... because the analogical inference for other minds fails.

It is not just a weak inference based on one case. It is far worse than that. The inference is just nonsensical because it assumes a particular way of thinking about one's self in relation to the world that doesn't hold up to phenomenological scrutiny.

The inference assumes that you exist as one of many human beings in an independent world and this particular human being 'has' experiences. The problem of other minds then becomes the issue of determining whether other human beings in this independent world have experiences like yourself.

So the inference runs as follows: I am one of many human beings in an independent world and I have experiences. Therefore, every other human being in this independent world must have experiences like I do.

But the problem here is that you are not a human being in an independent world. Because your body and the surrounding universe, where every other human being exists, is entirely constituted by your own experiences.

Once you recognize that you are not a human being in an independently existing universe then the analogy for other minds is exposed as nonsensical.

Furthermore, the human being you call ‘yourself’ – the one who appears at the center of the visual field – is recognized to be a p-zombie. Why? Because that human (the one who appears at the center of one's visual field) does not 'have' experiences at all (because that human being *just is* another experience) and a human being without experiences is a p-zombie, by definition.

And, thus, a new analogy supplants the old one: the analogical inference for other p-zombies. The new analogy runs as follows: Since the human being at the center of one’s visual field – ‘myself’ – is a p-zombie, then other human beings are p-zombies as well.

So this means everyone I know - including the human being I frequently identify as 'myself' - is a p-zombie.

Discuss.