Thinking about things

Daniel C

Having stumbled over the title of one of one of Foucault's books, "The Order of Things", I couldn't stop thinking about "things" in general. This developed into a struggle in my attempts to make sense of the nature of "things". Perhaps a good point of departure will be to ask what it is that I want to know about "things". It seems to me that my question tends to be conceptual in an ontological way because in asking about the nature of things I'm asking what it is which makes something being called / denoted as a "thing" in distinction of "things" not being typified / classified / viewed as "things". In other words we should be able to distinguish "things" from "non-things" in terms of acceptable semantics. So a first question can be if it is neccessary for something to be / to exist in order to be viewed as a "thing"? If we answer affirmatively we will have to bear in mind that there are fictitous "things": we all agree that they belong to the world of fiction and thus are not "real", but that being the case is not a cause for them to lose their status of being "things"! If that is the case, for "things" to be "things" one thing for them to be what they are - whatever that may be - is that it is not a prerequisite for them to exist in order to be "things". The result is that for "things" to be "things" they are or go beyond the problem of "to be or not to be" - this principle is simply not applicable in their case - they can be things without the need of having "to be". If what I've stated about "things" up to this point is true, don't you agree that "things", in being "things" are extaordinary things? And then, of course, the next question obviously arrives: what type of "things" are "non-things"? Hope that there is someone out there hoping to answer this.

Echarmion

So a first question can be if it is neccessary for something to be / to exist in order to be viewed as a "thing"? If we answer affirmatively we will have to bear in mind that there are fictitous "things": we all agree that they belong to the world of fiction and thus are not "real", but that being the case is not a cause for them to lose their status of being "things"! — Daniel C

But fictious things do exist in the form of ideas about things. Dragons don't exist (so far as we know), but we all now the fictious characteristics of a dragon. So if it were to exist, it'd be a specific thing.

Is the dragon in my head a thing? Or is it just a thought about a thing?

Daniel C

If that is the case, that fictitious things exist in the form of ideas about things, then it can be asked why it is that these ideas are not "things"? Example: a psychologist listens to the "ideas" of green dragons his patient is experiencing. In exasperation he says: "we must help you to get rid of all these funny "things" happening inside your head". Isn't it perhaps a matter of being able to distinguish between different types of things? And that therefore, an idea is a type of thing?

A Seagull

it is neccessary for something to be / to exist in order to be viewed as a "thing"? — Daniel C

Things are viewed as a 'thing' first and then the existence of the 'thing' is subsequently inferred.

Daniel C

Seagull, thank you, quite a brilliant move you are making here! You seem to be attempting to turn Sartre on his head: we are before we are anything - existence precedes essence. You know, Sartre remains one of my heroes in philosophy - like my old time heroes in western movies, actors like John Wayne, Clint Eastwood, Charles Bronson et al. Sartre may be gone, but never ever forgotten. Or, perhaps, you are excluding human subjects in your reference to things. If that is the case, we have one "thing" which is not a "thing": the human subject. But, if this is true, it implies that "things" are in a way that put them beyond the grasp of logical laws? I refer here specifically to the law of non-contradiction, unless we admit that there are different types of things. But in that case we will need a classification system for "things". If you agree, do you have any ideas on how to approach such a system? Or is such a system perhaps slightly beyond us - implying that our "cognitive closure" is rising on the horizon, or maybe not yet?

Antidote

we are before we are anything - existence precedes essence — Daniel C

In the mothers womb, there is "no thing" but your self. Existence, but without essence. So I agree, the order is most certainly in the order. Darkness was, then light appeared (no thing, then some-thing). Chaos was, Order appeared (no definable thing, then definable thing), etc.

All "things" are reported to you by your senses. Under sense deprivation, it becomes very hard, if not impossible to define anything in the "outside" world, hence leading some philosophers to suppose whether or not there is anything "out there" at all. Such is perception.

Daniel C

Thank you Antidote. On your first point: I have to agree with Heidegger that our arrival in this world is one of being "thrown" into existence - without being given the option of non-arrival. Your second point: the empirical element must always be borne in mind when we think of how we acquire knowledge. But, on the other hand, the important role of rationalism in this process can never be ignored - Descartes' "res cogitans" is just too strong for that!
I get the impression that you are suggesting that "things" should be restricted to include only (concrete?) objects known by means of empirical perception. Is that what you are in fact suggesting or am I getting you wrong on this point?

Possibility

↪Daniel C

It seems to me that our perception of ‘things’ depends on which level of awareness we are referring to.

There are three-dimensional things or objects, which are ‘known’ by means of the senses, and defined in relation to variable two-dimensional information. There are also four-dimensional things or events, which are perceived by a subject, and verifiable in relation to variable three-dimensional information. And there are five-dimensional things or experiences, which are valued by a being, and corroborated in relation to variable four-dimensional events. And finally there are six-dimensional things or possibilities, which are attributed meaning by thought, and matter in relation to variable experiences.

Green dragons, for instance, are possibilities, given meaning by thought and valued by a being, who is in a position to perceive their potential relation to three dimensional information and intentionally ‘create’ a green dragon as a valuable experience (cinematic effect), a perceivable event (literary effect) or ‘sensible’ object (visual effect) - even though we know that green dragons aren’t ‘real’...

Pfhorrest

Maybe, instead of thinking about things, you could try thinking about stuff for a change?

After all, this thread is really all about mereology: the study of things and stuff.

SophistiCat

↪Daniel C

In the broadest sense, a "thing" can be any subject of a sentence, anything to which we refer. The more specific senses depend on the context of the discussion. Sometimes we may be talking about all tangible, bounded things; sometimes - objects of some value (she has many nice things), etc. There is no deeper, truer meaning to thingness than this - same as with any word, really. The general context defines the rules of the game, if we do not set them out explicitly.

bongo fury

any subject of a sentence, anything to which we refer. — SophistiCat

Trouble is, a unicorn can be the first but not the second.

SophistiCat

Trouble is, a unicorn can be the first but not the second. — bongo fury

I had the same syntactic sense in mind in both cases. We can refer to unicorns in thought and in speech.

bongo fury

We can refer to unicorns in thought and in speech. — SophistiCat

By "unicorns" do you perhaps mean unicorn-stories, or unicorn-pictures? Or something more psychological such as unicorn-ideas or unicorn-thoughts? Or something even more exotic?

Or is your notion of reference itself exotic? Can you point at something which isn't there? (Any more than riding or stroking it?) Does reference never fail?

Either way, if so, why claim to be retreating to syntax?

I had the same syntactic sense in mind in both cases. — SophistiCat

Please advise?

SophistiCat

Either way, if so, why claim to be retreating to syntax? — bongo fury

I am deliberately "retreating to syntax," because that is the most basic function of things: as (grammatical) subjects. We can talk about "such things as unicorns." What, if anything, we mean by such talk is a secondary question, and the answer to that question will vary from case to case.

bongo fury

We can talk about "such things as unicorns." What, if anything, we mean by such talk is a secondary question, — SophistiCat

To be fair, "such things as unicorns" usually expresses impatience to clarify exactly what, if anything, can possibly be referred to, given that meaning of some sort is happening.

Retreat here is against the rules defined by context. :wink:

But you basically agree with me about the trouble.

Daniel C

Pfhorrest, "stuff" is too materialistic to limit things to that. But, then, the material can, of course, never be excluded. SohistiCat and bongo fury: too much syntaxis: once you get stuck into this there's no chance of escape - the ways and means of the analytical school must be applied more prudently. Possibilty, you've really impressed me with your approach. I like your idea of viewing "things" in terms of "dimensions". It seems to me that what you are doing, is to provide us with a model of reality. (With a "model" I mean a representation of reality, and not reality itself - yes, Kant's old "noumenon".) The way in which you describe your "dimensions" shows a clear interdependence between the "dimensions" and reminds me very much of Buddhism's "interdependent origination" of all things. Therefore, we can perhaps add a seventh "dimension" to your scheme of "things" and call it "interrelatedness".

jjAmEs

↪Daniel C

Responding to your OP, I'd just recommend not taking words too seriously. I mean don't assume that they correspond to essences or concepts in some context-independent way. The same word means a million different things in a million different contexts. The whole game of 'what is real' and 'should we include unicorns' is a dead end. English is not like math. Sometimes the question itself is the mistake. What the question forgets to question is where the ~~answer~~ abandonment of the question hides. It's the unquestioned framework that makes the question possible that I'm talking about --a certain vision of language that philosophy questions from but forgets to check for its soundness.

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