Does language channel our focus in such a way that it affects what we observe even at the level of basic percepts? — Enrique

Yes. Neural priming.

If this is the case, what are the implications for emergence of a worldview? — Enrique

Don’t understand. Can you explain in mire detail?

How much in our beliefs is merely a function of the language we happen to employ? — Enrique

Forget about how much, how would we quantify this? Can we quantify this? I imagine there is some loose way of relating ‘belief’ to ‘language,’ but I guess it would depend exactly on what we were trying to look at.

How radically can experience of reality change with modifications to language use? — Enrique

VERY radically. Obviously this isn’t instant and/or common or we’d have a hard time orientating ourselves.

I don't know. How seriously a given person connects words and concepts is probably highly variable.

I think this is a question which psycholinguistics is set to tackle if you value psychology's opinion. I know studies exist where language has been demonstrated to affect the formation of certain beliefs. Actually, that's kind of what rhetoric is supposed to be about, and that's been knocking around since ancient times.

If it's not personal variance, then it could be domain-related variance, as in a domain of knowledge and the vocabulary orbiting that knowledge. For example, it could be the case that people familiar with Catholic vocabulary are somehow more inclined to see things through a (Trinity-inspired) 3-sided logic.

(And for the record.. I don't see how neural priming phenomena are applicable here.)

Does language channel our focus in such a way that it affects what we observe even at the level of basic percepts? — Enrique

Yes, though it doesn't pay to run too far with that idea (as was the fashion at one time). Still, there's a lot of fun, unexpected things that we have learned about this. See for instance Lera Boroditsky's publications, such as How language shapes thought.

I don't see how neural priming phenomena are applicable here. — Zophie

I don’t see how it could possibly be denied. Everything perceptual experience depends upon what happened before it. It doesn’t take much though to see that IOR (inhibition of return) plays a role in how we perceive the world, and will therefore effect our perception of this. There are numerous instances that clearly show how we can be primed to respond in certain ways through use of language - not that I am suggesting that ‘language’ is or isn’t the same thing as ‘neural priming’.

Gazzaniga is famous for doing many different studies on split-brain patients. His research shows the full extend of how the brain hemispheres act independently and give completely different answers based on the same prompts. The myth of language existing in the left hemisphere is just that. Both hemispheres are capable of reacting to prompts but the both respond differently.

Something very interesting is how the two hemispheres ‘communicated’ in the physical world actions NOT directly. The ‘communication’ was happening ‘outside’ the brain.

These talks are quite interesting if you wish to look:

https://m.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL8AD2B712B1A0578F

I'd like to stay on track. Is it "neural priming" or just "priming"? Because I'm afraid the neural part may be quite fatal. Neuroscience can't examine mental contents, which was the focus of this topic. Apparently we can have things like neural dynamics, neural processing and neural correlates (etc), in addition to attentional priming, semantic priming and relational priming (etc).. but as far as I can tell it would be misleading to imply neurological phenomena fit onto behavioral phenomena with a single term.

If it refers to neurons in an ordinary, biological kind of way then this is also potentially confusing since the neurons are kind of implied, no? The role of neurons in mental contents as opposed to.. not-neurons?

While launching as few tangents as possible, those were my thoughts when I suspected it was inapplicable. I'm also not sure how Gazzaniga's work fits into that but I understand why he's mentioned.

I took this to be a topic about the role of language in belief and on the nature of mental contents, which is a highly speculative thing, but any connection to neural priming, assuming such a thing exists, strikes me as indistinct, if not nakedly conjectural. So.. your persistence is answered but no grouchiness is intended!

I'd like to stay on track. Is it "neural priming" or just "priming"? Because I'm afraid the neural part may be quite fatal. — Zophie

It’s a term used by many cognitive neuroscientists. Priming in sometimes used interchangeably, but generally speaking ‘priming’ refers more to ‘visual priming’ - essentially the same effect has been mapped in neurons in other instances.

Things like NLP are much more sketchy, but they popularity by mashing up psychological effects and attaching them to sparse neurological evidence as if it’s ‘proven’.

In terms of language it undoubtedly effects how we view the world. For instance, Korean infants are taught Korean with a strong emphasis on prepositions, whereas in most other languages parents focus more strongly on nouns. Studies have shown that children from around 2-4 (roughly, cannot remember off the cuff) can solve cognitive puzzles at different speeds due to this - Korean youngster surpassing others in spacial tasks where the others surpass the Korean youngsters in category tasks (admittedly this difference evaporate by the time the children hit about 5-6 yrs old). That said, when shown a quick flash of picture of a fish tank (this is from Gazzaniga lecture) and asked what they saw a European adult will just say ‘a fish tank’ where Asian adults are more likely to give a more detailed description - not conclusive, but there is clearly a different focus of attention when the task is given (something purely linguistic or partly educational, is there a serious difference?)

Neuroscience can't examine mental contents, which was the focus of this topic. — Zophie

Cognitive neuroscience is the hardest science there is that can reveal, in part, what the mechanisms of cognition are - which absolutely involve all aspects of consciousness including language development, perception and how we map the world. Priming is a term used throughout the cognitive neurosciences are there are plenty of studies focused on it because memory is of huge interest to many people for many reasons. Psychology has been revived by technological advances that have given a much deeper insight into brain functioning.

I’m not inclined to go down the dualist route of body and mind as separate entities. You can if you wish, whether you find it to be a useful theoretic distinction or a literal one. For me it’s not massively important when scientific evidence, soft or hard, is useful in offering a perspective that can be substantiated to some objective degree.

No one would deny that visual priming is a thing, and tests have been done that observe what neural pathways are firing when this happens. Neurons are certainly involved in mental processes, that would be an extremely difficult thing to argue against from my position.

It is a very broad and fascinating field.

Thanks for the elaboration. I do appreciate where you're coming from, and I broadly agree. For example, I understand MRI imaging identities regional brain activity even in unconscious patients, which is irrefutably neurological, and that this phenomenon isn't necessarily limited to visual areas. But I can't help but observe the incommensurability of neuroscience and psychology. Isn't it rather annoying?

From a psychosocial angle, which is one I'm more comfortable with, it goes without saying that translating from one language to another throws up weird artifacts of meaning. For example, the Ancient Greek ἀντίστροφος, counterpart, literally means twisted together, which I traced back to originating in ordinary rope. Clearly vocabulary binds fluent speakers to a certain scheme, as your Korean example alludes to.

All I know for sure is that I'm pedantic about language. I'll try to make that as tolerable as possible.

All I know for sure is that I'm pedantic about language. — Zophie

GOOD! :)

What you mention is one major reason I’ve had an interest in Husserl’s work.

Something very interesting is how the two hemispheres ‘communicated’ in the physical world actions NOT directly. The ‘communication’ was happening ‘outside’ the brain. — I like sushi

Can you elaborate some? What relationship might this have if any to theoretical modeling, if that makes sense.

That doesn’t make sense to me, sorry.

If this is the case, what are the implications for emergence of a worldview? — Enrique

I’d still like some clarification at this question please.

Preconceived concepts direct our perception, not language as such. You have a concept of what the thing is that we happen to call a computer, but the word as such is irrelevant. Imagine a child who was not taught any language but was allowed to play around with a computer. It would be restricted to use pictures and not words, but there would still be opportunities for quite advanced computers skills. Of course the child would recognize its toy and that means it would have a concept of it.

On the other hand, imagine someone who saw a computer for the first time, and who had no reference points outside the rainforest, say. He would not make any sense of it, would notice different parts than what is usually considered most relevant for a computer, like its color and smooth surface. If this person formed a concept of it at all, it would only happen if it had a vague resemblance of anything he had already seen. But at no point would the lack of a word for that object be the obstacle and he wouldn’t get our concept of a computer even if he was told what the object was called.

Oh gosh, this just reminded me of a great video involving color.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMqZR3pqMjg

Sorry for YouTube but this illustrates precisely what I mean to say. I can clarify using mythology if you like.

Yeah, it’s also a factor for various other uses such as quantities, time and positions. “Orange” is a VERY recent addition to the English language - basically it came about by people saying ‘that is the colour of an orange’.

I understand the story of "orange" is a whimsical irony.

Just like people.

Also, if you’re in a red room time subjectively slows down, and in a blue room it subjectively speeds up.

I think the only way you can fly that is by involving the circadian rhythm and our liking for a blue sky.

It is what it is. Why it is what it is is another matter entirely. Circadian rhythm seems the most likely cause, and I expect it has something to do with UV receptors that control out circadian rhythms - cannot remember what they’re called ... google? ... ha! No wonder:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrinsically_photosensitive_retinal_ganglion_cells

Bloody mouthful! :D

By worldview I just mean the collection of beliefs, opinions, valuated facts as an individual's general outlook on reality. I was wanting to explore how language links percepts and complex conceptual perspectives in both effective and fallacious ways.

As far as intuitions I have into my own thinking and observations of thought, which is all I really have to go on at this stage, it seems like language assists in differentiating and expanding concepts into richer conceptual frameworks. Verbal explicitness, especially in writing, makes the conceptual structures of thinking so artificially fixed as a definitional framework that constraints and boundaries in one's reasoned associating leap out as glaring, arbitrary and modifiable delimitations. Its like the ideas become a more tangible frame of reference to build upon and remodel. Language allows the content of thought to adopt much more complex architectures, and working out ideas linguistically remakes the mind itself somehow also, but to what extent I'm not sure, and in many contexts this function of language isn't even operative perhaps.

Those are some basic thoughts on the topic, I don't have a mechanistic sense of how any of this occurs neurally or psychologically aside from the observation that facility in making more and better kinds of generalizations seems to be greatly enhanced by critically assessing written language, which I think intersects with Husserl's kind of phenomenological theory as to how intuitive form gets translated into logical form and maybe vice versa as we cognize. With analytical language, its like you can revolutionize your own mind at will, as evinced by the stages of development that some of the most influential academics have displayed in their literature, Freud, Wittgenstein, maybe Heidegger, etc. But similar personal evolutions occur in completely nonlinguistic domains such as visual art, so there's obviously much more going on.

This entire nexus of perception, conception, language, theory, self and logic is kind of mysterious to me.

But at no point would the lack of a word for that object be the obstacle and he wouldn’t get our concept of a computer even if he was told what the object was called. — Congau

I was thinking about that, the concept is adjuncted by language, but the actual thought itself is only fractionally, maybe even negligibly linguistic. Its almost like the conceptual process is more foundational to the mind than the linguistic process, but language happens to most explicitly demonstrate it and maybe motivationally prompt it by some kind of superficial conceptual maneuver.

This entire nexus of perception, conception, language, theory, self and logic is kind of mysterious to me. — Enrique

Yeah! We are certainly intrigued by similar things. Noticed that a while ago.

The terms of art for this topic are Linguistic Relativity and Linguistic Determinism, the latter being a stronger form of the former.

Among the strongest statements of this position are those by Benjamin Lee Whorf and his teacher, Edward Sapir, in the first half of this century—hence the label, 'The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis', for the theory of linguistic relativity and determinism. Whorf proposed: 'We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language' (Whorf, 1940; in Carroll, 1956, pp. 213-4). And, in the words of Sapir: 'Human beings...are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. ...The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group' (Sapir, 1929; in Manlbaum, 1958, p. 162). — Language and Thought

These theses are understandably controversial. There is plenty of evidence indicating that language and thought are intertwined, but identifying causality is not so straightforward. Does thought drive language or the other way around? Or do other factors like ecology drive both thought and language?

Here is one recent review:

The central question in research on linguistic relativity, or the Whorfian hypothesis, is whether people who speak different languages think differently. The recent resurgence of research on this question can be attributed, in part, to new insights about the ways in which language might impact thought. We identify seven categories of hypotheses about the possible effects of language on thought across a wide range of domains, including motion, color, spatial relations, number, and false belief understanding. While we do not find support for the idea that language determines the basic categories of thought or that it overwrites preexisting conceptual distinctions, we do find support for the proposal that language can make some distinctions difficult to avoid, as well as for the proposal that language can augment certain types of thinking. Further, we highlight recent evidence suggesting that language may induce a relatively schematic mode of thinking. Although the literature on linguistic relativity remains contentious, there is growing support for the view that language has a profound effect on thought. — Phillip Wolff and Kevin J. Holmes, Linguistic relativity

However, you will also find both stronger and more skeptical claims, more-or-less supported by research.

Thanks. But aside from quotations, what does this mean?

It will be interesting to see how researchers progressively construct theoretical models and accompanying definitions from the empirical results going forward. I suspect their experimentally derived accounts of "schematic thinking" will eventually allow for some synthesis with the vocabulary of phenomenology.

Maybe the relativity is located deeper than language and culture, but is actually a relativity within the individual self, which might explain the conflicting results, with schematic thinking induced in only some investigative situations. Intentionality of the psyche could be composed of multiple modes or holistic settings, which some casually call "headspaces", and the self might mature as a kind of mode-selection phenomenon, so that while most of even conscious brain processes are not within full intentional control, the self can participate in conditioning or "neural priming" the psyche it resides in, then choose and sustain holistic activation orientations as brain region combos at will in many cases, a capability beneficial for more intensively sociocognitive circumstances.

Could be why education into high functioning rationality is such a nerve-wracking experience: humans have to master impulsive psychical inclinations and also reorg or reject socially adaptive headspaces for analytical purposes, attaining the unnatural self-consistency and noncontradictoriness of intellectual integrity, inspiration for Plato's cave analogy? Maybe this is why philosophers don't make "good" politicians lol

Thanks. But aside from quotations, what does this mean? — Zophie

I am not sure what you are asking. What do the designations mean? You can read the links and follow the references inside, but I think you already know something about this area.

Existing research understandably focuses on fairly modest cognitive functions that can be tested experimentally, such as color discrimination (thanks for the video, by the way); the more ambitious the hypothesis, the more speculative it is likely to be.

Maybe the relativity is located deeper than language and culture, but is actually a relativity within the individual self, which might explain the conflicting results, with schematic thinking induced in only some investigative situations. — Enrique

I don't know much about this, but my take, for what it's worth, is that cognitive activity, including but not limited to abstract thought, is thoroughly entangled with language, so that one should expect some causal entanglement as well. But I have a feeling that in most cases, causal factors going between language and thought are not clearly separable from other causal factors and contingencies. We'll see. When you read about this psychological research, you can't help but admire the ingenuity with which researchers find ways to tease out causal links.

I hope this helps understand the mallicious effect of word.

1. I KNOW LIGHT.
2. Yellow, 3, 4....

In 1, wordlessly, you mean 2.

1 = 2.

With word, 'I know light' - to the follow up question, 'what about light?', is an extension that is like a evil dream. It is complete stupidity, you may as well say 2 instead of 1.

If knowledge is just "point (1) and click (2)", it's a type of transmission and reception.

Search your mind for knowledge, is there a pool of all that you know? Yes but it's ineffable.

'Knowledge' as a pool is non existent, you do wordlessly, or do not control this part.

Knowledge as brain transmission and sense data reception is better.

1. Route memory(initial transmit) to put a lightbulb where one is missing(just the socket). Chances are you'll deviate to saying a word or just silence.
2. Coming over your head, out of your control, is the knowledge, or it has already and you're just ego stupid.

It's the right direction but incomplete, per se, gears and other.

Does language channel our focus in such a way that it affects what we observe even at the level of basic percepts? — Enrique

No way. No how.

Language does channel our focus. That focus has no affect upon what we're observing.

Trees are not at all affected by the fact that we call them "trees". If language channeled our focus in such a way that language affects what we observe then it would certainly affect trees. It doesn't.

The relationship/contrast/comparison between language and concepts is fruitless without also drawing and maintaining the distinction between that which exists in it's entirety prior to our knowledge of it, and that which did not.

Concepts are names of things. What's being named though? What are we picking out of this world to the exclusion of all else? Does it exist in it's entirety prior to our doing so?

These are the important aspects to consider when talking about 'concepts'.

They are nothing more than linguistic constructs. "Truth" the term, is the name. What's being named is the referent. The concept of "truth" consists of and/or includes both.

Correspondence with what's happened and/or is happening requires neither being named "truth" or being further talked about.

The term, the concept, of "truth" requires language. Correspondence does not. It exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it. So, when the term "truth" is used as a name to talk about correspondence, it is referring to that which existed in it's entirety prior to language use itself.

When the term "truth" is used to pick out a valid inference from a logical argument, it is not pointing to something which existed in it's entirety prior to language use.

Not all concepts are on equal footing.

I don't think language channels our focus.

When you say 'I know', in response to, 'what do we do?', saying I know is just a word.

The process of knowing happened physically as the query was made.

'I wanna talk about carrots'; there I channeled our thoughts to carrots, but am I really focused, and is that the reason for the channelling?

I mean, why did I pick carrots?

I'd differ. I'd say no. The next step is to follow wiki or some derelict, ledged information on carrots.

'Orange', 'food', etc. Pop into mind.

I think words are mallcious to thought process. Again, why carrots?

If I went through the same process of channeling thought - how I do I decide what channeling I want?

Suddenly, I think bulbs, apples or trees. There is no morality here.

I don't think language channels our focus. — ztaziz

What are you talking about again? Tell me all about it... focus my attention... without using language.

I think we disagree on that.

When you say 'I know', in response to, 'what do we do?', saying I know is just a word. — ztaziz

When one says "I know" in response to, "What do we do?", saying "I know" is not 'just a word'.

Again, we seem to disagree.