In my view this would be like: "The best / most intimate knowledge we have of what is causing our physical behaviour at a given time". We're able to know why we raise our hand, why we take avoiding actions, why we choose low fat over regular, etc. Moral competence then comes from interacting with other agents who are also capable of such understanding and expect you to have the same understanding. — Gooseone
The problem with this solution is that all people generally know why they have raised their hand or generally performed any act. — Hanover
The judicial system is for when we have reason to believe the understanding is there, but there is a lack of competence to act on this understanding. — Gooseone
Conversely, if the understanding is there but there is a physical lack of control (some forms of epilepsy, Gehrig's disease, Tourette syndrome) we try to physically aid such persons so that they are able to exercise their free will. — Gooseone
The fact that I know why I shot you (I just sort of felt like it) should not be the determining factor in whether I should be held responsible for it. — Hanover
...expecting a direct correlation between our conscious awareness of our actions or expecting to elaborate on physical processes beyond our conscious awareness is a too harsh of a demand to decide on (potential) moral competence. — Gooseone
Could it be pragmatic to stop associating free will with action and associate it with knowledge?
In my view this would be like: "The best / most intimate knowledge we have of what is causing our physical behaviour at a given time". We're able to know why we raise our hand, why we take avoiding actions, why we choose low fat over regular, etc. Moral competence then comes from interacting with other agents who are also capable of such understanding and expect you to have the same understanding. If we see "morally incompetent" behaviour we tend to look for the underlying reasons, if we then conclude there is a lack of understanding we generally do not hold such people responsible but do take away (a degree) of their rights to exercise free will. Conversely, if the understanding is there but there is a physical lack of control (some forms of epilepsy, Gehrig's disease, Tourette syndrome) we try to physically aid such persons so that they are able to exercise their free will. The judicial system is for when we have reason to believe the understanding is there, but there is a lack of competence to act on this understanding.
I feel that it is unfounded to use (the limits of) our conscious action capacity as a means to gain a supposed "understanding" of our behaviour on the whole which supersedes the individual understanding which suffices enough for us to deem ourselves morally competent. Priming individuals with the understanding of our behaviour on the whole (= free will does not exist) has an influence on their behaviour and that in itself shows to me that, when talking about free will, it matters more what we understand then the degree in which we deem actions volitional. — Gooseone
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