Does (not "did") a mathematical truth obtaining depend on any mind? — Sapientia

Yes. Truth in general does.

What would happen to mathematical truths if there were no longer any minds?

There would be no mathematical truths in that case.

Does (not "did") a mathematical truth obtaining depend on any mind? — Sapientia

Yes, it depended on a mind to be produced, written on the paper, and without a mind to read and interpret it in the future, it is just symbols on the paper. Even if we assume that there is meaning inherent within the symbols on the paper, there is no truth there unless a mind judges that meaning for correctness.

What would happen to mathematical truths if there were no longer any minds? — Sapientia

if there were no longer any minds, there would be just symbols on the paper. There is no truth to these symbols without a mind to interpret them, hence there'd be no mathematical truths without any minds.

Saying that some math principles persist through time sidesteps the fact that the vast majority of established math principles persist, and will continue to persist. That new math knowledge such as zero, calculus, non-euclidian geometries, etc are added to the math corpus is not the same phenomenon as the demonstrable evolution of moral conventions (such as slavery, divine right of kings, stoning adulterers and homosexuals, burning heretics at the stake ... .) — Brainglitch

I don't see the difference which you are claiming. Mathematical principles come into existence, they have in the past come into existence, and from the point that they come into existence, they spread from acceptance amongst a small group of people to a large more widespread group, then they may persist, onward into the future. Moral principles, such as the abolishment of slavery, and the abolishment of stoning adulterers and homosexuals, have come into existence in the past, they start from a small group of people, then spread to a larger group, and may persist onward into the future. Where is the basis for your claim of a "false equivalency"?

Because the ability to make distinctions is fundamental to being able to argue a case. — Wayfarer

Your neglecting the fact that the ability to establish similarities (identify), is even more fundamental. Focusing on differences while neglecting similarities cannot produce an adequate understanding.

Yes, it depended on a mind to be produced, written on the paper, and without a mind to read and interpret it in the future, it is just symbols on the paper. — Metaphysician Undercover

Didn't I make it clear that, in this context, the past is irrelevant? I thought I made that clear enough. Yet your reply begins by speaking in past tense! So, I will disregard that first part of your reply.

Yes, it depended on a mind to be produced, written on the paper, and without a mind to read and interpret it in the future, it is just symbols on the paper. — Metaphysician Undercover

These debates get very tedious unless you stick to the point or spell out your conclusions. So, you say that it can't be read or interpreted and is just symbols on paper. But that wasn't the question, was it? No, the question was whether it would be true.

A statement can be true or false. A statement is composed of symbols. A statement can be on paper. And a statement doesn't need to be read or interpreted for it to be truth-apt, and for it to be true (or false).

Each one of those statements is demonstrably true.

So, you'd need to explain why it would be any different in the hypothetical scenario.

Even if we assume that there is meaning inherent within the symbols on the paper, there is no truth there unless a mind judges that meaning for correctness. — Metaphysician Undercover

That needs to be justified. I see no good reason to accept that.

And wasn't it you who made the point earlier that these kind of things are rule-based and dependent on convention? (I could go back and check if need be, so bear that in mind before you think about denying it). Once this has been set or established, why would there need to be a mind there to judge whether or not it accords?

If there were no longer any minds, there would be just symbols on the paper. There is no truth to these symbols without a mind to interpret them, hence there'd be no mathematical truths without any minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

Begging the question. That's what the debate is about. You can't just assume it.

Similarity is a combination of sameness and difference; it cannot be derived just from sameness. — John

That's true, but what I was pointing to was the importance of sameness, as the basis of equality, as a moral principle. Sameness is an assumed absolute. Similarity is the recognition that only the perfect One is the same, and all other cases of individuals partake of difference.

No, the question was whether it would be true. — Sapientia

I gave a firm answer to that. No, it would not be true, and gave reasons for that answer. You dismissed my reasons, which refer to both past and future, by claiming that my reasons just refer to the past. Then you proceeded to claim that I did not answer the question.

A statement can be true or false. A statement is composed of symbols. — Sapientia

If a statement is just a bunch of symbols, how can it be true or false without an interpretation? Where do the symbols derive a meaning from?

There are two very distinct meanings for the word "statement". One is the expression in words, which you refer to here, the second is the thing stated, which is the assumed meaning of those words. It appears like you are trying to equivocate.

I gave a firm answer to that. — Metaphysician Undercover

An answer isn't the same as an argument, whether it's firm or not.

No, it would not be true, and gave reasons for that answer. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which I criticised, and am awaiting a proper response.

You dismissed my reasons, which refer to both past and future, by claiming that my reasons just refer to the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't true, as everyone can see. I only dismissed the part about the past - not out of hand, but because it isn't relevant to the question, which, as I clearly stated, is about the present or a hypothetical future.

Then you proceeded to claim that I did not answer the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll add this to the wealth of evidence which suggests that your preference is to attack a watered down misrepresentation.

Some of the things that you raised in response to the question don't answer the question, unless, perhaps, there is one or more implicit premise. They do not answer the question per se. That is what I was getting at when I said that these debates get very tedious unless you stick to the point or spell out your conclusions.

And some of what you said does answer the question, but requires justification.

If a statement is just a bunch of symbols, how can it be true or false without an interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would it need to be interpreted, at the time, for it to be true? That is demonstrably not the case now, so why would it be any different in the hypothetical future scenario?

I have made countless statements on here, and elsewhere, and they are either true or false, as the case may be - even when no one is interpreting them. There obviously isn't someone or other there constantly interpreting every statement that I've made. Yet, nevertheless, they are true or false, in correspondence with what is or isn't the case.

Your additional condition seems unnecessary and unreflective of reality. It requires justification.

Where do the symbols derive a meaning from? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a better question. But a related question, which matters even more than that, since it is closer to what the debate is about, is whether or not the meaningfulness of the symbols can be, or is, independent of that from which it was originally derived.

There are two very distinct meanings for the word "statement". One is the expression in words, which you refer to here, the second is the thing stated, which is the assumed meaning of those words. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, one can distinguish between a statement and its meaning. I was well aware of that.

It appears like you are trying to equivocate. — Metaphysician Undercover

It appears like you are getting ahead of yourself. Less haste, more speed.

And don't forget, I am still awaiting a proper response to my last post.

An answer isn't the same as an argument, whether it's firm or not. — Sapientia

You asked me to answer the question, that I did. I also gave you the reasons for my answer. if you wanted an argument you should have asked for it. That's what I do, I ask you to justify your numerous assertions, which you very seldom are capable of doing.

Why would it need to be interpreted, at the time, for it to be true? That is demonstrably not the case now, so why would it be any different in the hypothetical future scenario? — Sapientia

A bunch of symbols on a paper is neither true nor false without an interpretation. How many different ways must I spell this out?

I have made countless statements on here, and elsewhere, and they are either true or false, as the case may be - even when no one is interpreting them. There obviously isn't someone or other there constantly interpreting every statement that I've made. Yet, nevertheless, they are true or false, in correspondence with what is or isn't the case. — Sapientia

These statements that you've made here and elsewhere, consist of symbols. Why do you believe that these symbols correspond to anything without a mind to judge what they correspond to? Can you justify this? Does this symbol "to", automatically correspond to something without a mind to determine what it corresponds to?

You asked me to answer the question, that I did. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to have an overactive imagination. No, actually, I did not. The original question was just an example question, as I made quite clear. But you chose to answer it of your own accord. And, since then, I have criticised your answer.

If you wanted an argument you should have asked for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't bring up the question with the expectation of an answer of any kind, let alone an argument. But, since you took it upon yourself to answer it, I thought I'd analyse your answer, and point out the parts of it which would, in the context of a realism vs. anti-realism debate, need to be argued for, rather than merely asserted.

That's what I do, I ask you to justify your numerous assertions, which you very seldom are capable of doing. — Metaphysician Undercover

In your highly questionable judgement.

A bunch of symbols on a paper is neither true nor false without an interpretation. How many different ways must I spell this out? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's begging the question again, which is not at all what I'm interested in. I'm interested in an explanation or an argument. It's either that or don't bother to reply.

And don't think I haven't noticed your sly wording, taking advantage of the ambiguity in "without an interpretation". What does that mean? If there being an interpretation means there being a correct way for it to be interpreted, then I don't see why that would actually need a mind there interpreting it.

These statements that you've made here and elsewhere, consist of symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes...

Why do you believe that these symbols correspond to anything without a mind to judge what they correspond to? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the burden is on you to explain why that would be necessary, not on me to explain why it isn't. I don't know why you would think that to be necessary, unless you also believe some false idealist premise which would make that necessary.

What's annoying about these debates, from my experience, is that that is sometimes kept implicit, when it should be made explicit from the start. And at other times, it is simply plucked out of the hat, as if it were a self-evident truth, and not something highly controversial which the whole debate hinges on.

Can you justify this? Does this symbol "to", automatically correspond to something without a mind to determine what it corresponds to? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a very naive attack on the correspondence theory of truth. No, it doesn't work like that. Perhaps you should look it up. It's about a certain sort of statement, not a word.

Why would there need to be a mind to determine correspondence for there to be correspondence? That just doesn't make sense, unless, perhaps, you assume idealism, which would be begging the question.

Why do you believe that these symbols correspond to anything without a mind to judge what they correspond to? — Metaphysician Undercover

I want to know how there can't be mathematical truths without a mind, yet it remains truth there is paper with symbols on it. The presence of paper and symbols in experience/judgement/concept requires no less mind than mathematics.

The original question was just an example question, as I made quite clear. But you chose to answer it of your own accord.

...

I'm interested in an explanation or an argument. — Sapientia

OK, I gave you my explanation, concerning the nature of statements and symbols. What more do you want?

One meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to the symbols themselves as they exist. Another meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to what the symbols mean. We should not conflate these two or equivocate.

All you are doing is conflating the two and equivocating. Look:

That's a very naive attack on the correspondence theory of truth. No, it doesn't work like that. Perhaps you should look it up. It's about a certain sort of statement, not a word. — Sapientia

Then to my claim that that statements are composed of symbols, you said:

Yes... — Sapientia

So, which are we talking about, a statement as a bunch of symbols, or a statement as the meaning, such that we can have "a certain sort of statement"

I want to know how there can't be mathematical truths without a mind, yet it remains truth there is paper with symbols on it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It surely wouldn't be true. Did anything I said imply that it would be?

OK, I gave you my explanation, concerning the nature of statements and symbols. What more do you want? — Metaphysician Undercover

You said that it can be neither true nor false "without an interpretation". I asked you to clarify what that means, and to explain why you think that there would need to be a mind there interpreting it, if that is what you're implying. If that's not what you're implying, then what function would a mind being there serve? It would then seem redundant, unnecessary, irrelevant.

As far as I'm aware, you haven't done that so far.

One meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to the symbols themselves as they exist. Another meaning of the word "statement" is to use it to refer to what the symbols mean. We should not conflate these two or equivocate.

All you are doing is conflating the two and equivocating. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm not. I'm asking you why the statement, or the symbols on the piece of paper, can't be true or false. The whole issue here is whether or not they would be meaningful, so I'm not assuming anything about that. Rather, I am asking whether you can explain why you think that they wouldn't be so, and critising what you've said thus far. One such criticism is that what you've said doesn't explain anything, but is only a question begging assertion.

So, which are we talking about, a statement as a bunch of symbols, or a statement as the meaning, such that we can have "a certain sort of statement" — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not, in this discussion, used the word "statement" to refer to just the meaning. I made a distinction earlier between a statement and its meaning (if it has one). You should pay closer attention to what I've said before jumping to the conclusion that I'm equivocating. The question is whether or not the statement, as minimally a bunch of symbols, would be such that it could be true.

You're suggesting, if I've understood you correctly, that it would have to "have an interpretation" or "be meaningful". But what does that mean or entail? And why would there being at least one mind there be necessary for that?

I've outlined an alternative theory which can explain that without the need of positing any mind being there.

Occam's razor.

As far as I'm aware, you haven't done that so far. — Sapientia

Let me explain very slowly and carefully then. There's a bunch of symbols written on a piece of paper. These symbols could mean absolutely anything. For them to state a "truth" requires that the symbols have a determinate meaning, which corresponds to reality. For the symbols to have a determinate meaning requires a mind to determine that meaning. Therefore without a mind there is no truth to those symbols.

Here's another way of looking at it. There's something written on the paper. Whatever it is which is on the paper cannot be a "truth" unless it means something. It only means something to a mind. Therefore, only from the perspective of a mind, can what is on the paper be a "truth".

I've outlined an alternative theory which can explain that without the need of positing any mind being there. — Sapientia

I don't recall your alternative theory, I'd be interested in seeing it though.

Let me explain very slowly and carefully then. There's a bunch of symbols written on a piece of paper. These symbols could mean absolutely anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? I mean, it seems to me that they could or they couldn't.

If they were just randomly written, or written in a purposefully vague and ambiguous manner, with no strict meaning, open to interpretation... then yes.

But if the writer wrote them in a certain way, with a certain meaning, then, I mean, that would be their meaning, right? And if you or anyone else interpreted them in any other way, then that would be assigning them a different meaning. It would be to misinterpret them. And if the writer and everyone else died, then wouldn't it remain to be the case that there is - or would be - a correct way, as well as, by implication, incorrect ways, to interpret them? This would be what the writer meant when he or she wrote them - and this seems to be just as true today, even after the writer has ceased to exist, as it would be in the hypothetical scenario, when the writer, as well as everyone else, has ceased to exist. Of course, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be anyone there to do the interpreting - but why would there need to be?

I find this idealist way of thinking to be logically unsound and rather bizarre. It's like there's a school, and the school has rules, but the idealist thinks that whether or not the kids break the rules depends on whether or not there is a teacher there watching over them, rather than simply whether or not the kids break the rules. I mean, sure, you can add premises to make that a logically valid argument, but you'd be doing so at the cost of logical soundness.

For them to state a "truth" requires that the symbols have a determinate meaning, which corresponds to reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Note: for the following, I take "to be determined" to serve the same function as "to be known", "to be figured out", or, the classic, "to be perceived". According to my theory, the meaning is predetermined, and subsequent to that determination, it becomes a matter of discovery.

For them to state a truth requires that the symbols have a meaning which corresponds to reality. Why would it need to be determinate?

And even if it does, then for the symbols to have a determinate meaning is for the symbols to have a meaning which is capable, in principle, of being determined. Which is to say that if they were interpreted, then there would be a meaning to be determined. Which doesn't necessitate any interpreter or determiner. So, the question would then be: why are you adding this unnecessary condition that there be an interpreter or determiner?

For the symbols to have a determinate meaning requires a mind to determine that meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have demonstrated that that need not be so. Just as there need not be a teacher to watch over the kids, there need not be a mind to determine that meaning.

Therefore without a mind there is no truth to those symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover

That conclusion follows from one or more false premises, so it cannot be true.

Here's another way of looking at it. There's something written on the paper. Whatever it is which is on the paper cannot be a "truth" unless it means something. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, I'm willing to assume this much. Let's see where you take this.

It only means something to a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? The burden would be on you to justify that. It would mean something to a mind, if a mind was there, doing whatever it does for it to mean something to it. But whether or not it means something need not depend on a mind actually being there. If you're a realist, then it doesn't. If you're an idealist, then you say that it does. You posit this additional condition which Occam's razor can cut out. The burden would be on you.

Therefore, only from the perspective of a mind, can what is on the paper be a "truth". — Metaphysician Undercover

And here we have another conclusion which we need not accept, unless we accept your premises (assuming validity). But because one or more of your premises is (arguably) false, we need not accept your argument.

I don't recall your alternative theory, I'd be interested in seeing it though. — Metaphysician Undercover

Some of my earlier comments suggested it. I have now elaborated.

But if the writer wrote them in a certain way, with a certain meaning, then, I mean, that would be their meaning, right? — Sapientia

That's not their meaning though, that the writer wrote the symbols in a certain way. The meaning is not the "way" that they are written, because this just refers to the specific symbols used, and the patterns formed with them. The "meaning" is what is intended by the author, and this is something other than the symbols themselves, and the patterns, it is what they refer to.

And if you or anyone else interpreted them in any other way, then that would be assigning them a different meaning. It would be to misinterpret them. And if the writer and everyone else died, then wouldn't it remain to be the case that there is - or would be - a correct way, as well as, by implication, incorrect ways, to interpret them? This would be what the writer meant when he or she wrote them - and this seems to be just as true today, even after the writer has ceased to exist, as it would be in the hypothetical scenario, when the writer, as well as everyone else, has ceased to exist. Of course, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be anyone there to do the interpreting - but why would there need to be? — Sapientia

So I agree with all of this, that there is a correct "what the writer meant" etc., with one fundamental difference. "What was meant" is something other than the symbols themselves, and the pattern itself. And so, as much as we can assume that there is a "what was meant", it's really not there in the symbols themselves, it's in the assumption of the mind which apprehends the symbols. A mind apprehends the symbols and assumes that there is a "what was meant". There is no "what was meant" within the symbols themselves, there is an assumption in the mind which apprehends the symbols, that there is a "what was meant". Therefore there is no "what was meant", without a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". The "what was meant" is only an assumption.

I find this idealist way of thinking to be logically unsound and rather bizarre. It's like there's a school, and the school has rules, but the idealist thinks that whether or not the kids break the rules depends on whether or not there is a teacher there watching over them, rather than simply whether or not the kids break the rules. I mean, sure, you can add premises to make that a logically valid argument, but you'd be doing so at the cost of logical soundness. — Sapientia

Where would these rules exist? Let's say that they are written somewhere in a book or something. Whether or not a kid breaks a rule requires that someone interprets what is written in that book, and interprets what the kids do, and draws a comparison. It is your argument which is unsound. You think that you can make a conclusion about whether or not any kids broke any rules without a statement of what the kids did, and a statement of what the rules are.

Don't you realize that whether or not someone breaks a rule is something which is subject to interpretation? That is why we have trial by jury, to give the defendant a fair trial. It is not a case of either the person broke the law or did not, it is a case of how the person's actions are interpreted in comparison to how the laws are interpreted.

For them to state a truth requires that the symbols have a meaning which corresponds to reality. Why would it need to be determinate?

And even if it does, then for the symbols to have a determinate meaning is for the symbols to have a meaning which is capable, in principle, of being determined. Which is to say that if they were interpreted, then there would be a meaning to be determined. Which doesn't necessitate any interpreter or determiner. So, the question would then be: why are you adding this unnecessary condition that there be an interpreter or determiner? — Sapientia

OK, for the sake of argument, let's say that "determinate" implies "capable, in principle, of being determined". It actually means definite, and let's assume that definite necessitates that it is possible to determine it, and therefore determinable. The problem is that we have nothing more than an assumption that the symbols have determinate meaning. In order for them to state a truth, they must actually have a determinate meaning. How do we get beyond this gap, from assuming that the symbols have a determinate meaning, to them actually having a determinate meaning? We might say, that the author, gave the symbols a determinate meaning through intention, as what was meant. But how is this something which is actually determinate, rather than just us assuming that the author gave them a determinate meaning?

Why? The burden would be on you to justify that. It would mean something to a mind, if a mind was there, doing whatever it does for it to mean something to it. — Sapientia

Do you understand the meaning of "meaning"? It is what is meant. And what is meant refers to what is intended. It is only minds which have intention. Therefore meaning only exists in relation to minds. We can go back, and insist that the meaning was put there, in those symbols, through the intention of the author, but this is just an assumption. And assumptions only exist in minds. So, that there is meaning within the symbols, put there by a mind, is just an assumption, so even this meaning relies on a mind, because it is just an assumed meaning.

That's not their meaning though, that the writer wrote the symbols in a certain way. The meaning is not the "way" that they are written, because this just refers to the specific symbols used, and the patterns formed with them. The "meaning" is what is intended by the author, and this is something other than the symbols themselves, and the patterns, it is what they refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes and no. If we assume that what the author meant is what they mean, then yes. And that is what I was assuming, so that's not a problem. The author intended to write them in a certain way, with a certain meaning.

I have to call you out on your use of present-tense here, though. You say that the meaning is what is intended by the author. But that isn't necessary, and, as a necessity, is demonstrably false. The meaning can be what was intended by the author. It is demonstrably the case that the author doesn't need to constantly intend that meaning. What would happen when the author dies, and can no longer intend anything, let alone the meaning of what he wrote? What he wrote would instantly become meaningless, and remain meaningless ever after? That is absurd.

So I agree with all of this, that there is a correct "what the writer meant" etc., with one fundamental difference. "What was meant" is something other than the symbols themselves, and the pattern itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that that's a fundamental difference in terms of this realism vs. idealism debate, since it seems to me that a realist can accept that without contradiction or conceding idealism.

And so, as much as we can assume that there is a "what was meant", it's really not there in the symbols themselves, it's in the assumption of the mind which apprehends the symbols. A mind apprehends the symbols and assumes that there is a "what was meant". There is no "what was meant" within the symbols themselves, there is an assumption in the mind which apprehends the symbols, that there is a "what was meant". Therefore there is no "what was meant", without a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". The "what was meant" is only an assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem here isn't so much in what you've taken issue with. The problem here is that the above contains more tense errors. If, in key parts of your text, you were to speak in past tense ("was"), or in conditional tense ("would", "were", "could"), where appropriate, then that would remove the controversy. Your failure to do so basically means that you're begging the question again. So, you'd still need to provide an argument.

There was a mind that intended a meaning. That meaning is the meaning of the symbols that were written. If there were a mind, then it could interpret a meaning. Although that meaning might not be the meaning. But, in the hypothetical scenario, there wouldn't be a mind. Yet it doesn't follow from any of this that there would need to be a mind for the symbols to have a meaning. So, that is what you'd need to support.

What was meant doesn't have to be in the symbols. It is a fact that the author intended a meaning. It is a fact that the author meant something with the symbols. When talking about this, one shouldn't use scare quotes. But if you're talking about what another mind guesses to be what the author meant, then yes, use scare quotes. That way one can distinguish between what was meant and "what was meant". What was meant isn't only an assumption, but "what was meant" might be.

Where would these rules exist? Let's say that they are written somewhere in a book or something. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok.

Whether or not a kid breaks a rule requires that someone interprets what is written in that book, and interprets what the kids do, and draws a comparison. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nonsense. If, for example, one of the rules is not to speak, and a kid speaks, then that kid has broken that rule. There doesn't need to be an interpreter.

It is your argument which is unsound. You think that you can make a conclusion about whether or not any kids broke any rules without a statement of what the kids did, and a statement of what the rules are. — Metaphysician Undercover

Straw man. No, I don't. I just gave an example of that. I think that there doesn't need to be a teacher there for the kids to break the rules. What happens when the teacher leaves the room and the kids go wild? They don't break any rules until a teacher comes along? Poppycock! The rules are the rules. We're talking about rules, not guidelines for the teacher.

Don't you realize that whether or not someone breaks a rule is something which is subject to interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I do, but there is a correct interpretation, and incorrect interpretations, as we've agreed. The correct interpretion is predetermined. It was what was the author meant. You don't need a teacher there to interpret anything or to check whether or not the kids have broken the rule in order for the kids to have broken the rule. But you might need a teacher there doing that for other reasons not relevant to the analogy.

That is why we have trial by jury, to give the defendant a fair trial. It is not a case of either the person broke the law or did not, it is a case of how the person's actions are interpreted in comparison to how the laws are interpreted. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, our legal system is about how the laws are interpreted. We have judges who have some authority to determine outcomes. Metaphysics and logic don't really work like that.

The logic of it is that either P or -P. And if P, then Q. And if -P, then -Q.

The metaphysics of it is that that kid spoke (P). The rest logically follows. The rule was broken (Q).

Then you come along and say "Oh, and there must be a teacher to interpret stuff!". - Wrong.

OK, for the sake of argument, let's say that "determinate" implies "capable, in principle, of being determined". It actually means definite, and let's assume that definite necessitates that it is possible to determine it, and therefore determinable. The problem is that we have nothing more than an assumption that the symbols have determinate meaning. In order for them to state a truth, they must actually have a determinate meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you mean. It isn't an assumption that, in principle, the meaning - what the author meant - could be discovered. You can't rule that out. If it would be the case that if there were a mind, then it could be discovered, then the symbols have a discoverable meaning.

I think I'm going to try to avoid using the term "determinable", because I think that it's problematic. The meaning is predetermined, so strictly speaking, it can't be determined after that, unless you mean something else. So, I think that your talk about the meaning being determined, or the meaning being determinable, subsequent to that determination is false or misleading.

A meaning could be determined. And that could be anything. But, strictly speaking, the meaning can't be determined, because it is predetermined. Whether it can be known, understood, or discovered is a different issue.

How do we get beyond this gap, from assuming that the symbols have a determinate meaning, to them actually having a determinate meaning? We might say, that the author, gave the symbols a determinate meaning through intention, as what was meant. But how is this something which is actually determinate, rather than just us assuming that the author gave them a determinate meaning? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your meaning isn't clear to me, and the problem is this term you're using: "determinate".

If the author meant something, then the author meant something. That would be a fact, not merely something that we're saying, or an assumption. So, I don't get your point. Or it's just wrong.

Do you understand the meaning of "meaning"? It is what is meant. And what is meant refers to what is intended. — Metaphysician Undercover

Present-tense error.

Therefore meaning only exists in relation to minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't denied that, and nor is a realist required to do so. The meaning relates to a mind - the author's, for example. But the realist is saying that neither this mind nor any other needs to be there. That it was there is sufficient. It's about independence.

We can go back, and insist that the meaning was put there, in those symbols, through the intention of the author, but this is just an assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not about this "in the symbols" straw man, and it isn't an assumption. It's a fact that the author meant something with the symbols.

And assumptions only exist in minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

Facts do not.

Yes and no. If we assume that what the author meant is what they mean, then yes. And that is what I was assuming, so that's not a problem. The author intended to write them in a certain way, with a certain meaning. — Sapientia

Here's the difficulty right here. Let's say that the author intended to write all the symbols exactly as they appear on the paper. That is exactly what the author meant, to produce exactly those symbols in that exact pattern or order. We still assume that there is something which was meant, beyond this expression of symbols. We assume that there is something which was meant by the author, which is represented by the symbols, that the symbols represent something. Therefore we attribute "what was meant by the author" not directly to the pattern of symbols, but to that which lies beyond, what is represented by the symbols.

I have to call you out on your use of present-tense here, though. You say that the meaning is what is intended by the author. But that isn't necessary, and, as a necessity, is demonstrably false. The meaning can be what was intended by the author. It is demonstrably the case that the author doesn't need to constantly intend that meaning. What would happen when the author dies, and can no longer intend anything, let alone the meaning of what he wrote? What he wrote would instantly become meaningless, and remain meaningless ever after? That is absurd. — Sapientia

I have no issue with this problem of tense. I can replace "meaning" with "what was meant", as in the paragraph above, if that makes it easier to understand. We still have to deal with the distinction between "the author meant to write down these symbols", and what the author meant to represent with these symbols. These two are distinct, but related intentions. Following from what you argue here, what this phrase refers to, "what the author meant to represent" never had any existence. That's fine, and not at all absurd as you would claim here. As per my last post, that there is such a thing as "what the author meant to represent", is just an assumption held by the reader. Without this assumption, all the symbols on the paper are meaningless, as you say, but contrary to your claim, there is nothing absurd about that.

The problem here isn't so much in what you've taken issue with. The problem here is that the above contains more tense errors. If, in key parts of your text, you were to speak in past tense ("was"), or in conditional tense ("would", "were", "could"), where appropriate, then that would remove the controversy. Your failure to do so basically means that you're begging the question again. So, you'd still need to provide an argument. — Sapientia

As I said, I'll adhere to proper tense use, replacing "meaning" with "what was meant". The point I'm trying to make though, is that there is nothing real, which exists as "what was meant", other than a pattern of symbols. But this pattern of symbols does not constitute meaning for a reader. The reader must assume that there is a "what was meant" beyond the pattern of symbols, what the symbols represent. So the symbols have no meaning without a reader to assume that there is a "what was meant".

Yet it doesn't follow from any of this that there would need to be a mind for the symbols to have a meaning. So, that is what you'd need to support. — Sapientia

It is you who is making the tense errors. There is only "what was meant", at the time which the author wrote the symbols. You, for some reason, assume that this continues in time as "meaning", such that the symbols have meaning at the present time. This is what needs to be justified. "What was meant" is in the past, "meaning" is in the present. The difference between these two, past and present, justifies my claim that the symbols have no meaning. What you need to do is to show how "what was meant" continues to exist at the present, as meaning. First, you need to justify that there is such a thing as "what was meant".

Following your stated principles, as I explained, the symbols have absolutely no meaning unless there is a mind which assumes that there is a "what was meant". If we remove your conditions, and allow that there is a real "what was meant by the author", and this "what was meant" is not restricted to the past, but continues to exist as "meaning", within the statement, then we can dispose of the need for a mind to assume that there is a "what was meant". However, doing this produces a temporal absurdity, which must be dealt with. An intention at a particular time in the past, "what was meant", is assumed to continue in the present, as "meaning". I know that intention has an odd sort of relation to time, but how do we validate this claim? How do we justify that what was meant, at a particular point of time in the past, when the author writes the symbols, exists as meaning today, without a mind to assume that there is a what was meant?

What was meant doesn't have to be in the symbols. It is a fact that the author intended a meaning. It is a fact that the author meant something with the symbols. When talking about this, one shouldn't use scare quotes. But if you're talking about what another mind guesses to be what the author meant, then yes, use scare quotes. That way one can distinguish between what was meant and "what was meant". What was meant isn't only an assumption, but "what was meant" might be. — Sapientia

Even if we assume that it is a fact that the author intended a meaning, that act is in the past. How does the act of having intended a meaning, in the past, ensure that a meaning exists now at the present. I use quotes on "what was meant", because these words refer to something conceptual only, something within the mind, as intention. There is the intent itself, "what was meant" and this was only in the mind of the author, at that time of writing, in the past. There is also an interpretation of "what was meant", and this is in the mind of the reader. You seem to assume that there is such a thing as "what was meant", in order to claim objective meaning, but that's just an assumption.

Nonsense. If, for example, one of the rules is not to speak, and a kid speaks, then that kid has broken that rule. There doesn't need to be an interpreter. — Sapientia

Actually, your claim is what is nonsense. Of course there needs to be an interpretation, otherwise your supposed rule, "not to speak" is just symbols. Who interprets what it means "to speak" and "not to speak", in order to determine whether the kid has actually broken the rule? If the kid hums or starts making all kinds of unintelligible gibberish noises, has the rule been broken?

Does (not "did") a mathematical truth obtaining depend on any mind?
— Sapientia

Yes. Truth in general does. — Terrapin Station

So... care to elaborate?

If truth is here understood by you as some kind of correspondence between mind and world, then it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that truth is mind-dependent (in the sense that there could not be any truths if there were no minds).

That said, I haven't fully digested the above discussion, so please excuse me if this has already been addressed by you.

If truth is here understood by you as some kind of correspondence between mind and world, then it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that truth is mind-dependent (in the sense that there could not be any truths if there were no minds).

That said, I haven't fully digested the above discussion, so please excuse me if this has already been addressed by you. — Theorem

No, that's not my understanding. What are you basing that on?

Facts, statements, truth, the world... none of that seems mind-dependent in the relevant sense, namely that there can't be one without the other.

If you think that you can show that anything I've actually said leads to that conclusion, then be my guest.

No, that's not my understanding. — Sapientia

Ok.

Facts, statements, truth, the world... none of that seems mind-dependent in the relevant sense, namely that there can't be one without the other. — Sapientia

I don’t yet know how you define any of those terms ("fact", "statement", "truth", "world") so it’s hard to evaluate your claim at this point, but at face value I’d tend to take issue with the claim that statements (for instance) are mind-independent, so perhaps we can start there. To bring this intuition out more clearly I’ll pose the following question and see where it takes us:

1. Were any statements ever made prior to the emergence of intelligent life in the universe?

The way in which you answer this question should help provide some insight into your theory of statements and, hopefully, help drive the discussion forward.

I actually might have triggered that debate in an aside that came up in that thread.

My view: truth is mind-dependent, because it is the predicate of a proposition. Propositions are true, or not true, and whether they are, or are not, is a matter of judgement, and judgement is by a mind. In this respect, I don't agree with Sapientia's argument. But there's another point - a mathematical proof, for example, may be 'mind-independent' in one sense - that is, it is not dependent on being grasped by this or that mind; it's not a matter of convention as to whether it is true or no; so in that sense, it is 'mind-independent'.

But consider that any rational proposition, whether mathematical or otherwise, can only be grasped by a rational mind. So in that sense, it's not 'mind-independent'. This type of understanding actually tends towards 'objective idealism', that there is a rational or intelligible order, which is grasped though the intellect ('nous'); which I think is a strong underlying strain in the history of Western philosophy, until Hegel, but it's objective reality is now contested, due to the fact that physicalism generally rejects the idea of an 'intelligible order' (which is, however, still preserved in schools such as Feser's 'Aristotlean-Thomism'.)

My view of the idea of 'mind-independence', is that when it is turned into a philosophical tenet, as distinct from a methodological step, it is based on the missapplication of the scientific attitude. This is the subject of Thomas Nagel's critique in his most recent (and controversial) book, Mind and Cosmos, where he says in regards to modern thinking, generally:

Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel

This was the basis of Descartes' conception of a 'universal science' which could be applied to any subject whatever, using algebraic geometry and quantification. And of course it is manifestly obvious that it has been extraordinarily successful in terms of material outcomes. But it is philosophically problematical in my view.

Oh, and hi @theorem!

This discussion was created with comments split from Religious experience has rendered atheism null and void to me — Sapientia

I didn't look at that thread, so if my comment is wonky.. sorry. The question of whether anything at all is mind-independent is one that can be debated. Those who say nothing is (mind-independent) are positing that the average person is deluded. But independently of that situation, we frequently use the concept of truth to speak of the unknown.

"No one knew who killed the butler. The detective sought to reveal the truth."

This implies some proposition regarding the butler's killer which is true, but unknown. In this case, it's clear that "truth" does not indicate a mind-dependent property.

A bunch of symbols on a paper is neither true nor false without an interpretation. How many different ways must I spell this out? — Metaphysician Undercover

And don't think I haven't noticed your sly wording, taking advantage of the ambiguity in "without an interpretation". What does that mean? If there being an interpretation means there being a correct way for it to be interpreted, then I don't see why that would actually need a mind there interpreting it. — Sapientia

Truth arises as a property of a relation between mind and world. So MU is in the right here, but needs to take it a step further.

The crucial thing is that minds form maps of the territory for themselves. So truth becomes an interpretation of the map having some definite reliable meaning. Thus a triadic relationship is formed where we deal with the signs of what we think exists, rather than the noumenal things-in-themselves.

So it is right that a bunch of symbols on a paper don't have an inherent interpretation. The interpretation is a habit that has developed. A mind comes to recognise the map as saying something truthful about a territory.

The territory is then understood to "really exist" in the way it has been imagined. The map is presumed to describe it well. It must do because the map can be used reliably to get places we want to go.

But then - if we stop to think about it more carefully - all we really "know" is that these are the signs we interpret in such and such a way. So we can ascribe truth to that habit of interpretation. We can point to the robustness of a relation. But the territory itself stands beyond the map. And we might not really "know" it at all. It is only our particular habit of relation that is ever actually tested, and so has its "truth" demonstrated, by some act of interpretation.

But carry on with the usual useless idealism vs realism debate....

I agree with , there is an actuality which is independent of any and all minds. It could be argued that actuality is not independent of mind as such, but in this connection I would prefer to say it is not independent of spirit as such. The term 'mind' is too much specifically associated with the idea of analysis, proposition and judgement.

Truth arises as a property of a relation between mind and world. — apokrisis

The relation between mind and world is an expression of spirit; so, more primordially, truth is of the spirit.

The relation between mind and world is an expression of spirit; so, more primordially, truth is of the spirit. — John

But is that statement true beyond some particular mapping relation?

In talking about "spirit", you are speaking about the topological features on a map you have constructed. You know what "spirit" means to you because you believe you can recognise it in terms of phenomenology. If particular things happen in experience, you can successfully interpret them as an "expression of spirit".

Yet the next step for you and your map has to be to show you can and do actually use it to navigate a terrain in a way that meets some definite purpose.

I would say that "spirit" here sounds too vague in its ontic commitments. It's literal meaning is so ambiguous that it can be taken to mean pretty well anything one likes. It is the equivalent of a message scrawled on wet blotting paper with a fat felt-tip.

There may be some directions lurking in the putative map, but one could never really be sure that one was not merely getting lucky in eventually stumbling towards any actual destination.

So your response demonstrates how truth in terms of "maps of reality" is both model-centric - fundamentally epistemic - and yet also pragmatically comparable.

We can't transcend our epistemic conditions to inspect the world as it actually is. We are stuck with the internal signs we form as part of a modelling relation.

And yet there are objective features to this mapping - or at least features that we can socially share through language and agreement. That is, society is also a "mind" that makes maps.

The objective features would be the familiar ones of "crisp purposes" and "crisp counterfactuality". A map is true in terms of the purpose it is meant to serve (which can be either very general, or highly restricted). And for a map to be truth-apt, it must eliminate vagueness. It must render the world in as binary fashion as possible.

(And again, these are both good mapping qualities which we have plenty of reason to suspect reality itself to possibly lack. So that is how we arrive at the conundrum of how to remove ourselves - the interested mappers - from our view of reality. What does reality look like if reality were to "map itself"?)

And again, these are both good mapping qualities which we have plenty of reason to suspect reality itself to possibly lack. So that is how we arrive at the conundrum of how to remove ourselves - the interested mappers - from our view of reality. What does reality look like if reality were to "map itself"?) — apokrisis

I think this is really the point; that Reality is spirit; which cannot be mapped, but which does the mapping and which the maps are expressions of. The empirical world is what is mapped, so it is a symbolic, or you would probably prefer to say, semiotic, expression of spirit.

Of course you probably don't think of reality as purposive, intentional or teleological as spirit is thought; you would probably think of it as a virtual chaos or something like that. But when you get down to this level it is a matter of faith, or personal preference, as to how you think about the Real. A person will think about it in the way that seems to them to be most contributive to flourishing. So it really comes down to an ethical and not an epistemological question after all. Kant got it just right even you don't agree with his CI.

We can't transcend our epistemic conditions to inspect the world as it actually is. We are stuck with the internal signs we form as part of a modelling relation. — Apokrisis

That is true, within the domain of discursive reason, but there is also a domain beyond reason, which is what I would think 'spirit' is supposed to denote. That is probably not something you're prepared to recognise or accept, but I think it is understood in the Western philosophical tradition and that it provides a context for and a limit to the claims of reason. That said, 'spirit' is a problematical word, as it has many meanings - not least the obvious one of 'alchoholic liquor'. But in the Western philosophical tradition, there is at least a kind of recognised use of the term 'spirit' in either philosophical or theological terms as the 'ground of being' or 'first cause' or even one element of the Trinity. And I think the German idealists recognised that domain, as does the Thomist tradition in a different way. Whereas now the naturalistic project is to understand the principle of origination in terms of 'self-organisation'.

But for those who don't accept the primacy of naturalism, 'seeing things as they actually are' amounts to acknowledgement of more than what naturalism is prepared to acknowledge. There is an element required of revelation, illumination, or transcendent insight, which is generally not recognised by naturalism. It's a fault line in the culture-wars.

I think the value and the beauty of the term 'spirit' lies precisely in its ambiguity and, for instance, the fact that we can speak of the spirit of an art work, a text, music, love, friendship, unity and so on and know very well what we are speaking about. These are all connections in which the term 'mind' does not work.

We should be very careful, though, not to do what seems so easy and natural to us; that is we should take care not to fall into Hegel's mistake of objectifying spirit, because that way lies totalization, even fundamentalism.

The crucial thing is that minds form maps of the territory for themselves

Do you mean that we construct & share a worldview, the fact that it is shared, gives it reliable meaning, it has pragmatic use.

The triadic relationship. The noumena does not appear, but what does appear we symbolize into shared language which gives us its interpretation We have consciousness of an existent object, a tree for example, and we have a claim to knowledge of how it appears & how trees appear is part of our concept of a tree. So two separate claims: a) the thing is(we understand it is separate from us) & b) what that things is (how its concept epistemologically ties into its appearance).

The world exists separately from us, this is its facticity. What happens in the world happens regardless of our presence. Sure we can learn about it, study fossils, the cosmos, learn how the world works, but since we are also part of the world, our viewpoint has to be circular.

Numbers, some of the particles physicists presuppose, our concepts or ideas, are also part of reality, they are in the world in sofar as we too are in the world, but they are not factual part of it in the same manner as a tree. Part of the problem is that in saying 'a tree' we are using a general term (b) to specify a fact, a particular, which necessarily only points to the appearance and not (a), which is presupposed but not known, and we have no guarantee of the correctness of the correspondence between a & b except pragmatically.

It's more than Hegel. Since Descartes' time, the world was divided into 'matter' and 'spirit', abstractions that were subsequently reified (for which see this blog post). Hence the importance of 'non-objectifying' which is what 'cultivating spiritual awareness' does. It literally re-programmes the way your brain processes the world. But that is a radically different way of thinking to Western analytical philosophy.