The point is colors do not actually exist — Zelebg
The point is colors do not actually exist, and that is a fact in the sense that in the outside 3d person empirical reality there are only electric and magnetic fields, and they are transparent. There is no field of purple or substance of green. Therefore, we do not see colors, we "see" something else as colors. For example, colors could be mapped to magnetic density or electric voltage scales, or different orientation of molecules, or even symbols and numbers in some higher order representation mapping. — Zelebg
That is not it. I guess I failed to formulate the question properly.
The point is colors do not actually exist, and that is a fact in the sense that in the outside 3d person empirical reality there are only electric and magnetic fields, and they are transparent. There is no field of purple or substance of green. Therefore, we do not see colors, we "see" something else as colors. For example, colors could be mapped to magnetic density or electric voltage scales, or different orientation of molecules, or even symbols and numbers in some higher order representation mapping. — Zelebg
Moby Dick there too? — creativesoul
This line of reasoning leads to madness. You end up with nothing but quantum probability waves existing and nothing else.
Colors are properties, and properties exist.
It's a simple logical fact. What is your objection exactly? — Zelebg
The point is colors do not actually exist, and that is a fact in the sense that in the outside 3d person empirical reality there are only electric and magnetic fields, and they are transparent. There is no field of purple or substance of green. Therefore, we do not see colors, we "see" something else as colors. For example, colors could be mapped to magnetic density or electric voltage scales, or different orientation of molecules, or even symbols and numbers in some higher order representation mapping. — Zelebg
You're still confused over the same point. There are three completely distinct things here: (1) frequency, (2) spectral distribution, (3) color. — InPitzotl
That's incorrect. As you yourself say, "photoreceptors are just doing what they do". And what they do, with respect to responding to light, is send signals proportional to some amount of isomerization of photopsin molecules that they contain. That's it; nothing else. That thing is (3). And if (3) cannot distinguish between spectral distributions (2), then (3) cannot be said to measure which (2) you have. If (3) cannot distinguish frequency components (1) in a spectral distribution, (3) cannot be said to measure frequencies in a spectral distribution. (3) can do neither of these things, so it measures neither.
To reach your conclusion from the assessment requires conflating (3) with (1) and (2). My assessment contains no such conflating; that's all on you. — InPitzotl
Mantis shrimp's eyes measure... what they measure. The question is what they measure. I define color in terms of what eyes measure in color vision; that's the colorimetric definition — InPitzotl
You're reaching. Eyes do this:Eyes do not measure. Anthropomorphism. — creativesoul
linkmeasure
7: To serve as a means of measuring.
// a thermometer measures temperature — Merriam webster
According to this criterion, it would make sense to say that a mantis shrimp's eyes are measuring light frequencies and distributions... — creativesoul
here's an example of you using that sense of the word measure:
According to this criterion, it would make sense to say that a mantis shrimp's eyes are measuring light frequencies and distributions...
— creativesoul — InPitzotl
So where is this reductio ad absurdum argument that I've been waiting now 7 days for you and/or some "astute reader" to present?An astute reader will note that it's a case of following from your use(s) and showing that it leads to a reductio ad absurdum. — creativesoul
a. we actually see colors (colors exist)
b. we only think we see colors (colors do not exist) — Zelebg
I'm not sure why there is still said to be a "philosophical problem" of color. I'm sure there must be something very wrong with my way of thinking about it. How could it be so simple:a. we actually see colors (colors exist)
b. we only think we see colors (colors do not exist) — Zelebg
a. we actually see colors (colors exist)
b. we only think we see colors (colors do not exist) — Zelebg
Yes: the quality of the experience itself (the qualia). This is not decomposible.Is there some reason this way of thinking about color is not generalizable to light of any wavelength? — Cabbage Farmer
So far as I can tell, there are things in the world called dogs, and things in the world called perceptual experiences of dogs, and it's advisable not to get our thoughts about the two confused. Likewise with colors and experiences of colors.Yes: the quality of the experience itself (the qualia). This is not decomposible. — Relativist
We can't fully understand redness without having experienced it. Suppose you'd never experience either red or blue, but you knew all the physical aspects of these colors (the physics of reflected light, wavelengths, the mechanisms of visual perception...). I present to you 2 balls: a red and a blue. Can you identify which is which?For instance, should we say abstract objects are not composed or composable, hence are not decomposable, and that all perceptible things, and all or nearly all physical things, are composed and composable, hence decomposable?
Does it help us to understand colors, to say that our experience of colors has subjective features that are "not decomposable"? Does it help us to understand dogs, to say that our experience of dogs has subjective features that are "not decomposable"? — Cabbage Farmer
This is kind of a tricky question; it's asking for an intuitive answer, but the intuitions don't necessarily hold. The real answer to this question is, possibly. A person who both has never experienced red or blue, and lacks knowledge of the physical aspects of those colors, still might nevertheless be able to distinguish red from blue; such an individual is merely qualifying for type 1 blindsight. Technically a person who has knowledge might be able to distinguish by some "trick", but persons with type 1 blindsight can distinguish by "unknown non-conscious means".We can't fully understand redness without having experienced it. Suppose you'd never experience either red or blue, but you knew all the physical aspects of these colors (the physics of reflected light, wavelengths, the mechanisms of visual perception...). I present to you 2 balls: a red and a blue. Can you identify which is which? — Relativist
I don't think it makes sense to say we can have non-conscious experiences. The quale "redness" IS the experience, according to the paradigm anyway.(a) Does such a person experience redness non-consciously? (b) Could such a person experience redness non-consciously? — InPitzotl
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