The empirical is a symbolic representation of the spiritual. — John
So the universal (the spirit) is prior to the particular (empirical nature), but it does not follow that the universal exists prior to the particular. — John
Thus universality is ultimately prior and foundational to particularity. Particularity emerges from universality as various combinations and configurations of universals. — darthbarracuda
The general and the particular can only exist in relation to each other. And then that definite relation can only exist in relation to yet a third thing which is the same relation at its other limit - a state of maximal vagueness, a state where it can't meaningfully be said whether there is the general or the particular. — apokrisis
What does Aquinas say is a universal, then? While a nature does not exist as a universal, the nature can be considered as a universal insofar as the individual act of a mind relates that mind to many things. As Aquinas puts it, universality is an accident of an intelligible nature which accrues to it insofar as it exists in the intellect and thus relates the intellect to many things existing in reality.
Aquinas’s view is perhaps best framed in terms of what historians of philosophy call the “inherence theory of predication.” A proposition is true, on this account, if the predicate term signifies a nature or form which inheres in what is named by the subject term. “Socrates is white” is true if and only if the form of whiteness inheres in Socrates. “Socrates is a man” is true if and only if Socrates is characterized by the nature humanity. Obviously this view is linked to a metaphysical account of things as caused to be what they are by virtue of their forms; and it is linked, as well, to an account of cognition according to which I understand things insofar as they are characterized by these intelligible forms. Indeed, this is why it leads to the semantic account, as my words are only meaningful insofar as they signify the concepts in my mind, which concepts are caused by, and so represent by means of their formal similarity to, the forms of things.
Words signify forms—this is the heart of Aquinas’s “realism.” It is not that these signified forms are universals or have any universal existence; they exist only as the individual acts of being characterizing individual things. (And, as we will see, even the sense in which they “exist” in individuals can admit of great qualification.) But as the individual forms of individual things, they have a potential intelligibility which can be abstracted by the mind; abstracting this potential intelligibility—making it actually understood by the mind—is the formation of the concept.
Notice, however, that even if it does not entail that universals exist, the inherence theory of predication does seem to entail a rather highly populated universe of discourse, if not perhaps a highly populated ontology. For this view requires, in addition to all the beings about which I can form true propositions, a whole new set of beings, namely, the natures or forms, which verify any true proposition about those beings. For Ockham, this proliferation of objects was the ground for grave objection. In Ockham’s judgment, it is at best a meaningless play of language, and at worst an irresponsible complication of our theorizing, to insist that “the column is to the right by to-the-rightness, God is creating by creation, is good by goodness, just by justice, mighty by might, an accident inheres by inherence, a subject is subjected by subjection, the apt is apt by aptitude, a chimaera is nothing by nothingness, a blind person is blind by blindness, a body is mobile by mobility, and so on for other, innumerable cases.” Why should we “multiply beings according to the multiplicity of terms”? This is, for Ockham, “the root of many errors in philosophy: to want it to be such that, to a distinct word there always correspond a distinct significate, so that there is as much distinction between the things signified as between the nouns or words that signify.”
If Ockham’s primary motivation was to articulate an alternative to this proliferation of beings, he saw that he could do this very efficiently with some incisive logical or semantic innovation. Instead of having common terms signifying forms or natures of things, Ockham insisted that they signify the things themselves. “Man” does not signify the humanity of individual human beings; it signifies the individual human beings themselves. In other words, “man” is not predicated of men on account of their having humanity; rather, it is predicated of men just because “man” is a name for men. Ockham thus replaced the inherence theory of predication with an alternative version, sometimes called the two-name theory, or the identity theory. “Socrates is a man” is true if “Socrates” and “man” can name the same thing, if Socrates is among the things—individual human beings—that “man” can signify.
In effecting this revision of the semantics of terms, Ockham eliminated the need for even talking about natures or forms. This is the crux of Ockham’s nominalism, which while it cannot be adequately described as a denial of the existence of universals, can be described as a denial of the existence of forms or natures.
Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality.
I think the nub of the issue is this: Buddhists are always saying, don't try and conceive of 'the ultimate'. As soon as you try and conceive of it, say what it is or isn't, then you're entangling yourself in the domain of relative/verbal/conventional descriptions, 'mistaking the finger for the moon'. The point of Buddhist praxis is always practical: you have to realise the nature of the ultimate, which is indeed ineffable from the viewpoint of conventional philosophy. (cf Wittgenstein 'that of which we cannot speak...'.) So I think that this resistance to the consideration of metaphysical propositions such as universals is consistent with that. Dharmakirti's attidude is: 'so you say there are "universals"? Where is one? Show it to me! What difference does it make!' That is the characteristic pragmatist attitude of Buddhism to not reifying abstracta.
So I think I understand why Buddhism doesn't deal with universals and the like - they're all part of what amounts to speculative metaphysics.
But my interest in universals actually came out of my debates on Philosophy forums, about Western philosophy in particular. In that context the question has a different meaning. There, the eclipse of Platonism and the rise of nominalism is one of the principle factors underlying the origins of scientific materialism. So there's no grasp of an ineffable light at the end of the tunnel - neither any moon nor finger pointing to it - but simply the endless accumulation of empirical facts against the background of an intrinsically meaningless physicalism. In this context, the question has a different import.
Yet if I remember correctly Peirce included second-ness and third-ness. So first-ness would be vagueness (which is a vague term itself - a placeholder for what is impossible to predicate?), second-ness would be universality and third-ness would be the "crisp" particularity. A crude image would be gas-liquid-solid. — darthbarracuda
Universality comes before particularity simply because we particulars cannot exist without universals, i.e. constraints and repetition. The very class of particulars is a universal. So indeed you are correct that we never come across universals "by themselves", but this is well-accepted as the instantiation relation objects have with their properties. — darthbarracuda
What is the difference between existing and sort-of existing? — darthbarracuda
Does this mean that whatever exists depends upon an expression of universals? — darthbarracuda
here are many things that are real that you can't 'have an enounter with'- like the Gross National Product, the inflation rate, and the probability of the Mets winning the World Series. — Wayfarer
In my view, insofar as those things are real (again, read "extramental"), you can have an encounter with them. — Terrapin Station
but there are many things that are real that you can't 'have an enounter with'- like the Gross National Product, the inflation rate, and the probability of the Mets winning the World Series. Some are abstract but have real consequences, others are 'real possibilities'. — Wayfarer
Although we can then also tighten the definition of real when it comes to the symbolic or semiotic as it is not just about something as detached or dualistic as "an idea". A sign must be related to the material world for it to be actually a causal entity. Symbols must be grounded. Entropy must be expended, in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, the mother of all causality. — apokrisis
Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
You're imbuing thermodynamics with the status of divine will, as always. — Wayfarer
Likewise laws and principles are causal in the sense that the provide the matrices of possibility along which things tend to unfold, but they are not causal in the sense that efficient or material causes are. So your description of what is real being 'entities with causal potency' is still physicalist. — Wayfarer
The point about scholastic realism (i.e. acceptance of universals) is that it provides a connective principle, a telos, which has on the whole been lost to modern thought: — Wayfarer
A gas is vague possibility. Particles are not in interaction. A liquid is a collection of events. Some kind of organisation arises as every particle has some individual interaction with other passing particles. Then a solid is the emergence of a global rigid order that puts every particle into a final entropy-minimising state of organisation. — apokrisis
No, it means that whatever exists is an expression, or instantiation, of universals. — John
I would agree that they are real apart from their instantiations, but I would not agree that they "have Being", because I think 'to be' is coterminous with 'to exist'. Any alternative to this seems incoherent to me. Consider this; a thought, an imagining, or a feeling is real but it does not exist and is not a be-ing. — John
At any rate, we're denying that there's somehow literally one (real) thing that is identically, multiply instantiated in two different entites. — Terrapin Station
And better yet, it is not theistic mumbo-jumbo but testable hypothesis! — apokrisis
If your divine will could show itself more clearly, more consistently, then we might believe in it with more confidence. Until then, let's stick to what we are finding written into the fabric of nature everywhere. — apokrisis
If, however, the Universe expands and contracts through an endlless cycle of big-bang-and-bust, then there's your machine — Wayfarer
Such fine distinctions are always going to be, at least to some degree, terminological issues. — John
... I would not claim such things are not real. I just want to say that they do not "have being" or exist ... — John
Universals are more vague than particulars. — darthbarracuda
Theology doesn't try to be a science, because it's subject matter isn't scientific. — darthbarracuda
Says who exactly?
If you are thinking that universals are ghostly forms or epiphenomenal ideas, then your claim is that they definitely don't exist. So they are not vaguely existent. They are sharply inexistent.
But if you are taking my approach, then universals and particulars are as real (or ideational) as each other. — apokrisis
So they don't both talk about the world and our place in it? What are you on about? — apokrisis
I continue to find this terminological distinction helpful in these kinds of discussions. — aletheist
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.