional issue, hard to talk about. I think you have to get into the specifics of many different domains, and progress can change all participants. Do we temporarily delay some technological advancements to first get everyone generally educated and competently thinking about the issues involved? An extremely difficult social problem. You've got to somehow motivate citizens to give up the familiar and adopt new habits. Probably a multi-generational process always vulnerable to regression and corruption. Maybe fostering a broad historical perspective is a decent start, generating a "species" demographic.

This thread is to refute that? — bongo fury

Not interested in refutation. Just exploration.

You mean Davidson included? — bongo fury

I wasn't including Davidson.

Not interested in refutation. Just exploration. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Ok, this thread is to question that? Question Davidson's assertion that the problem scales up? You see the "non-trivials" as a different problem?

Not saying you shouldn't question the man's views.

Question Davidson's assertion that the problem scales up? You see the "non-trivials" as a different problem? — bongo fury

Yes. Learning more about Davidson by criticizing and questioning.

The question is what does the "true", not to mention the "largely true", even mean here — Janus

I agree. Davidson waffles on "truth", much to my own dismay. It causes confusion when reading him.

Yes. Learning more about Davidson by criticizing and questioning. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I don't have a problem with the critical attitude. I'm just trying to understand what you and @Janus have against scaling up from analysis at the relatively small-scale, so that you would associate such an approach with a lack of critical attitude.

I suspect by saying "less trivial" Davidson was using understatement to say "even less trivial, if that were possible".

What makes you think your "non-trivials" are a different kind of problem?

I'm just trying to understand what you and Janus have against scaling up from analysis at the relatively small-scale, so that you would associate such an approach with a lack of critical attitude. — bongo fury

There's no relation between the two. "Scaling-up" and a "non-critical attitude" - those two aren't related. You caught the tail-end of a longer conversation. But the two are unrelated.