This seems to touch on the ship of Theseus paradox. What makes it the case that the ship that left is the same ship that returned (if anything)? I'd say that our conceptual/linguistic imposition (we think about and talk about it as being the same ship) is what makes it the same ship. We model it as being the same ship. As TGW says, we simply stipulate ex hypothesi that it's the same ship. That's all the "essence" there is. — Michael

The question of whether an individual in another world is really the same as one in this world (the 'trans-world identity problem') has its roots in a deep conceptual confusion, that other worlds are like distant countries we view with lenses and try to determine correspondence relations between theirs and ours. This is just wrongheaded. Alternate possibilities are just that – alternate ways things could have been. And there's nothing incoherent about the same individual being supposed to be some other way. It's not like there's some other universe you're 'looking into' and seeing a numerically distinct copy of Barack Obama and asking whether that copy is 'the same' as 'ours.' It's not a sci-fi scenario, it's just a way of modeling how we talk about alternate possibilities involving the same individual.

I think it means what it says, — The Great Whatever

That sentence conveys no information whatsoever. Can you explain what it means to you or not?

I don't know, I just don't understand your demand. The idea that I should take a sentence of my native language and provide an elaborate paraphrase for it in other terms strikes me as bizarre, especially since the paraphrases you provide seem to change what the sentence means entirely. When asked what I mean when I say 'Imagine Barack Obama weren't the president...' I certainly don't mean to imagine another person, who is not Barack Obama, i.e. not him, not that very man, but rather someone similar to him and named the same as him, and so on. I could say such a thing, and ask you to imagine such a thing, but presumably then I wouldn't say 'Imagine if B.O. were...' but would rather say something like 'imagine there were a guy similar to B.O. who...' Your desire to conflate the two seems obviously wrong to me, since I can tell the difference between these two sorts of sentences.

It looks like we're at an impasse then. You believe there is a distinction between the two, but are unable to articulate what the distinction is. I see no distinction, and you interpret that as a failure to observe the 'obvious'. There doesn't appear to be any way around that blockage.

Maybe somebody else will come along that can serve as interpreter.

Let me put it this way. If I am obligated to explain to you what a sentence of English means, why are you allowed to say another, longer sentence of English, and not feel obliged to explain that? So suppose I asked you of your elaborate (English) paraphrase, what does that mean? What are you going to say? If you insist you don't need to say anything, why do I need to say anything about the original case?

Also, I find it hard to believe you don't see the difference between supposing that Obama himself were different, and supposing someone like Obama were. Are you serious?

What are you going to say? — The Great Whatever

I suppose we'll find out if it happens. It didn't happen with my interpretation of what 'BO could have spoken Mandarin' means, because you said that my meaning was the wrong one and, in order to know it was the wrong meaning, you must have understood it.

I know it is the wrong meaning only in the sense that there is an obvious difference between 'Barack Obama could have spoken Mandarin' and 'Someone like Barack Obama in the relevant respects could have spoken Mandarin.' Do you not see a difference, or does this misrepresent your position?

It seems to me that you are committed to saying that in supposing things about Barack Obama, we are not supposing things about him, but someone else who is qualitatively like him. But this seems like an untenable position, or it's not clear to me how to make it coherent.

I know it is the wrong meaning only in the sense that there is an obvious difference between 'Barack Obama could have spoken Mandarin' and 'Someone like Barack Obama in the relevant respects could have spoken Mandarin.' Do you not see a difference, or does this misrepresent your position? — The Great Whatever

Actually when I look back on the post sequence I see that the verb in question in the discussion of BO and Mandarin was 'imagine if', not 'could have'. The discussion turned to 'could' when you asked if my position was that nothing 'could' be different from how it is. I muddled the two together in that sentence in the last post. I should have either written about imagining BO speaking Mandarin, or alternatively, whether anything in this world could be different from how it is.

Since I think the 'could' and 'imagine if' qualifiers have different interpretations, and your latest question best matches the 'imagine if' one, let's concentrate on that.

Do I interpret the invocation 'Imagine if Barack Obama spoke Mandarin' as equivalent to
'Imagine if there is someone very like Barack Obama, in this world, who speaks Mandarin.'?
No. I interpret it as 'Imagine a world that is almost identical to this one, including having a USA and a president of that country called BO, who is like the BO in this world in almost every respect except that he can speak fluent Mandarin'.

But that's wrong, because you can say 'Imagine if Barack Obama weren't president,' or 'Imagine if Barack Obama had a different name.' So the meaning you attribute to imagining if Barack Obama is a certain way doesn't work, and at the very least you have to make ad hoc meaning clauses for every use of the name in an if-clause. But it seems the name 'Barack Obama' just means the same thing in each of these cases – it refers to a certian man.

Additionally, you're forced to claim that in imagining if Barack Obama were a certain way, we don't imagine if Barack Obama were a certain way, but some sort of counterpart or duplicate of him in an alternate world. Prima facie this is wrong: to imagine something about Barack Obama is to imagine something about him, the very man we refer to whenever we use the name 'Barack Obama.' Why, in these constructions, would this suddenly change to us referring to someone completely different? Why doesn't the name just refer to who it usually refers to, i.e. Barack Obama?

Why, in these constructions, would this suddenly change to us referring to someone completely different? Why doesn't the name just refer to who it usually refers to, i.e. Barack Obama? — The Great Whatever

Because BO is a process that has a bunch of known properties, one of which is that it doesn't speak Mandarin. Change any one of those known properties, however trivial, and we are talking about a different process (we can talk about alternative unknown properties - such as whether BO will live to 100 - without difficulties, because that is simply a question of what we currently know) . Believers in Aristotelian essences may try to get around that by dividing the properties into essential and non-essential ones. But as I have explained above, I do not accept that approach.

Hence, since one cannot imagine a BO that speaks mandarin (one says one does, but one also says that one laughs one's head off), one does the closest possible thing, which is to imagine a world identical to this in almost every way except that the POTUS differs from our POTUS in only one noticeable way - that he speaks Mandarin.

I understand the position of a Kripkean who is an Essentialist, although I do not share it. But I cannot understand how anybody that is not an Essentialist can subscribe to Kripke's account of language.

Because BO is a process that has a bunch of known properties, one of which is that it doesn't speak Mandarin. Change any one of those known properties, however trivial, and we are talking about a different process (we can talk about alternative unknown properties - such as whether BO will live to 100 - without difficulties, because that is simply a question of what we currently know) . Believers in Aristotelian essences may try to get around that by dividing the properties into essential and non-essential ones. But as I have explained above, I do not accept that approach. — andrewk

What reason is there for this? Why can't we talk about the same person, with alternate properties? Prima facie we do this all the time.

Hence, since one cannot imagine a BO that speaks mandarin (one says one does, but one also says that one laughs one's head off) — andrewk

But this is ridiculous. Clearly we can imagine such a thing, and to say one laughed one's head off is clearly an idiom, whereas the counterfactual language we're speaking of is literal and non-idiomatic.

whereas the counterfactual language we're speaking of is literal and non-idiomatic. — The Great Whatever

I have no problem with taking it as idiomatic. But maybe it is literal if we take what is - for me - the most intuitive interpretation of the verb 'imagine', which is to visualise an alternative world. That world can be very different, as in a fantasy novel, or it can be almost identical to this one except that POTUS speaks Mandarin.

In the case of future contingencies 'imagine' has a subtly different meaning, so let's stick to counterfactuals for now. As I understand it, you think that (counterfactual) 'imagine' does not mean what I said it means to me. But unless you can explain what it means to you, without circularity, I don't think we can make any progress.

It seems to me that, at least in some respects, rigid designators are like signifiers similar to Mill's notion of non-connotative proper names.

If a rigid designator is more or less a signifier of some sort, then any sign, symbol, pattern, behavioural cue, and even combinations of the above could be used as rigid designators. In other words, rigid designators aren't restricted only to proper names. A sentence or paragraph could be used as a rigid designator, or a piece of architecture could be used as a rigid designator, or a unique sort of handshake, for instance.

Now, in all possible worlds the identity of a particular/individual/object remains constant or doesn't change: A = A obtains in all possible worlds and is therefore necessarily true. We can say that that possibility is one of rigidity, i.e. involving no change or involving absolute consistency. That premise has to obtain for the idea of rigid designators to obtain, that is, rigid designators obtain iff rigid identities obtain.

So it seems, then, that rigid designators are just "markers" of some sort that reflect, acknowledge, or represent the law of identity of a particular (which is implicit within Kripke's notion of rigid designators). Persons construct the associations between a marker and the law of identity of a particular. Those associations are constructed by persons and shared in common making them conventional and contingent, and the law of identity of a particular is, obviously, necessarily true.

So I think the notion of rigid designators is equivocating the associations between markers of some sort with the (implicit) law of identity of particulars.

Another idea is that a rigid designator could be just implicitly stating that the law of identity is necessarily true and using particular/objects/etc. to exemplify this idea.

First off, there's no what it means 'to you' or 'to me.' There's something the words mean by convention, and you can't arbitrarily decide what that is. There's something you claim it means, but it remains to be seen whether this is right.

Second, the point is that even if to imagine means to visualize, the point is that if we imagine B.O. being able to speak Mandarin, we imagine him ,viz., Barack Obama, viz. the same guy we always use 'Barack Obama' to refer to, speaking Mandarin, not someone else.

First off, there's no what it means 'to you' or 'to me.' There's something the words mean by convention, and you can't arbitrarily decide what that is. There's something you claim it means, but it remains to be seen whether this is right. — The Great Whatever

For the sake of argument, let's say that wasn't true: that instead words are used as signs/symbols that individuals assign private meanings onto; and that a common or shared meaning by individuals was just a sign/symbol being used conventionally but that involved individuals attempting to match (via guesswork) what everyone is using that particular sign/symbols for.

How would that alter your view (if at all) of rigid designators?

It wouldn't, since the semantic patterns referred to above involving how names versus definite descriptions must be interpreted in modal contexts would stay the same.

It looks like you disagreed with everything I wrote in my post, and I disagree with both paragraphs of your last post.

Do you think we can at least agree that an impasse has been reached?

I don't really believe in impasses except where there's some cognitive difference, and it doesn't look like there is. I think your insistence on impasse is itself part of your philosophical position, rooted in a commitment that it's possible to decide what certain things mean for oneself, or commit to personal worldviews that may be incommensurable in philosophical conversation. Since I disagree with that deeper premise, it's not a game I'm inclined to play.

But of course if you just don't want to go on or don't care, I don't mind.

I have no problem with taking it as idiomatic. But maybe it is literal if we take what is - for me - the most intuitive interpretation of the verb 'imagine', which is to visualise an alternative world. That world can be very different, as in a fantasy novel, or it can be almost identical to this one except that POTUS speaks Mandarin. — andrewk

If I may, one way to think about this is to consider what allows you to speak of two worlds with different Obamas in the first place. Kripke's point is that your very ability to speak of two different Obamas, has, as it's prerequisite, the ability to think of an entity designated Obama of whom 'can speak mandarin' can be predicated of (or not) in the first place. That is, you wouldn't even understand what it means to speak of 'two different Obamas' had you not already had some idea of a 'an Obama' which can be in some way different in two different worlds to begin with. Otherwise it wouldn't be two different Obamas, it would be two different people altogether. You wouldn't be able to speak of 'different Obamas'. This is why a proper name is a rigid designator: it designates the same thing in all possible worlds. Your very ability to speak of 'different Obamas' is parasitic on your ability to think a singularly designated Obama who can be different in the first place.

Or another variation: Who or what is different in the different possible worlds? Obama - the singular.

Does one have to subscribe to an essence-based metaphysics in order to make sense of Kripke's approach to counterfactuals? If so then I suppose that leaves me out. I had to give up in believing in essences decades ago when I realised I just couldn't persuade myself any longer that the small, circular, odourless, tasteless wafer at communion really was the bleeding, crucified body of Christ.

If an essentialist approach is not required, then the question remains: what does it mean to say that a human-like organism in another possible world, that shares many of the properties of the BO of this world, is Barack Obama? Or, more crudely, what is the difference between a BO-like organism in an alternative possible world that is BO, and one that is not? — andrewk

Part of your confusion I think stems from treating this as an 'metaphysical' problem. It isn't. Summerised brutally, Kripke's point about rigid designators can be put like this: to the degree that language works as it does, a thing is called what it is because it is called that. Rigid deisgnators are such because they have nothing to do with the 'properties' of the thing in question; this is why it is referred to as an 'anti-descriptivist theory' of naming: no elaboration of the properties of the thing in question can settle why a thing is named as it is. Rather, it is a matter of language: because language functions in this stupid, tautological manner (in which a thing is called what it is because it is called that), rigid designators mark the same thing in all possible worlds.

Kripke's point is that your very ability to speak of two different Obamas..... — StreetlightX

That's where my disagreement with Kripke begins. I don't think we do, or can, speak literally about different Obamas. There is only one POTUS Obama, and he is not fluent in Mandarin. I believe that when people talk about imagining a counterfactual, they are visualising a world identical to this one except for a few specified differences.

It seems to me that Kripke's approach stems from interpreting phrases like 'Imagine if Obama spoke Mandarin' as meaning something different from what I believe people would say they meant - if they stopped to think about it, which - unless they are interested in philosophy of language - they almost certainly never will. His rigid designator approach is an attempt to solve a problem that he believes exists based on his interpretation of what people mean, and which I believe doesn't exist based on my interpretation.

But who knows whether Kripke or I am right about what people mean? We're all just guessing.

This gives me an idea for a practical research project for a philosophy of language PhD candidate. They could survey people - selected particularly for never having had any exposure to academic philosophy - and ask them a bunch of questions about phrases involving imaginings, both counterfactual and future-contingent - to find out what they feel those phrases mean when they use them. The tricky thing is that the PhD candidate would have to be someone that is not particularly committed to any particular PoL account, otherwise they might unconsciously bias the sampling by the phrasing of the questions.

I did a survey of one (!) with a non-philosophical, but highly intelligent, friend of mine the other day - asking him what he thought it meant if someone said 'Japan could have won the war in the Pacific and colonised Australia'. He said he'd have to think about it and get back to me. I haven't heard back yet.

Rather, it is a matter of language: because language functions in this stupid, tautological manner (in which a thing is called what it is because it is called that), rigid designators mark the same thing in all possible worlds. — StreetlightX

I wrote a post above along those lines -- that rigid designators are akin to signfiers a la Mill's non-connotative proper names, in which they just represent the law of identity of a particular.

The Great Whatever — The Great Whatever

Did you manage to read my other longer post (above) re "So it seems, then, that rigid designators are just "markers" of some sort that reflect, acknowledge, or represent the law of identity of a particular (which is implicit within Kripke's notion of rigid designators)...." ? I'm interested to know your thoughts about it.

That's where my disagreement with Kripke begins. I don't think we do, or can, speak literally about different Obamas. There is only one POTUS Obama, and he is not fluent in Mandarin. I believe that when people talk about imagining a counterfactual, they are visualising a world identical to this one except for a few specified differences. — andrewk

Whether you're speaking literally or figuratively here is irrelevant though. As is the talk of 'visualizing'. It's a question of formal identity conditions. Is the identity of thing qua proper name given by a set of descriptive features? Or are descriptive features irrelevant? Kripke affirms the latter, and then offers a reason why: because we can imagine situations in which every descriptive feature of a thing is replaced, and have the proper name still refer to the thing in question (cf. the thought experiment about Godel and Schmitt, which is alot of fun to read about if you're interested). Kripke makes an argument for this in Naming and Necessity, so it's isn't a case of 'interpreting' willy nilly. What Kripke or the normal person 'means' - or even what they think they mean - is not very relevant to the argument at all. Intentionality has got nothing to do with it.

Whether you're speaking literally or figuratively here is irrelavent though. It's a question of identity conditions. Is the identity of thing qua proper name given by a set of descriptive features? Or are descriptive features irrelevant? Kripke affirms the latter, and then offers a reason why: because we can imagine situations in which every descriptive feature of a thing is replaced, and have the proper name still refer to the thing in question (cf. the thought experiment about Godel and Schmitt, which is alot of fun to read about if you're interested). Kripke makes an argument for this in Naming and Necessity, so it's isn't a case of 'interpreting' willy nilly. What Kripke or the normal person 'means' is not very relevant to the argument at all. Intentionality has got nothing to do with it. — StreetlightX

Do you then think it makes sense to consider a possible world where the Earth is a star rather than a planet? Or where Napoleon was born a horse (to horse parents)?

I don't think that TGW's claim that we can simply stipulate that one thing in a possible world is the same thing as something in the actual world really cuts it.

I wrote a post above along those lines -- that rigid designators are akin to signfiers a la Mill's non-connotative proper names, in which they just represent the law of identity of a particular. — numberjohnny5

The importance of Kripke's intervention though (imo) has to do with the way in which he tackles questions of modality - that is, necessity and contingency with respecting to naming. For Kripke, a name is necessary - but this necessity is itself contingent (upon what he calls a primal baptism). It's no accident that Kripke more or less invented modal logic. It's where all the good stuff is.

Do you then think it makes sense to consider a possible world where the Earth is a star rather than a planet? — Michael

I'm not sure about the relevance of this question - what does this have to do with rigid designation or naming? (honest question, I really don't understand).

You said that a thing's identity (as Barack Obama) is not to be found in its properties but in its "referential peg". So unless this referential peg is some mind-independent thing (to which mind-independent properties attach themselves), then a thing's identity (as Barack Obama) isn't a mind-independent fact.

It seems to be that you're saying that being Barack Obama is simply something we stipulate.

I'm not sure about the relevance of this question - what does this have to do with rigid designation or naming? (honest question, I really don't understand). — StreetlightX

You said (of Kripke's position) that "we can imagine situations in which every descriptive feature of a thing is replaced and have the proper name still refer to the thing in question". So we can imagine a situation in which the Earth is a star and in which Napoleon was born a horse (to horse parents)?

I don't think we can. I think that this is a nonsensical counterfactual. In no possible world is the Earth a star or was Napoleon a horse. There's a limit (even if not a clear one) to which we can change the descriptive features.

Ah. Yeah, I think that follows. Insofar as we both recognize that we're talking about the Earth, even through we've been wrong about what it is this entire time (the terrain is a projection conjured by super-intelligent aliens - with a heat shield to boot!) it's still 'the Earth' we're talking about.