Indeed

It seems "the whole" has additional structure (and interaction) that the collection of "the parts" does not.
I suppose some emergence may be a result of the difference. — jorndoe

Indeed, the whole, say a car, is an assembly of interacting parts. These parts weren't assembled by themselves, but were put together by human, who also conceive the the property, interactions, forms, and the structure of the car.
However the same parts that wasn't put together by human remains a pile.

Do we need to invoke emergence to understand this?

I don't buy emergence beyond it being a way of saying that properties depend on dynamic structures, but again, relations/structures/processes are parts in my opinion (a fortiori because all parts in the normal "object" sense are dynamic structures in the first place)

Indeed if some want to express the relationship between parts and whole in mathematical terms the processes need to be included in the "equation".

At the same time it is important to remember that such "mathematical" description is symbolic Therefore arguing about its meaning is the same as arguing about "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin."

To have a meaningful discussion about whole and parts it need to be in terms of properties. The real question is: "Can the properties of whole be explained in terms of parts' properties (that includes interactions enable by these properties)"?

Experientially it feels right to me that the whole is at least other than the sum of the parts. If you ever make music you will recognise this. I sing in a choir and the collective feeling when things go right is of a different order from when one is singing individually, or from the notion of a bunch of individuals who happen to be singing with each other. People who play instruments tell me the same. — mcdoodle

I have no problem with using "the whole is other than the sum of the parts" in your example, because it belong to a figurative speech and subjective experience.
My problem only if the same "formula" and the same mistakes are applied to a scientific understanding of relationship between whole and parts.

The other ontological issue can come up even in 'realism'. (To generalize a point Wayfarer is making) Are for instance abstractions in biology 'reducible' to chemistry or physics? Is 'the economy' reducible to some set of naturalistic terms? Or are there - as I would see it - different levels of abstraction appropriate to different forms of analysis, without the supposed component parts being in some way 'superior' or 'more fundamental'? — mcdoodle

The reducibility of biology to chemistry and chemistry to physic is exactly what I going to discuss next. This discussion would also affect the reduction of social and economic phenomena.

Take a human level example of an army. For an army to make itself constructible, it must take large numbers of young men and simplify their natures accordingly. It must turn people with many degrees of freedom (any variety of personal social histories) into simpler and more uniform components. — apokrisis

Let me reflect on this example for a moment. The army's capacity to "turn people" into "uniform components" is dependent on the willingness of the individual to be turned this way. So it is highly debatable as to whether this "turning" is a function of the army as the whole, or a function of the individual, as a part. In other words, I would argue that this whole in your example, is really a product of the willingness of the individuals to turn toward a common goal.

So wholes are more than just the sum of their parts ... in that wholes shape those parts to serve their higher order purposes. Wholes aren't accidental in nature. They produce their own raw materials by simplifying the messy world to a collection of parts with no choice but to construct the whole in question. — apokrisis

Following your example then, if it is true that wholes actually "shape those parts to serve higher order purposes" they must do this through the intention of the part. The part must willingly serve the higher order purpose. So if it is actually the whole which shapes the parts to serve the purpose of the whole, as per your example, then the whole must be shaping the intention of the part.

The army's capacity to "turn people" into "uniform components" is dependent on the willingness of the individual to be turned this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

It may help if the individuals don't actively resist. But the army is what has the idea of what it needs the individuals to be. Point one. And the reduction in behavioural scope shows how components are created by a selective force subtracting degrees of freedom. Point two.

Following your example then, if it is true that wholes actually "shape those parts to serve higher order purposes" they must do this through the intention of the part. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the intention comes from the whole and it's common goal, as you just agreed. So the most you can argue for is a lack of effective resistance - some other goal in play. Materials only need to be pliable.

But the army is what has the idea of what it needs the individuals to be. — apokrisis

I don't buy that. Individual human beings have ideas. I don't see the basis for your assumption that the army has an idea. There may be seasoned veterans, commanders, who hold the idea of subordination, and impress these ideas upon the rank and file, but I think it is a mistake to say that "the army" has the idea.

But the intention comes from the whole and it's common goal, as you just agreed. So the most you can argue for is a lack of effective resistance - some other goal in play. Materials only need to be pliable. — apokrisis

The point though, is that intention is the property of the individuals, it does not come "from the whole", it comes from the individual parts. And in your example of the army, the entire existence of the whole, the army, is dependent on the intentions of the individuals. The army only exists through the intentions of the individuals. The whole only exists because the parts will it into existence. So if you want to argue that this act of the parts willing into existence the whole, is really an act of the whole exercising constraint over the individuals, you need to describe how the whole may influence the will of the individual. And, since the individuals must act willingly to bring the army into existence, the whole (being the army) must act on the wills of the individuals before that whole even comes into existence. At this time, the whole (the army) exists only as an idea within the minds of the individuals, and yet it still must have the capacity to act on the wills of the individuals in order that the individuals move to bring the actual army into existence.

The point though, is that intention is the property of the individuals, it does not come "from the whole", it comes from the individual parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confusing what was a simple point.

Under hierarchy theory, the whole is more than the sum of its parts because it has the power to make the parts less than what they were. The whole constrains the parts with a common purpose and this limits the freedoms they may have "enjoyed".

If you believe this is not how armies are, then you must have no clue about military life. Why do you think boot camps were invented? To aid recruits in discovering their truest selves? ;)

Peirce had an interesting take on the relations between parts and whole in terms of causation: "Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final causation is that kind of causation whereby the whole calls out its parts." The whole, in his way of thinking, is greater than the sum of its parts in the sense that a true continuum includes potential individuals far in excess of its actual individuals.

Yep.

You are confusing what was a simple point.

Under hierarchy theory, the whole is more than the sum of its parts because it has the power to make the parts less than what they were. The whole contrains the parts with a common purpose and this limits the freedoms they may have "enjoyed".

If you believe this is not how armies are, then you must have no clue about military life. Why do you think boot camps were invented? To aid recruits in discovering their truest selves? ;) — apokrisis

You have not demonstrated how the whole has the power to do anything. As I pointed out, it is the parts which are active, and being active they are the ones with the power. You have not demonstrated how "the army" has the power to do anything, other than by the power of the individuals. Do you think it is "the army", rather than the individual commanders who have the power over the recruits?

And who commands/institutionalises the individual commanders. Cmon, this ain't so hard.

Other people ... it seems to be quite difficult for you.

Good luck with your tale of infinite regress.

Ha, where do you get the infinite regress from? You seem to have forgotten that I started my description by referring to intention, and intention produces ends.

You're the one with a problem of infinite regress. You want to start with the assumption of a whole which imposes restrictions on the parts, but your whole is not a valid whole, as I've demonstrated. So now you face infinite regress. The army is just a part of a particular society, which is a part of humanity in general, which is a part of life on earth, which is a part of the universe, which is a part of a multiverse. Any whole you assume is actually just a part of something larger, until you lose yourself into the vagueness of infinity. And infinity cannot be a whole.

I start with the part, the individual human being, and see that there is a desire within that human being, intent, to be a part of a whole. The physical whole only comes into existence upon fulfilment of the intent of the part. But the non-physical whole, in the form of the design, necessarily pre-exists any physical whole. And, it must pre-exist all the parts as well, in order that when the parts come into existence, that non-physical whole has imparted to them, the intent, which is the necessary condition for producing the physical whole.

Perhaps there are no parts, just wholes. If each part itself is a whole, then perhaps we are talking about a classification issue. The discussion becomes one of how wholes interact. If two Hydrogen atoms meet up with an Oxygen atom, they may yield H20. The whole vs parts issue is transformed into a functional analysis of the relationship between discrete wholes.

Indeed, the whole, say a car, is an assembly of interacting parts. These parts weren't assembled by themselves, but were put together by human, who also conceive the the property, interactions, forms, and the structure of the car.
However the same parts that wasn't put together by human remains a pile. — miosim

Something similar shows up in all kinds of places.
Say, hydrogen and oxygen atoms (the parts) can combine to water molecules (the whole).
In turn, atomic hydrogen and oxygen has protons and electrons and neutrons, ...

Do we need to invoke emergence to understand this? — miosim

Depends on what counts as emergence I guess.
The car (the whole) can be used for transportation, but the pile (the parts) can't.
Are the water phases/states emergent? The nifty-looking, symmetrical, hexagonal ice-crystals?
The parts on their own can't be water steam/gas, liquid or ice/solid (which also depending on pressure and temperature).

I don't buy emergence beyond it being a way of saying that properties depend on dynamic structures, but again, relations/structures/processes are parts in my opinion (a fortiori because all parts in the normal "object" sense are dynamic structures in the first place) — Terrapin Station

Interesting.
Do you think the structure that make a car out of the parts, is also itself an independent part thereof (approaching Platonism it seems)?
Surely structure is contingent on parts to exist, whereas parts are not particularly dependent on other aspects of the car?
I suppose not just any structure will make a car out of the parts, but parts may be interchangeable.

Something similar shows up in all kinds of places.
Say, hydrogen and oxygen atoms (the parts) can combine to water molecules (the whole).
In turn, atomic hydrogen and oxygen has protons and electrons and neutrons, ... — jorndoe

The example of water is often used to justify the emergence phenomenon. The mistake in this example is that the water (the way we experience it) is not a single molecule, but gazillions of them interacting among themselves, and with the wall of vessel containing it, and with other external factors. Therefore comparing the water with an abstract physical model of atoms in terms what is "more" or "less" is a nonsense self-deceiving exercise. Instead we need to grow up and start talking about reducibility of the properties of water to the properties of its atoms that in most cases is fully reducible and therefore no need to talk about emergence.
At the same time there the complex phenomena like bifurcations etc., which have not satisfactory reduction explanation, but they deserves a separate consideration. For now I will state only that the gap in our understanding of these complex phenomena is not a proof for the ontological emergence.

Depends on what counts as emergence I guess.
The car (the whole) can be used for transportation, but the pile (the parts) can't. — jorndoe

The car used for transportation is a concept conceived by human who design and put it together. The pile of car's parts, say in the junk yard, cannot be used for transportation, because they are discarded by human for a different reason/purpose. Therefore talking about car as a whole without including human in this "figurative equitation" is "mathematically" illiterate.

Are the water phases/states emergent? The nifty-looking, symmetrical, hexagonal ice-crystals?
The parts on their own can't be water steam/gas, liquid or ice/solid (which also depending on pressure and temperature). — jorndoe

Each part on their own can't, but the parts interacting among themselves and with other surrounded parts (environment conditions that are non-disclosed parts in your examples of whole) - can.
There some aspects of the complex system phenomena (like bifurcation, etc.) that are not fully understood. I prefer don't discuss them now because they deserve a separate consideration. However the fact that they are not understood, is not a proof or even a good evidence of ontological emergence; at best they are symptoms only

nstead we need to grow up and start talking about reducibility of the properties of water to the properties of its atoms that in most cases is fully reducible and therefore no need to talk about emergence. — miosim

So say we have you, and then standing next to you, a small vat of chemicals - a vat of carbon, water, nitrogen, phosphorous, etc - that is absolutely identical in atomic composition.

What is missing that is present In one but not the other?

So say we have you, and then standing next to you, a small vat of chemicals - a vat of carbon, water, nitrogen, phosphorous, etc - that is absolutely identical in atomic composition.

What is missing that is present In one but not the other? — apokrisis

'I' is the result of very specific complex interactions between self-organized chemical components forming the living system, while the same chemical components without interaction among each other are just a quantity of things.

This is the same as a car and its parts. The only difference is that the car is put together by human, while 'I' am the self organized system.

Interestingly interesting.as a subject.

...while 'I' am the self organized system. — miosim

So what is "self-organisation"?

In systems theory, it is the limitations that wholes can impose to turn chaos into order, noise into signal. And that is why there is a metaphysical-strength contrast with the parts.

The parts can only construct a state of organisation. The whole has the opposite kind of causality in that it can constrain the state of organisation.

And that is why the whole is greater that the sum of its parts. It represents the other kind of causality involved in creating the kind of organisation we call systematic or purposeful.

So what is "self-organisation"? — apokrisis

Per wiki, self-organization is a process where order arises from local interactions between parts of an initially disordered system.

In systems theory, it is the limitations that wholes can impose to turn chaos into order, noise into signal. And that is why there is a metaphysical-strength contrast with the parts.

The parts can only construct a state of organization. The whole has the opposite kind of causality in that it can constrain the state of organization. — apokrisis

As I understand, the definition you used is based on the notion of ontological emergence. I am strongly oppose the ontological emergence and believe that any theory based on emergence is wrong. Therefore I don't see much sense to accept or even discuss the definitions provided by such theory.

I am strongly oppose the ontological emergence and believe that any theory based on emergence is wrong. Therefore I don't see much sense not accept or even discuss the definitions provided by such theory. — miosim

Yep. You gotta stick to what you believe and avoid all evidence to the contrary in this life.

Yep. You gotta stick to what you believe and avoid all evidence to the contrary in this life. — apokrisis

Indeed my last post sounds like my conviction is based on my believe regardless of evidence. My fault.
Instead I am open to discus any evidences that support ontological emergence.
In the past I was very enthusiastic about, new at the time, system sciences (especially complexity science) that had promised the new paradigm - the shift from the narrow-minded mechanistic way of thinking to the holistic views on reality. First, it felt like a fresh air leading to the new horizons for explanation of life phenomenon.
However the more I learned the more my hopes have been replacing with growing suspicion that the horizons open by complexity science led to desert filled with mirages.

So what are you evidences in favor of emergence?

The parts can only construct a state of organisation. The whole has the opposite kind of causality in that it can constrain the state of organisation. — apokrisis

But what is this kind of causality dependent on? Presumably the arrangements of parts. All the parts working together create the illusion of emergence, the illusion that there is "something more" to the whole other than the sum of its parts.

Ascribing causal power to a whole seems to me to simply be a heuristic, and also oddly similar to the Christian doctrine of transubstantiation. According to the doctrine, the bread and wine is literally transformed into the flesh and blood of Christ, yet none of the features actually change (something I believe Peirce called "bullshit" essentially). Similarly, would the addition of "wholes" really change anything about how things work? What difference does it make if there actually is a whole that is greater than its parts?

If you want to call a set of parts working together a "system", I'm fine with that. But to add on to this and say that this "system" is something greater than its parts, I have issues with, because it's not clear to me how this "system" could possibly be "more" than its parts in any meaningful sense. All a system is, is a network of causal powers supplementing and contradicting each other to lead to an eventual outcome. Change the parts and the system changes. Indeed it would seem to be the case that the only way a system can change to begin with is if some of its parts change.

However the more I learned the more my hopes have been replacing with growing suspicion that the horizons open by complexity science led to desert filled with mirages. — miosim

I see that you've learned to see through those mirages, as the hollowness of structures without a cause.

So what are you evidences in favor of emergence? — miosim

I was talking about self-organisation and not merely emergence. And I gave evidence. I said parts "emerge" via holistic constraint in hierarchically organised systems.

So it is not just emergence in the usual sense of new global properties popping out of collective behaviour. Instead it is the argument that global forms and purposes act downwards to limit material possibility in fruitful fashion. The whole simplifies messy reality to shape the very parts that compose it.

Change the parts and the system changes. — darthbarracuda

Yep. So that is why a functioning whole needs the power of constraint over its parts. It must limit the freedom or indeterminism of its components to ensure they remain "the right kind of stuff".

We are familiar with this principle in biology and sociology.

Societies fall apart if they don't produce the right kind of people. Bodies fall apart if they don't regulate their cells.

You've got a problem if your skin cells decide to start expressing their genetic potential to be bone, or liver, or heart tissue.

Yep. So that is why a functioning whole needs the power of constraint over its parts. It must limit the freedom or indeterminism of its components to ensure they remain "the right kind of stuff". — apokrisis

But, again, how does it do this? Is this "power" somehow something "else" other than simply interactions between the parts of the whole? A network of causal powers can function together but I hesitate to actually call this limitation function a thing itself.