Taking good care of yourself?

Virtue is more concerned with generally building a good moral character, and so seems to apply even to acts where other people are not involved.

Moral obligations seems to imply other people. Unless you would want to take the view that you have a moral obligation to yourself also.

Why not both?

Moral obligation is about maintaining the fabric of society, for better or worse. In this fabric we can have people who are more committed to that aim than others. Individual virtue is an untenable concept.

To tell the truth is a moral obligation. Seeking for audience to do so is a virtue.

Virtue is more concerned with generally building a good moral character, and so seems to apply even to acts where other people are not involved. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't quite understand. If virtue is moral it should imply some kind of action with respect to others. I don't know how a character that doesn't behave well towards others can be moral.
Could you explain a little more the opposition between moral virtue and moral action? Thank you.

I could argue that it is your responsibility to enlighten those who are unaware of the truth, as it may cause them harm in the future.

This would mean I had less time to do other things which may be even more important. When your are "telling the truth" you are telling one way or the other. But then it has to be the truth :)

This is true, although it was not an obligation for you to inform me, only virtuous. :) Or was it? I suppose I'm not going to find an objectively, exclusively virtuous action as it is very subjective. I just struggle to appreciate arguments in specific fields when the foundation of obligation Vs virtue has little definition.

to try to give an example of an action that is morally virtuous, but one that is not an obligation. My first instinct was that charitable financial donation is one such example, however I found myself finding it easy to justify this as an obligation, using Peter Singer's example of witnessing a child drowning and not intervening; — JacobPhilosophy

There’s a big difference between having a child drowning in a pool right in front of you and knowing there are unspecified children dying far away in Africa at this moment. That kid in the pool can be saved by you and probably by you only with only a minor effort on your part, and if you don’t do it, it really is as if you were the one who killed it. You may argue that the distance, six feet away versus ten thousand miles, is only relative and therefore the principle is the same but when a fellow human being has come within your immediate range of action, he is yours, so to speak. The only obligations that we have are those that we have taken upon us through our previous movements. You have rented a house, and you are under obligation to pay the rent, you have crashed into someone’s car and you must pay for the damage, you have walked into the perimeter of a drowning child and you are obligated to save it.

There are no limits and no obligations in virtue. It would certainly be virtuous to save that starving child twenty thousand miles away, but it can’t be an obligation. Why that child and not another one? You can’t save everyone anyone, and an obligation that it’s not possible to fulfill is nonsense.

I may vaguely connotate this point with the sentiment that it is an obligation to dedicate one's life to the ultimate minimalisation of suffering in the world, and subsequent management of resources. This may be financial, to charities that support children (and all who are in poverty) or this could be in individual research. I'm being pedantic but you see my point about basing argument on flimsy and subjective foundation.

I suppose I'm not going to find an objectively, exclusively virtuous action as it is very subjective. — JacobPhilosophy

A try: Virtuosity means seeking the opportunity to be a hero.
The obligation opposes itself.

could it not be argued that heroism is an obligation? Again, just being pedantic to express that there is no true definition or differentiation between obligation and virtue.

Thinking out loud here, but do we actually have any moral obligations? Or, in other words, if a particular action is most moral, or the morally right thing to do, are we obligated to act it out? I don't think so. I think free will is more important than moral obligation.

Spontaneity is what makes life so intriguing. If we were to just do whatever we were obligated to do, we would hardly be more than robots. However, we can still be virtuous—in fact, we may only be virtuous if we have free will. If everybody follows their moral obligations, virtue has no meaning. However, if certain actions are morally right, and we have the will to either follow it or not, then we can say the virtuous are those who decide to follow.

I don't quite understand. If virtue is moral it should imply some kind of action with respect to others. I don't know how a character that doesn't behave well towards others can be moral.
Could you explain a little more the opposition between moral virtue and moral action? Thank you. — David Mo

Yeah sure, I'll try to articulate my view on it... but virtue is a term used for a whole host of different things historically, so it's not that easy to say something clear and definite about it.

I think they are not so much in opposition to each other (although they can be), but rather different in scope. Virtue ethics is the wider and more encompassing idea, that also deals with the more general question of how to best live ones life. And that includes moral questions, but also things that are not necessary strictly moral.

The example I gave of something I think is virtuous, but not a moral obligation, is "taking care of yourself". That would be, I presume, typically part of virtue. Or another example would be maintaining good relations with other people in your community. There is no moral obligation to do that, I don't think, you don't 'have' to do that... but it does probably make for a better life if you do. Underlying virtue theories are psychological and sociological ideas and a host of other context of what it means to live a good life as a human being.

Moral obligations on the other hand are just that, moral obligations in the form of X is wrong, or Y is the right thing to do. In my view they are 'social agreements about what a society or community considers to be acceptable or not acceptable behavior' (that's what I think anyway, but people are known to disagree :-)). The goal is not necessarily making your life better, but to make sure that people can live together in a community without harming each other. Or maybe in a more active sense, the goal can be to make sure that people living together help each other out.... But whatever the extend of the concrete moral obligations, the underlying idea here is that the individual gives up some of his freedom to act, and in return other people will also refrain from certain behavior that might impact him negatively.

So maybe to summarize, i'd say there's a difference in scope and goals, and also in origin. Moral obligation come from a community or collective, whereas virtue is more centered around the individual. Often a virtue theory will include and agree with moral obligations of the community, as from the perspective of living a good life, moral obligations certainly can have value... but it doesn't always have to, because in the end they have different goals in mind and those can conflict with each other.

This is true, although it was not an obligation for you to inform me, only virtuous. :) Or was it? I suppose I'm not going to find an objectively, exclusively virtuous action as it is very subjective. I just struggle to appreciate arguments in specific fields when the foundation of obligation Vs virtue has little definition. — JacobPhilosophy

For the ancient Greeks and Romans, morality just referred to proper manners, behavior, or comportment. "Moral obligation," as we understand it in a contemporary context, was an unintelligible concept. Some time perhaps starting in the 1500s, and coming full swing in the 1800s, the moral tradition started changing to be more action-centric or rule-centric, as opposed to character-centric. Foot and MacIntyre point out that the tradition was sort of hijacked by the likes of Kant, Bentham, Mill, etc. The new idea, whether it was Victorian, or Enlightenment, was that questions concerning morality had actually correct answers, if only we could adopt a set of normative parameters to proceed from.

The problem with the modern moral tradition, in my view, is that it turned into a "truth-seeking" enterprise, whereby ethical questions must have answers, even if we don't know what those answers are. This is why there are so many irresolvable ethical "dilemmas" floating around. It is a kind of manufactured problem that came into being because we peculiarly expected ethics to answer questions for us that perhaps admit no definite answers in the first place.

For the Ancient Greeks, morality was understood as being concerned with wisdom, not truth. Aristotle always said ethics is a practical science, not a precise one, and so we should not expect mathematical certainty.

Just the other day I saw in another thread someone saying, "Virtue Ethics? No, it's too thin. It doesn't give us enough answers. We need something stronger."

That's sort of a preeminent example of the modern moralist's mindset -- very much steeped in the existing moral tradition, sans any historical understanding.

I may vaguely connotate this point with the sentiment that it is an obligation to dedicate one's life to the ultimate minimalisation of suffering in the world — JacobPhilosophy

If it were your obligation to achieve the ultimate minimalization of suffering in the world, what exactly would your obligations be? An obligation must be definite. If you have to do this, it is an obligation. If it would be nice if you did it, but you don’t really have to, it’s not an obligation.

So exactly what would an ultimate minimalization of suffering mean? I suppose someone would have achieved it if he had reached a point where he had maximized his capacity for alleviating suffering; the point where he couldn’t possibly do anything more. But what would that look like. Suppose he worked day and night, never giving himself rest, never wasting a second that wasn’t used for the good cause. Well, even that wouldn’t be his maximum. He could always work even harder, sleep even less, spend even less time eating, move even faster.
Well, he would soon drop dead from exhaustion, so he would need to portion his energy if he were to maximize it, but what exactly would the right measure be? Besides, maybe he was using the wrong strategy, maybe another profession would be more effective for minimizing suffering. There is no way of knowing what his obligations would actually be, and he would be sure to fail.

It can’t be your obligation to do something that can’t be done.

This should be an excellent book for this thread:
Book published in 2018 arguing for Objective Moral Realism.
Compassionate Moral Realism by Colin Marshall, Oxford University Press (OUP).

Here is the presentation at OUP: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/compassionate-moral-realism-9780198809685
And here is a review by University of Notre Dame as I haven't read it myself, also:
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/compassionate-moral-realism/
A presentation and option to buy at Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/Compassionate-Moral-Realism-Colin-Marshall/dp/0198809689
A book review by Mind Journal behind payment wall: https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/129/514/631/5511598

"Objective Morality is marching onwards toward Utopia!"

For the Ancient Greeks, morality was understood as being concerned with wisdom, not truth. Aristotle always said ethics is a practical science, not a precise one, and so we should not expect mathematical certainty. — Wolfman

Like every generalization there are holes and very big in this case: Plato. Plato believed in the unity of being and ought in the form of knowledge of the Good which was the supreme Idea. According to him, this was implicit in Socratic intellectualism.

Thus, when the rules of the Polis were established - and in this the Platonists were experts - a political morality was being applied that developed into rules. Although the perfect ideal was unattainable in the cave world (ours), the constitutions that were drawn up in the Academy tended towards that Good that begins with a capital letter.

Therefore the moral rules are not alien to Greek world.

Aristotle is more complex but he also speaks of “a standard and measure”. This is so because in my opinion the appeal to virtue is not contradictory to the search for moral rules. In any case, it qualifies the dogmatic vision of them.

Moral obligation come from a community or collective, whereas virtue is more centered around the individual. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't understand this opposition. And the civic virtue that was the basis of modern revolutionary morality? Wasn't it a virtue oriented towards the collective?

Yeah, you don’t know what you’re talking about, and most of this is a red herring :roll:

In your opinion. I have a different opinion of your outburst.

What I meant by my questions, which you have not been able to answer, is that raising an opposition between virtue, duty and consequences is a false dilemma. It is the classic false dilemma to which some philosophers are so fond of trying to justify their particular ideology by giving it an aspect of rationality.
To put it briefly: a reasonable morality is justified on the basis of a network of virtues, duties and consequences that cannot be formalized as if it were a problem of logic. The proportion is random and depends on circumstantial factors that are impossible to predict and systematize. To try to do so would be to enter into casuistry, which is the usual vice of those who have a bureaucratic concept of ethics and little moral sense.

The idea of obligation either to perform or not perform a morally significant act flies against the principle of freedom of will in re moral responsibility.

Surely, if one is to be responsible for one's actions, moral ones too, we need to be completely free as regards choices pertaining to our actions and another way of saying the exact same thing is we shouldn't be under the yoke of an, any, obligation.

It seems clear then that, as I stated in the first paragraph, the idea of moral obligation nullifes the notion of moral responsibility. Given that, people can't be judged as either good or bad if their actions are performed as a matter of obligation, it follows no one deserves either praise or blame in a obligatory moral code. Perhaps losing moral responsibility is a small price to pay for peace attained through a moral system that is obligation-based.

I don't get what you mean by "moral virtue". Do you mean those moral actions that are good but not obligatory? If yes, then I fully support a moral theory that deals exclusively with such entities. Moral responsibility would be retained to the chagrin of bad people and good people would be worthy of the praise given them.

All that said, consider the fact that morality is ultimately about, not solitary existence, communal living; morality is about how one interacts with others with the specific objective of creating and maintaining a harmonious society. If that's the case then the individual interest of moral responsibility must be less important than the collective interest of a harmonious society. If so, we can safely jettison moral responsibility in favor of a moral code that puts us under obligation to either perform or not perform certain moral acts.

Seems to me like all this either is, or is being taken as, more of a semantic argument. Things being relative an obligation is something you either must or should do. This depends on the person. If you're a pious one it would include sheltering or assisting just about anyone who comes your way to the best of your ability, provided you have the means to do so. If not, it may only include doing so only to your family, for example. Virtue, meaning conducting oneself as devoutly as possible to whatever one's moral standards happen to be can either be essentially the same or extend a bit further. Piety is the word I believe you may be looking for.

I don't know what civic virtue or modern revolutionary morality you are referring to?

Again, I'm not saying that virtue can have no eye for the collective, I'm just saying that it goes further than that.... it a wider idea.

And plato was no example of the traditional Greek view on morality... he was a radical break from it. If you don't get this, I don't think we can much progress in this discussion.

The idea of obligation either to perform or not perform a morally significant act flies against the principle of freedom of will in re moral responsibility. — TheMadFool

Moral obligation and psychic necessity are different concepts. Moral obligation functions on the level of duty and necessity on the level of causality. Therefore, moral obligation implies free will. You can do what you think is your duty or not for different motivations. If you are psychically determined to kill your father, you will kill your father yes or yes. You can do bad things even though you think they are bad in a moral sense. Because of selfishness, unwillingness, bad passions or other reasons.
It is another thing to claim that every psychic decision is determined, but this is a different problem.

And plato was no example of the traditional Greek view on morality... — ChatteringMonkey

The Greek tradition was not uniform. There were several opposing tendencies. The Platonic tradition was one of the most important. As you know it reached Hypatia of Alexandria or St. Augustine in the Christian era through Neoplatonism. You have no reason to exclude it.

I don't know what civic virtue or modern revolutionary morality you are referring to? — ChatteringMonkey

I am talking about the civic virtue of the revolutionaries and enlightened people who exalted the duty of citizenship towards the country and the people. See the famous paintings of David, The Oath of the Horatii and The Lictors Bring to Brutus the Bodies of His Sons . They are very graphic representations of that civic philosophy that they exemplified in the Roman virtue, which was not individual, but collective.

Again, I'm not saying that virtue can have no eye for the collective, I'm just saying that it goes further than that.... it a wider idea. — ChatteringMonkey

Every moral system includes the individual and the collective. Whether it is a system based on virtue, duty or consequences. When you talk about "it's wider" I don't know what you mean. If you don't mind, you could explain. Thank you.

Moral obligation and psychic necessity are different concepts. Moral obligation functions on the level of duty and necessity on the level of causality. Therefore, moral obligation implies free will. You can do what you think is your duty or not for different motivations. If you are psychically determined to kill your father, you will kill your father yes or yes. You can do bad things even though you think they are bad in a moral sense. Because of selfishness, unwillingness, bad passions or other reasons.
It is another thing to claim that every psychic decision is determined, but this is a different problem. — David Mo

You seem to be saying:

1. Duty is an obligation
2. There's a freedom of choice that comes into play before duty i.e. we're free to decide what our duty will be

Fantastic. Never thought of that. Every moral code/theory comes with a list of do's and don't's that are obligatory. No one can deny that. The entries in such lists follow, as of necessity, from some key assumptions of whatever moral theory we're considering. There is no choice as to the contents of the list. Ergo, the only point in moral theories where we do have a choice is the assumptions/axioms themselves. Making a choice regarding the assumptions only allow us to switch moral theories which differ from each other as per their assumptions/axioms. So, are you claiming we can choose which moral theory to adopt and practice?

If yes, probably yes, does this mean then moral obligation and free will are compatible?

I liken this state of affairs to a man who's forced (obligated) to behave in a certain way by force, say, with a weapon. He is told he has a choice - he may exercise his free will - and the choice available is the weapon (a gun or a knife or a bomb) that'll be used to force (obligate) him to behave in certain ways. It can be said of this unfortunate man that he had a choice in the matter of what weapon will be used to force his behavior - his obligations (duties) - but are we warranted to praise or blame him for his actions? Is such a man free?

Every moral system includes the individual and the collective. Whether it is a system based on virtue, duty or consequences. When you talk about "it's wider" I don't know what you mean. If you don't mind, you could explain. Thank you. — David Mo

Wider conceptually, like the concept 'fruit' is a wider concept than 'apple'.... it includes more things.

The Greek tradition was not uniform. There were several opposing tendencies. The Platonic tradition was one of the most important. As you know it reached Hypatia of Alexandria or St. Augustine in the Christian era through Neoplatonism. You have no reason to exclude it. — David Mo

Sure Plato was Greek and so what he produced is technically part of the Greek tradition... And yes, in retrospect, he has to be considered one of the pillars of Greek philosophy, because of the massive influence he had on the later Christian European culture. But what's more interesting to me is how it fit into Greek culture back then. Let's not forget that philosophy as a whole is only a small subset of culture to begin with, that is the case right now and it was also the case back then. Greek culture was among other things, the Homeric myths, tragic plays, a pantheon of flawed Gods etc. etc... and then came Socrates and Plato. They were in direct opposition to the culture of their time. Socrates got his hemlock for corrupting the youth, and Plato was explicitly trying to replace existing Greek culture by his Philosophy of ideal forms. It was not merely an extention of Greek culture or one of the many different strands... Check his views on music and poetry and how he sought to minimize their 'bad' influence on people. And to be clear this is not akin to someone lamenting the bad influence of 'pop culture' right now. In a predominately oral tradition, music and poetry were the main vehicles for the propagation of the culture. I could go on... but the point is that Plato, notwithstanding his huge legacy, is probably not a very good example of the traditional Greek view on morality.

Therefore, moral obligation implies free will. You can do what you think is your duty or not for different motivations. — David Mo

Another way of looking at this would be to look at where exactly free will matters.

To begin with, the postulates of moral theory are supposed to be self-evident truths which means we don't actually have a choice. These postulates are then used to infer logically necessary conclusions regarding what course of action we must take given any situation. Here too we lack choice in the matter.

If it's the case that we can pick and choose our moral postulates then all that means is we have options in which moral theory we select to abide by. Isn't that interesting? We can freely choose, for instance, either consequentialism or deontology.

However, this freedom is not enough, rather not in the right spot, to qualify as freedom, no?

Freedom should be at the level of our actions for that's where morality matters. Moral theories are either true or false but actions are good or bad. Firstly, this affects what we said earlier about having a choice regarding which moral theory to select - surely if we want a true moral theory, there can be no choice. Secondly, choice is absent where it matters - at the level of our actions.