to criticize of reductionism is to have an issue with what explanations are — TheMadFool

Not really. It is to criticize the traditional materialist conceptual toolbox for explaining things as being made of just one single tool. It’s not enough to explain this world.

If A has causal efficacy, why can’t something from level A affect something from level B? — Olivier5

You tell me.

It is to criticize the traditional materialist conceptual toolbox — Olivier5

Reductionism is not peculiar to materialism, and neither does materialism entail reductionism. Idealism is reductionist with respect to the physical. On the other hand, there are non-reductionists among materialists/physicalists.

the OP understands reductionism as materialist reductionism, and that people generally mean by the term. That’s certainly how I use it.

If I were to take exception to anything, I would think science is at least partially reductionism-driven, insofar as science should always seek the simplest principles....derived from the fewest conceptions.....to justify its methods.

Otherwise......well done.

Not really. It is to criticize the traditional materialist conceptual toolbox for explaining things as being made of just one single tool. It’s not enough to explain this world. — Olivier5

Then why give such a misleading name to the problem, - "reductionism"? Call it what it really is - materialism.

I suppose there may be other forms of materialism / naturalism that do not rule out the emergence of complex, new phenomena at higher levels of organisation, not necessarily predetermined and regimented by quarks... Life, human agency, the world of ideas and all that. It’s emerging, growing, evolving in non-linear, non-predictable ways. It can’t be reduced to a bunch of quarks shaking their ass up.

If I were to take exception to anything, I would think science is at least partially reductionism-driven, insofar as science should always seek the simplest principles....derived from the fewest conceptions.....to justify its methods.

Otherwise......well done. — Mww

Thank you! :) Occam's razor is not really the same as reductionism or is perhaps a very different kind of reductionism. Occam's razor shaves off assumptions in a theory that are unnecessary to the predictions that theory yields, e.g. that gravity is due to the curvature of a spacetime called Barbara. Reductionism replaces study of a system as a whole with study of its structural components working together. What I mean by "not reductionism-driven" is that, when a new thing is discovered (say, the Higgs boson), the next logical question isn't "what is it made of?". It's perfectly reasonable to be open to the idea of a Higgs boson having an internal structure, even though that doesn't fit with Higg's theory. But one proceeds on the assumption of simplicity until experiment suggests otherwise, which is what happened with atoms.

It's not really a philosophical position. We have limited resources for limited time; it is uneconomical to investigate questions there's no experimental reason for asking.

That said, it does happen. After formulating general relativity, Einstein immediately sought a unified theory of gravity and electromagnetism. This wasn't completely random: the mathematical similarities between the two theories are intriguing, and Einstein was in a position to do whatever Einstein wanted. A mathematician named Klein later found that both theories are the same in five dimensions, which gave rise to string theory, and what a waste of resources that turned out to be! Quantum gravity theorists are also reductionist, attempting to formulate a quantum theory of gravity to replace general relativity. Again, it's not a total longshot: quantum mechanics absorbed the special theory of relativity easily enough and that gave rise to quantum theories of all other forces, so it was not expected to be as hard as it turned out to be. (Also, string theory, which is a quantum theory, churns out gravity very well, hence it stuck around for so long.)

But these are exceptions to the rule, what we call "fringe science" or sometimes harshly "pseudoscience". Generally, we proceed on the basis that, if there's no evidence for internal structure of a thing, the thing can be assumed to be simple even if it is not. And most of the time we treat complex things as simple. (An anecdote: a fluid mechanics lecturer is asked about the aerodynamics of horse-racing. The lecture thinks, then takes up her chalk: "Assume the horse to be a perfect sphere...")

The drive to determine e.g. how love works on a physical level isn't scientists being spoilsports. We love love as much as the next fella. It's just that we know stuff about the brain now that leads us to examine how complex-seeming phenomena like love in complex systems like bodies can arise from interactions between simpler components for which well-tested theory already exists.

Occam's razor is not really the same as reductionism.... — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, William was more into parsimony than reductionism, per se.

It's not really a philosophical position. — Kenosha Kid

What isn’t? Reductionism? True enough, although reasoning logically from the general to the particular might be considered a philosophical reduction.

Another interesting post, at any rate. So thanks for that.

What isn’t? Reductionism? True enough, although reasoning logically from the general to the particular might be considered a philosophical reduction. — Mww

And thank you again! ^ I meant the scientific community's tendency to assume simplicity where possible. It's not a philosophy, rather an economy.

It's not a philosophy, rather an economy. — Kenosha Kid

Must be a scientific domain then; there’s no such thing as economic philosophy.

I meant the scientific community's tendency to assume simplicity where possible. It's not a philosophy, rather an economy. — Kenosha Kid

Or using Occam's razor.

Basically, reductionism is an inevitable consequence of the way we've defined the word "explanation". — TheMadFool

Analysis and reductionism are not the same thing. You can analyze anything into its components. It only becomes reductive when you assume that every phenomena at the system level (i.e. the thing being analyzed) must be sufficiently described at the level of the analyzed components.

@ssu :rofl:

I should clarify, practically speaking, it's an economy. Scientists will also defend Occam's razor philosophically. (Which is necessary for defending the economy.)

It only becomes reductive when you assume that every phenomena at the system level (i.e. the thing being analyzed) must be sufficiently described at the level of the analyzed components. — Pantagruel

For clarity, and your definition does cover this but not explicitly, the phenomena of the structure need to be understandable in terms of more elementary phenomena, not the same phenomena exhibited by more elementary components. What many-body people call "collective behaviour". This rids us of having to explain why the concept of love need not exist in atoms. Or at least it should :joke:

A 200lb pile of graphite and a 200lb solid diamond grandfather clock are both just 200lbs of carbon atoms, but the arrangement of those atoms makes all the difference. Saying that does not go against the reducibility of them both. — Pfhorrest

Sorry Pfhorrest, I don't understand the point? I'm not saying that reductionism qua analysis is invalid. I'm saying that concluding that there is nothing "above" that level of analysis is unwarranted. — Pantagruel

Somehow I missed this reply four days ago, sorry about that.

My point was that it's the arrangement of parts that constitutes the object of study at a higher level.

Physics takes its most fundamental things, say quantum fields today, and builds more complicated things like atoms out of those. At a physics level, even an electron is a rather complicated thing: "it" is actually an ongoing process of two types of proto-electron particles constantly interacting with the Higgs field and alternating between each other. Each type of quark likewise. Nucleons like protons and neutrons in turn are complexes of those quarks (which are already complex processes) interacting with each other and a bunch of gluons, and then atoms are even more complex processes of those nucleons and some electrons interacting with each other and the photons that constitute the electromagnetic field. Even a "simple particle" like a hydrogen atom is not just the sum of its parts, but the sum of its parts and the arrangement between them, including the temporal arrangement, or interaction.

Chemistry then takes the aggregate behaviors of lots of atoms together, only dipping a toe here and there barely down into the physics level, to build substances made of complex molecules, mostly not caring about stuff on the physics level anymore like the gluons holding quarks together into protons. A chemical substance isn't just the sum of the atoms it's made of, but of the atoms and the arrangements between them. A really clear example of this are isomers: octane and iso-octane molecules are made of exactly the same parts, but have very different arrangement of them, and so have very different chemical properties. But still, you could, if it mattered, bother to describe octane and iso-octane and everything they do differently from each other in terms of a bunch of quantum fields. It's just that at this level of study, that'd be a waste of time. There isn't anything new in the description of the world when you introduce the concept of iso-octane; that's just a useful shorthand for a particular pattern of things some atoms can do, which atoms are in turn just useful shorthand for particular patterns of things that more fundamental things can do.

Biology, likewise, takes aggregate behaviors of lots of substances together, various tissues and the structures formed out of them into the bodies of organisms, and only dips a toe here and there barely down into the chemistry level. You could, if it mattered, bother to describe an organism in terms of a bunch of chemical interactions, and for the very simplest of organisms, we sometimes do close to that. Those chemical interactions could in turn be described in terms of quantum fields, if you wanted to waste your time. There still isn't anything new in the description of the world when you introduce the concepts of organisms, species, etc: those are just useful shorthand for particular patterns of things that some chemicals can do.

Psychology likewise. It's about kinds of things some organisms do. It only occasionally dips a toe here and there just barely down into the biological level. But you could, if it mattered, in principle, just describe psychological stuff in terms of biological stuff. It would be a waste of time, because those details aren't important. But when introducing concepts like beliefs and emotions, we're still not adding anything new to the description of the world. We could, in principle, just describe what a bunch of quantum fields are doing, and get a picture (e.g. view a simulation) of human beings with all their thoughts and feelings. It's just extremely useful to have shorthand that hides all of that unnecessary detail when it doesn't matter for the purposes at hand; what one gluon is doing to one quark doesn't matter for the purposes of what Bob is feeling right now. But Bob's feelings still ultimately boil down to a bunch of quarks and gluons and stuff doing things to each other.

We could, in principle, just describe what a bunch of quantum fields are doing, and get a picture (e.g. view a simulation) of human beings with all their thoughts and feelings — Pfhorrest

I think that's the whole point is that we couldn't just do that. That's the essence of system-emergent properties. As systems co-evolve, new types of inter-relationships come into being which did not exist among the constituent sub-systems.

You could argue, for example, that the laws of chemistry have always existed. But until the long process of plasma-particle-object evolution has actually happened and complex systems capable of housing chemical interactions actually come into being, saying those chemical laws previously existed seems a stretch to me.

But if you simulate the universe and only simulate quantum fields, do you think you will not eventually end up with simulated chemical substances following laws of chemistry? I.e. do you need to add special chemical rules to the simulation in order for simulated chemicals to show up?

But if you simulate the universe and only simulate quantum fields, do you think you will not eventually end up with simulated chemical substances following laws of chemistry? — Pfhorrest

That seems highly hypothetical to me. Like angels on the head of a pin hypothetical. I would say the syngeristic-holistic fact of reality transcends simple simulation, yes.

So you would be surprised if a simple simulation of basic physics could produce simulations of chemical interactions, even just a few molecules interacting as expected by the known laws of chemistry?

Because I’m pretty sure that’s something someone could code up today, given that we’ve had complex protein folding simulations for decades already.

So you would be surprised if a simple simulation of basic physics could produce simulations of chemical interactions, even just a few molecules interacting as expected by the known laws of chemistry? — Pfhorrest

Pfhorrest, there is no intertheoretic reduction of chemistry to physics.

What really interests me is how a geometric construct called the amplituhedron, functioning along the lines of fractal attractors in systems theory, allows particle-particle interactions which used to require supercomputers significant calculation time to be done by hand on one sheet of paper.

edit: From "Intertheory Relations in Physics" (Stanford EoP)

Even within physical science, reduction between different levels of explanation is problematic—indeed, it is almost always so. Chemistry is supposed to have been reduced to quantum mechanics, yet people still argue over the basic question of how quantum mechanics can describe the shape of a molecule. The statistical mechanics of a fluid reduces to its thermodynamics in the limit of infinitely many particles, yet that limit breaks down near the critical point, where liquid and vapour merge, and where we never see a continuum no matter how distantly we observe the particles … . The geometrical (Newtonian) optics of rays should be the limit of wave optics as the wavelength becomes negligibly small, yet … the reduction (mathematically similar to that of classical to quantum mechanics) is obstructed by singularities

Reductionism is not peculiar to materialism, and neither does materialism entail reductionism. Idealism is reductionist with respect to the physical. On the other hand, there are non-reductionists among materialists/physicalists. — SophistiCat

You use the term differently than I do. To me, it's the idea that you can explain anything by looking at its parts, and that this will provide sufficient explanation and prediction. I disagree on ground of system theory, that says that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

May I ask for your definition of reductionism, or a good approximation thereof?

May I ask for your definition of reductionism, or a good approximation thereof? — Olivier5

There are different forms and theories of reduction, but the general pattern is to say that A is nothing over and above B, or A is explained by B, or A is corrected by B, or sometimes that A is constituted by B. But these broad generalizations don't tell you much - you really need to look at the specifics of each kind and instance of reduction. Pat slogans like "the whole is larger than its parts" are useless, and gesturing towards "systems theory" (as if there was just one) doesn't help either. This only serves to signal ideological allegiance.

I think "The whole is MORE than the SUM of its parts" deserves better than a misquote and summary dismissal as a bumper sticker. It explains a lot, including why human beings generally don't fancy being cut in pieces. They kinda know that they would lose something in the process...

You use the term differently than I do. To me, it's the idea that you can explain anything by looking at its parts, and that this will provide sufficient explanation and prediction. I disagree on ground of system theory, that says that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. — Olivier5

Yes, this is exactly the sense in which I started the thread.

The products of the actual reductive enterprise are valuable, as this can in one sense be viewed as the process of scientific analysis. But the extrapolation to the conclusion that "that's all there is" misses the bigger picture.

The parts are typically replaceable, and the structure (or system) will still work.

For instance, let's take a large mechanical clock, with wheels of say 1 to 3 inches wide, made of some metal eg steel. The clock works. One day for some reason, a wheel breaks. The owner orders the piece but has to wait a long time for it so he decides to 3D print a replica, identical to the broken wheel but made of some hard plastic. He fits it in and the clock works again, at least for a few days (plastic being more wearable than steel).

I posit that what happened there can easily be explained within a non-reductionist system approach: it's the structure, the shape of the pieces and the way they are put together, that makes the clock work. So all you need to replace a part is a replica of the same shape, the actual material you use is secondary (though it matters of course, eg for durability reasons) as long as it is solid at ambiant temperature.

However, in a reductionist approach, one would have to redo the whole quantic level of the explanation, as the fundamental physics involved in explaining metal and plastic solidity are different.

Ergo sometimes system thinking beats reductionism.

I posit that what happened there can easily be explained within a non-reductionist system approach: it's the structure, the shape of the pieces and the way they are put together, that makes the clock work. So all you need to replace a part is a replica of the same shape, the actual material you use is secondary (though it matters of course, eg for durability reasons) as long as it is solid at ambiant temperature. — Olivier5

Absolutely. I am a staunch systems theorist. It is analysis, but operating within a different governing paradigm, systems-centric.

I think "The whole is MORE than the SUM of its parts" deserves better than a misquote and summary dismissal as a bumper sticker. It explains a lot, including why human beings generally don't fancy being cut in pieces. They kinda know that they would lose something in the process... — Olivier5

Yeah, that kind silly example is a good illustration of how useless this slogan is (or any slogan for that matter). That is, if your interest runs deeper than boo-hooray.

It is analysis — Pantagruel

I would say it values synthesis and analysis equally, while reductionism uses only analysis.

You must know the paradox called the ship of Theseus. What's your solution for it?

Interestingly, our body is a literal example of the ship of Theseus. Pretty much all the parts in our body, ie the molecules comprising it, are constantly being replaced and recycled. That's how the body keeps itself alive: through constant maintenance and replacement of broken parts.

↪SophistiCat
You must know the paradox called the ship of Theseus. What's your solution for it? — Olivier5

I think the systems theoretic answer would be that it does not require a solution. It is only a paradox if you attempt to enforce either a bottom-up or a top-down interpretation exclusively. Bi-perspectivism is a feature of systems philosophy.

Exactly. In system thinking, any part of the structure is replaceable by a similar part, because what matters most is the structure. As long as Theseus's ship remains structurally identical to itself, Theseus can replace all the parts and he still has a boat.