Questions Re: Sartre's Conception of Human Consciousness

charles ferraro

Human consciousness has a non-positional consciousness of itself whenever and while it is having a positional consciousness of a transcendent object other than itself.

Does human consciousness have a non-positional consciousness of itself whenever and while it is having a positional consciousness of itself as a transcendent object?

Does human consciousness have, simultaneously, both a positional (objective) and non-positional (subjective) consciousness of itself?

Do human beings have one kind, or two kinds, of consciousness?

In The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre wrote:
“… the existence of consciousness is an absolute because consciousness is consciousness of itself. This is to say that the type of existence of consciousness is to be consciousness of itself. And consciousness is aware of itself in so far as it is consciousness of a transcendent object. All is therefore clear and lucid in consciousness: the object with its characteristic opacity is before consciousness, but consciousness is purely and simply consciousness of being consciousness of that object. This is the law of its existence.
We should add that this consciousness of consciousness – except in the case of reflective consciousness which we shall dwell on later – is not positional, which is to say that consciousness is not for itself its own object. Its object is by nature outside of it, and that is why consciousness posits and grasps the object in the same act. Consciousness knows itself only as absolute inwardness. We shall call such a consciousness: consciousness in the first degree, or unreflected consciousness.”

Question:
If, as Sartre claims, “(unreflected) consciousness knows itself only as absolute inwardness,” then how is it even possible for unreflected consciousness to become reflected consciousness? How is it possible for unreflected consciousness to posit or intend itself as transcendent object? And even if unreflected consciousness were able to posit or intend itself as transcendent object, by doing so, wouldn’t unreflected consciousness be violating “the law of its existence”?

Self-consciousness, or consciousness in the first degree, is non-objective and authentic because it is consciousness of the subject as subject, whereas consciousness of self, or consciousness in the second degree, is objective and inauthentic because it is consciousness of the subject as object.

Isn’t consciousness of the subject as object (consciousness in the second degree) inauthentic because it transforms and distorts consciousness of the subject as subject (consciousness in the first degree) into that which it is not; viz., an ego object?

Any opinions appreciated.

David Mo

Isn’t consciousness of the subject as object (consciousness in the second degree) inauthentic because it transforms and distorts consciousness of the subject as subject (consciousness in the first degree) into that which it is not; viz., an ego object? — charles ferraro

Sartre: The subject cannot be conscious of himself as an object, because he is no such thing. The subject is freedom. One is only an object for another. To conceive of oneself as an object is a false consciousness, that is, bad faith.

In addition, the consciousness of the subject (self-consciousness) is always irreflexive and empty.

I say this based on L'Être et le Néant. I read La Transcendence de l'Ego a long time ago and I remember almost nothing about it.

charles ferraro

David thanks for your comments.

I have no objections to what you are saying. In fact, I agree with you (and Sartre) completely that self-consciousness, or consciousness in the first degree, is always non-positional and irreflexive. It comprises the starting point of all explanation.

But, what then is consciousness in the second degree, or reflected consciousness? How is consciousness in the second degree even possible, how does it come about in the first place, since, it seems to me, the primordial starting point of any explanation must be consciousness in the first degree?

Doesn't any explanation for the existence of reflected consciousness, which Sartre claims does exist, presuppose irreflexive, non-positional consciousness somehow objectifying itself?

David Mo

Doesn't any explanation for the existence of reflected consciousness, which Sartre claims does exist, presuppose irreflexive, non-positional consciousness somehow objectifying itself? — charles ferraro

Sartre addresses the problem especially in L'être et le néant, Part II, Chapter II, Section III. For me, it is one of the most difficult to understand. In any case, he states categorically that the attempt to objectify conscience, that is, to make it an object for reflection, is a failure. From what I understand, because it tries to fix something that is elusive. The example of the Cartesian cogito can clarify this: Descartes claims that he captures by intuition the Ego as a being that doubts. But Sartre argues that the act of doubting implies a temporality: I doubt what was given to me before and can be given in the future. However, temporality cannot be captured intuitively. So Descartes has only captured the present moment of thought, which in itself is nothing substantial. Therefore, any attempt to demonstrate the thinking substance through a merely intentional and timeless act of the intuition of the Self will inevitably fail.

The argument seems to me ingenious.

charles ferraro

↪David Mo

David, nice to read someone's opinions that have substance to them! What do you think of the following?

A person’s pre-reflective consciousness, when and while it is totally absorbed in what it is intending, completely negates/nihilates (a) that person’s awareness of self and (b) that person’s awareness of the passage of time. There is a non-positional (nihilating) awareness of self, accompanied by a non-positional (nihilating) awareness of time.

However, it is always only one’s reflective, not pre-reflective, consciousness that is retroactively aware of this situation.

So, then, is a person’s awareness of self, the “I,” the Ego, and the person’s awareness of the passage of time (temporality) grounded in the pre-reflective or the reflected consciousness?

Is it Sartre’s position that a person’s consciousness in the first degree (pre-reflective consciousness) is essentially ego-less and timeless?

Is it also Sartre’s position that a person’s consciousness in the second degree (reflective, or reflected consciousness) is essentially and retroactively productive of the awareness of the ego and of time?

And, agreeing with, but restating what you wrote from my frame-of-reference, isn’t it Sartre’s contention that Descartes’ COGITO SUM is basically operating on the reflected level, rather than on the more primordial, pre-reflected level?

And, is it for this reason that what Descartes’ COGITO SUM asserts is always “after-the-fact” and confusing the results applicable to one level of consciousness with those applicable to another?

Gregory

What an interesting thread.

So Sartre wouldn't be Kantian, otherwise he would agree with Descartes. Time holds us, but I don't know if Sartre is saying "the way is in" or the way is without (i.e. the world)

charles ferraro

↪Gregory

Gregory, thanks for your positive comment!

Unfortunately, I do not fully understand your thoughts.

However, I will make the following observations.

Sartre, unlike Kant, is not concerned with determining the epistemological conditions that make experience possible. He is concerned, instead, with describing accurately human experience as it actually appears to us.

Kant, like Descartes, assumed that the "I think" must accompany all conscious experience as a pre-condition; but, as with Descartes', this was an erroneous position.

Sartre described something called pre-reflective consciousness which, instead, was a non-positional self-consciousness unaccompanied by the "I, the Ego, or the "I Think."

Gregory

Hi Charles! David had said Descartes was rejected by Sarte because doubt implies temporally and we can't intuit time. So Sartre throws Kant in with Descartes, and throws them out. Remember to read Sartre with Heidegger in mind, although Heidegger said Sartre misunderstood him a bit. Being is ozzy for Sartre, a combination of transcendentals for Heidegger.

It's conversations like this that gives me inspiration

David Mo

Heidegger said Sartre misunderstood him a bit. — Gregory

Heidegger's first reaction to Being and Nothingness was that Sartre was the philosopher who have understood his theory the most. After that, he possibly read the parts where Sartre criticized him and concluded that Sartre had not understood anything. Since he himself recognized that the concept of Being was not clear in his work, and Being is the center of his theory, it is not strange that Sartre did not understand anything. Neither did I.

David Mo

So, then, is a person’s awareness of self, the “I,” the Ego, and the person’s awareness of the passage of time (temporality) grounded in the pre-reflective or the reflected consciousness?

Is it Sartre’s position that a person’s consciousness in the first degree (pre-reflective consciousness) is essentially ego-less and timeless?

Is it also Sartre’s position that a person’s consciousness in the second degree (reflective, or reflected consciousness) is essentially and retroactively productive of the awareness of the ego and of time? — charles ferraro

I find also that this discussion is highly productive.

In respect your first battery of questions my answer is hesitant. I need to read again Sartre's texts about the Ego and temporality (in special the three ek-stases).

I am not sure if there is a consciousness of time pre-reflexive and that happens in the development of the personal project. What is reflexive is the concept of doubt.

And, is it for this reason that what Descartes’ COGITO SUM asserts is always “after-the-fact” and confusing the results applicable to one level of consciousness with those applicable to another? — charles ferraro

Yes, I think this is the criticism. In Sartre's words, it is confusing the original temporality with the psychical temporality.

Gregory

Sartre said solipsism is refuted every time we feel shame

Gregory

What is more fundamental for Sartre and Heidegger , knowing our transcendental consciousness or the transcendental universe!? I've only read the latter a little. Fun thread

David Mo

What is more fundamental for Sartre and Heidegger , knowing our transcendental consciousness or the transcendental universe!? — Gregory

Sartre: Consciousness, that is to say, the project of pour-soi.
Heidegger: Being, which is something like God with a different name. In my opinion.

I am not sure, but I think that transcendental has different meanings or nuances in each of them.

Sartre said solipsism is refuted every time we feel shame — Gregory

The presence of the Other is immediate. Shame is a universal response to this presence-look. The same for the world (thing in-itself). It makes itself immediately present to consciousness. Therefore, solipsism is an artificial construct that contradicts the phenomenological analysis of existence.

David Mo

I am not sure if there is a consciousness of time pre-reflexive and that happens in the development of the personal project. What is reflexive is the concept of doubt. — David Mo

I rectify: what is present to the pre-reflexive consciousness is temporality, not time. The past and the future are two aspects of being-for-itself. Past is the determinations from which I free. Future is the possibility towards I project. Everything in the very act of existence. But this is not an objective time, but a lived temporality.

charles ferraro

↪David Mo

David, with respect to the question of the dependency relationship between non-reflective and reflective consciousness, I find the following comments by Sartre in "Being and Nothingness" quite illuminating; especially the last three sentences.

" … at the moment when these cigarettes are revealed to me as a dozen, I have a non-thetic consciousness of my adding activity. If anyone questions me, indeed, if anyone should ask, "What are you doing there?" I should reply at once, "I am counting." This reply aims not only at the instantaneous consciousness which I can achieve by reflection but at those fleeting consciousnesses which have passed without being reflected on, those which are forever not reflected on in my immediate past. Thus reflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected on. It is not reflection which reveals the consciousness reflected on to itself. Quite the contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito."

But the following questions then arise:

With respect to human beings, does a non-reflective consciousness always require that a reflective consciousness accompany it?

How about with respect to non-human beings? Do they also have both kinds of consciousness, or just one? If only one, which one?

David Mo

With respect to human beings, does a non-reflective consciousness always require that a reflective consciousness accompany it? — charles ferraro

No. Pre-reflective consciousness is the "natural" state of human beings.

How about with respect to non-human beings? — charles ferraro

Sartre's work is an anthropology. It's difficult to extrapolate it to animals. I don't know any part of his work that's dedicated to that.

Valentinus

↪charles ferraro

The "inwardness" element gets treated in different ways in Transcendence of the Ego.
One pivot point is Sartre emphasizing that Kant said the "I" could be attached to any experience but was not always done.
The phenomena of being an "I" is not given as a such but is collected after making a basket to hold what is found.

charles ferraro

↪Valentinus

Sartre's central contention is that, from a phenomenological point-of-view, the transcendental "I" is not (to use Kantian terms) a necessary and strictly universal condition for the possibility of the existence of the unreflected consciousness.

The unreflected consciousness, or consciousness in the first degree, is essentially a non-positional self-consciousness; i.e., a consciousness of the subject as a subject.

There are no Kantian transcendental conditions required for the unreflected consciousness to exist
phenomenologically.

The reflected consciousness, or consciousness in the second degree, is essentially a positional consciousness of self; a consciousness of the subject as object (the I of psychology).

Valentinus

The reflected consciousness, or consciousness in the second degree, is essentially a positional consciousness of self; a consciousness of the subject as object (the I of psychology). — charles ferraro

That is a reasonable conclusion to Sartre's reference to Kant. For me, it misses a certain quality of a phenomenal observation of the sort Descartes saw himself doing. That the "reflection" could happen at any time is something to notice before outlining what consciousness is. Sartre's observation does not negate the immediacy of self awareness as depicted by Descartes; it places the experience in a particular context.

charles ferraro

↪Valentinus

Obviously, Descartes' "Cogito Sum" (the "reflection") can happen any time I wish to perform it (the "certain quality"). Non-positional self-consciousness does not depend on my performing it for it to exist. When and while I am having a positional consciousness of (intending) a transcendent object (which I am usually doing spontaneously), I am simultaneously having a spontaneous non-positional self-consciousness, but I am not "having" a "Cogito Sum." The latter is not a spontaneous activity, but a deliberate performance.

Thus, noticing the "certain quality" you refer to in no way automatically nullifies Sartre's unique insight that the Cogito Sum is an immediate, but second order, reflection (performance) the existence of which depends on a more primordial, first order, non-positional self-consciousness. THIS is the context in which Sartre places Descartes' Cogito Sum.

Questions Re: Sartre's Conception of Human Consciousness

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