P1) A phenomenon can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all its aspects can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
P2) All aspects of Objective states can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject.
C1) Therefore, Objective states can be given exhaustive Objective explanations. (From P1 and P2)
P3) Physical states are Objective states.
C2a) Therefore, physical states can be given exhaustive Objective explanations. (From P2 and P3)
C2b) Therefore, physical states have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Corollary to C2a)
P4) Conscious mental states have a Subjective and Objective character.
C3) Therefore, the Subjective and Objective character of Conscious mental states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation iff all aspects of a Conscious mental state’s Subjective and Objective character can become an Object(s)-for-a-Subject. (From P1 and P4)
P5) An aspect of the Subjective character of all Conscious mental states is the “Subject” to-whom and for-which Objects are presented.
P6) The “Subject” is unable to become an Object-for-a-Subject (i.e. an Object for-itself).
C4a) Therefore, there is an aspect of the Subjective character of all Conscious mental states that cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject. (From P5 and P6)
C4b) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that cannot be given an exhaustive Objective explanation. (Corollary to C4a)
C4c) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states which does not have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Corollary to C4b)
P7) Physical states have the property of being “something which can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.” (Restatement of C2b)
C5) Therefore, there is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that is not a physical state. (From C4c and P7 using Leibniz’ Law)
P8) Reductive physicalism is true iff all aspects of Conscious mental states are physical states.
C6) Therefore, reductive physicalism is false. (From C5 and P8)

A Defense of the Argument

We always find a Subject and Object internally correlated in Conscious experience; and to step outside that correlation would be for us to literally go out of our minds (Bradley, 1927, p. 323). The perspectival character of an Object is not only inseparable from a Subject’s Conscious experience of the Object, but also the Subject’s conception of it. In fact, the inherent perspectival nature of Conscious experience renders any conception of an Object that is absolutely unconditioned by a Subject absolutely futile. In other words, any Object of experience, conception, or feeling always has a determinate and perspectival character, a gestalt constitution, and an ineffable qualitative aspect. Indeed, it is logically inconceivable—in principle—for an Object to remain “Objective” (i.e. for-a-Subject) without said Object being qualitatively and perspectivally determinate or exhibiting a form and character contingent upon an internal relation to a Subject. Philosopher A.C. Ewing held a similar stance on this issue, writing that:

[To] know any [Object X]…or form any intelligent opinion about X I must ultimately think X as it would be for a [Subject] which was consciously aware of it as a present fact though there may never be or have been such a [Subject]…Thus ultimately we can only think of unperceived physical things in terms of a possible observer in the sense that we must think of them as if they were objects [for a Subject] (Ewing, 1934, pp. 56-57).

This dichotomy remains the case even when we examine the nature of “Self-Conscious” experience. The "Object of Self-Consciousness” is not the Subject (or Self) simpliciter, rather it is an Object contained within the Subject's consciousness. In essence, it is an Object-for-a-Subject. However, rather than being an Object of the outer sense (i.e. a spatiotemporal Object), it is an Object of the inner sense (i.e. an Object of introspection). To suggest that the Subject can become an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character would be no different from saying that the "eye can see itself,” which is false. The "eye" cannot see itself because it is that which sees. An “eye” cannot be placed in front of itself in order to catch a glimpse of itself seeing itself. If one were to reply, "But I can see my eye in the mirror," they forget that what they are seeing is not their "eye," (i.e. the Subject) but a reflection on the surface of a mirror (i.e. an Object).

Furthermore, the Subject cannot present itself as an Object for-itself while retaining its Subjectival character because anything that is presented to a Subject is something other than the Subject to whom that something is presented. Subject and Object are two poles of conscious experience that cannot be collapsed into one side or the other without vicious abstractionism—any attempt to do so would destroy the Objectival character that is essential to the Object or the Subjectival character that is essential to the Subject.

“Experience,” unlike the vitalist’s “élan vital,” is neither a folk-theory, nor an ad hoc explanatory construction; on the contrary, it is the prius of all conceptualization, explanation, description, and investigation. Experience simpliciter is not contingent upon a given conceptual theory or a discursive collection of propositions. Indeed, any conceptual theory derives the entirety of its matter and form from content abstracted from experience. The actual process of designing, reworking, and testing conceptual systems are isolated events that occur within the whole of experience itself. Experience is the vessel that upholds and retains the meaning, significance, and existence of the “concept.” A concept that neither holds a relation to an experiential source, nor tainted by an experiential aspect is pure unmeaning and hardly qualifies as a word. One could transpose some terminology from set-theory to help visualize this. If the concept “experience” is a set that contains all of what has been or ever will be the “stuff” of experience, then the concept “experience” would itself be an “improper” subset of itself. Or, to put it differently, the concept “experience” is an “improper” abstraction from itself because the very material referred to by the concept “experience” is the “stuffing” in-and-out-of-which all concepts (including the concept of “experience”) are contingent upon for their meaning and being.

Responses/Objections and Replies

“Isn't this just another way of laying out the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment?”

Very good question. I would have to say no, the argument is not another way of laying out the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment. I say this because my argument does not seek to demonstrate that "qualia" are non-physical (although they very well may be non-physical). Rather my argument looks to the nature of the relationship between Subject and Object in conscious experience—a dichotomy which serves as the basal structure of conscious experience itself. One might even be justified in saying that qualia are contingent upon their being an “Object-for-a-Subject” or a “Subject-having-an-Object.”

Unlike the Subject to and for whom the Object is presented, qualia always manifest themselves as the formal, perspectival, and aesthetic quality (and value) of that Object. Indeed, qualia always clothe the Object in an aesthetic, qualitative, and gestalt shroud that possesses a tacit, felt character that is unique to the Subject to-whom and for-whom the Object is presented. The Subject is never given in such a way; nor could it be without ceasing to be Subject and becoming an Object (a transition that necessitates a new Subject to apprehend that new Object).

Unlike the “Mary’s Room” thought experiment, my argument looks to the structure of experience rather than the content of experience. I’ll briefly summarize my argument and then contrast it with Frank Jackson’s argument:

My Argument (roughly sketched)

(Premise 1) Whatever cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject cannot be given an exhaustive Objective explanation (An Objective explanation implies an Object being described/explained).
(Premise 2) The Subject is an aspect of all Conscious mental states that cannot become an Object-for-a-Subject.
(Conclusion 1) Therefore, all Conscious mental states have an aspect which is incapable of being given an exhaustive Objective explanation. (From (P1) and (P2))
(Premise 3) Physical states can be given an exhaustive Objective explanation.
(Conclusion 2) Therefore, there is an aspect of all conscious mental states which is not a physical state. (From (C1) and (P3) (using Leibniz’ Law))

Jackson’s Argument (Taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

(Premise 1) Mary has complete physical knowledge about human color vision before her release.
(Conclusion 1) Therefore, Mary knows all the physical facts about human color vision before her release. (From (P1))
(Premise 2) There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning facts about human color vision that Mary does not have before her release.
(Conclusion 2) Therefore, there are some facts about human color vision that Mary does not know before her release. (From (P2))
(Conclusion 3) Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human color vision. (From (C1) and (C2))

Works Cited

Bradley, F. H. (1927). Ethical Studies. London: Oxford University Press.
Ewing, A. C. (1934). Idealism: A Critical Survey. London: Methuen.