"It's certain, but I do not believe it" is a performative contradiction. — Banno
Then, by JTB, it is believed, but we do not believe that we believe it. The scope of each belief statement differs. — Banno
This doesn't address whether we can be certain of things that are not numerically identical to things we can state. — fdrake
I'm not going to talk about things we can't talk about. I suggest you don't, either. It's a very common problem for philosophers, easily remedied. — Banno
Heat oil in an 8-inch nonstick skillet over medium-low. Gently crack eggs into pan. You shouldn't hear a hiss, and the eggs should lie flat and still. If you hear sizzling or the whites flutter or bubble at all, turn down the heat. Cook 3 minutes or until the whites are mostly set, with some still-runny whites near the yolks. Tilt pan toward you so oil pools on the bottom edge; dip a spoon in the oil, and gently baste the uncooked patches of white until they're set. Be careful not to baste the yolks, or they'll cloud over like cataracts. Sprinkle with pepper and salt. Remove eggs from pan, leaving excess oil behind.
Those last few posts of yours are terrible. They make no sense. — Banno
What more is there to a certainty, that it is not simply a belief?
— Banno
Think of it this way: the likelyhood that your certainty is right on (ie. that your belief is false, or else that your belief is right on target) is reflected by the degree of certainty. And the degree of certainty can't be established by any means by humans when it comes to KNOWING whether what we sense as reality is itself reality or not.
So what more is there to a degree of certainty: the possibility that our belief is false, or right on, or anywhere in-between. — god must be atheist
Are you claiming that a belief is always a belief that such-and-such is true? That's what I've long claimed. — Banno
Maybe a logical reframing of this might be that it's possible to be certain of things that we do not believe that we believe?
IE: Possibly [(X is certain that P) and not (X believes that X believes that P))]
If belief as a modality collapses, this is equivalent to:
Possibly[ (X is certain that P) and not (X believes that P)] — fdrake
It seems to me your standards for someone demonstrating that there are components of know how which cannot be stated are to state them; — fdrake
I don't think I disagree with any of what you said; but I'm not sure, 'cause I'm not sure what it is you are arguing. — Banno
Belief applies only to statements; and can thus only be a component of declarative knowledge. Certainty applies to statements and competences; — fdrake
Trivially, yes: "I flip the omelette". — Banno
I suppose you want more detail. — Banno
But then the question becomes: how much detail will suffice?
What is to count as sufficient? And the answer is: enough to be satisfied; if you are never satisfied, then that's not my problem.
And I am going to maintain that if one is certain that one can flip an omelet, then one believes one can flip an omelet; and this despite one possibly never vocalising that belief. And I will maintain this because it is a performative contradiction to be certain of one's capacity and yet not believe. — Banno
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