Take Russell's case of the stopped clock. Well, in that case it seems as if the fact the true belief was acquired by fluke explains why Reason did not adopt the knowledge attitude towards it. Thus her 'reason' (in the 'explanatory' sense) for not adopting the knowledge attitude towards that true belief was that it was acquired by fluke. — Bartricks
So I see no reason - no justification, no normative reason - to think that Reason has no reasons. — Bartricks
How else do you find out what something is, except empirically? How people use terms can be inconsistent with their understanding of what it is they are talking about - like in this case of "knowledge".I don't see how you can define knowledge in such a way and then say that a person fits that definition yet doesn't possess knowledge. It's like saying, "It walks, talks and acts like a duck, but isn't a duck".
— Harry Hindu
The issue is that we're trying to empirically find out what knowledge is (or, linguistically, how people use the term), not legislate it.
A human actor or a mechanical robot that walks, talks and acts like a duck satisfies the above definition, but isn't a duck. — Andrew M
Why doesn't the person have knowledge if they fit all the requirements? Find what is missing and make it part of the definition.
— Harry Hindu
Right. So JTB is like Newton's theory of gravity. Newton's theory predicts the planet's orbits really well. Except for Mercury. So the question just is to find what is missing (or to posit a different theory altogether). — Andrew M
Definition, explanation, etc. whatever you want to call it. You need an explanation of "knowledge" - of determining the common features, or qualities, that entail "knowledge" and "knowing" - before you can say that others have it or not.No, that's quite wrong. It's not a 'definition'. It is a thesis. It was Plato's thesis. And it seems true for the most part. — Bartricks
How were the counterexamples devised? If a person exhibits the common features and qualities that are commonly understood as "knowledge", or "knowing", then the counterexamples must be assuming something else about "knowledge" than what is commonly understood. What are they assuming?But then counterexamples were devised - cases where although a person possesses what the thesis says they need to possess, it seems manifest to reason that they nevertheless lack knowledge. — Bartricks
What is a clear case of knowledge possession? How would you know unless you already have an idea of what knowledge is? In explaining a clear case of knowledge possession, you'd be defining the common features and qualities of knowledge possession. How does one possess knowledge, and how is that different from "knowing"?A philosopher tries to figure out what knowledge is by a combination of looking at clear cases of knowledge possession and seeing if there is anything they all have in common apart from being cases of knowledge and conceptual analysis. — Bartricks
It seems to me that you're not saying anything different than I am, except that you seem to be trying to using phancy words to say it, like with your Reason with a capital "R".Now it seems to me that there is nothing all clear cases of knowledge have in common apart, that is, from involving a true belief.
That doesn't mean that having a true belief is sufficient for knowledge - it is clearly not, for we can easily imagine cases in which someone has a true belief but does not have knowledge. Nevertheless, there seems nothing - apart from being cases of knowledge - that all cases of knowledge have in common apart from involving a true belief. Knowledge cannot be reduced to 'true belief', but there seems nothing else all cases of knowledge have in common.
And that's why I propose that knowledge itself is an attitude Reason is adopting towards true beliefs. Hence why there is nothing else they all have in common apart from being cases where an agent has a true belief. — Bartricks
Thus we can say that what beliefs count as knowledge are the beliefs that Reason adopts a knowledge attitude towards. And the beliefs that Reason adopts a knowledge attitude towards are those that are justified, true and something else to be determined (such as the 'no fluke' condition).
So aren't we, in effect, back where we started? That is, we are inquiring about the conditions of knowledge, albeit mediated by Reason. — Andrew M
It has nothing to do with conventional standards - indeed, we judge the appropriateness or otherwise of conventional standards by considering to what extent there is normative reason to accept them — Bartricks
But if Reason asserts, directs, prescribes, and so on, then Reason must be a person, for it is a self-evident truth that persons and persons alone do that kind of thing. So it is not a mistake. — Bartricks
Plato proposed that knowledge involves having a justified true belief. — Bartricks
This is just nonsense. — creativesoul
Reason cannot assert, direct, or prescribe. — creativesoul
It is self-evident enough to say that persons and only persons assert, direct, and prescribe, because people use language. Reason does not. Reason is not equivalent to persons. — creativesoul
So, it makes no sense at all to say that normative reasons are not conventional. — creativesoul
I worded myself poorly. You didn't say time couldn't be known. I am saying time can not be known because we can not experience it. — Athena
I don't know about you, but I am so tired nothing is making sense to me, however, I think our argument is right on target. Do you remember Robin Willaims "Reality... what a concept." Have you ever tried LSD? I have heard it can be an experience that changes a person's reason. Good night — Athena
This claim:
Reason asserts, requires, demands, bids, favours, values
is 'true'. — Bartricks
This claim:
Reason does not assert, require, demand, bid, favour, or value
is 'false'. — Bartricks
This is so inconsistent, it can't be philosophy.No, because now we can recognise that there are two distinct questions here - "what is knowledge?" and "when do we have knowledge?"
The answer to the first question is "an attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs". The answer to the second question, well, varies and we can only say rough-and-ready things about it. Such as that, for the most part, we have knowledge when we have a justified true belief, but not always - sometimes we can have knowledge without a justification, sometimes we can have a justified true belief and not have knowledge, and so on.
Hitherto most have thought that they were answering the first question - the "what is knowledge?" question - by answering the second. That's a big mistake. And in a way one is continuing to make it if one faults my view for not being able to answer the second, for that is to fail to recognise that the second is a quite distinct question. — Bartricks
No, reason is the effort of linking justifications to beliefs.Reason is the effort to express 'reality' in words and numbers — ovdtogt
Well, not really. He describes developing that theory as no more than farting.
It was rejected from the start.
I'll add to the dualities described here, by pointing out that one can know that such-and-such is the case; and that one can also now how to perform some action. The distinction between knowing how and knowing that is well worth considering.
Isn't it odd that we talk of knowing in both these cases? Why should we have the very same word for such disparate activities? — Banno
No, reason is the effort of linking justifications to beliefs. — Harry Hindu
Dualistic thinking is the cause of many of the problems of philosophy. — Harry Hindu
You just don't know what a normative reason is — Bartricks
Reason is the effort to justify our beliefs and language-use is the effort to express reality in words and numbers. Language-use isnt necessarily a use of reason. We can say unreasonable things about reality using words and numbers.I would have accepted: 'reason is the effort to justify our beliefs' and that would not have precluded 'reason is the effort to express 'reality' in words and numbers'. — ovdtogt
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