OK, then define "meaning" in your terms.

I want to hear the best arguments how computers actually can simulate consciousness — Zelebg

Computers can simulate physical systems. Human brains are physical systems. Human brains are conscious. So a simulation of a human brain will be conscious, unless you think there’s some spooky metaphysical thing going on in real human brains that isn’t going on in simulated ones.

But it sounds to me like you don’t actually care about that metaphysical stuff, what you really want to know is what is the thing that human brains do that gives them the kind of conscious experience that they have. That’s a good question, but a different question than the metaphysical question, a better question than the metaphysical question, but an empirical question that needs to be answered by neuroscientists and software engineers, not one that we can speculatively answer on a philosophy forum.

OK, then define "meaning" in your terms.

So called “symbol grounding problem”. Meaning is what information represents in a given context. Meaning can be a physical object, abstract concept, property, action, relation, and whatnot.

...unless you think there’s some spooky metaphysical thing going on in real human brains that isn’t going on in simulated ones.

I might think that if I ever decide what to think, but right now that is what you think… aren't you the panpsychist here?

Panpsychism is exactly the opposite of that: whatever is metaphysically going on in human brains is nothing special, it’s just a normal facet of everything, and it’s only the functional differences between human brains and other things that account for the differences in their experience. Replicate the function and you automatically replicate the experience.

It’s the dualist and emergentist who say that human brains have some metaphysical difference from other things, though the emergentist at least says that that metaphysical difference “emerges” somehow from the functional difference.

The eliminativist, like the panpsychist, says that nothing besides functionality differs between rocks and brains, but rather than saying that whatever it is besides function that makes brains capable of phenomenal, subjective, first-person experience also exists in everything else, the elimanitivist says that there is no such thing as phenomenal, subjective, first-person experience at all, even in human brains.

Panpsychism is exactly the opposite of that: whatever is metaphysically going on in human brains is nothing special, it’s just a normal facet of everything,

No, panpsychism claims everything is conscious because it is a fundamental physical property, additional to electromagnetism and gravity,

Panpsychist can not claim consciousness can be simulated, it’s absurd. What do you need simulation for if a computer is already conscious by itself, even when broken or turned off?

And what exactly is supposed to be conscious in such a setting: program or computer, or both, or every atom individually, or electric components make up one consciousness while all the plastic parts another?

Replicate the function and you automatically replicate the experience.

Your belief is called functionalism, not panpsychism. Try to define your terms, write down what is “self” and what is “experience”, then it should become easier to understand what is it you actually believe and how much it doesn’t make any sense.

Your belief is called functionalism, not panpsychism. — Zelebg

I am both a functionalist and a panpsychist, and have been pretty explicit about that this whole time. There are two “problems of” or types of consciousness: the easy problem of access consciousness, and the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness. I am a functionalist about the first and a panpsychist about the second.

You seem to be conflating the two together and asking what function constitutes phenomenal consciousness, which is not a coherent question because phenomenal consciousness is definitionally about whatever is involved in consciousness besides function or behavior.

I don’t say that everything is access consciousness, which I think is the important kind of consciousness, precisely because it is what is different and special about humans compared to other things. I do say that everything is phenomenally conscious, because phenomenal consciousness is such a trivial thing that even rocks have it and that doesn’t mean anything important.

I am both a functionalist and a panpsychist

That sounds like emergentism. In any case you can not claim to be panpsychist without postulating there is sentience present within universe existing as additional fundamental physical property such as electromagnetism or gravity...

...which means you can not believe it can be simulated just like magnetic fields can not be simulated to produce magnetic attraction and repulsion, but only to produce abstract representation of spatial movement and geometrical arrangement resulting.

Neither functionalist nor panpsychist seem to have a definition of "self", so it is dubious what they mean when they say "subjective experience".

That sounds like emergentism. In any case you can not claim to be panpsychist without postulating there is sentience present within universe existing as additional fundamental physical property such as electromagnetism or gravity... — Zelebg

Tell that to Galen Strawson.

Tell that to Galen Strawson.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
Strawson has argued that what he calls "realistic physicalism" entails panpsychism. He writes that "as a real physicalist, then, I hold that the mental/experiential is physical.

Yep. Glad I could help.

It confirms what I said - you can not claim to be panpsychist without postulating there is sentience present within universe existing as additional fundamental physical property such as electromagnetism or gravity.

It says no such thing. It says that the mental/experiential is physical, nothing at all about it being anything like electromagnetism or gravity. You continue to just not understand what panpsychism, or the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness generally, is even about.

Yes, physical, it means it can not be simulated, just like you can not produce magnetic attraction by simulating bar magnet, just like you can not produce moisture or wind by simulating hurricane. Do you understand now?

In my humble opinion near-perfect simulation is already a reality.

Cortical Homunculus





The image above is called the cortical homonculus and shows how the sensori-motor system of our body maps onto the brain. The image clearly shows that our head and hands take up a major portion of cerebral real estate.

Video games are at the forefront of simulated realities and notice they, for all purposes, engage the head and the hand. There's a display & sound to experience the simulation and a hand-held controller to navigate the environment.

All in all, if the cortical homunculus is an accurate representation of our bodies AND with video games built as they are, simulated realities are already being experienced by our brains. All we need to do now, to complete the process, is to work our way through the rest of the brain's sensori-motor cortex.

Why can't I post images?

Simulating an electric field does not produce an electric field in the non-simulated world, but you can totally simulate an electric field that acts just like an electric field in the simulated world. You’re really mixing up concepts now.

In any case that’s besides the point of panpsychism. The panpsychist (at least the contemporary kind, a pan-proto-experientialist) would say that the computer running the simulation already had the kind of trivial fundamental phenomenal experience that all things have, and when part of it was programmed to function like a human brain, that part of it would begin to have a phenomenal experience like a human has.

It had SOME experience before already, it was just a tremendously simple and boring kind, just like its behavior was tremendously simple and boring compared to that of a human brain. But when you make something that DOES more interesting complicated stuff, built up out of the boring simple stuff its parts could already do, it also begins to EXPERIENCE more interesting complicated things, built up out of the boring simple things its parts could already experience.

The contemporary panpsychist like me or Galen Strawson is just saying that complicated interesting experiences like humans are capable of are built up out of boring simple experiences that the stuff we’re made of is capable of, in exactly the same way that the complicated interesting behaviors we exhibit are built up out of boring simple behaviors the stuff we’re made of exhibits.

The dualist, in contrast, thinks there’s some other kind of stuff that does interesting complicated experiencing to being with and physical stuff gets its apparent experience from that.

The emergentist similarly says that sufficiently interesting complicated stuff just suddenly starts having complicated interesting experiences out of nowhere at some point, not built up out of simpler more boring stuff, just appearing by magic.

The eliminativist says that nothing has any kind of experience, simple or complicated, interesting or boring; behavior is all there is to account for.

All of those sound far more absurd than “the complex and interesting experiences we have are just built out of the boring simple experiences everything already has”.

Only subscribers can upload images here; others have to host them elsewhere and then link them from here.

Only subscribers can upload images here; others have to host them elsewhere and then link them from here. — Pfhorrest

:up: :ok:

Simulating an electric field does not produce an electric field in the non-simulated world, but...

There is no but, simulation can not produce actual physical phenomena, i.e. you were wrong as I already explained. That's all.

Matrix type simulation is one thing, there are actual humans outside the simulator. But that the whole universe is being simulated in which we only exist virtually — Zelebg

No one seems too worried about this bit. But I have NEVER (before) heard of a simulated universe that is the whole the universe. That doesn't even make sense as it would not be a simulation of anything.

By definition a simulation is an "imitation"...so a simulated universe must exist within some universe (or somehow 'outside' all universes yet aware of their properties...if that is even a reasonable thought) or it is not a simulation.

For me the only worthwhile argument for a simulated universe is the idea that it could be possible to create such a thing. If the simulation will EVER be possible, then what are the odds that we live in the original universe vs one of the infinite simulations that would emerge. However, this same logic can be applied to time travel so I think you are justified in questioning whether it ever will be possible.

Computers can simulate physical systems. Human brains are physical systems. Human brains are conscious. So a simulation of a human brain will be conscious — Pfhorrest

A simulation of gravity doesn't attract nearby bowling balls. A simulation of the brain would perfectly simulate the behavior of a brain but would not necessarily implement consciousness.

Is there something spooky about wetware? We don't know. That's Searle's argument I believe. Something special about the wetware.

By definition a simulation is an "imitation" — ZhouBoTong

Exactly right. If the world is a simulation, what's it a simulation of??

A simulation of gravity doesn't attract nearby bowling balls. A simulation of the brain would perfectly simulate the behavior of a brain but would not necessarily implement consciousness.

Yes, but only in the case qualia is indeed physical phenomena. Alternative being virtual phenomena.