Truthmakers are what make statements true, whereas justifications are what make asserting a statement justified.

The asserter believes the asserted statement to be true and the justification is the grounding for that belief.

A truthmaker grounds the statement in a different way? How?

What is the statement? A representation? Are there unasserted statements in your view?

Truthmakers are usually said to be the "entity" in virtue of which a truthbearer (a proposition) is true. "Entity" is a misleading term in my opinion. I prefer to say (well, when I talk about this, which is pretty much only when someone else, such as yourself, brings it up, because I don't find it very useful in general) that a truthmaker is simply the conditions that make a claim true. (Per convention there are also falsemakers, by the way--conditions that make a claim false).

The easiest way to understand this is simply via the conventions of stating what correspondence theory is in a nutshell: that is, that "P" (is true) iff P. (Or in other words, that a proposition is true just in case the proposition corresponds to some fact.)

So the truthmaker for "The cat is on the mat" (for that truthbearer, that proposition) is the fact that the cat is on the mat (or rather the cat being on the mat as it's often put in truthmaker talk).

Justifications on the other hand are the set of reasons that one takes as (sufficient) grounds for belief that P. For some simple claims, it might seem that truthmakers and justifications would be the same, but arguably there is always more to justifications, including for example reasons for belief such as "I trust my phenomenal data," and for claims like "There is a God," justifications will typically be much different and more extensive than the truthmaker--since the truthmaker is simply there being a God.

Truthmakers are what make statements true, whereas justifications are what make asserting a statement justified. — Michael

Yet what else could make a statement justified if not that it is true in virtue of a truthmaker?

"P" is true IFF P is not an expression of Correspondence, is it? That's the t-sentence. It's trivially true and it's the banner of Redundancy, which is truth skepticism.

Who uses the t-sentence to describe Correspondence?

What the heck do you think that correspondence is then? That is correspondence. A proposition is true just in case it corresponds to the fact it putatively picks out. "P" in quotation marks is the convention for denoting a propostion as such. P without quotation marks is the convention for denoting the fact as such. (At least in this context, where it's important to make a distinction.) Also, the reason I put "is true" in parentheses was simply to allow it to count as either traditional correspondence or deflationism. You seem familiar enough with this (otherwise how would you know "t sentence" or redundancy?) that it's bizarre to have to explain this to you . . . and then you just focus on that and don't say anything about whether you understood the distinction between truthmakers and justifications, which you also shouldn't need explained to you given an apparent familiarity with relevant material.

Evidence can make the assertion of a statement justified. But such evidence might not itself be the truth-maker.

Can you point out a source that uses the t-sentence to describe Correspondence theory?

Sure, an example is Matthew McGrath's Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory, although note that he uses "angle brackets"--< and > rather than quotation marks.

Could you answer the questions and address the points I brought up now please?

Then that's not the t-sentence. It's something else. Many have dreamed of replacing correspondence with the t-sentence. Hasn't been accomplished though.


What are the angle brackets supposed to mean?

If that's not the t sentence to you, then how is what I wrote the t sentence, since the t sentence doesn't normally have "(is true)" in parentheses in the middle, does it?

The brackets are just an alternate symbol for setting off the proposition. You could use any symbol.

What, on your view, are we replacing with the t sentence if we replace correspondence with it? (Which is another way of asking you just what you take to be correspondence theory)

I think the SEP description covers the appropriate bases. The t-sentence doesn't have anything to do with propositions...

The t-sentence doesn't have anything to do with propositions... — Mongrel

Wow. So "P" in the t sentence isn't a proposition in your opinion?

Dude. That's why it's called the t-sentence rule.

So "P" in the t sentence isn't a proposition in your opinion? — Terrapin Station

My understanding is that it is a sentence, not a proposition; which is presumably why this is called the semantic theory of truth, and is not simply (or non-controversially) categorized under either correspondence or deflationary theories.

Yet what else could make a statement justified if not that it is true in virtue of a truthmaker? — darthbarracuda

Given the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief, there is evidently a distinction between justification and truth; otherwise, one or the other would be redundant. Justification is what warrants someone holding a belief, while truth is what makes that belief count as knowledge. We can be justified in holding a belief even when unaware of its truthmaker(s). We can also be justified (but mistaken) in holding a belief that is not true, and thus has no truthmaker.

So Correspondence says that truth is independent of knowledge, right? So how is the ontology of unstated statements handled? Or is it?

Dude. That's why it's called the t-sentence rule — Mongrel

Right. So propositions don't have anything to do with sentences in your view?

Is the t-sentence about questions and commands and so on, would you say?

My understanding is that it is a sentence, not a proposition; which is presumably why this is called the semantic theory of truth, — aletheist

Haha--okay, and what would you say the received view is on what propositions are?

So Correspondence says that truth is independent of knowledge, right? — Mongrel

Oy vey. Are you guys learning philosophy off the back of cereal boxes or what?

I am not sure that it makes any sense to talk about "unstated statements." However, a declarative statement expresses a proposition, and a true proposition represents an objective fact, regardless of whether anyone ever expresses that proposition as a declarative statement. Is that what you have in mind?

I'm used to Scott Soames' terminology. Propositions are expressed by uttered sentences. "Proposition" and "statement" mean the same thing.

A truthmaker is an entity which makes utterances true (or sentences, if you like).

A justification is a reason to believe.

Justification has precious little to do with truth, on my view. Sure, insofar that we want to know we want to believe what is true. But justification has to do with belief and persuasion more than truth.

EDIT: By 'entity' I mostly mean to denote individuated existence -- events, objects, persons would all qualify.

I have in mind the idea that different statements--in different languages, even--can express the same proposition. I can even express a proposition without using words at all--e.g., holding out a gift-wrapped box is not a statement, but it can indicate (in a certain context) that I am giving you a present.

Justification has precious little to do with truth, on my view. Sure, insofar that we want to know we want to believe what is true. But justification has to do with belief and persuasion more than truth. — Moliere

Yes. Looking at the question with Redundancy goggles on, the question: "By virtue of what is P true?" doesn't make a lot of sense. Redundancy says that there is no more to truth than a certain attitude on the part of a speaker... an attitude that makes the speaker an asserter.

What gives a speaker that little extra oomph such that we call him an asserter? Justification?

Eh.. anyway. The way you have framed the issue makes it sound like you accept Correspondence theory. Is this the case?

I have in mind the idea that different statements--in different languages, even--can express the same proposition. I can even express a proposition without using words at all--e.g., holding out a gift-wrapped box is not a statement, but it can indicate (in a certain context) that I am giving you a present. — aletheist

You're sounding like Austin, but he didn't use "proposition." I don't hold that there's one way the words should be used. But no worthwhile discussion can be had where there is no agreement about how to use the words.

The SEP mentions several candidates for how we might understand truthmaker. This one is cool:

(Entailment-T)
a truth-maker is a thing the very existence of which entails that something is true.
So x is a truth-maker for a truth p iff x exists and another representation that says x exists entails the representation that p. It is an attraction of this principle that the key notion it deploys, namely entailment, is ubiquitous, unavoidable and enjoys a rich life outside philosophy—both in ordinary life and in scientific and mathematical practice. — SEP article on truthmakers

The challenge to entailment is confusing and involves necessity. It might take me a while to get to the bottom of it. Anybody who already understands it... help would be appreciated.

Eh.. anyway. The way you have framed the issue makes it sound like you accept Correspondence theory. Is this the case? — Mongrel

It's more or less how I think about truth, yes.

But I think I've mentioned elsewhere I find most of the stuff I've read on truth confusing. So I just default to the theory that at least makes sense to me. It does, at least, seem to encapsulate what truth means, at least, if not what truth is.

Interestingly, the SEP article on truthmakers starts with an image of clapping hands to convey how truthmakers and truth-bearers relate... each one is a hand and it takes both of them to get the clapping. What I notice is that entering into the topic of Correspondence is like entering a self-contained world where every bit implies other bits. Once you take that first step into accepting representation, the skeleton of the whole theory is there as if innate. It's just waiting for the flesh to be stuck on in the form of specific truth-bearers being chosen and specific ideas about truthmakers.

That's why the alternate viewpoint has the character of a giant step out of the representational scheme.

That makes a good deal of sense to me.

Heh. I'm even anti-representaitonal in my thinking on knowledge, it's just that all the alternatives I've read on truth are either 1) obviously not what truth means (coherency, pragmatic), 2) flabbergasting (anything somewhat related to deflationary approaches)

Then there's this other side to me that wonders about other uses of "truth" which don't seem to be addressed by any of the theories. Not that these would be what truth is, per se, but then what is it people mean by "truth" if they are not meaning truth?

So I can see the motivation for wanting another theory of truth aside from correspondence. I just haven't found that bridge into the topic which makes it easy for me to make heads or tails of.