You think that is the definition of computability? — ssu

Generally, yes. If something can not be proven to be true or false, then is it not undecidable and thus non-halting?

The point I am making is that giving a proof by computation isn't universal and adaptable to all models. — ssu

That's just saying that a system is incomplete and can not prove its own consistency.

OK, let's start with this premise, there is just one concrete thing, the world. Now, in your last repy to me, you said "all truths are equal, depending on the relations between different objects". The premise that there are different objects contradicts that other premise, that there is just one concrete thing. So according to these two premises, which are contradictory, the idea of truth appears to be a fiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

No.

The world entails all the facts (logical relations) of objects within it. They are one and the same.

No, it makes a "configuration of objects and things in the world" impossible. There is just one thing, the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there is just one thing, the world, which entails all the configurations or state of affairs between objects.

And in being thus an orthogonal kind of space to physical space, information is a proper further dimension of existence. It is part of the fundamental picture in the way quantum mechanics eventually stumbled upon with the irreducible issue of the Heisenberg cut or wavefunction collapse. — apokrisis

I read a short part of that paper you linked. The author says:

Briefly, the idea is this. The universe and all systems within it are assumed to run according to universal laws whether or not observers or life exist. The mathematical descriptions of these laws are interpreted by ontological concepts of space, time, matter and energy but the laws themselves do not include the epistemological concepts of measurement and control events. However, measurement is essential if we want to predict any consequence of laws on a specific observable system. There must be measurement of initial conditions and the measurement process requires local control constraints of a measuring device or instrument.(The Necessity of Biosemiotics: Matter-Symbol Complementarity, H. H.) Pattee

Both your conception of QM and the authors implies the Copanhagan Interpretation or the measurement effect. However, in this thread I have taken Everttian Quantum Mechanics as a startinig point. Everettian QM is determinisitic from what I have read, and David Deutsch in his Church-Turing-Deutsch principle asserts this as a fact due to assuming that because the machine is physical itself and thus obeys the same laws of the world, then it can itself replicate all those laws. This seems fundamentally different from saying that an initial condition is needed, whereas reality can be an infinite amount of possible states.

As you may have noticed Occam's razor flies out the window when confronted with the infinite amount of realities in the world. Everettian QM is an elegant solution when confronted with apparent infinities, which supersedes Occam's razor.

No models that we use involve these numbers of functions, so that mathematical truth is irrelevant to our present models that we use. Just like non-Euclidean geometry or Computer science was irrelevant to people during Antiquity. — ssu

That is wrong. There *are* models that we use that are non-computable, in the sense that they do not obey the CTD-Principle.

Quantum mechanics obeys the CDT-Principle, as does QFT and the Standard Model. Any future theory will also obey CDT. In fact CTD is a guide to future theories, as are the conservation laws.

This is interesting and I don't dare to contest those findings by such brilliant minds. However, how does one explain that man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills? — Question

That statement is obviously false. It is perfectly possible to reprogram yourself to will, or desire different things. People do it all the time.

Yes, but you can't program yourself to program yourself to program yourself [...] ad infinitum [...] to program yourself to program yourself...

As you may have noticed Occam's razor flies out the window when confronted with the infinite amount of realities in the world. Everettian QM is an elegant solution when confronted with apparent infinities, which supersedes Occam's razor. — Question

Well something sure flies out the window once you deny the measurements that might locate you in some actual world rather than leaving you to fluff about in a sea of infinite possibility.

See
http://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/37346/

I'm having a mental cramp over it.

I'm having a mental cramp over it. — Question

Just keep chanting "all branches of the wavefunction are equally real" until you are a paid up member of the cult of MWI. That way you will never have to trouble yourself with real metaphysics ever again.

Statistically not so! The reality that is real is the one most probable to occur according to the evolution of the wavefunction. The rest aren't as real!

Statistically not so! The reality that is real is the one most probable to occur according to the evolution of the wavefunction. The rest aren't as real! — Question

You've clearly not been paying attention.

Generally, yes. If something can not be proven to be true or false, then is it not undecidable and thus non-halting? — Question

Yet simply note that some proof of truth or falsehood can be given by other way than computation, direct proof. Indirect proofs like reductio ad absurdum proofs can prove if something is false or true.

That's just saying that a system is incomplete and can not prove its own consistency. — Question

Actually the thing (giving a proof by computation isn't universal and adaptable to all models), isn't just that. It actually does have a lot of effect in real world modelling problems.

The most simple example of this is when a measurement effects the outcome and there is no way around it; when the model that should portray reality, itself has an effect on that reality it ought to model. In these kind of situations basically objectivity is lost. In these situations some models can be used to some effect, for example we can use probabilities, or make premisses so that the dynamic model is stable. Yet these do not reply to the question as an normal computation would do.

Wittgenstein in his Tractatus gave the simple reason for this:

3.333 A function cannot be its own argument, because the functional sign already contains the prototype of its own argument and it cannot contain itself.

For example in economics, self fulfilling expectations are extremely difficult to model. And for example for speculative bubbles there aren't good models around and earlier were simply assumed not to even exist, there wasn't the math to do them. The simple fact is that many Real World economic phenomena are extremely difficult to model. I think the reason is that the best models simply are uncomputable ones. Even in classical Physics you get similar problems.

Yes, there is just one thing, the world, which entails all the configurations or state of affairs between objects. — Question

Well, if you cannot see that it is explicitly contradictory to say that "there is just one thing", and that this one thing is a multitude of configurations of things, "objects", such that you would keep insisting on the same contradiction, then I give up on trying to help you.