It's more a question of where the soil seems most fertile.

I was just going through a book that’s a guide to philosophers and their work, not one mention of Heidegger. Is it that bad?

Edit: on reflection I think it might have been a matter of space and that they chose Kant over Heigegger.

↪180 Proof I wasn't going to write anything in this thread, since the less oxygen given Heidegger, the better; but tha[nk] you for your summation as to why. — Banno

Yeah, well, boredom made me do it ...

I'm not sure why you include Spinoza, however. Surely not the clearest writer either. — Xtrix

Read S. His latin is crystal clear as are the excellent english translations by Stuart Hampshire & Edwin Curley. (Also, S is the ontologist par excellence.) H's german, on the other hand, is as clear as mud, which many scholars have also attested to, such that even very fine translators like Joan Stambaugh could not render H's meandering mumblings into serviceably lucid english.

If you mean the opposite of what Nietzsche thought, then all I can say is that Heidegger discusses "being" a lot where Nietzsche thought it was a "vapor" and "mistake" -- but that's Heidegger's entire philosophy ...

And so H uncharitably interprets N in his own 'onto-theological' terms rather than in N's philological-genealogical & psychological-axiological terms - thus, what I call 'anti-Nietzschean' - in order to project onto N's 'practices' the very 'onto-theology' H claims to have 'overcome' even as he too 'practices' it; thus, "die Kehre" away from Sein to Seyn, etc. Obscurant pedantic sophistry. :shade:

But you haven't really shown you've read his works -- have you?

Apparently I have not "shown" anything to you since clearly you've not studied H's works enough (or any of the philosophers I've cited in my previous post) to recognize the pearls I've cast before you. :roll:

Where does [Heidegger] go wrong?

You've already answered your own question, Xtrix:

Heidegger discusses "being" a lot where Nietzsche thought it was a "vapor" and "mistake" ...

As for Nietzsche's ideas about values, [Heidegger] doesn't have much to say about that.

[Heidegger] ignores social and political issues [implications] ... That's just not his concern.

As for obscurantism -- yes, a common charge, and one he anticipates ... the same charge has been made against Kant and Hegel as well, not completely unfairly.

... the neologisms and awkwardness of translating a complex analysis of "being" from idiomatic German ...

It's more a question of where the soil seems most fertile. — Banno

Yeah, I agree. It's hard to be a mortal with only so much time and decide which soil is more or less fertile. Time and chance lead us all to different thinkers in a different life contexts.

Perhaps we focus too much on the authors and not enough on the intensity of reading. I'm used to people hating on Nietzsche, because Nietzsche can be outright obnoxious. But if one stays with Nietzsche and grows up while reading Nietzsche...one uses Nietzsche to criticize Nietzsche.

I can probably think of something objectionable about every philosopher that I have learned from. I'm guessing that many of us feel that we are beyond taking this or that talkative mortal as our guru. We're all lighting matches in the dark, which doesn't mean we don't also act with a certain confidence.

I’m interested in definitions of Besorgen and Sorge and the use of “care” and “concern”. These seems to me, in spirit, more like engagement. Any thoughts?

I was just going through a book that’s a guide to philosophers and their work, not one mention of Heidegger. Is it that bad? — Brett

Is what that bad?

I'm not sure why you include Spinoza, however. Surely not the clearest writer either.
— Xtrix
Read S. His latin is crystal clear as are the excellent english translations by Stuart Hampshire & Edwin Curley. (Also, S is the ontologist par excellence.) — 180 Proof

I can't read Latin very well unfortunately. But if you say Spinoza is clearer in Latin, I believe you.

As for ontologist par excellence -- one of the greatest, no doubt. But the fact that he's still very much (like Pascal) struggling with Christianity makes me less likely to delve in further. I've only (partly) read his Ethics. But he's certainly on my list, with Augustine, Anselm, Suarez, Duns Scotus, and Aquinas. (I realize he's not defining "god" in the way the Church Fathers did, by the way.)

H's german, on the other hand, is as clear as mud, which many scholars have also attested to, such that even very fine translators like Joan Stambaugh could not render H's meandering mumblings into serviceably lucid english. — 180 Proof

Unfortunately German isn't a second language of mine either. But from what I've come across, there are many scholars who say his German isn't unclear, it's just very idiomatic and extremely hard to translate into English. I've also heard from Dreyfus, and others, that the John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson version is still the best we have (although quite a few adjustments need to be made there as well -- for example of their translation of "woraufhin"). So perhaps that's worth a try, if attempting to take a serious look at it.

And so H uncharitably interprets N in his own 'onto-theological' terms rather than in N's philological-genealogical & psychological-axiological terms — 180 Proof

When? I never see him translating Nietzsche's ideas about values into ontology. Heidegger argues that Nietzsche eternal recurrence is ontological; that's debatable, of course -- and Heidegger is the first to admit this. He acknowledges Nietzsche did indeed believe the concept of "being" was a vapor and mistake -- and agrees with him in the sense of how it's been handled in Western thought.

But you haven't really shown you've read his works -- have you?

Apparently I have not "shown" anything to you since clearly you've not studied H's works enough (or any of the philosophers I've cited in my previous post) to recognize the pearls I've cast before you. :roll: — 180 Proof

But I have studied Heidegger, carefully, at length, and in detail. I think I've demonstrated that as well, numerous times on this thread and in this forum. If you have as well, you've been very non-specific in your critique. You made a few claims, like the one about wu wei, which may indeed be true, but which I have no way of checking or fully understanding because, again, it's so vague.

Where does [Heidegger] go wrong?
You've already answered your own question, Xtrix:

Heidegger discusses "being" a lot where Nietzsche thought it was a "vapor" and "mistake" ...

As for Nietzsche's ideas about values, [Heidegger] doesn't have much to say about that.

[Heidegger] ignores social and political issues [implications] ... That's just not his concern.

As for obscurantism -- yes, a common charge, and one he anticipates ... the same charge has been made against Kant and Hegel as well, not completely unfairly.

... the neologisms and awkwardness of translating a complex analysis of "being" from idiomatic German ... — 180 Proof

Yes, but I've also started this thread and mentioned from the beginning I think Heidegger is an immensely deep and important thinker who has taught me a great deal. So if these are truly your criticisms, then I repeat: that's fine, but superficial. Why? Because Heidegger is up front about what he's doing: his question, repeated over and over again, is that of "the meaning of being." If that's not what you're interested in, and prefer learning or thinking about politics, ethics, social issues, etc., then why bother with Heidegger at all? You won't find it there.

But that's much less a criticism of his thought than it is a reflection of your interests.

Is what that bad? — Xtrix

The antipathy towards him.

Not that I can tell. I know there's been a lot of backlash, and continues to be, for his being a member of the Nazi party. I'm no apologist for him in this respect, but I do think his work contributes much to philosophy. If some guides leave him out, that's their decision, but I don't see it as widespread "cancellation."

Here's an infamous line, yanked out of context, that I'd like to re-contextualize.

Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy. — Heidegger

A thinking is 'strong' if it questions the very framework ('vocabulary','method') that is currently taken for granted (enacted 'blindly' and automatically). If I work within the taken-for-granted framework or vocabulary or method, then I'm just doing more 'normal discourse.' This is sub-philosophical or at most 'weak' philosophy. At this level we can argue as if our terms and method were fixed, which is to say pseudo-mechanically. To say that we are thrown is to say that we are always already operating in such unnoticed, inherited frameworks. As being-in-the-world, we are mostly no one or the one enacting the form of life.

If a 'strong' thinking comes along and intervenes against the vocabulary or the tacit assumptions of a conversation, then it is 'unintelligible' from 'within' that conversation. The sacred current vocabulary is being rudely fucked with! Our bold boy is talking nonsense ! Our initial reaction 'must' be a misreading that tries to tame such deviation by re-assimilating or refuting it in the currently dominant vocabulary.

Also... our would-be strong philosopher or thinker has no choice but to use the currently dominant vocabulary even as he seeks to undermine it. We just are the history that we're trying to wake up from. To abandon this thrust against our throwness (the project of dragging our constraining prejudices into the light) is to abandon 'strong' philosophy to fly around in the same old bottle.

I’m interested in definitions of Besorgen and Sorge and the use of “care” and “concern”. These seems to me, in spirit, more like engagement. Any thoughts? — Brett

I think it's definitely related. Anything we engage with or "comport" ourselves to involves "care" and "concern," or "concernful circumspection." In the simplest sense I can think of, any time we're doing anything at all, there's some kind of "attending" involved and thus "caring." Unfortunately there are many connotations with "care" as well, in the social sense of "caring for one another." I think it's worth keeping in mind Husserl's "intentionality" here, because it's in this context that Heidegger is defining "Sorge."

Perhaps we focus too much on the authors and not enough on the intensity of reading. I'm used to people hating on Nietzsche, because Nietzsche can be outright obnoxious. But if one stays with Nietzsche and grows up while reading Nietzsche...one uses Nietzsche to criticize Nietzsche. — path

Exactly right. One should react against and criticize only something they understand, otherwise they're whacking at straw men. While no one has infinite time to read everything, and carefully, one should be careful to rely on secondary sources, pop culture philosophy books, etc., and form a "stance" on the thinker in question on that basis alone. It's risky business, and at best you are left with an extremely general view. Better to reserve judgment or acknowledge your superficial engagement, rather than feign expertise. This happens far more often on this forum than I would have expected, even for "amateur" philosophy people. It's just ego I suppose.

To me this passage just destroys our mentalistic assumptions. We don't have some isolated subject gazing on Platonic meanings. The inside is outside. — path

From my reading I don't see him saying there is no "inside" or "outside," but that indeed there is an "inner" and that "inner concepts" can't be really linked to objects. But I don't know the full context of Wittgenstein to be confident in that reading.

I do agree with you, however: there really isn't an "inner" world separated from an "outer" world. This is very hard for some people to accept, as is the subject/object dichotomy. We love our dualisms.

Lots of famous people being influenced and interested is of course no proof that Heidegger or whoever is great, but it might give one pause. — path

I love this. Exactly right. I know it gives me pause. In the same way that a good friend who knows your taste makes a recommendation for a place to travel or a book to read or a movie to see -- something I may have otherwise considered garbage, and therefore ignored, now I'm much more likely to want to take a look at.

'That fad didn't suck me in. I'm too shrewd.' I don't know if we are ever done deciding if we are lying to ourselves in either direction. — path

I think there's personal reasons involved perhaps, but also the question should be asked: What is most useful not only to me now (and to the current world), but the future world?

At least with this more future-oriented sense of "useful" in mind, I keep gravitating towards a handful of people in various domains, and I'd like to think I have good values and good instincts. To me the names Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Chomsky are the most relevant and interesting, if I were forced to choose only the essentials. But I may be completely wrong as well -- I can live with that.

Again so there's no huge mystery: I think the key to the future isn't space travel and artificial intelligence as far as technology goes, but eugenics (not in the Nazi sense!), and in terms of spirituality (in the philosophical-artistic sense) in the most general sense.

Better to reserve judgment or acknowledge your superficial engagement, rather than feign expertise. — Xtrix

Yeah I like that. I haven't always lived up to it, but yes. And we can question the notion of expertise beyond its vague relative use. I've read passionate disputes between Heidegger scholars (Sheehan and Farin). Even the experts can't agree...on the basic message!

Is there such a thing as Heidegger in the singular? Are we ever done figuring out any thinker? I think Heidegger is first rate. But even a second-rate thinker can't be mastered, perhaps. By 'mastered I mean assimilated with a kind of assured finality. This is often associated with a sense of knowing what so-and-so was 'really getting at.' I have this sense myself at times. Gadamer thinks its essential to reading. We constantly project a vague total meaning as we read and constantly adjust this projection. Perhaps it eventually stabilizes, giving us a sense of relative mastery.

I love this. Exactly right. I know it gives me pause. In the same way that a good friend who knows your taste makes a recommendation for a place to travel or a book to read or a movie to see -- something I may have otherwise considered garbage, and therefore ignored, now I'm much more likely to want to take a look at. — Xtrix

Thanks! Indeed, that's just how I hopped from poet to poet, novelist to novelist. Someone wins your trust. It could be a friend, or it could be a philosopher. I really got into Rorty, and he led me to taking difficult Heidegger and Hegel seriously enough to read the originals (and other secondary sources).

Rorty I found by chance at the public library. I just loved his easy style. I also found Kojeve this way, and he fused Hegel and Heidegger into something that really blew my mind.

Definitely truth in that. There's lots of interpretation, projection, and re-assessing whenever studying something hard. How we do so is also shaped by our purposes, values, and goals. What I said earlier about "usefulness" was a little misleading because while true, it doesn't necessarily mean what's most "useful" and what's the most important "part" of what's been said.

I think there's personal reasons involved perhaps, but also the question should be asked: What is most useful not only to me now (and to the current world), but the future world? — Xtrix

As I grow older I become more aware of how much I do care about the human future. I think we all do, and that to be intellectual is even to implicitly enact the 'we.' We get bored with our idiosyncrasies. We want to connect with something larger. I suggest that we have transferred traditionally religious passions into a secular humanism that can criticize itself. Instead of the afterlife, we think of how future generations might benefit from our efforts.

[Criticizing secular humanism might include getting some distance from our anthropocentrism and the willful subject.]

To me the names Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Chomsky are the most relevant and interesting, — Xtrix

I haven't studied Anaxmander or Chomksy closely, but the others have been important to me.

This happens far more often on this forum than I would have expected, even for "amateur" philosophy people. It's just ego I suppose. — Xtrix

Yeah. I studied the clash of 'sec' and 'sarl' (Derrida and Searle) closely in Limited Inc. Even at the top level there's the same kind of nasty and impish combat. (I know that you are currently a Derrida skeptic, but in this context Derrida might as well be Heidegger. He's trying to do a strong thinking that is being opposed rhetorically by appeals to the obvious and the familiar.)

On this forum in particular I have often seen two exceptionally intelligent people do their best to tear one another to shreds, paint the other (clearly bright) as an idiot. It's not the same two people each time but a recurring pattern. (I follow many conversations that I never participate in.)

Again so there's no huge mystery: I think the key to the future isn't space travel and artificial intelligence as far as technology goes, but eugenics (not in the Nazi sense!), and in terms of spirituality (in the philosophical-artistic sense) in the most general sense. — Xtrix

I agree that tech won't save us. If something can save us, I (also) think it will be spiritual in the philosophical-artistic sense, which will manifest politically. 'Only a god can save us' is legit if interpreted a certain way. The eugenics theme is fascinating. Elaborate if you feel like it.

I agree that tech won't save us. If something can save us, I (also) think it will be spiritual in the philosophical-artistic sense, which will manifest politically. — path

And thus we come full circle, in a sense. Philosophy and politics in some ways seem like polar opposites, but are connected in very clear ways. The latter is far more pressing to deal with these days, no matter how knowledgable or familiar one is with philosophy (or history) -- but having that knowledge certainly doesn't hurt. I'd argue that, like with any decision, the more information one takes into account, the better the decision will be. The same is true about where we go as as species and how we should therefore organize society.

The connection is that the powerful people of the world who are currently making the key decisions for hundreds of millions (and in fact billions) of human beings, are not aliens -- they have ideologies. They have belief systems. Thought systems, perspectives, in which they interpret the world and set their agenda. Much is tied up with values, and the values with "religions," but I'd argue they are really philosophical at bottom (even the Christian "ontology" in the sense of a worldview).

From my reading I don't see him saying there is no "inside" or "outside," but that indeed there is an "inner" and that "inner concepts" can't be really linked to objects. But I don't know the full context of Wittgenstein to be confident in that reading. — Xtrix

Yanked out of context like that, the passage is far from conclusive. Surely I am reading into it also. But if the beetle in the box plays no role, then that's revolutionary. Hegel made a similar point in his first book. A crude empiricism wants to point 'here' and 'now.' 'Look! Reality is right there.'

Some kind of ineffable direct access is vaguely taken for granted and yet plays no role. This is why the question of being is related to the question of meaning and the question of consciousness for me.

I have a strong sense that I'm always still finding words to say in new ways that we human beings don't know what we are talking about. Now obviously we get along practically. So I'm exaggerating as a rhetorical device in order to make something visible. This helps me relate to Heidegger trying to awaken the question of being. I am still trying to figure out how the question of meaning and the question of being relate, beyond the straightforward way (what does it mean to say something is?)

Is it the same-enough question? I think AI connects to this, not because (at all) I project some mystical capacity on AI. Rather because AI is a kind of a mirror for us. Whatever we think that AI can never be is related to whatever meaning is or being is. Just to emphasize, I don't have answers. With Heidegger, I just want to light up a question, drag our 'ignorance' or hazy preinterpretation into the light.

It's basically a thrust against complacent chatter that has no choice but to work within that chatter.

The eugenics theme is fascinating. Elaborate if you feel like it. — path

That requires another thread, I think!

But oddly enough, this is something Heidegger worried about. With the advancements in genetics, the only thing that stands in our way (truly) are ethical (philosophical) concerns. Eventually the taboo will be lifted, and we can in a sense "engineer" human beings. I think that's probably the next stage of our evolution.

Philosophy and politics in some ways seem like polar opposites, but are connected in very clear ways. — Xtrix

Indeed, I am even tempted to speak of the primacy of the political and the embedded-ness of any philosophy within a contentious history.

They have belief systems. Thought systems, perspectives, in which they interpret the world and set their agenda. Much is tied up with values, and the values with "religions," but I'd argue they are really philosophical at bottom (even the Christian "ontology" in the sense of a worldview). — Xtrix

Right! And beyond their conscious ideologies I think there are 'enacted' non-linguistic comportments. I also see the philosophy in Christianity. I like to generalize either religion or philosophy to something like 'form of life' or 'spirit of the times.' We enact a stance on our existence that is only to some degree verbalized or self-aware. In some stances we see a critical tradition (philosophy proper) that allows for a kind of endless bonfire (yet quietly constrained nevertheless by throwness.)

[Have to go get some work that pays done, but I'll be back for more!]

But oddly enough, this is something Heidegger worried about. With the advancements in genetics, the only thing that stands in our way (truly) are ethical (philosophical) concerns. Eventually the taboo will be lifted, and we can in a sense "engineer" human beings. I think that's probably the next stage of our evolution. — Xtrix

Perhaps one begins to see why the predilection for Heidegger.

Eventually the taboo will be lifted, and we can in a sense "engineer" human beings. I think that's probably the next stage of our evolution. — Xtrix

I'll just make one last comment. In The Possibility of an Island, we get to see the 'neo-humans' who drink sunlight through their green skin. Yes, it's likely enough that we will do it. This is a great issue indeed. [This is not to say that we should do it.]

Yes Banno, because I love the Nazis. Run along.

Perhaps one begins to see why the predilection for Heidegger. — Banno

:yikes: :rofl:

Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy.
— Heidegger — path

Thanks for this - so I didn't have to.

As for ontologist par excellence -- one of the greatest, no doubt. But the fact that he's still very much (like Pascal) struggling with Christianity makes me less likely to delve in further. — Xtrix

Given that S was an excommunicated Jew, the first openly secular philosopher in Christendom in the last half or so millennium and the father of biblical (Tanakh & Xtian NT) criticism, he certainly wasn't "struggling with Christianity" (Judaism, Islam or any 'religious faith').

I've also heard from Dreyfus, and others, that the John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson version is still the best we have (although quite a few adjustments need to be made there as well -- for example of their translation of "woraufhin").

If you're literate in deutsch, then that earlier 1962 translation more than suffices. It's the version I first read in the early 1980s since it was the only one available until 1996 (which I read a decade later). And since Stambaugh's is based on H's 1976 revisions of SuZ instead of the 1927 manuscript on which Macquarrie's & Robinson's translation was based, I'll stand by Stambaugh's as more authoritative (pace Dreyfus et al).

So perhaps that's worth a try, if attempting to take a serious look at it.

Be-en there, Do-ne that. :yawn:

But I have studied Heidegger, carefully, at length, and in detail. I think I've demonstrated that as well, numerous times on this thread and in this forum.

If you say so. Clearly, neither of us is convinced of the other's bona fides. For me, sir, H is not worth my time to delve any deeper than I have - e.g citing chapter & verse - in order to more thoroughly critique his work (or the relevance to ANY existential project, as I've said, of the question of a "meaning of being" (vide Adorno, Levinas, Arendt et al)).

... "the meaning of being." If that's not what you're interested in, and prefer learning or thinking about politics, ethics, social issues, etc., then why bother with Heidegger at all?

A philosophy which is either of no consequence to or concerned even tangentally with its own implications for "politics, ethics, social issues, etc" is not worth bothering with - EXCEPT that H's has blitzkrieged universities throughout the West since the end of the Second World War, and in order to make sense of all the p0m0 backwash in his wake, H has to be studied. If one is serious, one doesn't choose philosophers a la cart or from a buffet table; serious study includes running down significant sources wherever and whomever they are. If you are serious, Xtrix, then you know that, and that your question is disingenuous.

My criticism isn't that he is mole hill easily bypassed but that H is a very high mountain pass to scale and find the least treacherously sophistical path through and beyond him; or as Freddy Zarathustra might say, H is a "priestly-type" of human, all too human "underhanded (onto)theologian" decadent one must overcome in oneself in order to affirm the whole of life - amor fati!

That's much less a criticism of his thought than it is a reflection of your interests.

Maybe; I don't think so. We'll have to agree to disagree on this point.

...the only thing that stands in our way (truly) are ethical (philosophical) concerns. Eventually the taboo will be lifted... — Xtrix

Not at all sus, that. We don't want all that ethics getting in the way.