Every newspaper in the Netherlands is basing themselves off the Chinese data, where the serious cases/active cases ratio is bloody high compared to every other region except for, maybe, Iran. Then they also confuse mortality rate and CFR all the time. Good way to induce panic!

Benatar's ethics is consequentialism. — Benkei

I do want to bring up, I am not necessarily using Benatar's version of antinatalism here, though I guess I'm obliged to defend it now being it is something I do generally agree with. But let's not mix what schopenhaer1 is saying with strictly what Benatar is saying. He has a pretty idiosyncratic form of antinatalism that I don't always use. That being said, have you actually read his arguments or are you just going by third-hand accounts?

If living entails suffering then living doesn't cause suffering. — Benkei

No one is saying that living causes suffering. However, no existence is so charmed as to not entail some suffering and thus for pragmatic argument's sake, semantically speaking, you can see why it becomes conflated in common parlance in these discussions (being suffering's ubiquitousness in all forms of living).

So if the position is, suffering is intrinsic to life then it must necessarily fail as a consequentialist argument because living then does not cause suffering. — Benkei

Benkei, you have some interesting ideas, but this is a semantic argument, not a deep philosophical one. One can just make the move in this tit-for-tat game to remake the terms and keep the same substance of the argument. The position is suffering is entailed in (most life that we've ever known).. That's good enough then if living doesn't actually cause suffering. But who knows, maybe living does entail suffering. That is an intriguing idea to pursue. Buddhists believe it to be some sort of necessity, for example. It may be considered an illusion ultimately in this conception, but it is part of the doctrine in a fundamental way.

Also, Benatar isn't strictly a consequentialist. I actually see him more as a Kantian if we are to use the most widely used ethical categories. That is to say, he doesn't want to see people (the child) being used as a means to the someone else's (the parents') ends when it comes to generating the conditions for suffering for others (that is to say the necessary condition of life). Also he seems to say that there is an obligation not to cause the conditions of suffering, and not an obligation to cause happiness (if there is no actual person there in the first place). Thus, there seems to be an obligation around preventing suffering that is not purely about the consequences, but about obligations around suffering (and uniquely so, in the case of procreation where prevention of good affects no person so is not bad, and prevention of bad also affects no one, but is still good that no suffering occurred).

If the argument is that it is not intrinsic to life, then it becomes necessary to examine the causal chain. And then you run into problems because living is never a sufficient condition for suffering, merely a necessary condition. — Benkei

This to me is really what you are trying to argue. For all intents and purposes, living is the cause of that which is inevitable- suffering. We have to define suffering of course. Certainly a life that has experienced an ounce of disease has some suffering. It is another argument, for example, as to how much disease, and how painful for this to be considered truly "suffering". But your argument is strictly about whether living is necessary and sufficient. The facts are that suffering is almost impossible to avoid while alive. The proof is simply seeing the suffering in almost everyone's life. No utopia exists, no paradise exists, etc. If Buddhism/Schopenhauer does have some truth to it, then perhaps there is a metaphysical aspect of animal striving that indeed would relate suffering with living itself. None of this needs to be consequentialism, in other words. Even if it was, the balance sheet is not on your side of the argument, if we are to use Benatar's argument. That is to say, if in the procreational decision, no actual person loses out on experiencing the good life that is not bad (as there is no actual person). However, not experiencing the bad of life is always good, even if there is no actual person to enjoy this good (see Benatar's asymmetry and formal argument written elsewhere to get full picture of his argument before you go by my rough outline of the argument).

Please have more response to my argument than that. I did provide a pretty detailed response and even though I generally disagree with your current argument, I think you elicit good debate. On an aside, I could swear I've seen you make (at least tepid) antinatalist arguments or at least have shown some sympathies for the arguments in the past. I could be mistaken though.

Benkei, you have some interesting ideas, but this is a semantic argument, not a deep philosophical one. One can just make the move in this tit-for-tat game to remake the terms and keep the same substance of the argument. The position is suffering is entailed in (most life that we've ever known).. That's good enough then if living doesn't entail suffering. But who knows, maybe living does entail suffering. That is an intriguing idea to pursue. Buddhists believe it to be some sort of necessity, for example. It may be considered an illusion ultimately in this conception, but it is part of the doctrine in a fundamental way. — schopenhauer1

No dude, this is most certainly not a semantic issue.

You underestimate the importance of delineation. If one thing is intrinsically part of something, that one thing is not caused by the something. Water does not, by its mere existence, cause itself to be wet. Does living cause breathing? Does living cause a heartbeat? If you want to make an argument, your use of language must be sensible. So it's fundamental to decide whether living causes suffering (however remotely) or whether suffering is intrinsic to living. If the latter, then there is no argument to be had from an ethical point of view.

Also, Benatar isn't strictly a consequentialist. I actually see him more as a Kantian if we are to use the most widely used ethical categories. That is to say, he doesn't want to see people (the child) being used as a means to the someone else's (the parents') ends when it comes to generating the conditions for suffering for others (that is to say the necessary condition of life). — schopenhauer1

This makes no sense. I'm using non-existent people (which is in itself a contradiction in terms and therefore not intelligible)? Fine, that means I'm using nothing because non-existent (not that that can be a quality but whatever!). It's not Kantian, it's Konfused.

This to me is really what you are trying to argue. For all intents and purposes, living is the cause of that which is inevitable- suffering. We have to define suffering of course. Certainly a life that has experienced an ounce of disease has some suffering. It is another argument, for example, as to how much disease, and how painful for this to be considered truly "suffering". But your argument is strictly about whether living is necessary and sufficient. The facts are that suffering is almost impossible to avoid while alive. The proof is simply seeing the suffering in almost everyone's life. No utopia exists, no paradise exists, etc. If Buddhism/Schopenhauer does have some truth to it, then perhaps there is a metaphysical aspect of animal striving that indeed would relate suffering with living itself. None of this needs to be consequentialism, in other words. Even if it was, the balance sheet is not on your side of the argument, if we are to use Benatar's argument. That is to say, if in the procreational decision, no actual person loses out on experiencing the good life that is not bad (as there is no actual person). However, not experiencing the bad of life is always good, even if there is no actual person to enjoy this good (see Benatar's asymmetry and formal argument written elsewhere to get full picture of his argument before you go by my rough outline of the argument). — schopenhauer1

The fact that all living things suffer at some point in time, is not a valid argument to conclude that living is a sufficient condition for suffering so this does not resolve the causal chain. Living is simply not, and never will be, a sufficient condition for suffering. The disease causes suffering, being run over by a car causes suffering, a break up causes suffering etc. etc. Suffering is unique and particular.

The whole anti-natalist approach also ignores the fact that suffering is subjective, that all the research on human well-being shows almost everyone across cultures is well above neutral on happiness. So Benatar (and you) are simply empirically wrong about the experience of suffering in the world. The argument "yeah, but you really suffer more and are just deluding yourself" does not resolve the issue because if it's true the delusion is the experience and it's all about the experience.

And "not experiencing the bad of life" by not existing isn't "good" is the usual metaphysical mumbo-jumbo: We cannot ascribe ethical states to nothing.

No dude, this is most certainly not a semantic issue. — Benkei

Yes compadre, it is.

You underestimate the importance of delineation. — Benkei

You overmine it and are making a non-argument an argument.

If one thing is intrinsically part of something, that one thing is not caused by the something. Water does not, by its mere existence, cause itself to be wet. Does living cause breathing? Does living cause a heartbeat? If you want to make an argument, your use of language must be sensible. So it's fundamental to decide whether living causes suffering (however remotely) or whether suffering is intrinsic to living. If the latter, then there is no argument to be had from an ethical point of view. — Benkei

Living causes the conditions of suffering. See my post above about its inevitability and thus why its a non-starter what you're saying. If it was a poor unfortunate handful of souls that suffered in some odd foible of the universe, and everyone else lived some Edenic lifestyle, then you might have something more than a semantic argument. But that is not the case.

This makes no sense. I'm using non-existent people (which is in itself a contradiction in terms and therefore not intelligible)? Fine, that means I'm using nothing because non-existent (not that that can be a quality but whatever!). It's not Kantian, it's Konfused. — Benkei

OH here we go.. It is preventing.. "people from being used".. It is not preventing (non-existent) people...from being used. There is a difference. Think about it before you answer though.

The fact that all living things suffer at some point in time, is not a valid argument to conclude that living is a sufficient condition for suffering so this does not resolve the causal chain. — Benkei

Again, if most (if not all) life has suffering, how is that not approaching sufficient enough, even if you think that it must be sufficient to cause suffering? Can there be human life without suffering? We can certainly try to imagine it, but that is in the imagination, not reality.

The disease causes suffering, being run over by a car causes suffering, a break up causes suffering etc. etc. Suffering is unique and particular. — Benkei

Sure, but what lives don't have these particular cases? Extremely low, if any. In fact, because life entails some sort of strife to live, one can argue (barring arguments against induction, Hume style) that any life will have to have strife in order to live and thus some form of suffering.

The whole anti-natalist approach also ignores the fact that suffering is subjective, that all the research on human well-being shows almost everyone across cultures is well above neutral on happiness. — Benkei

That is a bold assertion to say ALL the research shows... These are Benkei picked studies.. I can throw the opposite conclusion articles your way too.

So Benatar (and you) are simply empirically wrong about the experience of suffering in the world. The argument "yeah, but you really suffer more and are just deluding yourself" does not resolve the issue because if it's true the delusion is the experience and it's all about the experience. — Benkei

Again, have you actually read Benatar (in full)? We would do far better making this an actual book discussion if we are going to invoke his name and arguments. That way we are not just arguing our own second-hand points about Benatar.

Anyways, there is certainly many negative experiences in even an average human life. Diseases (being the topic of this thread) being one of many many many negative experiences. Why should a parent force their view of the world (that it should be lived out in its current conditions) by having a child who must then live this view of the world (that it should be lived out in its current conditions..lest suicide) out?

And "not experiencing the bad of life" by not existing isn't "good" as this is the usual metaphysical mumbo-jumbo: We cannot ascribe ethical states to nothing. — Benkei

This is the case again that you're not actually reading Benatar, so you get to debate a representative interpretation, as we aren't using the actual text. But, if I recall, he thought that it is absolutely good to not experience negative experiences/pain/suffering but relatively good to experience happiness. Then he gives some thought experiments. One if I recall was about how we wouldn't care if happy aliens don't exist on Mars. We would most likely feel sympathy if we found out aliens lived a tortuous painful life on Mars. Preventing pain is more important than generating good experiences in this conception because of these type of intuitions.

Living causes the conditions of suffering. See my post above about its inevitability and thus why its a non-starter what you're saying. If it was a poor unfortunate handful of souls that suffered in some odd foible of the universe, and everyone else lived some Edenic lifestyle, then you might have something more than a semantic argument. But that is not the case. — schopenhauer1

I'm sorry but you don't understand what causality is when you say "living causes the conditions..." It doesn't.

This is again your not actually reading Benatar, so you get to debate a representative interpretation, as we aren't using the actual text. But, if I recall, he thought that it is absolutely good to not experience negative experiences/pain/suffering but relatively good to experience happiness. Then he gives some thought experiments. One if I recall was about how we wouldn't care if happy aliens don't exist on Mars. We would most likely feel sympathy if we found out aliens lived a tortuous painful life on Mars. Preventing pain is more important than generating good experiences in this conception because of these type of intuitions. — schopenhauer1

I'm reacting to what you wrote - not Benatar. And what you write is non-sensical. You're not preventing pain by not procreating because you're comparing a possible situation (people suffering) with nothing (nobody suffering), which is not a valid comparison. You're preventing suffering when you avoid the suffering of an actual person that would otherwise suffer. That's an actual comparison between possible states. It's that simple.

If ideological spam is acceptable here, then responding to it with ideological trolling is fair game.

I'm sorry but you don't understand what causality is when you say "living causes the conditions..." It doesn't. — Benkei

You can't handwave the whole post off with this cherry-picked quote. You have to read the part that it is an almost inevitability that suffering will occur..So I qualified it. Is sufficiency even an ISSUE? Does it have to be if all lives have it?? I think this is using a non-essential, non-starter argument against the suffering we are discussing.

I'm reacting to what you wrote - not Benatar. — Benkei

So shall we both agree to get a copy of Benatar's book before we go further since this is deeply involving his arguments?

I'm reacting to what you wrote - not Benatar. And what you write is non-sensical. You're not preventing pain by not procreating because you're comparing a possible situation (people suffering) with nothing (nobody suffering), which is not a valid comparison. You're preventing suffering when you avoid the suffering of an actual person that would otherwise suffer. That's an actual comparison between possible states. It's that simple. — Benkei

Living a life that suffers is not a possible state? It is pretty simple. Even if there is no one who exists, if there is a possibility that suffering can occur.. what then?

If ideological spam is acceptable here, then responding to it with ideological trolling is fair game. — SophistiCat

I think you mean philosophical spam. However, you are not doing philosophical trolling. You are just trolling. Anyways, Coronavirus in and of itself can be said to not be philosophical. I am at least trying to bring some philosophical themes involved. I think it is very relevant being that people will suffer from this, and antinatalism, if nothing else, revolves around the theme of suffering.

You can't handwave the whole post off with this cherry-picked quote. You have to read the part that it is an almost inevitability that suffering will occur..So I qualified it. I sufficiency even an ISSUE does it have to be if all lives have it?? I think this is using a non-essential, non-starter argument against the suffering we are discussing. — schopenhauer1

If you are going to handwave logical requirements for a valid argument because it's convenient for your preconceived conclusion, I'm fully in my right to handwave the entire post into the bin. Which I did.

So shall we both agree to get a copy of Benatar's book before we go further since this is deeply involving his arguments? — schopenhauer1

What? You've never read Benatar?

Living a life that suffers is not a possible state? It is pretty simple. Even if there is no one who exists, if there is a possibility that suffering can occur.. what then? — schopenhauer1

Not what I said.

If you are going to handwave logical requirements for a valid argument because it's convenient for your preconceived conclusion, I'm fully in my right to handwave the entire post into the bin. Which I did. — Benkei

But I didn't handwave your arguments. I tried to answer them by questioning whether sufficiency matters when all lives have suffering (to some degree) that we have known of since the beginning of time.

What? You've never read Benatar? — Benkei

I had a copy of the book. I did read it years ago. I don't have it in my possession now, to my frustration as I constantly try to find bits of it online.

Not what I said. — Benkei

Maybe not, but it's what I'm trying to say.

But I didn't handwave your arguments. I tried to answer them by questioning whether sufficiency matters when all lives have suffering (to some degree) that we have known of since the beginning of time. — schopenhauer1

If upon reading my arguments your first substantive sentence is "Living causes the conditions of suffering" then you're ignoring my arguments.

Upon pointing that out and your subsequent reaction is "I sufficiency even an ISSUE does it have to be if all lives have it?" then we're done.

Read up on sufficient and necessary conditions in a logical text book. For the love of God, please.

If upon reading my arguments your first substantive sentence is "Living causes the conditions of suffering" then you're ignoring my arguments. — Benkei

How is that ignoring your arguments? Its saying that living itself is not "sufficient" to cause particular cases of suffering, but it is necessary for the conditions for all these cases to occur. That is not ignoring anything.

Upon pointing that out and your subsequent reaction is "I sufficiency even an ISSUE does it have to be if all lives have it?" then we're done. — Benkei

Yes, is it an issue? The conditions of suffering are necessary enough to contain the particular instances that cause suffering. Being that life usually has many of the instances, we don't need to talk about every single cause of an instance of suffering.

Yes, is it an issue? The conditions of suffering are necessary enough to contain the particular instances that cause suffering. Being that life usually has many of the instances, we don't need to talk about every single cause of an instance of suffering. — schopenhauer1

Yes. It is an issue. As I said before that every life has some suffering is no proof that it is a sufficient condition for particular suffering. I'm not even sure what to call this fallacy. For a sufficient condition "if P then Q" it means that the truth of P guarantees the truth of Q. Let's try that shall we?

Here's what it means to say life is a sufficient condition for suffering, or that being alive guarantees suffering.

If life causes suffering then living things should be suffering
I'm alive
therefore I'm suffering

Except I'm not. So the premisse is wrong. Why? Because living is only a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition.

Living does not cause a disease, it does not cause a car accident and it does not cause a break-up. Causality matters. The difference between necessary and sufficient conditions matters.

As I said before that every life has some suffering is no proof that it is a sufficient condition for particular suffering. — Benkei

Ok, we can agree to that.. Still doesn't make it an "issue".

For a sufficient condition "if P then Q" it means that the truth of P guarantees the truth of Q. Let's try that shall we? — Benkei

Sure.

Except I'm not. So the premisse is wrong. Why? Because living is only a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition. — Benkei

You are not suffering right NOW. There almost certainly was and probably will be. That is the same for everyone.

Living does not cause a disease, it does not cause a car accident and it does not cause a break-up. Causality matters. The difference between necessary and sufficient conditions matters. — Benkei

Yes but these examples are anticipated and countered by these past quotes I've stated:

The conditions of suffering are necessary enough to contain the particular instances that cause suffering. Being that life usually has many of the instances, we don't need to talk about every single cause of an instance of suffering. — schopenhauer1

Sure, but what lives don't have these particular cases? Extremely low, if any. In fact, because life entails some sort of strife to live, one can argue (barring arguments against induction, Hume style) that any life will have to have strife in order to live and thus some form of suffering. — schopenhauer1

Living causes the conditions of suffering. See my post above about its inevitability and thus why its a non-starter what you're saying. If it was a poor unfortunate handful of souls that suffered in some odd foible of the universe, and everyone else lived some Edenic lifestyle, then you might have something more than a semantic argument. But that is not the case. — schopenhauer1

The theme here is that one can't prevent all instances of suffering, but one can prevent the container that the instances fall under for a future case (by preventing that case from occurring). We know how people get made, so don't give me the non-identity argument please. The non-action prevents the case from happening. Simple as that. I can agree with you for the already living, that we have to mitigate as much as we can and maximize what is good, etc.

You are not suffering right NOW. There almost certainly was and probably will be. That is the same for everyone. — schopenhauer1

Ok Good. So then we are in agreement that living doesn't cause suffering?

Ok Good. So then we are in agreement that living doesn't cause suffering? — Benkei

If we are using it in a precise and not common-parlance way, sure it is necessary but not sufficient (unless we explore Buddhist/Schopenhauer's ideas of striving). However, I don't see how that is an issue. The inevitability and frequency of it, makes it such that it would be almost a truism to say "Life will have suffering". The question is, with this information, what does one do with it?

Eradicate or mitigate the sufficient causes of suffering since suffering from a break up, or a car crash or a disease entails living.

Eradicate or mitigate the sufficient causes of suffering since suffering from a break up, or a car crash or a disease entails living. — Benkei

Agreed for the already living. Until further eradication or mitigation, why bring more people into it?

They can help.

They can help. — Benkei

Is that your final answer? You know I'm going to say that falls into the "using people as a means" category. Now they have to deal with, because you wanted them to help with the already existing problem. Not only does it not eradicate or mitigate, it simply extends and prolongs for more people.

I said "can" not "should". Their choice.

I said "can" not "should". Their choice. — Benkei

Ok, then the hope they will help is sufficient reason to go ahead and have people that will inevitably suffer? That is still causing the necessary conditions for suffering for a particular reason that is not the person themselves (thus being a means in some way).

Not really. The real answer, as opposed to my flippant one which I had hoped conveyed the implication of the real answer: is that at this point it isn't a moral problem. I don't need a reason to bring more people "in it" on the basis of the discussion we've had so far. If living doesn't cause suffering, then obviously procreating and giving life has no moral implication whatsoever in the abstract.

If living doesn't cause suffering, then obviously procreating and giving life has no moral implication whatsoever in the abstract. — Benkei

No not really. It is a known fact that suffering exists and is almost indubitably inevitable beyond a doubt that someone will suffer in some way- even just negative interactions with other people you work with, anything. There is no way that this new person will do the impossible and 1) be able to 2) know how to be able to 3) even have the ability to be able to mitigate all or even most of their negative experiences. That's not possible but yet you know this.

This is just restating what was previously proved to be logically wrong. If the logical conclusion is that living does not cause suffering then causing life is not morally wrong because I didn't cause anyone to suffer through that action.

This is just restating what was previously proved to be logically wrong. If the logical conclusion is that living does not cause suffering then causing life is not morally wrong because I didn't cause anyone to suffer through that action. — Benkei

C'mon dude. You know what my argument is. If it is a well known fact that If I do X and people will get hurt from it, why would you bother with this kind of non-argument?

Your doing x is not a proximate cause to anyone's suffering so it's irrelevant. That you think it is relevant, is a self-imposed burden but it's not borne out by a logical argument.

You're doing x is not a proximate cause to anyone's suffering so it's irrelevant. That you think it is relevant, is a self-imposed burden but it's not borne out by a logical argument. — Benkei

This I find to be totally misplaced and irrelevant. It does not have to be the proximate cause for a particular instance, but it is a necessary condition for all instances.

To provide an example, if I have natural gas pumping into a room, that is a necessary condition for something blowing up. Every instance of someone lighting a match would be the proximate cause. I allow people to enter this room knowingly..is that correct?

Now obviously the analogy isn't perfect. There are good experiences to be had in that natural gas room too in our case. Also, the proximal cause in the real world case is always varying, but we know they will be caused, which is my point.