My account of JTB is a bit more nuanced than what you might normally hear from those who hold to JTB. For e.g., there are different language games that account for the different uses of justification (logic, testimony, sensory experience, and linguistic training for e.g.). And my account of truth is a bit more nuanced. We all think the other guy we disagree with is doing poor philosophy.

My account of JTB is a bit more nuanced than what you might normally hear from those who hold to JTB. — Sam26

Yes, and my apologies if I implied otherwise. Your account of Wittgenstein is excellent, well-researched and coherent. But I do not quite agree with it. The problem is working out exactly where...

My target was a critique of Wittgenstein that misrepresented his views. Perhaps that has been cleared up.

No problem Banno, and thanks for the kind words. I tried to capture what I thought was Witt's thinking. I'm sure I did in many ways but failed in others. What I tried to do is go beyond his thinking, i.e., to see where it might lead.

The idea that it's absurd to say one "knows" that one has a toothache suggests that "knowing" is about justification. — Count Timothy von Icarus

His remark is about the grammar of the word 'know'. It makes no sense to say that I have a toothache but do not know it. If it is not the kind of thing that I do or might not know then it makes no sense to say that I do know it.

The idea that one can doubt anything one "knows" also makes it pretty clear that "knowledge" here is something like belief. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What would it mean to know something but doubt it? I know by experience not to grab a hot pan from the stove. If I ever doubted it I no longer do. My knowing it has nothing to do with believing it or not believing it. I will get burned whether I believe it or not.

From On Certainty:

177. What I know, I believe.

179. It would be correct to say: "I believe..." has subjective truth; but "I know..." not.

180. Or again "I believe..." is an 'expression', but not "I know...".

424. ...One says too, "I don't believe it, I know it".

478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?

483. The correct use of the expression "I know". Someone with bad sight asks me: "do you believe that the thing we can see there is a tree?" I reply "I know it is; I can see it clearly and am familiar with it." - A: "Isn't N.N. at home?" - I: "I believe he is." - A: "Was he at home yesterday?" - I; "Yesterday he was - I know he was; I spoke to him." - A: "Do you know or only believe that this part of the house is built on later than the rest?" - I: "I know it is; I got it from so and so."

"To state that a truth value is a property of propositions that function as assumptions in an argument is to lay out the terms of a language game.

But"
...such assumptions are not themselves amenable to ascertainment of truth value.
— Joshs
Well, no. We do assign truth value to some propositions, but we also work out the truth value of other propositions. Not all assumptions must be hinges. — Banno

To be clear, when I equated ‘stating a truth value as a property of propositions that function as assumptions in an argument’ with ‘laying out the terms of a language game’,I didnt mean that all language games are expressible in terms of presenting a truth-apt argument. That is, I dont believe that ‘language game’ is just another word for a ‘proposition with truth values’. They are not the same thing. The latter is subordinate to the former, in the same way that moves in a chess game are subordinate to the rules of chess, and the rules of chess is just one among many possible language games. I’m equating a truth-apt propositional argument with the moves of chess, not with its underlying rules , and certainly not with the nature of language games in general. The underlying rules of a truth-apt argument are not reducible to formal logical notation such as ‘Here is a hand. Therefore there are hands. f(a)⊢∃(x)(fx).’ The bedrock of underlying assumptions making truth apt arguments intelligible don’t , and can’t, look like any statement in formal logic. A system of bedrock convictions is a gestalt structure of interdependent meanings.

141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)
142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.
410. Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it

Furthermore, because the system of convictions underlying the intelligibility of truth apt statements is only one particular language games among many possible games, one can no more use truth apt arguments to express language games in general than one can use the rules of chess to express any and all languages games.

Would you say that deciding to change the rules of chess in order to make a more interesting game is an example of ‘doubting’ the current foundation of chess? — Joshs

I think there is a need here to distinguish between essential and accidental properties, as a way toward understanding this question. If we say that every single rule is essential to the game known as "chess", then changing any one of them would render the new game as no longer "chess". We'd then say that any such change affects the foundation. But if, for example, we designate only the position of "check" as essential to the game, then we are free to make all sort of rule changes, still call the new game "chess", and say that we have not doubted "the foundation".

So it all depends on what is determined as "the foundation". I believe that in many conceptions, there is no such thing as "the foundation", because numerous essential aspects are brought together, therefore numerous foundational aspects. Doubting, and changing aspects of a conception generally alter the conception by degree. However, I believe that we do have to acknowledge the reality of foundational aspects, such as when we turn things right around, like the change from the geocentric to the heliocentric model. Clearly the foundational belief was doubted.

Imagine if we turned the game of chess right around, so that each player started in an equal position of checkmate, with some pieces already taken off the board, and the players were allowed to move other pieces while the king was checked, and the goal was to get all the pieces back to what is now the starting place. This would render the check position irrelevant, and that change would clearly be the result of doubting the foundation, because "the object" of the game would be completely changed. In this case we can say that when the conception of "the object" is doubted, the foundation is doubted.

If read closely, much of what I've written implies that Wittgenstein's OC enhances the traditional view of knowledge as JTB. I believe that JTB is still a good definition, but given OC, it needs a bit more nuance. Let me be a bit more precise about my view of JTB given the backdrop of OC.

So, integrating JTB into OC involves rethinking how we use justification and truth, and how we think of beliefs. For example, justification often focuses on logic or rational argument, but Wittgenstein's approach is more practical focusing on the various language games within our forms of life. Also to acknowledge the limitations of justification as foundational or bedrock to our whole system of knowledge. Thus, what constitutes justification is based on the context of the language game being played. To understand this requires a good understanding of Witt's views in the PI.

My approach to truth is that it's more about their role in different language games. So, one role is that statements can be true as part of a framework, like the role of hinges or the role that rules play in a game. These are not truths that are justified, but truths that are part of our background certainty (and they can be used as propositions in an argument).

The other predominant role of truth is those that are justified, these are epistemological, i.e., they are used in our language games of epistemology. So, I don't think the use of truth is restricted to the language games of epistemology. I guess this is a dualistic approach to truth.

You can think of traditional JTB as being enhanced by OC. First, with the base layer of hinge propositions (or as I like to say basic beliefs or basic subjective certainties). In this layer justification and truth are about their role in our system of epistemology, viz., they're bedrock to our system of epistemology. In other words, they allow the language games of epistemology to take root.

The upper layers above the base layer (bedrock) are more akin to the traditional language games of JTB. This is where the typical role of inference takes place.

Then there is the role of skepticism in all of this or the role of doubting. Some claims don't need to be justified in response to skeptical doubt because they are part of what makes doubting possible.

This view of knowledge (JTB) is more holistic and is connected to a web of beliefs, practices (forms of life), and language games. So, JTB is enhanced by Wittgenstein and how it correlates with our practical life, viz., how we act (linguistically and as we move in the world).

By integrating these ideas the traditional model of JTB can be enhanced.

So, whenever I use JTB this is what I think about.

I think there is a need here to distinguish between essential and accidental properties, as a way toward understanding this question. If we say that every single rule is essential to the game known as "chess", then changing any one of them would render the new game as no longer "chess". We'd then say that any such change affects the foundation. But if, for example, we designate only the position of "check" as essential to the game, then we are free to make all sort of rule changes, still call the new game "chess", and say that we have not doubted "the foundation".

So it all depends on what is determined as "the foundation". I believe that in many conceptions, there is no such thing as "the foundation", because numerous essential aspects are brought together, therefore numerous foundational aspects — Metaphysician Undercover

A language game like chess has built into its assumptions the looseness of the relations among its rules. This looseness is what makes it permissible to tinker with individual rules without making the game unrecognizable or incoherent. What is considered accidental and what is essential is itself specified by the structure of the language game of chess. By contrast , the language game underlying the statement ‘water boils at 100 degrees’ cannot remain intact if this fact is questioned.

However, I believe that we do have to acknowledge the reality of foundational aspects, such as when we turn things right around, like the change from the geocentric to the heliocentric model. Clearly the foundational belief was doubted.
Imagine if we turned the game of chess right around, so that each player started in an equal position of checkmate, with some pieces already taken off the board, and the players were allowed to move other pieces while the king was checked, and the goal was to get all the pieces back to what is now the starting place. This would render the check position irrelevant, and that change would clearly be the result of doubting the foundation, because "the object" of the game would be completely changed. In this case we can say that when the conception of "the object" is doubted, the foundation is doubted — Metaphysician Undercover

Wiitgenstein uses the word ‘doubt’ to indicate a situation where some particular feature within a language game is put into question, while leaving the game intact. This is why he says that some beliefs must be left certain in order to doubt anything. We can’t doubt the geocentric model by switching to a heliocentric model unless the two models have features that can be incorporated under the same language game.

My approach to truth is that it's more about their role in different language games. So, one role is that statements can be true as part of a framework, like the role of hinges or the role that rules play in a game. These are not truths that are justified, but truths that are part of our background certainty (and they can be used as propositions in an argument). — Sam26

You say that the system of convictions that form the background certainty of a language game can be used as propositions in an argument . Banno says the kind of propositions that the ‘truths’ of a background system of convictions can be used as are those which assign a truth value. Do you agree with him? If not , what kind of propositional argument can these truths be used as? Can you give an example? I have problems with calling a language game an ‘argument’. What kind of argument is a form of life? If we try to persuade someone to adopt our way of seeing, are we presenting an argument or is our way of seeing the condition of possibility for arguments? Isnt the language game the bedrock, the groundless ground for arguments and the point where arguments end?

105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.

By this, Wittgenstein doesn’t mean that the elements of the background system form a meta-argument, but that they are not of the order of an argument at all.

the bedrock, the groundless ground — Joshs

I think the following metaphor is apt:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

You say that the system of convictions that form the background certainty of a language game can be used as propositions in an argument — Joshs

Sorry Josh, but I never said anything about a "system of convictions." You're confusing what I said about Moore's use of "I know..." (which is more like an expression of conviction as opposed to knowledge) with the framework of reality, made up of basic beliefs or certainties.

The statement, "I believe this is a hand," can be said (I don't like the term 'truth value') to be true in some language games. It's comparable to saying "It's true that bishops move diagonally." These are just certainties that grow out of very basic beliefs about our foundational background. For example, part of the background reality of chess is that there are rules, pieces, and a board, and it's this background that allows for the game of chess. In the same way, basic beliefs (hinges) are basic beliefs about our background (beliefs like "we have hands" "there are other minds" etc) - this background is necessary for the language games of knowledge and doubt to take place. This doesn't mean that basic beliefs can't be referred to as true, just not in combination with being justified, i.e., justified and true. So, you can't on the one hand believe that the foundation is not justified (i.e., hinges) and on the other say they are justified. It's necessarily the case that hinges aren't justified - that's the whole point of Witt's argument.

I believe that JTB is still a good definition, but given OC, it needs a bit more nuance. — Sam26

But did Wittgenstein continue to believe it was a good definition?

"Don't think, look!"

"I know I have a toothache - how silly of you to suppose otherwise!". "I know where my hand is".

These look to be reasonable, straight forward uses of "I know..." and yet they are problematic for the JTB account. The use of "I know..." is broader than the JTB account sanctions. The game is played, in such a way that the JTB account is inadequate to explain it.

I had my tonsils out and was in the Evelyn Nursing Home feeling sorry for myself. Wittgenstein called. I croaked: I feel just like a dog that has been run over. He was disgusted: “You don't know what a dog that has been run over feels like.”

Would he also say that you don't know that you have a toothache?

And if he did, would he be right? Or would he be delineating "know" in an arbitrary fashion, against his admonition to look to use?

I don't think it contrary to the OC to say Wittgenstein was arguing for the inadequacy of Justified True Belief. And he would be in good company.

But this is one of the problems with working on an unfinished document.

But did Wittgenstein continue to believe it was a good definition? — Banno

I'm sure he didn't align himself with the traditional accounts of JTB. So, no, I don't think he would agree with traditional JTB. This was acknowledged above in my account, although not explicitly.

"Don't think, look!"

"I know I have a toothache - how silly of you to suppose otherwise!". "I know where my hand is".

These look to be reasonable, straight forward uses of "I know..." and yet they are problematic for the JTB account. The use of "I know..." is broader than the JTB account sanctions. The game is played, in such a way that the JTB account is inadequate to explain it. — Banno

They do look reasonable, after all, Moore thought so. I wouldn't say they're problematic (although they're problematic for Moore's account) for JTB. I would say they aren't JTB at all, and that's Witt's point.

I don't think it contrary to the OC to say Wittgenstein was arguing for the inadequacy of Justified True Belief. And he would be in good company. — Banno

I don't see any indication that Witt was specifically arguing against JTB. He was arguing against the misuse of language, specifically Moore's misuse of know. Moreover, Moore's use of know, strictly speaking isn't a case of JTB. I think that's more to the point.

I would say they aren't JTB at all, and that's Witt's point. — Sam26

So there are legitimate uses of "I know..." that are not instances of justified true belief?

Yes.

Cool. Then the JTB definition is incomplete?

Sam26
Cool. Then the JTB definition is incomplete? — Banno

I mean...

No, it's not incomplete, there are just other uses (language games) where the use of "I know.." isn't JTB.

Then as an account of the uses of "I know...", JTB is incomplete.

Gettier is just a repeat of the aporia of the ending of the Theaetetus. Let's not.

Wittgenstein pointed out in several instances that Moore's use of "I know..." is more like an expression of a conviction, it's not that JTB is incomplete. You seem to not acknowledge that there are uses of "I know..." outside JTB, i.e., they have nothing to do with JTB. For example, "My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it. Here the expression 'I know' stands for the conviction [my emphasis] that this is so (OC 86)." These are two completely different language games. Not every language game involving the use of "I know..." is about an epistemological language game (JTB).

By the way, the whole Gettier problem is misguided, but I agree with you and am not interested in re-hashing that mess.

Sorry Josh, but I never said anything about a "system of convictions." You're confusing what I said about Moore's use of "I know..." (which is more like an expression of conviction as opposed to knowledge) with the framework of reality, made up of basic beliefs or certainties. — Sam26

I was equating “system of convictions” with the expression you did use: “truths that are part of our background certainty.”
Do you distinguish between what you call the “framework of reality” and what Wittgenstein calls a system of convictions, which I see as equivalent to language games, hinge propositions and forms of life?

The statement, "I believe this is a hand," can be said (I don't like the term 'truth value') to be true in some language games. It's comparable to saying "It's true that bishops move diagonally." — Sam26

Someone is trying to learn the rules of chess. They are afraid they are getting it wrong, so they ask if it is true that bishops move two squares up and one step over. Even as they ask this, they doubt that they have it right. Notice how in this example, it makes sense to talk about true vs false and doubt. But what is one doubting, what is one getting wrong, the language game of chess? But that can’t be, because it doesn’t make sense to doubt a language game. So what is true or false, or to be doubted, about the statement ‘bishops move diagonally’ if not the rules of chess?

Isnt my telling someone their belief that ‘bishops move two squares up and one step over’ is false akin to the adherent of an heliocentric account telling the adherent of a geocentric account that their belief is false? In both examples, aren’t the concepts of falsity and doubt misplaced? We act as though believing a bishop moves two squares up and one square over is incorrect in the same way as miscalculating the product of 25 x 347, when in fact it is an example of producing rules of a different language game than that of chess.

You seem to not acknowledge that there are uses of "I know..." outside JTB — Sam26

Rather, I was wondering whether you made that acknowledgement. The wording 'Not every language game involving the use of "I know..." is about an epistemological language game (JTB)' strikes me as problematic, again. Epistemology is, arguably, the study of "I know..." more than of JTB.

Cheers, thanks for humouring me.

the whole Gettier problem is misguided — Sam26

I quite agree.

Glad I could provide some humor. :grin:

We act as though believing a bishop moves two squares up and one square over is incorrect in the same way as miscalculating the product of 25 x 347, when in fact it is an example of producing rules of a different language game than that of chess. — Joshs

My take on that is that chess is a game (or perhaps even a sport, though I personally don't think so) while math is not a game. The very expression "language game" should be retired from Philosophy of Language. It served its purpose, it now has the same epistemological status as the Aether or the Phlogiston.

My take on that is that chess is a game (or perhaps even a sport, though I personally don't think so) while math is not a game. — Arcane Sandwich

By ‘game’, Wittgenstein meant a discursively produced and reproduced system ( convention) of intelligibility. I consider math to be a discursive convention as well.

By ‘game’, Wittgenstein meant a discursively produced and reproduced system ( convention) of intelligibility. I consider math to be a discursive convention as well. — Joshs

Sure, but not in the same way that chess is a discursive convention. You don't do math because you want to win some math tournament. You're doing basic and applied research. What basic and applied research are chess players doing when they play chess?

I was equating “system of convictions” with the expression you did use: “truths that are part of our background certainty.”
Do you distinguish between what you call the “framework of reality” and what Wittgenstein calls a system of convictions, which I see as equivalent to language games, hinge propositions and forms of life? — Joshs

While it's true that many of our convictions are hinges (basic beliefs), I wouldn't use "system of convictions," and Witt never used this wording. He did equate Moore's use of "I know..." to that of an expression of a conviction, which closely resembles a strong opinion, although not always. Sometimes one's conviction is the result of JTB, it's just that the conviction is justified as opposed to Moore's conviction which isn't justified, nor can it be.

I've explained in other posts the answers to your last two paragraphs. Please, I don't want to re-write it, or even search for where I talked about these issues.