haaa that was supposed to be an im, no idea how i accidentally posted it here. I won't apologize for euphonious tho, or God-y.

Get a hold of yourself, man!

I like Tillich but find the use of the word "God" to describe "the ground of being" superfluous. The ground of being is, to me, just another way of phrasing Kant's thing-in-itself. — Thorongil

Not really - I don't think the ding an sich is a religious idea.

A snippet on Tillich

'Existence' refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being. Within the finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy (Greek: 'autos' - self, 'nomos' - law) and heteronomy (Greek: 'heteros' - other, 'nomos' - law) abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from yet also dependent upon ('In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite' (Newport p.67f)). Therefore existence is estrangement."


"Although this looks like Tillich was an atheist such misunderstanding only arises due to a simplistic understanding of his use of the word 'existence'. What Tillich is seeking to lead us to is an understanding of the 'God above God'.

And a supporting passage concerning Hegel's philosophy of religion:

Hegel begins with a radical critique of conventional ways of thinking about God. God is commonly described as a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and so forth. Hegel says this is already a mistake. If God is to be truly infinite, truly unlimited, then God cannot be ‘a being’, because ‘a being’, that is, one being (however powerful) among others, is already limited by its relations to the others. It’s limited by not being X, not being Y, and so forth. But then it’s clearly not unlimited, not infinite! To think of God as ‘a being’ is to render God finite.

But if God isn’t ‘a being’, what is God? Here Hegel makes two main points. The first is that there’s a sense in which finite things like you and me fail to be as real as we could be, because what we are depends to a large extent on our relations to other finite things. If there were something that depended only on itself to make it what it is, then that something would evidently be more fully itself than we are, and more fully real, as itself. This is why it’s important for God to be infinite: because this makes God more himself (herself, itself) and more fully real, as himself (herself, itself), than anything else is.

Hegel’s second main point is that this something that’s more fully real than we are isn’t just a hypothetical possibility, because we ourselves have the experience of being more fully real, as ourselves, at some times than we are at other times. We have this experience when we step back from our current desires and projects and ask ourselves, what would make the most sense, what would be best overall, in these circumstances? When we ask a question like this, we make ourselves less dependent on whatever it was that caused us to feel the desire or to have the project. We experience instead the possibility of being self-determining, through our thinking about what would be best. But something that can conceive of being self-determining in this way, seems already to be more ‘itself’, more real as itself, than something that’s simply a product of its circumstances.

Putting these two points together, Hegel arrives at a substitute for the conventional conception of God that he criticized. If there is a higher degree of reality that goes with being self-determining (and thus real as oneself), and if we ourselves do in fact achieve greater self-determination at some times than we achieve at other times, then it seems that we’re familiar in our own experience with some of the higher degree of reality that we associate with God. Perhaps we aren’t often aware of the highest degree of this reality, or the sum of all of this reality, which would be God himself (herself, etc.). But we are aware of some of it – as the way in which we ourselves seem to be more fully present, more fully real, when instead of just letting ourselves be driven by whatever desires we currently feel, we ask ourselves what would be best overall. We’re more fully real, in such a case, because we ourselves are playing a more active role, through thought, than we play when we simply let ourselves be driven by our current desires.

What is God, then? God is the fullest reality, achieved through the self-determination of everything that’s capable of any kind or degree of self-determination. Thus God emerges out of beings of limited reality, including ourselves. — Robert Wallace

From here

You mean this Tillich? :-* It seems not even his philosophy could save him, why should any of us trust it?

Interesting link, thanks, but... So? He was an academic theologian, not a candidate for sainthood. And as a non-candidate for sainthood, sexual adventurism (aka adultery) doesn't invalidate what he had to say about God being the ground of being. Maybe he had that useful insight during theological pillow talk with a paramour.

You, for instance, might end up committing adultery, and that won't invalidate what you have had to say about various topics (except your comments on your immunity to adultery. those might then go down the drain).

So? He was an academic theologian, not a candidate for sainthood. — Bitter Crank

The purpose of theology and philosophy is to free man of the chains of vice, and lead him towards an enlightened state of being. Thus, if his philosophy didn't even help him, why should I trust it? I insist on the question. Philosophy is not just empty thought, it has to work. If it doesn't work, isn't it useless? Obviously thinking of God as the ground of being wasn't helpful for Tillich.

(except your comments on your immunity to adultery. those might then go down the drain). — Bitter Crank

>:O

But this seems to say that being is being, which is a tautology. — Thorongil

Yes, because it aimed solely to point at what Being isn't. Being isn't a being. Existence isn't an existent. Existents are in existence. Existence isn't itself in existence.

According to what you have said and to classical theism as I understand it, we can't say God exists; hence my curiosity that classical theists like Aquinas still proceed to concoct proofs that he does. — Thorongil

We can but we're not too sure what we mean when we say it. You insist on being sure of what the meaning of your statements is. They don't.

You'll often hear classical theists, and here think of Aquinas as a paradigmatic historic example thereof, claim that God is not a being among beings, but being itself. — Thorongil

Aquinas is known for his claim that God is a being Whose existence is His essence. If we interpret "essence" as the form, or 'what' a thing is, and existence as the fact that a thing is, then we have "the fact that God is, is what God is".

I think you have provided a somewhat inverted and I believe, invalid interpretation. You have said, the essence of God, is existence. God is being itself. Notice the difference. My interpretation makes God a specific type of being, allowing that there are other types of beings, but this special type of being, God, is such that what it is, its essence, makes its existence necessary. What this being is, is its existence. Your interpretation makes "God" the name of the category, being, or existing, such that all existing things, by the fact that they exist, are God, or part of God. My interpretation makes "God" the name of a being which cannot be other than existing.

The main problem is that it seems to define God into existence. — Thorongil

Yes, God is defined as existing, and you might even say that God is defined into existence, but this should not be seen as a problem, it's very consistent. The type of existence which God is understood to have, is as a separate Form. A form is an intelligible object, a concept, and the existence of such an object is substantiated by its definition. Therefore the substance of God's existence must be His definition. Just like any intelligible object (concept) God is what God is defined as. That cannot be avoided if God is understood as a separate Form.

One wonders why he even bothered with the five proofs, which leads me to believe that I've neglected something, though of what that might be I have no idea at present. In sum, it's a nice little trick that I'm surprised hasn't been employed more often. "Oh no, I don't have to prove that Big Foot exists, because he's existence itself, you see, so he naturally must exist!" — Thorongil

You actually have neglected something, because as I explained above, this interpretation "God is existence itself" is invalid. So the position is not that God must exist because God is existence, the claim is that God must exist because the very definition of "God" is that the being referred to by "God" exists. To speak of a non-existent God is necessarily contradiction, and therefore must be rejected and denied, because this is not to use the word "God" to refer to something existing, therefore negating the definition of "God". I had a long thread on this subject at pf, and there are numerous atheists who just cannot comprehend this. When the essential properties of a thing are identified, then these are the defining aspects of that thing. If we proceed to talk about that thing as if it does not have those defining features, then we are not actually talking about that thing, but something else. To claim that we are talking about that named thing, is contradiction. So if "God" is defined solely by the feature "existence", then to speak about a non-existent God is the most pure contradiction.

The difference with Big Foot, is that "Big Foot" is not defined as existing. Atheists will use such a tactic, and claim God is not defined as existing, claiming omnipotence, omniscience, absolute good, and such things, as the defining features of God, and these in substitution for existence, allow without contradiction, that God does not exist. But who do you think knows better how to define God, a theologian such as Aquinas, or an atheist?

The Five Ways are necessary in order to provide an understanding of why we need something such as "God", which is defined as existing. If there is no need for such a term then we can cease using it. And it would drop out of our vocabulary.

Is the totality of being the totality of beings, or something else besides? — John

Being itself seems to be something else besides the totality of being or beings. — Thorongil

Yes, but is the being of a being something separate from, or independent of, the being? Could the being of a being itself be independently of the being? Can being itself be at all in any sense?

Is the being of anything something separate from, or additional to, the thing? — John


I tend to agree with Kant that existence is not a predicate. — Thorongil

So, the being of a being is not something additional to the being, as a predicate would be additional to that which it is predicated of, then?

Being isn't a being. Existence isn't an existent. Existents are in existence. Existence isn't itself in existence. — Agustino

This is counter-intuitive to me. I don't know how I would object to it at the moment, but it just seems off.

We can but we're not too sure what we mean when we say it. — Agustino

Well hold on. You just got done saying that existence isn't itself in existence. If so, then Aquinas shouldn't be saying that God exists, period. You don't get off the hook by saying "we don't know what we mean when we say this." If you mean to say that existence isn't in existence, then God, as existence itself, cannot be in existence; hence it is impossible to prove that he is; hence also, and once again, my bafflement over the fact that he does proceed to try and prove just this.

God is a being — Metaphysician Undercover

No, he doesn't permit the indefinite article here, so far as I can tell. That's precisely the trap the classical theist wants to avoid.

I think you have provided a somewhat inverted and I believe, invalid interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Great, then show me a passage in Aquinas or some other classical theist to this effect and I might believe you.

So the position is not that God must exist because God is existence, the claim is that God must exist because the very definition of "God" is that the being referred to by "God" exists. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does this not amount to the same thing? I ask anyone reading this to explain the difference here.

"Big Foot" is not defined as existing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, I did just define him in such a way. Unless you're going to tell me that God has only one unambiguous definition, then my stipulation about Big Foot is perfectly justified. If you still don't like it, I could make up a word, like "fdjh" and say that this is defined as existing. How would you dispute that?

But who do you think knows better how to define God, a theologian such as Aquinas, or an atheist? — Metaphysician Undercover

That is indeed the question! Why should I accept Aquinas's definition and not another kind of theist's definition, or an atheist's definition? Who knows.

Can being itself be at all in any sense? — John

It's my view that it must be.

So, the being of a being is not something additional to the being, as a predicate would be additional to that which it is predicated of, then? — John

Yeah, I think so.

Great, then show me a passage in Aquinas or some other classical theist to this effect and I might believe you. — Thorongil

All you need to do is read the first section of Summa Theologica. Here's the gist of Pt1,Q3, Art1:
"I answer that God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence.
...
Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from his essence.
...
Therefore His essence is His existence."

Does this not amount to the same thing? I ask anyone reading this to explain the difference here. — Thorongil

No it doesn't amount to the same thing, for the reasons I explained in the preceding post. God's essence is His existence. This does not mean, as you claim, that God is existence. It has to do with how one concept participates in another. "Animal" participates in "human being", such that a human being is necessarily an animal. "Existence" participates in "God", such that God necessarily exists. But just like an animal is not necessarily a human being, existence is not necessarily God.

If you still don't see it, try this. Notice how Aquinas always refers to "His existence" when relating God to existence. Existence is a property which God has. This is not the same as equating God to existence, as is what you do when you say "God is existence". Aquinas recognizes that existence is something which God has, while you claim God and existence are one and the same thing. To say that God necessarily has the property of existence, because this is God's essence, is not the same thing as equating God and existence.

Actually, I did just define him in such a way. Unless you're going to tell me that God has only one unambiguous definition, then my stipulation about Big Foot is perfectly justified. If you still don't like it, I could make up a word, like "fdjh" and say that this is defined as existing. How would you dispute that? — Thorongil

I would not dispute that, but that is not what you said about Big Foot. This is what you said:

"Oh no, I don't have to prove that Big Foot exists, because he's existence itself, you see, so he naturally must exist!"


To define "God" as necessarily existing, is to say that God could not be conceived of in any other way than existing. This would be to conceive of something other than God. But this says nothing about what existence itself is, except that it is something which God has. To say that God is existence is to equate God and existence, and this is to say what existence is.

Let's define "human being" as necessarily animal. This means that "human being" cannot be conceived of in any way other than as an animal. To conceive in another way would not be the conception of "human being" it would be the conception of something else. But this says nothing about "animal" other than that it is something which a human being necessarily is. To equate these two, human being and animal, to say that human being is animal, is to say what animal is.

So Aquinas does not say what existence is, which would be the case if he said God is existence.

Also notice that Aquinas, and 'classical theists' generally, freely admit that there's a lot they don't know. They're not describing a specimen in a bottle.

They're not describing a specimen in a bottle. — Wayfarer

No, they're just defining a different one into existence.

All you need to do is read the first section of Summa Theologica. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have. There's no need to patronize.

"Existence" participates in "God", such that God necessarily exists. But just like an animal is not necessarily a human being, existence is not necessarily God. — Metaphysician Undercover

But this seems to propose that there is something outside of God, namely existence. That's not something classical theists would want to maintain.

Aquinas recognizes that existence is something which God has, while you claim God and existence are one and the same thing. To say that God necessarily has the property of existence, because this is God's essence, is not the same thing as equating God and existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

I get this. What I still don't get is the purpose of the five proofs (or any other proofs a classical theist might concoct). What are they proving? That God possesses a property called existence? But that already presupposes that God exists, which is what the proofs are meant to demonstrate. It's a circular mess.

To define "God" as necessarily existing, is to say that God could not be conceived of in any other way than existing. This would be to conceive of something other than God. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to Aquinas. But why should I accept his conception of God? You conveniently ignored that question.

They're not describing a specimen in a bottle.
— Wayfarer

No, they're just defining a different one into existence. — Thorongil

But in saying that, you assume that it's axiomatic that the corpus of revealed religion is to be disregarded. Aquinas would never for a moment suggest that one can arrive at faith by way of syllogisms.

But this seems to propose that there is something outside of God, namely existence. That's not something classical theists would want to maintain. — Thorongil

There are existing things, and God created them. God's creation is other than God. You seem to be thinking of pantheism which is somewhat different from classical theism.

I get this. What I still don't get is the purpose of the five proofs (or any other proofs a classical theist might concoct). What are they proving? That God possesses a property called existence? But that already presupposes that God exists, which is what the proofs are meant to demonstrate. It's a circular mess. — Thorongil

I think that Aquinas specifically states that the five ways are not to be taken as "proofs", in the sense of arguments which are meant to prove God's existence. They are called the five ways, and they are meant to explicate, or enhance one's understanding of God.

According to Aquinas. But why should I accept his conception of God? You conveniently ignored that question. — Thorongil

I avoided this question because I have no simple answer for it. Why should I accept anyone's conception of anything, "blue" for example? Because it makes sense? Because other people accept it? Because it is useful? There are many different reasons. That's what the five ways are for, to present to you, some of these reasons. You don't have to accept it though, if you don't want, that's a matter of choice, and that's why the five ways are "ways", and not "proofs".

Aquinas specifically states that the five ways are not to be taken as "proofs", in the sense of arguments which are meant to prove God's existence. They are called the five ways, and they are meant to explicate, or enhance one's understanding of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

True. There was a blog post, since lost, about how taking the proofs as proofs in a modern scientific sense (as Dawkins always does) is based on a misinterpretation. The proofs are for the intellectual edification of the faithful, not to convert the heathen.

The proofs are for the intellectual edification of the faithful, not to convert the heathen. — Wayfarer

Except that Aquinas presents them even in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

But that doesn't affect my point. They're not aimed at conversion. Nowhere does classical theology presume that you could arrive at faith without, well, faith. And Christian faith takes the Bible as the 'inspired word of God', which conveys truths that have been revealed, truths that one cannot simply discern through philosophical reasoning. Then, given that you accept the premisses, such arguments can be made. (I will see if I can find that reference I mentioned.)

Then, given that you accept the premisses, such arguments can be made — Wayfarer

For what purpose? It's just fides quaerens intellectum, I suspect you will answer. But why is understanding necessary when faith is already certain?

(I will see if I can find that reference I mentioned.) — Wayfarer

Sure. I'd be interested.

There are existing things, and God created them. God's creation is other than God. You seem to be thinking of pantheism which is somewhat different from classical theism. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm thinking that, according to Aquinas, existence is a property independent of God, in that God can possess or partake of it just as created things can.

They are called the five ways, and they are meant to explicate, or enhance one's understanding of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

See my response to Wayfarer on this point. "Enhancing" understanding doesn't make sense.

You don't have to accept it though — Metaphysician Undercover

Very well, but this is not how many, many apologists conceive of and use them.

No, I'm thinking that, according to Aquinas, existence is a property independent of God, in that God can possess or partake of it just as created things can. — Thorongil

I don't understand what you wrote. Created things are contingent, they are dependent on God as the cause of their existence. God exists necessarily. The reason why God exists necessarily is that created things are contingent, therefore there must be a cause of their existence. That there "must be" a cause is necessitated by the fact that these contingent things are actually existing. The necessary cause is God. So here's the logical order. We observe that things are actually existing. These things are understood to be contingent, they don't exist of necessity. Therefore it is necessary that there is a cause of their existence. This necessary cause is God.

You wrote this:

"Existence" participates in "God", such that God necessarily exists. But just like an animal is not necessarily a human being, existence is not necessarily God. — Metaphysician Undercover

Take a look at the wording again. Existence participates in God? You've set up a binary here.

I will also say that you've basically already ceded the main problem I have with classical theism, its unfalsifiability. The conversation we're having above is much less interesting to me.

Take a look at the wording again. Existence participates in God? You've set up a binary here. — Thorongil

This is Aristotelian logic. The concept "animal" is within the concept "man", because "man" is defined by "animal". Animal is within the definition of man. Likewise, the concept of life is within the concept of animal. The more general is within the more particular. But since "life", as a concept, is within "plant" as well as "animal", we can say that the concept participates in both, "plant" and "animal". God has existence, so existence is the more general, and the concept of existence is within the concept of God. But this doesn't mean that "God" is the only concept which the concept of "existence" participates in.

According to Aquinas. But why should I accept his conception of God? You conveniently ignored that question. — Thorongil

God is always and everywhere defined as the necessary being. The five proofs are meant, in their different ways, to show that there must be necessary being as well as,and as the very condition of the existence of, contingent being.

I don't particularly like the equation of God with being. You could say the same as I did above without using that word 'being':

"God is always and everywhere defined as the necessary, The five proofs are meant to show that there must be the necessary as well as, and as the very condition of, the contingent."

It is also worth noting that 'contingent' in this context just means 'dependent on something other than itself for its existence'. The existence of any finite thing is contingent, but from this it does not follow that the very existence or being of finite things is contingent. No finite being is God, and God is not a finite being, but all finite beings have their necessary existence in God.

I think it's also worth noting that it is reasonable to think of this as a mystery which cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, as much as we might want to.

Aquinas probably saw this great mystery: he was reportedly celebrating Mass when he had a revelation so profound that he ceased writing, leaving the Summa Theologiae unfinished. To Brother Reginald (his secretary and friend) he reputedly said,"The end of my labors has come. All that I have written appears to be as so much straw after the things that have been revealed to me." When later asked by Reginald to return to writing, he said, "I can write no more. I have seen things that make my writings like straw."

God = the 'is' in existence.

I have seen things that make my writings like straw." — John

I always thought a great comparative religion essay question would be: 'this is the starting point for Nāgārjuna. Discuss'.

(Y)

I haven't read that much of Nāgārjuna, but I can remember being impressed at how meticulously he strove to formulate what cannot be formulated, while also trying to build the acknowledgement of the impossibility of formulation into his formulations. All in all a great formulator of the formless. 8-)

you get it.

In sum, it's a nice little trick that I'm surprised hasn't been employed more often. "Oh no, I don't have to prove that Big Foot exists, because he's existence itself, you see, so he naturally must exist!" — Thorongil

The more I read about ancient philosophy and the history of Christianity, the more I tend to reject the "nice little trick" judgment.

It seems to me that people were/are honestly trying to figure out how it is that facts (or a reality independent of mind, or objectivity, or mathematics) or anything for that matter, could exist. Plato's forms (I was recently reminded that Nietzsche called Christianity, "Platonism for the masses") were a pretty good idea, as was Aristotle's Prime Mover... and people expanded upon the ideas.