Doesn't semantic externalism require some kind of distinguishability? — NotAristotle
But he assumes that we are not BiV in proving it. — NotAristotle
It seems to me that having an experience of eating pizza cannot be simulated. That is because my experience of reality requires more than BiV, it requires sensory organs that can experience the reality. The proof is in the pudding, or in this case, the pizza. I think that if you remove the sensory abilities of the organism, you remove phenomenal consciousness too, or at least you remove the phenomenal consciousness of what is sensed. Experience is a more integrated process than just brain processing, in my opinion.
The assumption that the body only keeps the brain alive and does not factor into phenomenal experience is a materialist form of dualism that ought to be dismissed as nonsense. — NOS4A2
The assumption that the body only keeps the brain alive and does not factor into phenomenal experience is a materialist form of dualism that ought to be dismissed as nonsense. — NOS4A2
And you'd be like, "a real tree is not a BiV tree." But of course you'd be assuming that the tree you were pointing to was not a BiV tree. And that's the problem. There's no reason that you, the scientist, are not also a brain in a vat. The semantic externalism argument against BiV only goes through by assuming not BiV. — NotAristotle
The point still stands that if semantic externalism is true then none of the words in the brain’s language can refer to the vat. — Michael
It’s a real tree given what “real tree” means in my language. — Michael
I agree with you, but that's different than saying that if semantic externalism is true then we cannot be brains in a vat. — NotAristotle
If you prefer, consider instead a body in a vat. It’s the same principle. This person never sees trees, only “hallucinations”, but if the causal theory of reference is true then none of the words in its language can refer to (real) trees.
To be the same principle the body would in some way need to be silenced, or asleep, or unconscious, as in the movie Matrix. — NOS4A2
Sure. The point is that its experiences are elicited artificially by a computer directly manipulating the sense organs.
It never sees a tree or a brain or a vat and as such no words in its language can refer to these things.
To be the same principle the body would in some way need to be silenced, or asleep, or unconscious, as in the movie Matrix. — NOS4A2
Sure. The point is that its experiences are elicited artificially by a computer directly manipulating the sense organs. — Michael
If the person is awake, they are aware that they are BiV. — NotAristotle
But wouldn't he be referring directly to the light and the patterns, even if he mistook them for a real tree? — NOS4A2
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